Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era

Authors

  • Gerhard Gross German Armed Forces Military History Research Office

Abstract

This manuscript focuses on German command  at the higher operational and strategic levels during the First and Second World Wars. It emphasizes the admiration which commentators often express for German operational qualities and analyses their development and performance between 1871-1945, explaining the roots of this behavior, and the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. Its characteristics are contextualized, noting the limits to the famous auftragstaktik (mission oriented command), which did not work quite as its supporters  imagine. Both the success of German operations and the failure of its strategy, stemmed from the same central root, an attempt to achieve a continental hegemony which Germany was too weak to acquire, but insufficiently wise to avoid. 

Author Biography

Gerhard Gross, German Armed Forces Military History Research Office

Gerhard Gross was born in Mainz in 1958.  He graduated from the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz with the topic " The naval warfare guidance of the imperial navy in the year 1918" From 1988-1996 he served as military history training staff officer in at the German army officers school. In 1996, he became the history staff officer at the Military History Research Office (MGFA), Head of the History of Education. In 2003, he served as head of the "First World War" in the research area "era of world wars" of the MGFA and since 2010, serves as head of Research Area IV "military alliance in the history of the GDR" in the MGFA.

 

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Published

2012-01-20

Issue

Vol. 13 No. 4 (2011): Summer 2011

Section

Military Strategy in War and Peace