Journal of Military and Strategic Studies

VOLUME 22, ISSUE 1

Implementing National Security: The IDF's Principles for Planning the Israeli Civilian Industry after the Establishment of the State of Israel

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Introduction

There is considerable literature on the concept of national security in terms of what it means and what it represents. Definitions range from classical, purely military notions, to a broader multi-dimensional concept encompassing a spectrum of different features such as politics, economics, society, and the environment.[1] The classic definition of national security has five components: the *threat source*, in other words, countries, usually neighboring countries, with the ability and motivation to pose a threat; the *threat character*; i.e., the military capabilities of the opponent; the response to the threat, which is necessarily also military; "Who is responsible for providing security," namely, the state; and securing core values, primarily sovereignty and national independence, and state borders.[2]

[1] Chris Philo, "Security of Geography/Geography of Security," *Transaction of the Institute of British Geographers* 37, no. 1 (2012): pp. 1-7; Jessica Wolfendale, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006): pp. 753-770; Gil Meron, "Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism", *Political Science Quarterly* 114, no. 3 (1999), pp. 409-434.
[2] Benjamin Miller, "The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24, no. 2 (2001): pp. 13-42.

ISSN : 1488-559X

What affects a country's sense of security and the need for defenses are threats and vulnerabilities. A threat is clear and present. It is definable and manifested in reality. It can be imminent or only a distant prospect; in some cases, can reflect objective reality but can also be subjective, supposition, or invented, but in every instance, it requires the appropriate response.[3] An example of an invented threat can be seen for example in the US administration's policy toward the Japanese minority in the United States during World War II. A minority was suspected of aiding and abetting the Japanese enemy. Defining them as a threat gave the administration the justification to infringe on their civil rights.

Ullman defined a threat to national security as an action or sequence of events that pose a radical danger to the quality of life of the residents of the country for a relatively short period of time, that can significantly curtail the policy-making capabilities of the government or non-governmental entities (individuals, groups, etc.) within the state.[4] Baldwin suggested a broader definition that when dealing with a threat, its nature, duration, the values at risk, and the best means of eliminating or reducing it to a minimum, must be taken into account.[5] By contrast, vulnerability is an indicator that is not always fully defined. In this case, the nature of the response to such events as famine, pandemics, criminal activity, etc. is not straightforward.

National security has come to mean different things to different people with regard to the threats facing the nation. Definitions tend to be a function of time, place, and context so that in practice what constitutes a threat to national security is linked to and depends a great deal on those defining it. For these reasons, concepts of national security have become broad and general since there is a consensus that these threats impinge on the integrity, sovereignty, and well-being of the country's residents.[6] Romm suggested that the purpose of national security is to sustain freedom from external

[3] Zeez Maoz, "Threat Perception and Threat Manipulation: The Uses and Misuses of Threats in Israel's National Security, 1949-2008," in *Existential Threats and Civil-Security Relations,* eds. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer (Boulder: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 179-218; Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): pp. 171-201.

[4] Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no.1 (1983): p. 133.

[5] David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): pp 17-18.

[6] Marc Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" *International Security* 20, no. 2 (1995): p. 40; Suzan Peterson, "Epidemic Disease and National Security," *Security Studies* 12, No. 2 (2002): pp. 43-81.

dictates and improve the standard of living while maintaining a sustainable environment.[7] Chandre and Bhonsle argued that in today's complex world, where many elements are interdependent, national security must be defined holistically, to cover independence, territorial and state integrity against external and internal threats, concern for equitable economic growth, securing food, water, and energy, respect of human development, and the protection of education, health, and housing amongst others.[8]

Most works on national security in democratic states highlight the role of the civilian government or its appointed bodies (e.g. the National Security Council) in defining national security principles in instances where the overall responsibility for implementing these principles within the framework of a national security policy is that of the elected civilian government.[9] Hence, one of the goals of national security planners is to create guidelines for decision-makers and convince them and public opinion of the necessity and importance of these guidelines in deterring expected threats. This is because decision-makers do not always grasp military needs and may have other economic, social, and political criteria that impact their national security decisions.[10]

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[7] Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security* (New-York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 85.
[8] Satish Chandra and Rahul Bhonsle, "National Security: Concept, Measurement and Management," *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 4 (2015): pp. 337-359.
[9] Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei & Sak Sakoda, "National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Defense & Security Analysis* 25, no. 3 (2009): pp. 255-269; William E. Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making," *Parameters*, 45, 3 (2015): pp. 13-26; Kobi Michael, "Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 5 (2009): pp. 687-713; James Gow, "The United Kingdom National Security Strategy: The Need for New Bearings in Security Policy," *The Political Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (2009): pp. 126-133; Sam C. Sarkesian, John A. Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala, *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008); Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak, Israel's Security Network: *A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For works on civil-military relations in Israel see: Ze'ev Drory, "Society Strength as a Base for Military Power: The State of Israel During the Early 1950s," *Israel Affairs* 12, no. 3 (2006): pp. 412-429; Moshe Lissak, *The Unique Approach to Military-Societal Relations in Israel and Its Impact on Foreign and Security Policy*, Davis Occasional Papers, no. 62 (September 1998). Amiram Oren and David Newman "Competing Land Uses: The Territorial Dimensions of Civil-Military Relations in Israel," *Israel Affairs* 12, no. 3 (2006): pp. 561-577; Gabriel Sheffer & Oren Barak, *Israel's Security Network: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[10] Matt McDonald, "Human Security and the Construction of Security," *Global Society* 16, no. 3 (2002): pp. 277-295; Emma Rothschild, "What Is Security?" *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995): pp. 53-98.

Thus, national security does not necessarily denote an objective reality, but rather a process of social construction involving various political, economic, military, and other entities. Buzan, Wever, and De Wilde's theory of securitization shows how a particular problem, even if it is not military in nature, becomes a security issue when a public figure (usually a politician) defines it as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and justifies actions beyond the normal bounds of political procedure. Crucially this issue does not have to be a true existential threat: it only needs to be presented as such.[11]

The current study explores how the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] defined the principles of Israel's national security in the early years after the establishment of the State of Israel, and what it did to implement them. It is argued that during this time frame, the IDF needed to grapple with the disparity between the way it defined these security principles and their actual implementation in the absence of legislation, government backing, and the overriding principle of Israel as a democratic state. This was an independent initiative by the IDF, without the coordination or guidance of government officials, based solely on the IDF's needs. This manifested in the ways the IDF planned and attempted to dictate the geophysical planning of the country's civilian industry infrastructure.

Background

Israel's War of Independence ended in early 1949 with a ceasefire rather than a peace treaty. It was clear to the political and military leadership that a second round of fighting with the Arab countries was only a matter of time. This is why the IDF's threat assessment policy did not change substantially throughout the 1950s since it was based on the declared intention of the Arab states to destroy Israel.

In terms of its geo-political margins of maneuver, Israel had no strategic depth and no natural or artificial obstacles along or near the borders, which made it easy for hostile forces and infiltrators to penetrate them. Perhaps even more worryingly, there were no such obstacles around the country's vital regions such as Jerusalem - the capital

[11] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securatizaion," p. 181; Barry Buzan, Ole Wever and Jaap De Wild, *Security: A new framework in analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

of Israel the Port of Haifa, industrial zones, major population areas, Tel-Aviv, the airport, etc.[12] This hampered Israel's ability to contain an attack or develop its offensive capabilities. In addition, the ceasefire lines were not drawn along strategic or operative topographic vantage points on which a defensive line could be based. In the words of Moshe Dayan: "border zone security had very little meaning in the context of the geography of the State of Israel at that time, since the entire state was actually a border zone."[13]

The territory of the State of Israel, as defined after the War of Independence, consisted of two large areas in the north and south, connected by a very narrow corridor (the area between Tel Aviv and Hadera) where, in addition to the state capital located in the bulge of the Jerusalem corridor to the east, the vast majority of the state's potential in terms of manpower and means of production were also located. For example, the region around Tel Aviv, from Petah-Tikva to Rehovot was home to 34 percent of the Jewish population and 50-55 percent of the country's industrial production. Roughly 64 percent of all civilian vehicles were registered in this region (as of the end of 1952). The Jerusalem metropolitan area raises the concentration to 45 percent of the total Jewish population.[14] This is why the IDF considered these areas, located only 10-15 km from the border, as being the most security-sensitive areas of the country, the most difficult to defend, and the Arab countries' prime target in a future war.

In terms of military planning for another round of fighting, the IDF assumed that Israel was at a disadvantage with respect to its war potential ratio since the Arab states had larger armies and populations, more natural resources, stronger economies, etc. The Arab states' economic advantage meant they could purchase more weapons than Israel at that time. Thus the IDF's threat assessment policy included the fact that the Arab countries' superior manpower, both quantitatively, and perhaps in the future

[12] Dan Horowitz, *Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1975), pp. 5–6.
[13] Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border and Security Problems," *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 2 (1955): p. 250.
[14] Col. Shalom Eshet, Head of Planning Department, to head of the General Staff Headquarters (GSHQ), "Comments and Proposals for the areas Distribution Plan," 24 Dec. 1952, Israel Defense Forces Archives, Tel-Hashomer [IDFA], file 64-488/1955.

qualitatively as well, would enable them to have better and more sophisticated weapons.[15]

During the first years after the establishment of the State of Israel, the IDF engaged in a heated debate with the political leadership led by David Ben-Gurion over the threats facing the state and the financial investment needed to respond to them. By contrast to the IDF which saw the Arab countries as the main threat, Ben-Gurion argued that the social, economic, and political threats were equal to and in some cases even more important than the military threat, thus making his national security concept much broader.[16] Nevertheless, this did not deter the IDF from considering itself as having the authority to set security principle guidelines governing the military and civilian aspects of Israel's national security.

Security Principles when planning the country's national potential

In the 1950s, the IDF's Planning Department threat assessment and the steps taken in the framework of the country's national security concept were based on five basic assumptions:[17]

1. The initiative for starting a war is in the hands of the Arabs. That is why the IDF needs cover forces to contain the Arab attack. These cover forces will consist of the regular army (mainly the regular brigades and artillery battalions), the civilian territorial defense system, the Navy and the Air Force. The purpose is to ensure quick and efficient mobilization of the reserve units.

[15] Meeting of the General Staff, 20 April 1952, IDFA; Lieut. Col. Yuval Ne'eman, Head of the Planning Department, "Security principles for Planning the State Economy," August 1953, (IDFA), file 78-757/1961.
[16] Yoram Fried, "Military, Civilian or Both: David Ben-Gurion Perception of National Security After the War of Independence," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7, no. 2 (2020): pp. 1-18.
[17] Much has been written about Israel's security concept. See for example: Meron, "Israel's National Security," pp. 409–434; David Rodman, "Israel's National Security Doctrine: An appraisal of the past and a vision of the future, review," *Israel Affairs* 9, no. 4 (2003): pp. 115–140; Israel Tal, *National Security: The Few against the Many* (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House, 1996) [in Hebrew]; Isaac Ben Israel, *Israel's Defense Doctrine* (Ben-Shemen: Modan Publishing, 2013) [in Hebrew].

2. The IDF's strength is based on mobilizing and deploying its reserve forces.

3. An effective intelligence system that provides alerts in advance of any enemy attack to ensure sufficient time to mobilize the reserve units.

4. The State's full potential (manpower, transportation, industrial production, settlements,[18] etc.) must be mobilized to respond to the war with total efficiency.

5. After full mobilization of the IDF's order of battle and the state's potential a counter-attack can begin.[19]

Shortly after the War of Independence, the IDF's Planning Department realized that the concept of national security not only encompassed the military defense of the State, but also the capabilities involved in guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of the State, and the protection of its residents, their property and their dignity against any threat or plot.[20]

The Head of the Planning Department defined national security as "the ability of a country to prevent military or political aggression, to oppose it and to quickly restore a standard of living equivalent to that prior to the aggression."[21] He argued that in order to achieve victory in war with minimum casualties and without serious damage Israel needed to rely on two national security factors, namely the armed forces and the national potential (assisting the armed forces directly and/or the home front so that the

[18] During this time the IDF's General Staff set up a "Territorial Defense Deployment" unit (Hebrew acronym: Hagmar) based on civilian [Jewish] communal settlements. The idea was that current and future Jewish communities (mostly kibbutzim and moshavim, or communal villages) situated along the country's borders would play a pivotal role in containing enemy assaults pending the arrival of reserve troops. For more on this topic see: Yoram Fried, "Strike First or Wait Defensively: The Formulation of the IDF's Fighting Strategy after Israel's War of Independence," *International Journal of Military History and Historiography* 38, no.1 (2018): pp 67-91.

[19] Meeting of the General Staff, 16 April 1949, IDFA; Head of Planning Department, GSHQ, "Assessment and analysis of Israel's security forces in 1952," Oct. 1952, IDFA, file 249-488/55.

[20] "State security and its development," White paper produced by the IDF Planning Department, April 1949, IDFA, file 431-1308/1950.

[21] Office of the Head of GSHQ, to the Office of the Chief of Staff, "The committee for proposing the organization of planning and exploiting the potential for emergency needs," 5 July 1954, IDFA, file 19-636/1956.

State's economy could continue operating safely during and after the war).As he saw it, national security involved coordinating the use of the country's available potential in wartime or politically exploiting these resources in peacetime as a deterrent to any possible threat.[22]

The IDF leadership quickly realized that the military planning bodies were the sole entities to fully comprehend the country's security needs and therefore should be the only ones authorized to dictate national security requirements. As such, it should oversee all other civilian institutions. Hence, the National Security Planning Branch was set up in the Planning Department for this purpose.[23] A directive issued by the Head of the IDF's Planning Department stated emphatically that no department, officer, or soldier in the IDF or even the Ministry of Defense itself was authorized to present security requirements with regard to geophysical planning in the country, to government and public bodies except to the National Security Planning Branch within the Planning Department.[24] The various government ministries were aware of the importance of these security considerations. They accepted this directive and made sure to contact the relevant body of the IDF for instructions.

The Planning Department maintained this stance for the next few years. Yuval Ne'eman, the Head of the Department at the time took the position that "The Planning Department is the only authorized address and the only body to define security requirements touching on the development of the State economy".[25] It is important to note that in addition to the assumptions and principles mentioned above this position by the Head of the Planning Department was determined solely by the IDF and did not receive legal backing from the government or even coordinate with it before making this decision.

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Col. Shalom Eshet, to Hintz Greenbaum, director-general of the ministry of industry, Untitled, 8 October 1950. IDFA, file 43-488/1955.

[24] Col. Shalom Eshet, "Forestry and location of sites in the geophysical planning and civil development (presentation of the IDF's position to civilian bodies)," 28 July, IDFA, file 95-79/1954; Lieut. Col. Yehuda Ben David, acting head of Planning Department, "Planning Department - defining duties," 24 December 1950, IDFA, file 210-157/1959.

[25] Lieut. Col. Yuval Ne'eman, head of Planning Department, "Alignment planning - main thoughts," 18 February 1953, IDFA, file 40-433/1956.

The IDF made it clear that the General Staff via its divisions was responsible for defining the threats to the State of Israel and national security needs. The role of the government was to implement these security requirements with regard to Israel's national security. However, beyond the notion that the IDF must operate within the democratic framework of the State of Israel, the IDF had another reason to insist on government responsibility for the implementation of the principles of the security requirements; namely, the absence of legislation requiring civilian planning and operational entities to comply with military requirements and plans. This meant that the IDF relied on the government's policy platform and on Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben Gurion's position on civilian issues (immigration, settlement, education, industry) as crucial to State security. The IDF thus insisted that the government's platform and Ben Gurion's policies were in fact its legal basis to subordinate the civilian economic development in Israel to military oversight.[26]

Since there was no law that obligated civilian planning entities to accept the military's stipulations and enact them, military personnel had to address each of these bodies separately, to ask them to update the IDF in advance of any development planning and to include a representative of the IDF on any committee formed to develop civilian enterprises throughout the country.[27] The rationale was that these committees would ultimately decide on courses of action.[28] Hence the IDF needed to be present during these deliberations to ensure that the IDF's requirements were met. For example, General Maklef, the Deputy Chief of Staff, served as a representative on the

[26] Col. Shalom Eshet, to Herman Hollander, director general of the ministry of trade and industry, "Security factors in industrial development", 29 June 1951, IDFA, file 43-488/1955. See in this context what Ben Gurion said: Meeting of the General Staff, 16 April 1949, IDFA; "Minutes of government meetings", 12 July 1949, Israel State Archives (ISA); *Knesset (Israel's parliament) Minutes*, 22 December 1952.
[27] Lieut. Col. Israel Beer, to the Head of the Town Planning committee, Planning coordination, untitled, 12 October 1949, IDFA, file 46-596/1953; Col. Shalom Eshet, Head of the Planning Department, to the Director of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, "Establishing new civilian enterprises," 2 April 1950, IDFA, file 34-1166/1951.
[28] Lieut. Col. A. Arbel, Acting Head of Planning Department, "Minutes of the session for briefing delegates to the sub-committees for industrial development planning," 1 March 1956, IDFA, file 79-104/1962. "Minutes of the 'Towns Planning' committee - southern district," 8 May 1957, ISA, file Gal-3940/10.

committee that would decide on the location of a deep-water port in the southern part of the country.[29]

In practice, the reality was much more complex. In the 1950s, in addition to the lack of legislation compelling civilian planning and operational bodies to act in accordance with military requirements, there was no authorized central, governmental, or nation-wide geophysical planning institution. Rather, a large number of governmental, public, and civilian bodies each operated separately and often without coordination and the IDF had to work with each and every one of them. At the time, the Head of the Planning Department listed 15 separate governmental and public bodies the National Security Planning Branch was working with, directly, on security requirements.[30]

Additionally, the IDF had no qualms about taking a forceful approach in the form of a threat to halt development plans that did not receive the IDF's approval when asking civilian bodies to cooperate. In an order sent by the Head of the Planning Department to the Head of the National Security branch, he stated firmly:

> Until the establishment of a central planning body by the Israeli government and the enactment of legislation coordinating general planning, I emphasize that without the approval of the IDF's authorized institution – the Planning Department - the establishment of any factory, facility, city or settlement cannot be approved.[31]

The situation was even more complex for the IDF because the Prime Minister and the government, despite their stance on the security importance of civilian development (such as population and industry dispersal), did not make an effort to compel these civilian bodies to consider the IDF's stipulations. As the Deputy Chief of Staff wrote to the Chief of Staff after being advised that the Ministry of Transportation had acted without consulting and updating the IDF : "On this occasion, I ask you to ensure that a

[29] Lieut. Col. Nehemiah Argov, military secretary to the Prime Minister, to the Minister of Transportation, Untitled, 21 December 1951, IDFA, file 79-104/1962.

[30] Col. Shalom Eshet, Head of the Planning Department, to the Commander of the Air Force, "Problems in planning the general development and the potential of the state," February 1952, IDFA, file 383-488/1955. See also: Capt. Dov Stern, Officer in the National Security Planning Branch, to the Head of the Branch, "Areas planning," 18 August 1951, IDFA, Ibid.

[31] Col. Shalom Eshet, to the Head of the National Security Planning Branch, "Policy for locating sites for facilities and civilian enterprises," 17 January 1952, IDFA, file 293-488/1955.

proper directive is issued by the government to ensure initial and ongoing coordination with the Planning Department and other military institutions as decided."[32]

Because one of the fundamental factors in Israel's perception of national security was the imbalance between the war potential of Arab states and that of the State of Israel, there was a consensus that every effort should be made to reduce this gap.[33] This was reflected in a comprehensive effort to control all the resources available to the military and required constant monitoring of state development and incessant initiatives to introduce security requirements to ease the IDF's defense preparedness as well as increase its war potential.[34] The IDF was influenced by the principles of total defense popularized by the Scandinavian countries after World War II. For example, it was argued in a General Staff meeting, that Sweden would be able to wage war without outside assistance for six months simply by relying on its own potential and without plummeting the Swedish economy into crisis.[35]

The IDF realized that the prime condition for military power is a well-developed economy that meets most of the state's needs. As long as the Israeli economy could not meet the basic needs of its citizens domestically and by importing what the economy could not produce, military power and security could not be achieved in the modern sense of the word. The Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II which relied on the lifeline of American financial aid was often cited as an example. The Marshall plan directed most of its funding to restore Europe's devastated economy. Funding in the form of military aid did not begin until 1951 when the European economy had begun to rebuild.[36]

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[32] Gen. Mordechai Maklef, Deputy Chief of Staff, to the Chief of Staff, "Complaint," 8 February 1951, IDFA, file 293-488/1955.

[33] A review by the Chief of Staff Yigal Yadin to members of the Cabinet. "Minutes of the cabinet meeting," 26 April 1950, ISA.

[34] Lieut. Col. Yuval Ne'eman, Head of the Planning Department, "Array planning - major principles," 18 February 1953, IDFA, file 40-433/1956.

[35] Meeting of the General Staff, 20 April 1959, IDFA. In Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries, a model of total defense was adopted after World War II incorporating security agencies with the civilian economy as part of the country's readiness for war. James Kenneth Wither, "Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defence Concepts," *Defence Studies*, 20, no. 1 (2020): pp. 61-81.

[36] Col. Avigdor Rosenthal, Deputy Chief of Quartermaster's branch, to the Chief of Staff, "IDF requirements that can be carried out with grants and assistance," 11 March 1952, IDFA, file 383-488/1955;

Col. Shalom Eshet, the Head of the Planning Department, came to the conclusion that the Israeli economy was still not equipped to fulfill its security needs and that the government needed to act in two stages. Initially, even though there was a certain risk, security requirements should be lowered and adjusted to the existing potential of the state. The second phase, which would be initiated during the first phase, would involve overseeing the country's economic development planning to increase the national potential until it met security requirements.[37]

The IDF General Staff faced a number of problems when planning ways to ready civilian industry for war. Once war broke out or shortly before, the military's demands for weapons, ammunition, and auxiliary equipment would vastly exceed its peacetime needs. Unpredictable conditions and forms of combat could dictate needs for different types of armament that would quickly be depleted. In addition, productivity would be affected by the bombing of industrial zones, false alerts, damage to factories, power plants and power lines, and the water supply, depletion of the labor force as more reserves were recruited, as well as fatigue and anxiety on the part of workers.

The IDF considered that these factors would have a devastating effect on production productivity which would not only make increased productivity impossible but would also endanger the existing level of production. The outcome would be shortages of equipment for combat, which would make it impossible to form new units, and result in a lack of sufficient spare parts for present and future weapons, etc. The IDF thus considered it critical to fortify the state's personnel and equipment stockpile by imposing supply, production, import and transportation efforts on civilian bodies, who would prepare an array of emergency services (public relations, health, welfare, police, water, electricity, etc.), and plan for the reassignment of manpower and the subordination of the economy to these steps.[38]

Increasing industrial production in wartime was yet another issue. The military thinking envisioned three production possibilities, each of which had its own

Col. Shalom Eshet, Head of Planning Department, to Dr. H. Greenbaum, the Investment Center / Ministry of Trade and Industry, Untitled, 8 October 1950, IDFA, file 61-108/1952.

[37] Meeting of the General Staff, 20 April 1959, IDFA.

[38] Office Manager of the Chief of Operations Branch, to the Chief of Staff, "The committee for proposing the organization of the development planning and the utilization the potential for emergency needs," 5 July 1954, IDFA, file 19-636/1956.

advantages and disadvantages. The first was to maximize production in existing plants. While this would lead to increased production in the short term, its shortcomings were related to the lifetime of machines, the excessive burden on employees that could result in a decline in quality, the wasting of raw materials, and the danger that an enemy strike on a specific plant would end production entirely. The second possibility would be to build new factories. The main drawback was the lengthy delay between the decision to start building a plant and the time it actually started manufacturing equipment. The third approach was to harness civil industry for war production. The advantages were the swift transition from peacetime to wartime production, provided this transition was planned in advance.

The IDF concluded that in an emergency, all three approaches could complete each other. The existing industrial potential would be exploited first, and only then would new factories be built. The argument went as follows: "Converting entire sectors of industry to war production requires complex and far-reaching planning based on early, meticulous, and detailed research. Just as the IDF is planning today how to mobilize the reserves, train and equip them for a possible war, so civilian industry must be planned and prepared for war."[39] The IDF assessment was based on the responses to four basic questions:

1. What military requirements should be placed on civilian industries?
2. What are the needs of the civilian population during wartime?
3. What stockpile of raw materials and finished products needs to be available in the event of a war?
4. Which industries will continue to operate in an emergency?

The security guidelines for planning the development of the national potential, as defined by the IDF Planning Department in the early 1950s, saw the need to prepare the country as much as possible in terms of sufficient inventory (for the population as a whole and the military in particular) by directing the development of resources

[39] Major Yitzhak Sheffer, to the Head of the Planning Department, "Proposal for organizing civil industry in wartime," 14 May 1950, IDFA, file 34-1166/1951.

(agriculture, quarrying); industries and services; and weapons. In addition, it was concerned with improving the quality and consolidation of human resources (national aspirational, technical-professional, physical, etc.), settlement (population dispersal, agricultural settlement, establishment of cities and towns), and the economy (factories, transportation infrastructure, and services). It also dealt with ways to integrate them into the country's defense system during an emergency. The purpose of the guidelines was to have the civilian industry producing for the military in times of war on a regular basis as though it was part of the military establishment: This included:

1. Enabling a quick transition from peacetime production to wartime production according to pre-defined plans.
2. Achieving proportional output between the different types of products.
3. Maintaining high-quality workmanship.
4. Ensuring maximum security against enemy activity by disseminating factories throughout the country, in particular by dividing industry between the north and the south.
5. Efficient utilization of professionals and fault prevention by recruiting production specialists.
6. Avoiding as much damage as possible to factories whose civilian production is essential during wartime.
7. Ensuring uninterrupted production by stockpiling enough raw material to last until supply chains are adjusted to war conditions.[40]

A key part in planning the wartime potential in peacetime civilian industrial plants was to prioritize civilian industries of military value.[41] Factories were classified as a function of their economic importance in times of peace and their military importance in terms of war management and life in the country during wartime. It was clear to the

[40] Ibid. Meeting of the General Staff, 20 April 1959, IDFA; Col. Shalom Eshet, Head of the Planning Department, to the Director of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, "Establishing new civilian enterprises," 2 April 1950, IDFA, file 34-1166/1951.

[41] The term "civilian industry" also referred to warehouses, silos, fuel depots, power plants etc., and not only factories.

IDF planning officials that factories differed in terms of their economic and military importance, but in terms of the IDF's Planning Department, the military contribution of these plants to the country's vital needs was primordial. Internal debates in the Planning Department focused on determining in advance which factories would be important, since the agricultural sector could at times be as crucial as electricity and water production facilities.[42]

In general, most industries in Israel did not depend on the availability of raw materials nearby (except for mining industries such as the potash and cement plants, or large power plants that had to be built near the sea to have access to cooling water), and therefore could be built anywhere according to the development plans. The IDF Planning Department evaluated the functional aspects of any given plant and how vital its products would be in an emergency, its size and the scope of its operations, the number of plants in the country or region that produced the same products, and the possibility of re-building the plant or replacing equipment in a short time.[43] This resulted in the following four categories that classify industrial plants and factories according to military and civilian needs during wartime:[44]

Essential plants and factories - this refers to plants, factories, or services of direct and crucial importance with respect to wartime management and the maintenance of civilian life in an emergency. Any damage to these plants would be a serious and dangerous blow to the war effort.[45]

Important plants and factories - plants and factories whose existence is important for war management or are sources of supply during wartime. Damaging them could cause serious difficulties but would not endanger the war effort.[46]

[42] Col. Avigdor Rosenthal, Deputy Chief of Quartermaster's Branch, to the Planning Department, "Scaling industries," 28 April 1952, IDFA, file 43-488/1955.
[43] Lieut. Col. Eliezer Miron, head of the National Security Planning Branch, "Proposal for the classification of Industrial plants," 22 February 1952, IDFA, file 43-488/1955.
[44] Capt. Shimshon Amitai, on behalf of the head of the Planning Department, "Classification of industries and locating areas for industry," 16 July 1954, IDFA, file 142-756/1961.
[45] For example: oil refineries; power plants; military industry; airplane repair workshops; ship and boat repair facilities; water supply, fuel reservoirs; explosives manufacturing plants, and more.
[46] For example: dead Sea plant; iron and steel foundries; manufacture of cans and boxes; medicines; medical equipment; tools, and more.

Beneficial plants and factories - plants and factories whose existence make it easier to manage the war and/or help maintain more normal civilian life in an emergency. This also refers to a situation where several plants manufacture the same product. If one is damaged there will be a similar plant that can continue producing so the war effort will not be affected.[47]

Unimportant plants and factories - plants and factories that have no effect on wartime management or the home front during an emergency such as the luxury sector, crafts, etc.

The IDF assumed that vital industrial sites would be targeted by enemy attacks during wartime. Hence, their optimal location was dictated by the best way to safeguard their continued existence in wartime. This meant that the planning for any factory or service, classified as essential, had to comply with security requirements: guarantee full employment, provide for expansion (geographically and in manpower), have a secure power supply plus reserve electrical power, a three-month stockpile of raw material, ensure the good working order of all machines at all times, prioritize the purchase of equipment, the construction of bomb shelters and camouflage, and secure location according to the State defense plans.[48]

For example, the guidelines stipulated that weaponry should not be manufactured in the northern part of the country and ammunition in the south: both needed to be manufactured in the same area. However, if two essential factories manufacture the same product, one must be built in the north and the other in the south. Key factories should not be concentrated in one area but rather spread evenly over the entire country. This was done to ensure continued production and supply even in the event of damage to one plant, or occupation of part of the state.

[47] For example: quarries; certain textile factories; certain clothing and footwear factories; plastic, paper and cardboard products, etc.

[48] Col. Shalom Eshet, head of Planning Department, to the members of the subcommittees of the government's High Manpower' committee, "Guidelines and definitions of military policy for members of the subcommittees," 26 March 1950, IDFA, file 211-157/1959.

Defining the location of essential plants

The Electricity Transformer Station in the Haifa area

Ensuring a continuous supply of electricity to both the military and civilian populations is crucial for all nations. This was true in the 1950s and even more so today in light of the enormous dependence of the civilian and military infrastructure on the electricity grid.[49]

The IDF considered that planning and operating the electricity supply of the country was an essential part of national security because of its importance for continued industrial and military production during the war and for the reconstruction of the state afterward. This was naturally in addition to the psychological importance of a regular power supply to the civilian population during the war. The Planning Department's basic approach was to plan, build and secure the electricity sector to meet the needs of the military and the civilian population in times of emergency. To do so it was important to plan the electricity sector in advance, based on data and forecasts of industrial and civilian demands in the upcoming years and security requirements.

After the loss of the Nahartim power plant during the War of Independence, the power supply was concentrated in two main plants located in Tel Aviv and Haifa. The other power plants that operated in the early 1950s were small, local power installations that were not connected to the national grid. Electricity was provided by the Electric Company (EC) that had franchises throughout the country, the Jerusalem Electric Company (JEC) that only operated in the Jerusalem area, and private power plants in areas where there was no supply from public sources. The maximum production capacity of the EC in the early 1950s was 180,000 kilowatts, whereas the production capacity of the JEC was 9,500 kilowatts.[50]

The IDF realized with apprehension that about 85 percent of Israel's total electricity generation capacity was concentrated in only two power plants. Clearly, Israel's potential enemies were aware of this fact as well, and in wartime, or even before,

[49] For an examination of the various threats to the electricity system in Israel during the 2000s, see Dan Weinstock and Meir Elran, *Securing the Electrical System in Israel: Proposing a Grand Strategy* (Tel Aviv: Institute of National Security Studies, 2016).
[50] "Report of the 'Electricity Review' Committee," October 1952, ISA, file p-715/24.

they would make every effort to destroy them. The concern among military planning officials was that this attempt might succeed since there was virtually no way to completely secure these plants. As Chief of Staff Yigal Yadin said: "if the IDF does not decide where the power company should build its plants, the new Naharayim will fall into the hands of the enemy… and the whole sector will stop functioning."[51]

IDF planning officials criticized the Finance Ministry for addressing the issue of electricity supply in Israel without first consulting military advisors. Instead, planning as a whole was carried out by the EC, and the Finance Ministry approved the financial aspects. The IDF Planning Department pointed to the conflict between economics and security considerations that pit economic centralization against military decentralization.[52]

In 1954 the EC chose a terrain near the Kaiser-Fraser car factory in the Tel-Hanan neighborhood of the town of Nesher, as the best location for the construction of transformer substation *C* of the main Haifa power station. After examining the plan carefully, the IDF objected to this site and suggested two possible alternatives at a considerable distance from the preferred location by the EC. The Head of the Planning Department explained that despite its willingness to compromise, crucial security reasons made this impossible. He criticized the EC for having waited to inform the IDF until late in the planning process and hoped that in the future the EC would work more closely with the Planning Department to avoid such occurrences.

The Planning Department's objections to the site had to do with its proximity to other key industrial installations in the area that would also be exposed to bombardment in the case of war including refineries, military fuel facilities, and the Haifa power plant itself. Building the transformer station would be an added bonus for enemy bombers, so clearly it should be built in a 'neutral' area, and be camouflaged in appropriate colors to ensure its better survival. For this reason, Col. Amichai asked the EC to submit alternative proposals for the station in more neutral locations.[53]

[51] Meeting of the General Staff, 20 April 1959, IDFA.
[52] "State Electricity Planning Commission, session No. 15," 30 April 1953, IDFA, file 213-488/1955.
[53] Col. Ithiel Amichai, Head of Planning Department, to Avraham Rotenberg, "The transformation station near Haifa," 17 May 1955, Electric Company Archives (ECA), box 747, file 101.

Roughly two years later, in June 1957, there was another round of discussions. The EC continued to insist on their original location and asked the IDF to reconsider its objections. The Head of the Planning Department at the time, Col. Yosef Nevo, reiterated that the proposed location was situated in the heart of an area that constituted a key target, and could be damaged even if an attack was not directly aimed at it. He explained that when the IDF approved the construction of the second power plant in Haifa in close proximity to the existing plant - which went against security considerations - it did so on the express condition that the electricity grid and its facilities would meet stringent safety requirements. Since the transformer station was vital to shunting electricity from the south to the north if the power plant in Haifa was destroyed, any damage to it would constitute a serious weakness in the national grid.

Because the nearby Haifa oil refineries would be in the crosshairs of any attack, the IDF stipulated that the transformer station should be located at least 2 kilometers away. It suggested an area near the Technion, the Israel Institute of Technology, since it met the security requirements but gave the EC a free hand to find suitable terrain.[54]

In November 1957, the two sides met again to attempt to agree on a site. After the EC reiterated its basic opposition to the IDF's location, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Dagan proposed building the station between the refineries and the fertilizer plant south of the Kishon River. The EC objected to this location as well, claiming that it was too far from the power plant, which would considerably increase production costs. Furthermore, the proximity to the Nesher cement plant and the fertilizer plant raised concerns about emissions of dust and gases that would be detrimental to operations. Given the stalemate, the EC asked the Ministry of Development to intervene.[55]

On December 10, 1958, another meeting was held between the EC and the IDF[56] in which the parties agreed that the station would be built in the town of Nesher, about 2 kilometers south of the refineries, about a kilometer from Kishon Junction and about 4

[54] Col. Yosef Nevo, to Ya'akov Pele, the Electric Company, "Sub-station 'C' near Haifa", 27 May 1957, ECA, box 747, file 101; Major Shimshon Amity, to the Electric Company, "Location for transformation station C," 7 July 1957, ECA, box 747, file 101.
[55] Dr. G. Levi, to Menachem Bader, director general of the ministry of development, ""Sub-station 'C' near Haifa," 26 November 1957, ECA, box 747, file 101.
[56] Y. Tamir, head of the EC Network Department, to the IDF Planning Department, "To the attention of Lieut. Col. D. Dagan," 28 December 1958, ECA, box 747, file 101.

kilometers from the power plant. This location was much closer to the EC's original location than the other IDF proposals.

The Nesher cement factory in Ramla

In May 1950, the Nesher cement company decided to build a new cement factory in the Ramla area, located in the center of Israel, which was closer to the quarries and raw materials needed and the railway siding. Given the critical importance of cement production in Israel, the government granted the request and approved the allocation of the area.[57]

The Planning Department strongly opposed the building of the factory in Ramla because it had classified cement production as *essential*. Shalom Eshet, the Head of the Department, argued that the Har-Tov cement factory was already at a very advanced stage of development and that the 15km distance between it and the new factory would place them in the same target zone in wartime, on either side of the Latrun-Ramla and Latrun-Jerusalem roads, two of the main thoroughfares in the country that any invading army would use as it advanced. According to Eshet, the estimated total production of these two factories would be 600,000 tons, about two-thirds of the total production in the country. Eshet demanded that the new plant be built in the Negev area, near the city of Be'er-Sheva to comply with the national security guidelines to split up essential industries by locating them in the north, the center, and the south. Eshet acknowledged the fact that any cement factory without direct access to a rail siding would be economically unfeasible. His point was that building the factory in the Be'er-Sheva area would make building the southern extension of the railway a priority and would also turn the area into a hub for the production and export of raw materials other than cement, settling and establishing additional factories. Thus, for the Planning Department, building the *Nesher* cement factory in the south was not seen as a one-off

[57] David Shafrir, the governmental custodian of absentee property, "Establishment of a cement manufacturing factory near Ramla," 12 May 1950, ISA, file G-2715/4.

enterprise but rather part of a broader security plan to develop industry and quarries in the Negev.[58]

The Nesher executives refused to accept Eshet's arguments. Their position was that their yearlong survey had concluded that the Ramla location was optimal economically and in terms of raw materials and that transporting raw materials by any other means than rail would lead to a hike in production costs. They nevertheless agreed to re-examine the possibility of finding raw materials in the Be'er Sheva area and promised to update the Planning Department.[59] However, about two months later, they informed the IDF that they could not conduct the survey because their surveyor was out of the country and they had to wait for his return.[60]

The Nesher stonewalling and refusal to accept the security requirements forced the Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Mordechai Makef, to refer the issue to the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Pinchas Sapir. Gen. Maklef acknowledged that the economic factors were problematic, but that "with vision and initiative", as he said, the factory and the railway could be established in the Negev. He suggested forming a committee that would include the Head of the Planning Department in addition to the civilian representatives.[61] Sapir quickly held a consultation with Gen. Maklef and representatives from the Labor Ministry and the civilian Planning Division and decided that two additional cement factories should be built: one in the Ramla area and the other in the Negev. However, until a suitable site and planning for the cement factory in the Negev had been found and approved, Sapir asked all the parties involved to speed up the building of the Nesher cement company in Ramla.[62]

[58] Col. Shalom Eshet, to the deputy Chief of Staff, " Nesher cement plant,, 25 October 1950, IDFA, file 210-157/1959.
[59] 'Nesher' cement factory, to the Planning Department, "Cement factory near Ramla", 10 August 1950, ISA, File G-2715/4.
[60] 'Nesher' cement factory, to the Planning Department, "Cement factory," 25 September 1950, ISA, ibid.
[61] Gen. Mordechai Maklef, to Pinchas Sapir, director general of the ministry of defense, "A place for the 'Nesher' factory in the south," 8 November 1950, IDFA, file 61-108/1952.
[62] Pinchas Sapir, "New factory for Nesher," 19 November 1950, ISA, file G-2715/4.

Summary

The IDF's security requirements, formulated in the first years of the State of Israel, considered the development of the civilian economy to be a critical component of the state's national security and its readiness for another war against the Arab countries. Israel's geo-strategic particularities, in that it is a long and narrow country with borders that are very difficult to protect due to the lack of obstacles and strategic depth, made the decision of where to locate and build industrial factories critical to easing the war effort and contributing to the state's recovery thereafter.

The IDF's responsibility for defining threats and setting national security principles created a complex dilemma involving a number of tough issues: how to ensure that these principles were integrated into civilian planning in a democratic state where the military must not interfere in civilian activity, the absence of legislation requiring civilian planning bodies to comply with military requirements, the absence of an authoritative central national planning body, and government demands that were not always in line with those of the military.

The IDF resolved this conundrum in two ways. The first was to determine that the IDF itself was not responsible for civilian planning, but should only ensure that security considerations be taken into account during planning. The second involved direct engagement in all civil planning bodies by delegating IDF officers to civilian planning committees, joint tours, program approval, frequent updates, etc. The IDF's Planning Department defined a series of security requirements and demanded that civilian planners take them into account, in advance, when planning new plants and factories.

In a sense, by claiming it would prohibit the construction of various plants and factories on specific sites that did not receive its approval in terms of security demands, the IDF exercised a form of veto power and dominance over civilian planning. In reality, however, many civilian planning bodies attempted to circumvent the IDF by failing to provide plans and updates (there was no law requiring them to do so) or stonewalling, thus forcing the IDF to abandon or modify its demands.

Although the IDF defined the security requirements for civilian industry planning in a very detailed manner, its inability to impose them led to a different reality

on the ground where economic considerations often outweighed security/military considerations, such that civilian planning bodies simply ignored the way the military defined national security.

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