Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Wrong? A Clausewitzian Analysis

Abstract

In military academies throughout the United States, there is ongoing debate about whether or not Carl Von Clausewitz’s ideas on military strategy, now nearly 200 years old, are still valid. This is an important issue to resolve considering the fact that war colleges have been inculcating their officers with Clausewitzian notions of strategy since the Vietnam War. Officers spend a great deal of time and energy studying his works, especially his classic tome On War (1827). In the past, Clausewitzian principles were credited for helping analysts identify U.S. strategic errors in Vietnam and for providing a strong basis for a successful strategy in the Persian Gulf War. These days, however, a growing number of scholars are attributing the U.S. military’s inability to secure victory in Iraq to an antiquated Clausewitzian approach to war. These critics are calling for a radical transformation of professional military education in order to avoid making similar mistakes in future conflicts. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Clausewitzian principles in 21st Century warfare, specifically with respect to the War in Iraq. The U.S. military’s failure to secure victory in the initial combat phase of the war, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, cannot be attributed to Clausewitzian strategic principles. In fact, this paper will demonstrate that precisely the opposite was true. In key areas of strategic decision making, U.S. military planning suffered where Clausewitzian precepts were either misapplied, or disavowed altogether.