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Military Peace Leadership to Protect the Force and Civilians in an Ever-Changing Environment:
Beyond the Conventional Mindset.

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"Long are gone the days of just monitoring ceasefires. Now we are working in crisis settings. Now it is time to do more."

Mr. Herve Ladsous.

Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations[2]

Peace Operations: Past and Present

In 1949, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established due to the clashes between the new State of Israel and the Palestinians, supported by other Arab states. UNTSO was the first United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (PKO), whose mandate focused on the cessation of hostilities and was monitored by a group of International Military Observers. In this scenario, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974 and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 were established to deal with the conflict between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon, respectively. These three missions, together with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which was established in 1964 to settle the conflict between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, are the only current United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) whose mandates focus on the separation of formal state forces through the establishment of buffer zones. Therefore, these four missions fall within the traditional peacekeeping operations category, as some scholars call it. Here, the United Nations (UN) forces employ a sole military approach, militarizing the buffer zones by monitoring the two parties' military activities, separating forces, and preventing further clashes, as agreed upon in their respective peace accords.[3]

At the same time, in places like the Congo in the 1960s, a new operational environment began to develop, challenging the classical approach of PKOs. Intra-state conflicts and the emergence of non-state actors characterize these scenarios, presenting new challenges and exploiting diverse, deep-rooted social and political causes that would

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[2] Herve Ladsous, "UN Peacekeeping: Challenges from the Field Today and Tomorrow," *YouTube*, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OyJULAN7-so&ab_channel=UnitedNations.

[3] Kai Michael Kenkel, "Five Generations of Peace Operations: From the 'Thin Blue Line' to 'Painting a Country Blue,'" *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56, no. 1 (2013): pp. 122–43, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292013000100007.

make the conflict ever more complex. This situation was exacerbated after the Cold War ended, unleashing a spiral of violence that led to major failures by the UN in protecting its personnel and local civilians, thereby preventing the restoration of law and order in most places where the organization intervened.

In this context, major failures such as those in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Somalia[4] and several cases linked with sexual exploitation and abuse[5] among other wrongdoings performed by peacekeepers, have forced the UN to assess the situation many times since the 1990s, seeking to maintain its legitimacy and improve its actions on the ground. The Brahimi[6] and Gen. Dos Santos Cruz[7] reports are only two examples of the organization's attempts to match a dynamic conflict trend where it has always been one step behind. These efforts have led to the implementation of multidimensional, integrated, and even hybrid missions that differ significantly from the so-called traditional ones. These new missions have incorporated civilian and police participation into military activities, extending beyond the mere separation of belligerent forces, thereby charting a broader spectrum of peace operations that includes peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding approaches.[8]

Today, the traditional Westphalian and Clausewitzian concepts of peace, war, the balance of power, and sovereignty are challenged, making physical space now less critical than population control and protection.[9] Under these complex, changing, and sometimes

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[4] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (Alfred A. Knopf, 2007); Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails: 20th Anniversary Edition* (Springer International Publishing, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11428-2.

[5] Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*.

[6] United Nations General Assembly, "Brahimi Report," United Nations, 21 August, 2000, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/brahimi-report-0.

[7] Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, "Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business," United Nations Peacekeeping, 19 December 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf.

[8] Thomas Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness," in *Peace Leadership: The Quest for Connectedness* (Routledge, 2017), https://www-taylorfrancis-com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315642680-12/military-peace-leadership-thomas-maty%C3%B3k.

[9] Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness"; Tim Ford, "Leadership in UN Missions," in *The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping* (Routledge, 2018), https://www-taylorfrancis-

unpredictable circumstances, high-standard military leadership skills, training, flexibility, creativity, and adaptability are more required than ever.

Success Out of Adversity

Slainte! Honour and Pride After Five Decades of Political Betrayal

After gaining independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) fell into chaos, with power struggles spreading across the country. The lack of adequate education reserved for white European settlers and only a few locals during colonial times, combined with internal conflicts mainly driven by natural resource reserves, led the newborn republic into a spiral of conflict and secession attempts, sometimes supported by international mercenaries.

Katanga, a Congolese province rich in copper and diamonds and one of the leading global suppliers of cobalt and other minerals needed to manufacture defence technology, accounted for 50 percent of the country's revenues. It declared its independence from the DRC on 11 July 1960.[10] In this scenario of uncontrolled unrest, Prime Minister Prince Lumumba asked the UN for support to restore law and order. As a result, the Security Council (SC) passed Resolution S/4387 on 14 July[11] authorizing military assistance to the DRC, which led to the formation of the United Nations Operation in Congo (UNOC). One month after the implementation of the UNOC, 14,000 military personnel from 24 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) were on the ground.[12] However, the rapid UN action and troop deployment were far from efficient. From the outset, UNOC required a more precise mandate, effective leadership, suitable equipment, comprehensive training, and efficient communications. This intra-state theatre was something new for the UN to deal with. High-ranking civil officers attempted to exert their power over the Military Leadership, even by making operational decisions for

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com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203702116-10/leadership-un-missions-tim-ford?context=ubx&refId=4a3a7e36-48c1-4ba7-8609-1f27cc19ef8e.

[10] Declan Power, *Siege at Jadotville: The Irish Army's Forgotten Battle*, First edition (Blackstone Publishing, 2016).

[11] Power, *Siege at Jadotville*.

[12] Power, *Siege at Jadotville*.

which they were unprepared. This strategic flaw affected tactical units on the ground, constantly putting the entire operation at risk.

Under these circumstances, Irish forces were deployed in Katanga, one of the conflict's biggest hotspots. On September 4, 1961, after two and a half months of operating on Congolese soil, Commandant Pat Quinlan, Officer-in-Charge of the A Company, a 35th Infantry Battalion's sub-unit, and his one-hundred-fifty-seven men moved to Jadotville with orders to protect the white population of settlers from the local militias. It soon became clear that the A Company was ill-suited to perform its mission due to its members' lack of combat experience, outdated equipment, insufficient support weapons, unreliable communications, a disadvantaged tactical position, and unclear orders. To make things worse, the settlers who were to be protected rejected the UN presence and supported the local militias that were fighting for the secession of Katanga. What was supposed to be an easy and peaceful move for the Irish to deter local forces from any action against innocent civilians turned out to be an operational mess and an almost-suicide mission.

Early in the morning on 13 September, Katanga forces, led by European mercenaries, attacked A Company for four days. During the battle, Commandant Quinlan and his men, despite their lack of combat experience and the absence of headquarters support, demonstrated high standards of leadership, motivation, and commitment to the assigned mission. A Company fought an estimated force of three thousand militias, twenty times the company's size, killing several hundred in a strong, well-organized, and highly disciplined defence of its position. Quinlan only signed a negotiated surrender of his unit after the scarcity of ammunition, food, and water, combined with the impossibility of being resupplied and reinforced by the UNOC forces, put the lives of his men at serious risk. As a result, the A Company's members were taken prisoners of war for more than a month, and they were released after a UN deal with Katanga leaders.[13]

Unfortunately, although they were welcome at home as heroes, the Irish government and the Army soon considered their surrender an embarrassing act that discredited Irish military traditions. A Company's members were prevented from being

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[13] Power, *Siege at Jadotville*.

recognized for their bravery. Only after more than fifty-five years of the events, on December 2, 2017, were they recognized as heroes, and their actions are a case study for various militaries worldwide.[14]

Saving Angels While Dancing with The Devil

Canadian General Romeo Dallaire's book [15] *Shake Hands with the Devil* is as shocking as an accurate tale of what happened in 1994 in Rwanda, where, in a period of one hundred days, more than eight hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered by radical Hutus in a bloodshed considered to be one of the worst genocides of our time. Dallaire's leadership is out of the question when considering his actions on the ground, given the lack of support from the UN, the scarcity of personnel, poorly trained subordinate units, and national caveats that left him and his troops isolated and abandoned in such a dangerous scenario. Despite the previously mentioned, Dallaire stood his ground and rejected the idea of leaving Rwanda in such a situation. Instead, he and most of his troops committed to doing their best to save the lives of as many innocents as possible.

However, shaking the devil's hand during the Rwandan massacre was not enough for Dallaire, as even after he left the mission and returned home, the devil would not leave the Canadian general alone. The truth is, despite leaving Rwanda more than twenty years later, the devil has never left Dallaire's mind or memories. His third book, *Waiting for First Light: My Ongoing Battle with PTSD*, is a remembrance of how a soldier can be damaged by witnessing mass atrocities and the frustration of not being able to do more for the ones in need.[16] But being a man of action, Dallaire´s book is only a part of his involvement in improving veterans' well-being, especially for those suffering Post-Traumatic-Stress-Disorder (PTSD). In his second book, *They fight like soldiers, they die like children*, Dallaire explains how vulnerable children can be in war-torn scenarios where

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[14] Sean O'Riordan, "The Defence of Jadotville: A Hiding to Nothing," *Irish Examiner* (Dublin), 26 August 2021, https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/spotlight/arid-40365881.html; Gráinne Ní Aodha, "After 55 Years, Irish Soldiers Awarded Medals for Siege of Jadotville," *The Journal* (Dublin), 2017, https://www.thejournal.ie/jadotville-medal-3729319-Dec2017/.

[15] Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004).

[16] Romeo Dallaire, *Waiting for First Light: My Ongoing Battle with PTSD* (Random House of Canada, 2016).

warring parties use them to run the war machinery. From combatants to labour force to sex slaves, children, both boys and girls, are effective, cheap, and easily disposable assets for these organizations.[17] In this journey of protecting the most vulnerable, Dallaire also founded The Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace, and Security, whose mission is "To prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed violence and transform cycles of violence." [18] This organization has partnered with different academic institutions, including universities and peacekeeping centers worldwide. In short, General Dallaire's story of protecting the vulnerable in conflict leaves no doubt about his commitment, even at the cost of his own well-being.

The Land of Mountains and The Little Cardboard House

Sarah was a young American working for a private company in Port-au-Prince in 2014. When I met her, she asked if I would like to accompany her to visit an orphanage and deliver anything that might bring relief and happiness to the eighty children living there. Shortly before, I had arrived in Haiti, commanding an infantry company of more than three hundred men and women as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). After accepting Sarah's invitation, I met with my officers and planned the visit. We arranged security for the convoy, formed teams to perform entertainment, delivered food and clothing, and provided basic dental and medical care to the children and the orphanage staff. When the day arrived, the activity proceeded as planned until I entered the two-story main building, which housed all the children and had a couple of classrooms on the first floor. To my surprise, I found a structure was made of damp and damaged wood, making the building unsafe for occupancy and posing a significant risk to the children's well-being. I felt I should do more for the well-being and safety of these children and told the orphanage administrator that I would try to find ways to improve the building's conditions, but all I could promise was to do my best to achieve something, nothing more.

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[17] Romeo Dallaire, *They Fight like Soldiers They Die like Children: The Global Quest to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers* (Random House Canada, 2010).

[18] The Dallaire Institute for Children Peace and Security., *Building a World Where Children Are at the Heart of Peace and Security - Annual Report 2022-2023.* (The Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace, and Security, 2023), https://www.dallaireinstitute.org/annual-report.

That evening, before arriving at my base, I stopped by the Paraguayan Military Engineering Company and asked its Commandant if he could assign me two engineers to assess the situation and develop a plan; he agreed without hesitation. The next day, I returned to the orphanage with an engineering team to do the assessment and returned to our base, waiting for the final report to be submitted to me in a week. The next morning, I received a call from an unknown number. A lady with a Spanish accent told me that she learned about my idea of helping the orphanage. Her name was Patricia, and she led a Spanish NGO in Port-au-Prince. She was willing to join me in the project and offered money to fund it. I asked her to visit my office a week after the engineering report was submitted to discuss the issue.

The report arrived on time, and I met with the engineers and Patricia to decide the best course of action and define the roles. We developed a *Quick Impact Project* (QIP) that required approval from MINUSTAH. I would provide the workforce, and Patricia's NGO would fund the project and manage logistics. Meanwhile, the Paraguayan engineers would lead the fieldwork. Everything was coordinated, so we all thought it was only a matter of time before getting the approval. We were wrong.

After four months of waiting for the UN approval, the QIP was rejected by the very last office in the MINUSTAH Headquarters due to a minor administrative flaw. It was too late for me to try to fix it because I was about to leave the mission in a couple of weeks and had other significant commitments before my departure. The project's refusal left me devastated because I had put so much effort into making it a reality. After a six-month tour of duty, I finished my mission and returned home at the end of July 2014, wholly disenchanted and demotivated, thinking that my mission in Haiti had been in vain. Once again, I was wrong.After some months of trying to find my place back home and dealing with my frustration, I felt nobody understood me. When asked about my experience in Haiti, I always tried to avoid giving too many details. I felt I did not fit in Lima, my hometown, anymore. Until the first week of December 2014, when Patricia sent me the following email:

From: Patricia
To: Omar
Subject: Orphanage

Dear Omar,

How are you? Did you stay in Peru, or have you travelled again? I hope you are well.

I have wanted to write to you for a long time to tell you that we have finally built the orphanage. My organization found extra funds and began working on that. We inaugurated it on October 29, 2014.

The next day, I returned to Spain, and now the UN has hired me to work at MONUSCO as a civilian. I arrived a week ago and will be based in Lubumbashi. So, if you come through the Congo, please let me know.

I am sending you the photos of the orphanage. Thank you for your support and enthusiasm. Without your encouragement, I would have left it as impossible from the beginning. You have contributed enormously to making it finally come true. I hope it fills you with joy and pride.

A big hug,

Patricia

On 16 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew hit Haiti, killing more than one thousand people and causing significant damage nationwide.[19] On that day, I was commanding an Amphibious Vehicles Battalion at the Peruvian Marines´ Base in Lima. When I learned

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[19] Omar Tejada Perez, "Una Gota de Esperanza En Medio de La Adversidad y La Burocracia: La Historia de La Reconstrucción de Un Orfanato," *Sociedad Argentina de Estudios Estratégicos y Globales*, May 16, 2020, https://saeeg.org/index.php/2020/05/16/haiti-una-gota-de-esperanza-en-medio-del-desastre-la-adversidad-la-burocracia-la-historia-de-la-reconstruccion-de-orfanato/.

about the devastation caused by Matthew, my mind was only with those eighty kids at the orphanage. Fortunately, the new orphanage building was not damaged.

The Making of Future Leaders

This paper defines leadership as a dynamic and evolving set of skills and capacities that allows one person to influence others. It is an art that influences others by persuasion or example. Since it involves human nature, it is a complex competency that aligns with a shared understanding of what is required to achieve a common goal. Therefore, leadership implies authority and accountability from the leader and commitment and loyalty from the followers.[20]

In this sense, Sinek explains the reasoning behind leadership excellence, rather than managerial acumen, as the primary driver of organizations' success.[21] He describes the circle of safety as having an internal and external area. These areas are related to the environment and the people we interact with. The internal area covers our colleagues and any related factor within the organization, while the external area covers out-of-the-group people and other factors outside the organization. For him, the safer people feel in their internal area, the better it is for the organization, because its members will focus only on solving problems affecting the organization from outside. Leaders are

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[20] Wesley Clark, "The Potency of Persuasion," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 6th ed. (Routledge, 2018), https://www-taylorfrancis-com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429495007-11/potency-persuasion-general-wesley-clark?context=ubx&refId=cd04dc8f-42e2-4959-aaed-2db1dd7c8ba4; Norman Copeland, *Psychology and The Soldier: The Art of Leadership*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2021), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003214328; Mie Augier and Jerry Guo, "Adaptability in Western and Non-Western Leadership Research," in *Adaptive Leadership in The Military Context: International Perspectives* (Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2014), https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/mdn-dnd/D2-336-2014-eng.pdf; Kurt Eyre, "Global Policing Leadership and Security Sector Reform," in *Modern Police Leadership: Operational Effectiveness at Every Level* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), https://link-springer-com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-63930-3_26; Lawrence Taylor and William Rosenbach, "The Gettysburg Leadership Experience: Learning, Leading, and Following," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 6th ed. (Routledge, 2018), https://www-taylorfrancis-com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429495007-26/gettysburg-leadership-experience-lawrence-taylor-william-rosenbach; Sezai Özçelik et al., "Leadership in Conflict Response: A Conceptual Exploration," in *Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa* (Routledge, 2022).

[21] Simon Sinek, *Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don't*, Paperback edition (Portfolio/Penguin, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC, 2017).

responsible for creating the conditions to form the safest possible internal circle and for leading the necessary actions to address external problems as a cohesive, robust team. [22] To do so, a leader should possess appropriate education, social skills, emotional intelligence, flexibility and adaptability, and experience.[23]

In an ever-changing operational environment, military leaders face the challenges of a lack of flexibility and adaptability to new realities. Most militaries worldwide are anchored in conventional warfare mindsets, stemming from Professional Military Education (PME) programs that focus on classic attack and defence operations, with the ultimate objective of winning a war.[24] Instead, PME must evolve and recognize the full spectrum of conflict in which current Peace Operations are conducted. Instead of winning a war, today's conflicts must be seen as a never-ending process in which civilians and militaries play their respective roles. Therefore, military education must extend beyond kinetic activities. Non-kinetic actions are required more than ever, and the capacity to engage with the local population is crucial to addressing the roots of conflict and, by doing so, protecting the force and the local population.[25]

To be able to match current educational requirements for military leaders, PME curricula should consider topics related to social sciences, current global political affairs, cultural awareness, local languages and history, gender issues, human rights, mediation, and negotiation, among others. [26] These improvements should also include sharing classes and training with civilians and police members, promoting a common lexicon, building trust, and creating the necessary networking to benefit the entire organization in future missions. In addition, today's peace operations require a coordinated,

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[22] Bernard Bass, "Leading in the Army After Next," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 6th. ed (Routledge, 2018), https://www-taylorfrancis-com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429495007-30/leading-army-next-bernard-bass.

[23] Özçelik et al., "Leadership in Conflict Response: A Conceptual Exploration."

[24] Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness."

[25] Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness"; Magnus Lundgren et al., "Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66, no. 1 (2022): pp. 32–60, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211028989.

[26] Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness"; Adolfo Calatrava and Marién Durán, "Military Interaction with Local Actors," in *Leaders for Tomorrow: Challenges for Military Leadership in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare* (Springer Nature, 2021), https://link-springer-com.uml.idm.oclc.org/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-71714-8_5.

synergistic effort among various international organizations and local state and non-state actors.[27]

Meanwhile, although scholars have identified various leadership styles, ranging from the servant, spiritual, authoritarian, discursive, authentic, charismatic, transactional, and transformational, military leaders should adopt an adaptive leadership approach that combines all the other styles.[28] In this sense, they should be able to adapt leadership styles to the situation.[29] Consequently, military leaders are called upon to build ties, generate trust, and, to the extent possible, speak the same language as local authorities, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social institutions, and even all parties to the conflict. Civic Military Coordination and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) activities are fundamental to accomplishing such a complex goal. Military leaders risk failing this vital task without the necessary multinational experience,[30] social skills, and cultural knowledge.

Today's military leaders must develop their skills and competencies through a balanced approach of scholarship and practical experience.[31] Furthermore, military institutions should train their members to think beyond the conventional warfare mindset, embracing the unpredictable and hybrid nature of today's threats and conflicts.[32] The *Flexible Soldier*[33] and *Hybrid Warrior*[34] concepts describe current military leadership

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[27] Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness."

[28] Augier and Guo, "Adaptability in Western and Non-Western Leadership Research."

[29] Eraldo Olivetta, "What Does Leadership Mean?," in *Leaders for Tomorrow: Challenges for Military Leadership in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare*, ed. Marina Nuciari and Eraldo Olivetta, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications (Springer International Publishing, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71714-8_2.

[30] Robert Taylor et al., *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 6th ed (Westview Press, 2018).

[31] Matyók, "Military Peace Leadership: Space and Design for Connectedness."

[32] Marina Nuciari and Eraldo Olivetta, eds., *Leaders for Tomorrow: Challenges for Military Leadership in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare*, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications (Springer International Publishing, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71714-8; Ford, "Leadership in UN Missions."

[33] Marina Nuciari, "Asymmetric Warfare Operations. Research Framework and Some Methodological Remarks," in *Leaders for Tomorrow: Challenges for Military Leadership in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare*, ed. Marina Nuciari and Eraldo Olivetta, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications (Springer International Publishing, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71714-8_1.

[34] Calatrava and Durán, "Military Interaction with Local Actors."

features that challenge traditional, conventional mindsets and promote multifunctional, highly competent, adaptable, and globally minded leaders.[35]

Conclusions and Recommendations

The constant evolution of conflict environments has challenged traditional concepts, including sovereignty, war, peace, and military leadership, for decades. Although this trend was slightly present during the Cold War, it became the norm after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Meanwhile, due to a lack of adaptation to new realities and wrongdoings performed by peacekeepers against the local population, UN Peace Operations have been criticized for being unable to protect their forces and the lives and human rights of innocent civilians.

Although different in context, intensity, and consequences, the Irish A Company, General Dallaire, and the Haitian orphanage reconstruction cases presented in this paper share several leadership traits, including adaptability, flexibility, cultural awareness, and a passion for making a difference, even in the absence of organizational support. They all worked to protect the force and the local population. Consequently, the Irish A Company's performance in Jadotville became a case study in the military and, through the magic of cinema, transcended the barracks' walls to become an inspiring story. General Dallaire's leadership acknowledges the high price that sometimes an integral person must pay to follow their principles and values. At the same time, the Haitian orphanage's reconstruction served as a successful example of Civil-Military Interaction and Coordination, with the well-being of dozens of children as the primary motivation to mobilize all available resources amid uncertainty.

However, there must be many more unknown leadership stories to be told and more than isolated cases are needed. A revolution in the Professional Military Education curricula should be developed to effectively train military personnel to face the highly complex current Peace Operations scenarios. This educational shift should be enhanced by promoting joint civil-military educational and operational activities that would build strong organizational structures ready to face current challenges. Additionally, military personnel should be encouraged to develop a global mindset by promoting professional

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[35] Taylor et al., *Military Leadership*.

exchanges with peace and humanitarian organizations both nationally and internationally. These experiences, combined with operational know-how, will help develop the skills and capabilities needed to become future *Flexible Soldiers* and *Hybrid Warriors.*

Leadership is also about principles, values, emotional intelligence, and social sensitivity. Therefore, today's military leaders must establish a strong connection with their troops and colleagues within the inner circle of safety. They are responsible for building trust, commitment, and cohesion, so their teams can confidently address any external problems they may encounter. Only this level of cohesion will foster the sense of belonging needed to work toward a common objective while discouraging wrongdoing that would jeopardize the team's image and reputation.

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