Counterintelligence for Hybrid Threats in Large-Scale Joint Operations
A Divisional Model from the Australian Defence Force
Abstract
Democratic militaries face growing challenges from what are often labelled hybrid intelligence threats—intelligence-driven activities that combine espionage, cyber-enabled collection, insider enablement, and decision-shaping to gain decision advantage. This paper uses the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a case study to consider how counterintelligence (CI) should be structured at the divisional level for large-scale, joint operations. Drawing on Prunckun’s theory of counterintelligence, it applies a strengths–opportunities analysis to ADF doctrine, allied practices, and historical cases to develop a principles-based CI posture. The article is normative and design-oriented: it advances a plausible organizational design under stated legal and command constraints rather than offering an empirically tested explanatory model. The proposed posture integrates CI practitioners into the divisional intelligence structure, standardizes joint CI processes at the operational headquarters, and links CI with psychological operations and defensive cyber measures at key planning stages. Within existing authorities, it also specifies conditions for limited offensive CI through deception and neutralization. The paper concludes with generalizable design propositions for democratic forces seeking to adapt CI to hybrid threats without presupposing new legislation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Charles Sturt University for access to its invaluable library resources.
DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest regarding the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
FUNDING
The authors advised that no financial support was provided for this article’s research, authorship, and/or publication.
