

**Research Note** 

# A Mixed Methods Study of Enlistment of Indigenous Men on Reserves in the First World War

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The relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian military has changed significantly over time, from moments of nation-building cooperation in the War of 1812 to the nation-threatening low of the Oka Crisis of the 1990s. Yet between these crises, and especially in the past several decades, Indigenous enlistment in the military has remained comparable to membership in the overall public service, including the visible role of the Canadian Rangers in the Arctic and in more traditional domestic disaster relief and overseas missions. Over time, these quotidien commitments to the Canadian Forces are far more representative than the constitutionally challenging conflicts. The presence and importance of Indigenous veterans is clearly on display during Remembrance Day ceremonies in Ottawa, with a separate Aboriginal Veterans Day observed on 8 November.

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Despite the modern ceremonies, the contemporaneous relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian military that began in earnest in the decades prior to the First World War, was at best both rocky and far from uniform. In terms of the former, while some found success and camaraderie, expectations of equal treatment were rarely realized, especially when Indigenous soldiers became returning veterans, and even legendary soldiers like Francis Pegahmagabow found their achievements questioned and undermined for a generation at least. This dichotomy has been welldocumented on both the civilian and soldiers' sides of the war experience. The unevenness of experiences is unsurprising, but remains at best stated rather than thoroughly examined.

There can be a significant difference between a government department's aspiration and the on-the-ground outcomes; reality is rarely as predictable as a bureaucrat might hope. Given the importance of the First World War to both Canadian military history and Indigenous military participation trends, it is surprising how often historians interpret government exchanges uncritically or how frequently they treat exceptional soldiers as representative examples. We must more adequately address the tinge of assimilation in the story of Indigenous soldiers to understand the how, if any, government sought to influence decision making (we know that they tried). The following is a cliometric analysis of the possible relationship between government policy, practice and outcomes, particularly in relation to enlistment in the First World War with the following question in mind: Given that the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) attempted (albeit unevenly) to use Agents to recruit Indigenous men for the war effort, were the Department's efforts successful?

### **Background and Hypothesis**

The question of Indigenous recruitment and enlistment has attracted specific criticism, often as part of a larger argument about the character and condition of Indigenous-government relations at the time of the war (and beyond). On the one hand, Gaffen (1985), Dempsey (1999), Mountain Horse (1979) and Winegard (2012) point to the expression of warrior culture, a survival against the crushing effects of assimilation that were growing in effect during this time. This narrative has maintained its

popularity, being represented in museum exhibits and even movies, despite the fact warrior culture was both far from universal among the many distinct Indigenous communities across Canada and that members of those non-warrior communities enlisted alongside the more clearly warrior-informed soldiers (Carlson, 1997). Warrior culture definitely informed some enlistees' thinking, but it is far from a compelling explanation for all Indigenous enlistment.

Others have pointed to the *overlap* of colonizing forces and enlistment; McGowan (2010, 2011) and Lackenbauer & McGowan (2007) in particular have focused on how recruiting officers worked closely with Indian Agents, and sometimes were former agents themselves. Importantly, these studies have sought to understand how the Department of Indian Affairs supported the Allied war aims, as a reversal from an early-war prohibition on Indigenous enlistment (while this prohibition fell short of a policy but this prohibition did result in some Indigenous recruits being discharged). Indian Affairs even lent the militia Charles Cooke, an Iroquois man who worked in Ottawa for the Department doing translation work, to travel across Ontario and Quebec to recruit for both traditional combat and engineering units (the latter especially in Quebec among communities with significant logging populations) (McGowan, 2010). This debate seems far from over: Story (2015) argues that the above focuses too much on policy, denying the agency of Indigenous peoples.

Jettisoning this dichotomy entirely, Talbot (2011) points to the significant disparity between Indigenous communities in terms of their responses to the war, suggesting that cases such as the Six Nations are more appropriately considered outliers than representative. This argument has merit; as will be discussed in further detail below, Six Nations was the most populous reserve in the country and therefore should not be assumed to be representative of Indigenous experiences.<sup>1</sup> McGowan (2011; forthcoming) has pointed to Departmental conversations that preferences recruitment efforts in communities they believed would be most receptive and who would best reflect the assimilation process. Some of these concerns were practical - language skills were heavily emphasized - but others were downright contradictory, such as the hope

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Six Nations' population in 1914 reached more than 4600 people, whereas the average reserve population at the same time was about 165 people, and the median population was 106.

good hunters would make good snipers, suggest the Department was comfortable fetishizing noble savage stereotypes even as they sought to erase that population.

While it is difficult to state the real influence of this duplication of authority in the recruitment process and indeed, there was an incident where Cooke was present at a recruitment meeting when a speaker used the platform to criticize the war itself, in an Indigenous language Cooke was supposed to speak. Historians remain divided about whether this event undermines Cooke's credentials as a translator or if he had other motivations for staying quiet. Yet we know both that some – but not all - men enlisted to follow warrior tradition, and that the Department of Indian Affairs wanted to support Indigenous enlistment, but not equally.

A Hypothesis. Given the variant evidence discussed above, it is important to assess the relative weight of different influences on the decision of Indigenous men to enlist in the war effort. Each of these historical studies, when appropriately bounded, arises from a logical interpretation of the available evidence, yet scaling their conclusions is highly problematic, as Talbot (2011) identified. Instead, we must seek to assess the relative effects of assimilative efforts in the context of a wider, highly personal, highly localized set of factors. Given that the DIA clearly attempted (albeit unevenly) to use Agents to recruit Indigenous men for the war effort, is there evidence that the Department's efforts were successful?

To test this hypothesis, we employ standard cliometric methods (e.g. multiple regressions and descriptive and inductive statistics) that first estimate the relative enlistment rates across agencies/jurisdictions. Then, agents and DIA employees-turned recruiters' activities are mapped according to the agencies in which they recruited, and we estimate the effects of recruiter activities on enlistment rates. While further analysis is required, this provides sufficient backdrop for an initial/early assessment using cliometric analysis and hypothesis testing.

### Methodology

*Cliometrics*: Cliometrics refers to the use of classic economic theory and empirical research methods to analyze economic history and explore historians' beliefs about the

past. These methods include (but are not limited to) descriptive summaries of historical statistical data (e.g. marriage, enlistment, or tax records), informal hypothesis testing using statistical tests and multiple regression and machine learning (e.g. the analysis of large data sets), and formal modeling.

Cliometric methods are not appropriate to answer every question about the past. They are a poor tool for understanding an individual's motives or feelings. But cliometric methods are well-suited to test beliefs (hypotheses) about large-scale human behaviour (such as patterns of behaviour in times of war or peace) especially when historians are trying to determine if individuals within a group shared a belief or motive that led them to act a certain way. In other words, cliometric methods offer us another tool to understand the big picture.

Analytical Boundaries. Our use of agencies as an unit of analysis in this research note is not meant to justify or validate the Indian Act system. Modern definitions of Indigenous are significantly broader than they would have been understood at the time, hence the frequent use of the term "bona fide Indian" among different government departments to indicate Indigenous people who fell under the *Indian Act* (McGowan, 2012), while those off-reserve risked full ostracization from their community and legal protections/identity. While the Indigenous population (then as now) extends far beyond reserves and Agencies, we limit our analysis to those populations with a legal relationship with the federal government during the war.

*Data Set - Considerations & Limitations.* A note on the population of Indigenous soldiers: in 1919 the Department of Indian Affairs published a report summarizing the Indigenous contributions to the war effort. This was clearly self-serving, as the authors emphasized how these contributions were proof of the success of assimilation. Nevertheless, it is useful for this study. This report estimated a total of approximately 3,000 Indigenous (status Indian) enlistees, although they provided no tables, lists, or other evidence to substantiate this number. The Department did, however, request individual Indian Agents to provide them with a list of men on their reserves who had enlisted, and this is likely the backbone of that report (RG 10 Volume 6767 File 452-17).

Those reports formed the foundation of our list of Indigenous enlistees. Unfortunately the reports are of varying quality, sometimes with incomplete information, and therefore we could not identify approximately 10% of the Indigenous soldiers identified by Indian Agents (meaning we could not find a corresponding attestation paper or regimental number). Their subsequent exclusion is not a political choice, but a methodological one. Additional effort was made to find honour lists created by reserves and where new names were identified we added them to the data set. Lastly, we examined in detail those units that targeted Indigenous recruits to identify additional Indigenous soldiers based on at least three points (birth location, enlistment location, and physical description, as race information was not collected). Based on these three searches, we have identified with a medium to high degree of confidence over 1,900 Indigenous enlistees.

The difference between recruit and enlistee is important; a recruit may not pass initial medical tests, may have been discharged for language reasons or general fitness, or their Chief intervened (as we know in at least a few cases). This difference - one where men may have had the sincere intention of joining but were prevented for some reason - may contribute to explaining the difference between Indian Agent estimates and our data set. Additionally, there were likely many Indigenous men who enlisted and served but were not captured in Indian Affairs accounting, including Métis men, non-status men, and men living off-reserve. This study is not meant to diminish their efforts, but to better understand the delicate interplay of military and assimilation forces from within the Canadian federal government, and what influences these may have had on the lives of Indigenous men during the First World War.

#### Indigenous Populations at the Time of the War


At the outbreak of the war, the Department of Indian Affairs' annual report recorded approximately 100,000 status Indians in Canada. The term status Indian is crucial: the Department only had legal responsibility for, and interest in documenting, those people who fell under the category of status Indian – a more restrictive category then than it is now.<sup>2</sup> This category excluded Métis people, those who had Indigenous

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Status Indian women lost their status if they married non-status men; attending university or leaving the reserve generally meant losing status; and becoming enfranchised definitely meant the loss of status.

heritage but did not live on reserve or in their community, and those who had lost or given up their status.


The population distribution was diverse, but generally speaking, most reserve communities were small (less than 500 people, with an average population of 166).

Figure 1: Distribution of Band Populations, per Government of Canada, 1914



The Canadian government reported the population of 628 bands in 1914. These communities were overwhelmingly small. 90% had fewer than 340 members.

Figure 2: Distribution of Agency Populations in 1914, per Government of Canada



### **Enlistment Rates**

Government records of band and agency populations from the war are relatively simple. Demographic data - such as sex and age - are often missing or incomplete. Nevertheless, overall band population figures are fairly complete, which makes comparing crude enlistment rates possible. Using numbers drawn from government records, the average enlistment rate of each agency (men who enlisted as a percentage of the entire agency population) is just under 3% (2.95). This average rate masks some considerable variance. Enlistment rates varied from 0% to 33%. Table 1 offers a summary of agency-level enlistment rates, broken down by province, territory, or treaty area.

Table 1: Agency-level enlistment rates


Jurisdiction	Average	Minimum	Maximum
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Canada	2.95	0	33.33
Alberta	0.92	0	2.29
British Columbia	0.36	0	1.01
Manitoba	2.96	0	8.14

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New Brunswick	1.97	0.71	3.6
Northwest Territories	0	0	0
Nova Scotia	3.07	0	10
Ontario	6.15	0	33.33
Prince Edward Island	7.99	7.99	7.99
Quebec	1.52	0	8.7
Saskatchewan	2.49	0	6.94
Yukon Territory	0	0	0
Treaty 8	0.09	0.09	0.09

Over 99% of the approximately 123 agencies that the government listed in 1914 saw fewer than 100 men join the Canadian armed forces during the war. Six Nations was the exception to this rule, with an estimated 293 men enlisting from that agency.

Figure 3: Distribution of Total Enlistment by Agency



# **Government Communications**

The confused path of government policy towards Indigenous enlistment in the war has been covered elsewhere in great depth (Lackenbauer & McGowan, 2007; Winegard, 2012) and therefore it does not merit similar attention here. In essence, the government - after some internal debate between the Militia and Indian Affairs over issues such as whether Indigenous soldiers would receive "civilized treatment" from the Germans should they be captured (Lackenbauer & McGowan, 2007) - discouraged and then actively encouraged Indigenous enlistment. The former was never an entirely effective ban or prohibition (although many were dismissed or turned away)<sup>3</sup> and the latter was a mixed effort. It is this mixed effort that we explore next.

The Department of Indian Affairs' asserted its supremacy within the federal government when it came to engaging Indigenous people on reserves (Brownlie, 2003). The new programs and demands of the war tested this supremacy, but whether it was a question of practicality, prudence or legal jurisdiction, military officials generally respected Indian Affairs. Recruiters frequently contacted local agents and officials in Ottawa for help prior to entering reserves. The below chart includes those officers who contacted Indian Affairs (and at what level), for which unit they were recruiting, and where they sought to recruit. The file sources for each entry are contained in the footnotes.

Recruiter	Recruitment Unit	Indian Affairs Contact	Date	Region/ Reserve
LtCol. McLean <sup>4</sup>	207th Ottawa- Carleton Bttn	Ottawa (D.C. Scott)	15 May 1916	Ottawa Region
Surgeon- General Eugene Fiset⁵	Forestry & Construction Bttn	Ottawa (D.C. Scott)	Jan 1917	National; British Columbia; Manitoba <sup>6</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> RG 10 Volume 318 File 452,124-1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13

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LtCol. Glen Campbell <sup>7</sup>	107th Bttn	Ottawa (D.C. Scott)	3 Feb 1917	Elkhorn & Brandon Residential Schools
Sgt. W. R. Taylor <sup>8</sup>	249th Bttn	Ottawa (D.C. Scott); suggests the Chief said to contact Scott	9 Feb 1917	The Pas, Manitoba
Lt. Frank H.H. Williamson <sup>9</sup>	256th Railway Construction Bttn	Indian Affairs provided a letter of introduction (see Cooke below, Table 2)	Feb 1917	Eastern Ontario & Quebec
Lt. Frederick O. Loft <sup>10</sup>	Indian Forestry Draft No. 3	Ottawa (D.C. Scott; J. McLean)	Feb- March 1917	Ontario (Parry Island)
Lt. J. Jones	Indian Forestry Co.	Ottawa (D. C. Scott)	18 May 1917	Norway House/Treaty 5 (former agent)
Lt. Gilmour <sup>11</sup>	Forestry Bttn; 238th Bttn	Sent by Ottawa to reserve	March 1916	Maniwaki Agency
LtCol Merritt <sup>12</sup>	No Bttn	Chief in Council contacted Ottawa	Nov 1914	Six Nations
Lt-Col. Baxter <sup>13</sup> ;	114th Bttn	Minister of Indian	Jan 1916;	Six Nations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Scott suggested two different agents for the different provinces (Tyson for BC, S.J. Jackson for Manitoba) Tyson discusses this in detail in RG 10 Volume 318 File 452,124-1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> RG 10 Volume 318 File 452,124-1; RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

LtCol. A.T. Thompson <sup>14</sup>		Affairs	June 1916	
Col. Thoburn	227th Bttn	Minister of Indian Affairs	June 1916	Manitoulin/Man itowaning

Indian Affairs employees recruited Indigenous men as well. Agents frequently bragged to Ottawa about their success in their own agency, and Ottawa employees were sent out with specific ears to target. Table 3 indicates the agent, why they recruited (according to their own account), the communities in which they recruited, and the units for which they worked.

Table 3: Indian Affairs Employees as Recruiters

Agent/ Official	Time of Work	Community/ies	Unit
Thomas Deasy <sup>15</sup>	Sept 1914	Queen Charlotte Islands	N/A; Home Defence
G.P. Cockburn	Jan 1917	Sturgeon Falls Agency	Railway Constr, Forestry Bttns
W. Murison, Indian Agent <sup>16</sup>	Winter/S pring 1917	Touchwood Agency (claims 35 men)	107th Bttn
James Motion, frmr Residential	Jan 1916	Alberni, BC	No Unit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> RG 10 Volume 3180 File 452-124-1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13

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School Principal <sup>17</sup>			
S.J. Jackson, Indian Agent <sup>18</sup>	Jan 1917	Oak River, The Pas (focus on lumber camps)	Forestry Bttns; Railway Constr
F.E. Taillon <sup>19</sup>	Jan 1917	St. Regis Agency	Forestry Bttns; Railway Constr
E.S. Gauthier <sup>20</sup>	Jan 1917; March 1917	Maniwaki Agency	Forestry Draft; 238th Bttn
Charles Cooke	1916-1918	Six Nations; Rama; Parry Sound; Oka; Caughnawaga; Manitoulin	114th; 256th Railway Constr Bttn <sup>21</sup>
W.R. Brown <sup>22</sup>	Oct 1915	Nipigon, Fort William Reserve	52nd Bttn, 94th Bttn
S.R. McVitty, Principle <sup>23</sup>	Feb 1916	Mount Elgin Industrial School	No unit
T.A. Stout <sup>24</sup>	Oct 1916	Saugeen	160th Bttn
BC Tyson; with Col Warden <sup>25</sup>	Nov 1915-1917	Lytton; Bella Coola; Vernon; New Westminster; Babine & Upper Skeena; Kamloops; Kwakewlth	Brass Band; Forestry; General

The behaviour described in Table 3 was not universal; consider the case of the Blackfoot at Gleichen (Siksika), for whom D.C. Scott intervened to stop recruitment for

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> RG 10 Volume 318 File 452,124-1; RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> RG 10 Volume 3180 File 452, 124-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ibid. Note this agent was accused of threatening Indigenous men into enlisting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

the 191st Battalion on the reserve itself, noting that "this is not according to [the] understanding with the Indians and must be discontinued pending representations from [the] Indians."<sup>26</sup> This was not the first such warning issued in Alberta: the Department warned all of its agents in 1914 that "the Indians of your agency have been much disturbed" by recruiters. Other agents faced different challenges (both real and perceived). Agent W.M. Halliday was generally positive about the possibility of enlisting men from his agency, Kwakewlth (Alert Bay), in British Columbia, and Inspector Tyson visited there in 1917, but officials in Ottawa warned the military away from the Agency as filled with men who were "all the Coast type, who make their livelihood principally by fishing, and that they would not be suitable as soldiers."<sup>27</sup> Meanwhile, Halliday himself hypothesized that serving with non-Indigenous Canadians - rather than in an Indigenous-exclusive unit - was the greatest impediment to enlistment.<sup>28</sup>

### **Testing Our Hypothesis**

Looking at the top-line enlistment rates and debates inside the Department about the appropriateness of recruiting Indigenous men for the war effort suggests that whatever sporadic efforts the DIA and its agents made were probably inconsequential. After all, it is reasonable to assume that a certain number of Indigenous men would enlist in the armed forces for their own idiosyncratic personal reasons or due to local (e.g. band-specific) economic, political, geographical, and/or cultural factors.

Nevertheless, as Table 3 affirms, the Department did seem – at certain times and in certain places – to make a genuine effort to encourage Indigenous men to enlist, authorizing agents to explicitly recruit men for service. Charles Cooke is perhaps the most widely-known Indian Agent-Recruiter of the war. Adorned with an officer's commission, he traveled across southern and near-northern Ontario and Caughnawaga and Oka in Quebec in an effort to enlist men in the 114<sup>th</sup> Battalion, although Talbot raised questions about his effectiveness (2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> D.C. Scott to Agent Gooderham 30 January 1917 RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. This was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

This historical record offers an obvious hypothesis: namely that bands and agencies where Indian Agents explicitly and actively recruited men during the war had higher enlistment rates then bands and agencies where the DIA made no such effort. In other words, some of the variation in Indigenous enlistment rates across Canada can be explained by the variation in the Department's recruitment efforts.

We tested this hypothesis using some classical statistical assumptions about the data and standard analytical techniques.<sup>29</sup> When examining Canada as a whole, the data does not offer much support for the hypothesis. While it appears that the presence of a recruiting Indian Agent may have increased agency-level enlistment rates by around 1.2%, the result is not reliable (i.e. it does not pass classical tests of statistical significance, and we cannot rule out the possibility that this apparent increase in enlistment rates is due to random chance).

A potential explanation for the lack of a consistent effect of Indian Agent recruiting efforts becomes clear upon further examination of the data. Table 1 shows the average agency-level enlistment rate across Canada, and across provinces, territories, and Treaty 8. Enlistment levels did not just vary on an agency-by-agency basis, they also varied considerably across the country on a regional basis. While the overall unweighted agency-level enlistment rate for Canada as a whole was 2.95%, it was as high as 8% in Prince Edward Island, and essentially zero in the Territories. Enlistment rates in British Columbia merit some attention: the agency-level enlistment rate in BC was 0.36%, or 1/12<sup>th</sup> of the national rate. This is despite the fact that agents Deasy, Motion, and Tyson recruited in eight of the province's sixteen agencies, covering around 55% of the province's treaty Indian population.

Given the large difference in enlistment rates in BC compared to the country as a whole, it is worth considering that there may be a hereto unobserved dynamic at play in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Namely, we assume that enlistment rates are normally distributed. Analysis of the effects of Indian Agent recruitment efforts was conducted using a double-censored Tobit regression model with robust errors. Some specifications included terms for the absolute population of each Indian agency (in case enlistment rates were affected by either herding behaviour or band/agency social dynamics that correlate with overall population size) and province-/treaty area-level effects. Details are available from the authors upon request.

that province which explain this difference.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, we re-estimated the effects of Indian Agent recruitment efforts in two other ways: one model omitted BC agencies entirely, and another which used a (hypothetically unobserved) province-/territory-/treaty-level effect to allow for additional variation among these jurisdictions.

These models offer a reliable Indian Agent effect of increasing agency-level enlistment rates by around 1.3% to 3.2%, depending on the specific modeling assumptions. Importantly, this effect is consistently statistically significant according to classical standards, suggesting that it is unlikely to be a product of random chance. This finding suggests two things: that Indian Agents did help drive the enlistment rates of Indigenous men, and that this effect was not homogenous but varied across the country.

While this is simply a preliminary test of a single hypothesis about why Indigenous men enlisted in the Canadian armed forces during the First World War at different rates across the country, it does point to the potential usefulness of a research agenda that explicitly compares and contrasts how the DIA interacted with the different bands and nations in specific regions of the country. While historians, social scientists, activists, politicians, and policymakers often pay lip service to the fact that Canada's First Nations are a diverse group of cultures and communities, the assumption of "pan-Indigeneity" often seeps into public discourse and analysis. This is probably a fatal assumption for any academic or policy-oriented efforts to understand the experiences of Indigenous Canadians and the social, political, and economic consequences of those experiences.

#### Discussion

It is unwise to rely on government records to evaluate and assess the motives of Indigenous men, but they are a reasonable indicator of Indian Affairs' motives and outcomes. The latter is our focus here: can we see an influence of Agents in their own records. This is necessary in part because the records themselves are full of hyperbole,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Whether it is the relationship between BC's Indigenous peoples and Ottawa, their relationship with the DIA, local unique cultural or economic factors, some combination of these, or a whole other phenomenon is beyond the scope of this note.

boasts, and assumptions about the capacity of Indigenous men – both in their favour and against. Agents frequently boasted about raising dozens of men or even full companies (between 100 and 125 men) from communities that could barely provide that many men and boys under any circumstances. This is beyond idle chatter: agents' actions and opinions had significant weight and could carry real consequences under many circumstances.

The results we report in this note are suggestive. First, Indian Agent boasts must be taken with a grain of salt. They did have influence (outside of British Columbia) but nowhere near what their self-evaluations suggested. There is another possibility to explain the agent effect on enlistment: that their on-the-ground knowledge made them more realistic in general towards who might be a receptive audience. Given that these agents were frequently self-directed (see Table 3), and also reported communities uninterested in or adverse to enlistment, it is possible that they used this kind of knowledge to selectively guide their efforts. Yet the results suggest that a complete rejection of the role of policy and government would be premature.

Second, British Columbia raises a number of questions, the answers to which remain speculative at this piont. The low enlistment rates could be attributed to a number of factors, from the geography and spatial qualities of the reserve communities (generally small, highly distributed), to political ones (the absence of treaty relationships, the ongoing McKenna-McBride commission and the emergent Indigenous rights organizations/movements (McGowan, 2011)), to cultural ones (Carlson, 1997). The Department's initial hesitation to encourage enlistment in the area may have had a chilling effect. Moving beyond speculation will require research in communities themselves, as the limitations of departmental records are clearly evident in this context.

The stories of Indigenous men and women in the war and its aftermath are more than the sum of Department reports. That does not excuse a lackadaisical acceptance or rejection of those same records. Instead they must be examined within a complex scaffolding of geography, policy, culture, and social networks. This also means rejecting pan-Indigeneity in favour of a community-based approach. Conducting communitybased research is not about adding details, but better understanding the rhythms of life for those people in whom we are most interested. Their stories need to be privileged.

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