Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations?

Authors

  • Harold R. Winton School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University

Abstract

This article assesses the efficacy of Effects-Based Operation by examining the Battle of the Bulge by relating the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as EBO to determine the extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO.

Author Biography

Harold R. Winton, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University

Harold R. Winton is a professor of military history and theory at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University. Among his many publications are To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Military Reform, 1927–1938 (1988), co-editor of The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941 (2003) and Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes (2007).

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Published

2012-05-11

Issue

Section

Seventy Years On: New Perspectives on the Second World War