

Introduction: Conflict in Contemporary Africa

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This special issue of the *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* focuses on contemporary conflicts in Africa. While wars in post-colonial Africa have never received a great deal of attention from mainstream Western media or academia, the Russian invasion of Ukraine over the last year has further obscured a series of growing wars and related humanitarian catastrophes on the continent. Just over a decade ago, it seemed that the frequency of warfare in Africa was decreasing with active insurgent groups becoming marginalized and unable to threaten state power.² As a brief survey of recent and ongoing African conflicts illustrates, however, such an optimistic view now seems dated.

As of early 2023, every region of Africa is experiencing some type of armed conflict with multiple and often intertwined wars in large parts of West, Central and East Africa. Though it remains uncommon for rebel forces to threaten an African

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² Scott Straus, "Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa," *African Affairs* 111, 443 (2012): pp. 179-201.

capital, some African governments have buckled under the pressure of insurgency, some have lost control of much of their territory, and many African rebel groups ignore and reject the borders and state structures that the continent inherited from the colonial period. The character of warfare in Africa in the early 2020s remains largely consistent with that of the previous post-colonial era as most conflicts are civil wars or insurgencies, direct inter-state warfare remains rare, and fighting involves light infantry forces with small arms supplemented in some cases by limited armour, artillery and/or air power.³ Arguably, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) involving the impact of new technology on warfare in the post-Cold War era has been of limited significance in African conflicts although aerial drones have recently become important in some places.⁴ In some parts of contemporary Africa, long-standing United Nations (UN) missions and French intervention forces have failed to resolve conflict prompting a few weak and embattled African states to turn to Russian military contractors for external support. Indeed, given that weak African states and armed forces struggle to contend with various threats, increased employment of private security and military contractors seems evident across the continent over the past few years.⁵

This rise in conflict has taken place in the context of several important emerging factors. First, and after a period of neglecting Africa following the end of the Cold War, external powers seek to re-engage or engage with the continent to access resources and markets in what some observers call the “New Scramble for Africa.”⁶ As such, while Western countries provide African states with development aid, loans or military assistance based on conditions around human rights and democracy, new partners like

³ For the history of conflict in post-colonial Africa see William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa: New Approaches to African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Timothy Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2018).

⁴ For early predictions on the RMA in Africa see Francois Very, “The Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs: A Theoretical Perspective on its Contribution to Solving Sub-Saharan Conflicts,” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 21, 2 (November 1999): np.

⁵ Bashir Bala and Usman A. Tar, “Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and National Security in Africa,” *Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Africa*, edited by Usman A. Tar, (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 589-604; Mucahid Durmaz and Murtala Abdulla, “‘White Hands’: The Rise of Private Armies in African Conflicts,” *Al Jazeera*, 28 April 2022, accessed 23 February 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/4/28/white-hands-the-rise-of-private-militaries-in-african-conflict>.

⁶ Padraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); Lee Wengraf, *Extracting Profit: Imperialism, Neo-Liberalism and the New Scramble for Africa* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2018).

China and Russia seem attractive as they offer a variety of economic or security deals without such terms. Secondly, many parts of Africa have become badly impacted by climate change which has led to drought and famine in places like the Horn of Africa, increased competition and violence between herders and farmers over less-and-less usable lands such as in the Sahel and intense storms that have disrupted communities in Mozambique.⁷ More recently, and partly related to the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War, African countries that are among some of the world's poorest have been disproportionately affected by the global cost-of-living crisis with food and fuel prices, and inflation rates increasing dramatically.⁸

West Africa has seen significantly increased insurgency and political instability over the past decade. Since 2012, when the French mounted *Operation Serval* to save the Malian capital of Bamako from advancing Islamists and separatists and recapture towns these forces had occupied in the north, the insurgency has spread across much of Sahelian West Africa including in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso threatening other countries in the region.⁹ Once seen as an island of stability in the Sahel, Burkina Faso experienced increasing conflict after a popular uprising in 2015 ended the long-ruling authoritarian regime of Blaise Compaoré who had been placating armed groups.¹⁰ Despite a history of staging military interventions in the coastal countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has proven impotent in the face of insurgency in its vast Sahelian hinterland. Exacerbating the crisis, armed groups in the Sahel frequently support themselves by engaging in organized crime including kidnapping for ransom,

⁷ Camilla Toulmin, *Climate Change in Africa* (London: Zed Press, 2009); Charlene Cabot, *Climate Change, Security Risks, and Conflict Reduction in Africa: A Case Study of Farmer-Herder Conflicts over Natural Resources in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina Faso, 1960-2000*, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, 12 (Berlin: Springer, 2016).

⁸ Victor Oluwole, "Here's What You Need to Know About the Cost of Living Crisis in Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and S.A.," *Business Insider Africa*, 13 September 2022, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-cost-of-living-crisis-in-nigeria-kenya-ghana/4wdk9bb>.

⁹ Alexander Thurston, *Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups* (Cambridge University Press, 2020); Benedikt Erforth, *Contemporary French Security Policy in Africa: On Ideas and Wars* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2019).

¹⁰ Viljar Haavik, Morten Boas and Alessio Iocchi, "The End of Stability – How Burkina Faso Fell Apart," *African Security* 15, 4 (2022): pp. 317-339.

and smuggling migrants, weapons and drugs.¹¹ Though there had been previous rebellions in northern Mali and Niger, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 led to a proliferation of weapons across the Sahel and this southward flow of arms from Libya may pick up once again given the end of Libyan Civil War of 2014-2020.¹² The pressure of escalating rebellion in the Sahel prompted a series of recent military coups including in Burkina Faso in January 2022 and September 2022, Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, and Guinea in September 2021 as well as failed coup attempts in Niger and Guinea-Bissau. Reminiscent of the 1960s to 1990s period when military coups were common in African states, this trend appears to signal a return in the frequency of military takeovers which had been on the decline in the early years of the twenty-first century.¹³ Similarly, in April 2021, Chad's long-ruling president Idriss Deby was killed while leading military operations against a local rebel group resulting in the succession of his son, army general Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno. A subsequent negotiation and peace agreement in Ndjamena, Chad in August 2022 failed to attract the participation of the main rebel organizations.¹⁴ The new military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso ordered the French expeditionary forces to leave their territories leading to the official end of France's *Operation Barkhane*, which had replaced *Operation Serval* in 2014, in the Sahel in November 2022 with remaining French troops in the region consolidating in Niger.¹⁵ Around the same time, the Wagner Group, a Russian military contractor under international sanctions for its activities in Ukraine, was hired by the Mali government

¹¹ Stijn Gabriël, "Drug Trafficking in the Sahel," *Jason: Institute for Peace and Security Studies*, 21 April 2019, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://jasoninstitute.com/drug-trafficking-in-the-sahel/>.

¹² Hassane Koné, "Arms Trafficking from Libya to Niger is Back in Business," *Institute for Security Studies*, 28 July 2022, accessed 23 February 2023, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/arms-trafficking-from-libya-to-niger-is-back-in-business>.

¹³ Peter Mwai, "Are Military Takeovers on the Rise in Africa?" *BBC*, 4 January 2023, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600>.

¹⁴ "Chad's President Idriss Deby Dies After Clashes with Rebels," *BBC*, 20 April 2021, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56815708>; "Chad Signs Peace Pack with Rebels, But Main Insurgents Stay Out," *Reuters*, 8 August 2022, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-rebels-sign-peace-deal-2022-08-08/>.

¹⁵ Isabelle King, "How France Failed Mali: The End of Operation Barkhane," *Harvard International Review*, 30 January 2023, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane/>; Thiam Ndiaga, "Burkina Faso Marks Official End of French Military Operations on its Soil," *Reuters*, 20 February 2023, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/>.

and Burkina Faso appears to be considering a similar option. In 2022, and potentially illustrating their approach to warfare, Wagner mercenaries were accused of participating in massacres of civilians in Mali.¹⁶

Adding to these problems in West Africa's Sahel, the Islamist insurgency of Boko Haram that began in northeastern Nigeria in 2009 has spread to parts of neighbouring Cameroon, Niger and Chad, and led to the rise of a new faction called Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Although Islamist fighters control less territory inside northeastern Nigeria than they did in the mid-2010s given Nigerian military offensives and the establishment of military super-camps, the area is far from secure with very large numbers of internally displaced people still unable to return to their homes.¹⁷ In addition to rampant kidnapping and herder-farmer conflict across much of Nigeria, insurgency resumed in the oil-producing Niger Delta around 2016 and a revived Biafra secessionist movement launched limited armed operations in the early 2020s.¹⁸ Though Islamist insurgents staged car bombings in Abuja in 2011 and 2014, and a prison raid near the capital in 2022, the potential disruption to oil revenue by Delta militants and pirates represents a more serious threat to the Nigerian state. In Cameroon, since around 2017, secessionist rebels have fought to achieve independence for the primarily Anglophone region of the southwest which they call Ambazonia from an authoritarian Francophone state historically backed by France.¹⁹ Additionally, during the 2010s and early 2020s, piracy increased in the Gulf of Guinea mainly targeting the oil industry off

¹⁶ Jason Burke and Emmanuel Akinwotu, "Russian Mercenaries Linked to Civilian Massacres in Mali," *The Guardian*, 4 May 2022, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/04/russian-mercenaries-wagner-group-linked-to-civilian-massacres-in-mali>; "Burkina Faso Inches Closer to Wagner Mercenaries," *ADF News*, 31 January 2023, accessed 20 February 2023, <https://adf-magazine.com/2023/01/burkina-faso-inches-closer-to-wagner-mercenaries/>.

¹⁷ There is a large literature on the Boko Haram conflict. For some examples see Alexander Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2018); Akali Omeni, *Counterinsurgency in Nigeria: The Military and Operations Against Boko Haram, 2011-2017* (London: Routledge, 2018).

¹⁸ Cyril Obi and Temitope Oriola, (eds.), *The Unfinished Revolution in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Prospects for Environmental Justice and Peace* (New York: Routledge, 2018); Michael Nwankpa, *Nigeria's Fourth Republic, 1999-2021: A Militarized Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2023).

¹⁹ "Cameroon Denies Asking for Help With Anglophone Separatist Crisis," *Al Jazeera*, 24 January 2023, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/cameroon-denies-asking-for-help-to-mediate-separatist-conflict>.

southeastern Nigeria with such maritime crime expanding to adjacent waters. Unlike off Somalia during the late 2000s and early 2010s, international naval actions against piracy in West African waters have been less effective for reasons such as the many different West African states involved and the fact that maritime crime in the region often occurs close to shore.²⁰

In Central Africa, existing conflicts have intensified or revived over the past few years. In the Great Lakes region, armed groups that emerged during the Congo Wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s persist in the vast ungoverned spaces of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and support themselves by illegal mining and smuggling. While these groups do not threaten the capital of Kinshasa far away from the west, the DRC government has little or no presence in large parts of the east. Some of these armed factions represent exiled rebel groups from adjacent states often described as “negative forces” such as several from Burundi, and the Hutu extremist Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) while others are rooted locally in eastern DRC including various Mai Mai militias.²¹ Originating as a western Ugandan Islamist rebel group based in the Rwenzori Mountains on the border with eastern DRC, the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) renewed its violent campaign during the 2010s including massacring civilians in Congo’s North Kivu province and pledging allegiance to Islamic State with one faction rebranding itself as Islamic State Central Africa Province.²² Comprising a Congolese Tutsi movement claiming to protect its people from genocide by the Hutu FDLR, a claim that evokes powerful memories of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the M23 group embarked on a successful military offensive in 2012 capturing the city of Goma in North Kivu but was dispersed and driven into Uganda by a Southern African intervention brigade the following year. However, with the departure of the intervention brigade, elements of M23 began returning to the eastern DRC in 2017. In 2022, the movement with support from neighbouring Rwanda

²⁰ Dirk Siebels, *Maritime Security in East and West Africa: A Tale of Two Regions* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2019).

²¹ Kris Berwouts, *Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War* (London: Zed Books, 2017).

²² Chiara Torelli, “17 Killed and 20 Injured in ADF Attack on Church in North Kivu, 15 January,” *ReliefWeb*, 17 January 2023, accessed 19 February 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/17-killed-and-20-injured-adf-attack-church-north-kivu-15-jan>; Lindsay Scorgie, *Conflict at the Edge of the African State: The ADF Rebel Group in the Congo-Uganda Borderland* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022).

mounted a new offensive that captured some towns in North Kivu prompting the dispatch of an East African intervention force largely from Kenya at the end of the year. Recently, and repeating a tragic pattern of behaviour by such factions in eastern DRC, M23 fighters seem to have committed grave human rights violations against civilians including rape and murder. Related international tensions between the governments of DRC and Rwanda have resulted in some border clashes including Rwandan ground forces shooting at and damaging a DRC jet fighter flying over the border city of Goma in January 2023.²³ In DRC's northeastern Ituri Province, the conflict between Lendu farmers and Hema pastoralists renewed in 2017-2018 resulting in the emergence of a coalition of Lendu militias called the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO) in the early 2020s. The DRC Armed Forces (FARDC), itself a fragile coalition of personnel from various factions dating back to the Congo Wars, has struggled to contend with these challenges.²⁴ Now over two decades old, the 20 000-strong United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has failed to contain violence in eastern DRC prompting frustrated local civilians to occasionally attack the international peacekeepers. Violence has also plagued other parts of DRC such as during the Kamwina Nsapu (or Kamuina Nsapu) rebellion from 2016 to 2019 in the central provinces of Kasai, Kasai-Central and Kasai-Oriental.²⁵

In the mineral-rich Central African Republic (CAR), where the country is divided between territory controlled by a weak central government backed by Christian militias and areas occupied by rebel factions comprising Muslims and herders, extensive violence revived around the 2020 presidential election. With the 17,000 international peacekeepers of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR

²³ "Congo's M23 Rebels Killed 20, Carried Out Mass Rapes, Amnesty," *Reuters*, 17 February 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-m23-rebels-killed-20-carried-out-mass-rapes-amnesty-says-2023-02-17/>; Andrew Bagala, "Tensions Escalate After Kigali Shoot Congo Jet," *Monitor*, 25 January 2023, accessed 19 February 2023, <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/tensions-escalate-after-kigali-shoots-congo-jet-4098288>.

²⁴ "More Than 20 Killed in Militia Attack in Northeast DR Congo," *Africa News*, 14 February 2023, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/14/more-than-20-killed-in-militia-attack-in-northeast-dr-congo-un/>

²⁵ "Kasai Conflict Assessment: Current Dynamics and Potential Interventions (February-March 2019)," *Mercy Corps*, 10 June 2019, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/Kasai_conflict_assessment.pdf; Ephrem Rugiririza, "First Trial in Kasai for Crimes of the Kamuina Nsapu Rebellion," *JusticeInfo.net*, 8 November 2021, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/84096-first-trial-kasai-crimes-kamuina-nsapu-rebellion.html>.

(MINUSCA) having stood between the armed groups since 2014 and the French withdrawing military support in 2021, CAR government forces with allied Rwandan army units and Russian Wagner contractors began pushing back the rebels in the early 2020s amid some heavy fighting. With some of its troops forming a strong contingent of MINUSCA and others deployed as part of a bilateral agreement between the two states, Rwanda's military operations in CAR aim to bolster the former's credentials as a regional security provider and encourage Rwandan economic activities beyond its borders. Observers have linked Wagner's recent activities in CAR to a Russian desire to acquire valuable minerals like gold to partly counteract the impact of international economic sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine.²⁶

In East Africa, during the early 2020s, the Horn experienced continued insurgency in Somalia and a new and devastating war in Ethiopia. Embroiled in a series of civil wars for the past 40 years, Somalia was considered Africa's quintessential "failed state" of the 1990s and now, with the transformation of the Transitional Federal Government into an internationally recognized Federal Government in 2012, is often described as a *fragile state*. The current phase of Somalia's civil war, which began around 2009, pits the Islamist insurgents of Al-Shabaab and other groups such as Islamic State against the forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) largely made up of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya, and the Somalia National Army both with some United States support including advisors and airstrikes. Although Al-Shabaab has been on the back foot recently given a surge of clan-based resistance against their extortion of civilians suffering from dire famine, guerrilla

²⁶ Frederico Donelli, "Rwanda's Military Diplomacy: Kigali's Political Use of the Military Means to Increase Prestige and Influence in Africa and Beyond," *French Institute of International Relations*, April 2022, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/donelli_rwanda_military_diplomacy_2022.pdf; "Wagner Mercenaries Sustain Losses in Fight for Central African Gold," *The Guardian*, 2 February 2023, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/wagner-mercenaries-sustain-losses-in-fight-for-central-african-republic-gold>; "Central African Republic: Averting Further Fragmentation of the Armed Forces," *International Crisis Group*, 10 May 2022, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/centrafrique-eviter-une-nouvelle-desintegration-de-larmee>; Pauline Bax, "Russia's Influence in the Central African Republic," *International Crisis Group*, 3 December 2021, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic>.

warfare and counterinsurgency continue in Somalia.²⁷ In Ethiopia, given a power shift in the federal government related to the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, a new conflict broke out in late 2020 when the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) defied federal authority in the Tigray region. The subsequent civil war quickly spread to some other Ethiopian regions, prompted the intervention of forces from neighbouring Eritrea in support of the Ethiopian federal government and resulted in a massive humanitarian catastrophe centred on Tigray with refugees fleeing into Sudan. At one point, in November 2021, Tigray forces gained the upper hand and threatened the capital of Addis Ababa. A year later, however, the momentum had shifted to the federal side and with African Union facilitation, the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray forces signed a preliminary peace agreement allowing some humanitarian relief for civilians in affected areas. With the TPLF agreeing to its eventual disarmament to save Tigrayans from starvation, the deal seemed to confirm the military dominance of the Ethiopian federal government.²⁸ Elsewhere in East Africa, while agreements technically ended conflicts in the Darfur region of western Sudan and the new state of South Sudan in the late 2010s, serious violence has continued in these countries.²⁹

Further down Africa's Indian Ocean coast, the Islamist insurgency that broke out in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province around 2017, including a battle over the port of Palma in 2021, represents Southern Africa's first major conflict in about 20 years. Jeopardizing the development of a French-led liquid natural gas project in the area and maritime navigation in the strategic Mozambique Channel, the Cabo Delgado conflict prompted military intervention by the South African Development Community (SADC) and Rwanda. Additionally, the poor condition of the Mozambique Armed Forces led to

²⁷ Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Michael Keating and Matt Waldman (eds.), *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Somalia's Challenges in 2023," *Brookings*, 27 January 2023, accessed 19 February 2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/01/27/somalias-challenges-in-2023/>.

²⁸ Alex De Waal, "Ethiopia Civil War: Tigray Truce a Triumph for PM Abiy Ahmed," *BBC News*, 3 November 2022, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63503615>.

²⁹ Ewelina U. Uchab, "Sudan: Between Violence, Humanitarian Crisis and Protests," *Forbes*, 30 December 2022, accessed 22 February 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2022/12/30/sudan-between-violence-humanitarian-crisis-and-protests/?sh=133f1060687d>; "Rights Experts Say Peaceful Transition in South Sudan Crucial, Amid 'Immense Suffering,'" *UN News*, 17 February 2023, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133642>.

the country's government hiring private military contractors including initially the Russian Wagner Group which proved ineffective against the rebels and was replaced by the South Africa-based Dyck Advisory Group which human rights activists accused of committing war crimes against civilians.³⁰

In the hope of encouraging scholarship on contemporary African conflicts, with a view to better understanding them and therefore inform their eventual resolution and prevention, this special issue presents four papers each on a specific case. Gershon Adela shows how French, and to some extent UN and European Union, military operations in Mali over the past decade violated fundamental principles of counterinsurgency contributing to the prolonging and expansion of the Sahelian conflict. With reference to the Cabo Delgado crisis, Enock Ndawana argues that the delayed SADC regional response in northern Mozambique will remain limited in its effectiveness if the basic social, political and economic causes of insurgency are not addressed. Rejecting traditional explanations such as poverty and unemployment for the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Okechukwu Iheduru maintains that such maritime crime has become institutionalized in Nigeria and the introduction of private maritime security has only worsened the situation. In a rare military analysis of a post-colonial African conflict, Charles Thomas shows that while both sides attempted to apply historical lessons from their experience of fighting the Ethiopian insurgency of the 1980s that toppled the Derg regime, only the current federal government was successful in that regard.

³⁰ "Winning Peace in Mozambique's Embattled North," *International Crisis Group*, 10 February 2022, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north>; Klaudia Badzynska, "Private Military Companies and Combating Terrorism in Mozambique," *Institute of New Europe*, 16 April 2021, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://ine.org.pl/en/private-military-companies-and-combating-terrorism-in-mozambique/>.