What Luck Has to Do With It: Understanding the Role of Nuclear Luck in Decision-Making
Abstract
Since the end of the Second World War and the start of the Nuclear Age, there have been numerous cases of nuclear near-use or near-incidents. This article makes a case for how luck, particularly nuclear luck, has not only been an essential variable in preventing nuclear wars and uses, but also how experiences with nuclear luck have shaped the decision-making process in America and the Soviet Union. Through case study analyses of the War Scare events in the early 1980s, primarily the Able Archer-83 incident and the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, the paper identifies attitude and policy shifts in decision-makers’ posture towards nuclear security with an understanding of political psychology scholarship. The findings suggest that experiences of nuclear luck can lead to more careful and risk-averse behaviour, the paper also highlights how the relationship between nuclear luck and the decision-making process can advance theories on behavioural arms control.
Keywords: nuclear luck, decision-making, nuclear weapons, nuclear near-use, 1983, war scare, Cold War
