Acting on the Corridors: A Minilateral Coalition Design for Southeast Asia's Scam-Compound Crisis

Abstract

Southeast Asia’s scam-compound networks expose a persistent gap in regional security governance: the institutions required to dismantle transnational criminal economies are, in some jurisdictions, compromised by the networks they are expected to regulate. Although scholarship on minilateralism demonstrates the capacity of small coalitions to act beyond consensus-bound institutions, its application has focused predominantly on great-power competition. Research on transnational crime in Southeast Asia has examined how ASEAN’s non-interference norm and consensus-based decision-making constrain collective enforcement, but has paid less attention to coalition-building when state capture undermines the reliability of potential partners. This paper bridges these literatures by examining how minilateralism can be adapted to counter transnational criminal networks operating across compromised jurisdictions. It argues that a coalition anchored by six willing ASEAN members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—with support from Canada and other middle powers offers a viable framework for sustained counter-criminal governance. Rather than relying on enforcement within captured jurisdictions, this model prioritizes financial chokepoints and human-trafficking corridors that traverse non-captured jurisdictions, enabling coordinated intervention while reducing dependence on compromised state institutions. The paper examines Canada’s potential contribution through its financial intelligence capabilities, regional diplomatic profile, and transnational community connections. By reconceptualizing minilateralism as an instrument of counter-criminal governance, this paper advances an alternative approach to regional security cooperation that circumvents institutional paralysis without abandoning ASEAN-centred engagement.