Mythology and the Air campaign in the Liberation of Iraq

Authors

  • Major J.R. McKay Department of National Defence

Abstract

The air campaign for the 2003 liberation of Iraq has led to the development of two faulty myths about the nature of the war and air power. The first myth was that the air campaign saw land forces and air power were applied simultaneously. The second was that the air campaign represented the failure of strategic applications of air power. The first myth (simultaneity) is flawed in that the coalition's air forces had ten and half years to 'prepare the battlefield' through reconnaissance due to the southern no-fly zone. Through that time, and certainly in the three weeks leading to the war, the coalition's air forces exploited every opportunity to engage in the suppression of enemy air defences. The second myth is faulty as it fails to account for decisions about the force structure required to liberate Iraq, the timing of changes in the air campaign and the relationship with the situation on the ground.

Author Biography

Major J.R. McKay, Department of National Defence

J.R. McKay completed his Doctor of Philosophy in War Studies at King's College London in 2003. His thesis was a study of the Coalition's coercive air operations against Iraq from March 1991 to December 1998. He is currently serving as Canadian Army staff officer in Kingston, Ontario.

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