Networked security between “restraint” and “responsibility”?  
Germany’s security policy towards Africa

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Introduction

Germany seems to be on the brink of a new phase in its policy towards the African continent, both with regard to what usually is described as the Maghreb (North Africa) and what traditionally is referred to as sub-Saharan Africa. A pronounced security policy is in-the-making that may contribute to change fundamentally the civilian power attributes which have characterized Germany’s approach to the African continent so far. This development, first, is due to a combination of post-unification global geostrategic dynamics, amidst long-term harmonization of Germany’s Africa policy with those of the European Union (EU) and the Group of 7/8 (G7/8). Second, and more recently, it results from the rise of security threats of new dimensions in the Horn of Africa and the larger Sahel region since 2011 as well as the African Union’s (AU) financial constraints to address these comprehensively. And, third, the emerging partnerships between the AU and the United Nations (UN) on the one hand, and the EU on the other, contributed to this development.

This article, first, will provide a very brief synopsis of Germany’s Africa policy. Second, it will offer a (hopelessly incomplete) overview on the country’s most recent
security policy vis-à-vis the African continent by high-lighting: (1) Germany’s participation in international peacekeeping missions; (2) its involvement in the fight against piracy, terrorism, and transnational organized crime (TOC); and (3) its development assistance in support of the African Union’s efforts to establish the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). And, lastly, some concluding observations will be offered.

**Background to Germany’s Africa policy**

Since the Second World War, Germany has never really had a security policy, not to mention any strong military ambitions vis-à-vis Africa (with the marginal exception of the early 1960s in Tanzania and Nigeria where military training missions overlapped with efforts to export aircraft and other military equipment). Until the end of the Cold War, Germany’s Africa policy to a large extent was determined by external role expectations, mainly originating from its two most important allies, the United States and France, and later the European Union.¹ Within this set of relations, Germany strongly aimed at harmonizing and routinizing its Africa policy – a term that until recently was reserved for relations with sub-Saharan Africa only (for a long time, policies vis-à-vis the Maghreb followed a different pattern and were closely linked to Germany’s policy on Israel). Throughout the years there have been frequent conflicts between Germany’s Africa policy identity (or role conception) that was said to follow an interest in the peaceful promotion of human rights and democracy as well as fostering “development” on the one hand, and its partial contradictory self-interests (or role behaviour) on the other which in some cases led to the material support of, for instance, the Apartheid regime in South Africa.

But in general, academic analysis of Germany in Africa has focused largely in terms of civilian power politics – similar, in many ways, to Canada.² Germany argued for the limited use of force and pleaded for cooperation and security arrangements. It

¹ Here, and in the following, see: Ulf Engel, *Die Afrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1999: Rollen und Identitäten* (Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 2000).

favoured the strengthening of the rule of law through multilateral cooperation, integration, and the partial transfer of sovereignty. Germany promoted democracy and human rights, propagated non-violent forms of conflict management and resolution, supported social equity and sustainable development, and bolstered interdependence and an international division of labour.

In view of repeated calls for a renewed German Africa policy and, more importantly, a generally changing international environment in the 2010s, some adjustment of German Africa policy can be discerned. These changes have been conceptualized in a set of policy documents. Though the government has finally come up with one main document, the May 2014 Africa Policy Guidelines, additional documents still co-govern the different dimensions of Germany’s Africa policy, ranging from development policies, trade and foreign direct investment, and security policy to – most recently – the prevention of migration policies. In the field of security policy the most important documents are the Ministry of Defence’s 2006 and 2016 White Papers and its 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines as well as the Ministry of Development Cooperation’s 2004 Action Plan: Civil Conflict Prevention.

But in principle, the German government wants to follow a comprehensive and networked approach. In the May 2014 Africa Policy Guidelines the following perception of crisis, conflict, and interests is documented:

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6 BMVg (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung), White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: BMVg, 2006); BMVg, Defence Policy Guidelines 2011 (Berlin: BMVg, 2011); and BMVg, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: BMVg, 2016).

7 BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung), Aktionsplan: Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung (Bonn: BMZ, 2004).
... crises and the consequences of conflicts in Africa (displacement, organised crime, proliferation, terrorism, piracy and much more) also have a direct impact on Europe and Germany. Growing ties with the Maghreb region are reinforcing problems whose roots lie in sub-Saharan Africa. Instability triggers migration which, in turn, leads to human trafficking and social unrest. Internal and security policy cooperation with Africa is in our own national interest. In an interconnected and globalised world, in a Europe without borders, security in Germany can only be guaranteed if we help develop rule of law structures and functioning security entities in other regions.⁸

Although there is one Africa strategy, in practice there are still many different Africa policies that are pursued by various state and quasi-state actors. In the security realm these policies aim at (1) fostering regional integration through the AU and the RECs (Regional Economic Communities); (2) reducing state fragility, conflict and violence as well as preventing human rights violations; and (3) supporting the APSA as the continent’s peace and security vision.⁹ According to the Foreign Office, these policies are reinforced by activities in other sectors, including support for the African Governance Agenda (AGA) (i.e., support for good governance, human rights, rule of law, etc). All these policies are embedded in Germany’s multilateral tradition, with the European Union and, increasingly, the G7 providing important frames of reference.

### Changing peace and security landscape in Africa

To understand the newly unfolding German security policy towards Africa, one has to look at post-millennial global geostrategic shifts, more recent conflict dynamics on the African continent, the financial situation of the AU, and the dynamics of the

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⁸ German Federal Government, *Africa Policy Guidelines*, p. 4  
emerging partnerships between the AU and the UN on the one hand, and the EU on the other.\textsuperscript{10}

First, Germany’s new security policy towards Africa has to be located in the larger picture of the country’s post-9/11 geopolitics. Although after the German unification in 1990 the country has become increasingly engaged in UN peacekeeping missions, over the past three decades the different coalition governments – whether led by social-democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) or by conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel (since 2005) – showed considerable levels of restraint to act in international US-led military coalitions. Many observers related that to the country’s historical guilt by causing two World Wars in the 20th century.\textsuperscript{11} In any case, Germany was widely seen as a “reluctant warrior”.\textsuperscript{12}

This verdict was epitomized in Schröder’s refusal to get Germany drawn into the US-British invasion of Iraq in 2003 and also the country’s 2011 abstention in the UN Security Council on the resolution that paved the way for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to impose a no-fly zone in Libya that finally led to regime change and all kinds of regional repercussions.\textsuperscript{13} In the background, however, for many years a process of coordination and harmonization of Germany’s foreign and security policies has taken place that started in the mid-1970s with the European Political Cooperation, and has developed further in the 2000s in the G7 context.\textsuperscript{14} As a result, on many


\textsuperscript{11} On the construction of collective German memory on World War II and its instrumentalization see Maja Zehfuss, \textit{Memories of War. The Politics of War in Germany} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).


questions policy differences within various Western alliances usually are not that big – though, of course, not every issue has been homogenized to the same extent.

Second, in Africa “wars do not end!”
15, to paraphrase Straus’ premature assessment that “wars do end!”.
15 Since the mid-2000s the number of violent conflicts in Africa has dramatically increased. Based on the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer’s figures on violent conflict, the number of “wars” has increased in Africa from 2 in 2010 to 10 in 2011 (and remained at this level since), the number of “severe crisis” – which had dropped from 14 to 5 in the years 2006 to 2010 – has increased again to 13 (2012), and the number of “crises” has gone up, too, from 24 (2007) to 33 (2008), from 34 (2010) to 40 (2012) – peaking at 55 in 2014.16

According to the AU, the surge of violent conflict around 2006/2007 can be attributed to a considerable increase in election related violence, third term debates that turned sour and “unconstitutional changes of government”, or coups d’état.17 In 2011 there was another rise in the continent’s conflict curve associated with the so-called Arab Spring and the popular uprisings in the Maghreb,18 followed by a spread of terrorism and violent extremism across the region including the emergence or resurgence of terrorist movements such as Al-Mourabitoun, al-Qaida in the Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis (Egypt), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West

16 Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2002-2015, last accessed: August 26, 2016, http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/. Combined data for sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb (from Middle East section). Year-to-year Heidelberg data partly is inconsistent. “War” and “severe crisis” are characterized by high conflict intensity; all three forms of conflict are characterized by violence.
Africa (MUJAO), the so-called Islamic State Provinces (Sinai, Libya and Tunisia), al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram.\(^{19}\)

This has led the AU and the RECs, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa, to engage in a broad variety of activities, ranging from preventive diplomacy and mediation in the pre-conflict phase, to peace support operations and counter-terrorism measures in the conflict phase, to DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), SSR (security sector reform) and PCRD (post-conflict reconstruction and development) efforts in the post-conflict phase.\(^{20}\)

Meanwhile, the nature of violent conflict in Africa is said to have changed again.\(^{21}\) Nowadays, violent actors increasingly take on a multiplicity of roles (e.g., illegal trader, “rebel,” or Jihadist). They operate in transnational networks rather than clear-cut groups (e.g., Jihadists in Mali, Somalia, etc.). Many conflict situations are characterized by the presence of transterritorial deployments (e.g., UN refugee camps, Western Special Forces, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), etc.). And conflicts are developing at the margins of territories and in transnational theatres of operation (i.e., frontiers and borderlands, “ungoverned spaces,” etc.) rather than in state “containers”. Increasingly, it seems, that civilians – especially women and children – are targeted, leading to their massive displacements.\(^{22}\) In addition there are numerous low-level forms of ad hoc violence (often committed by non-state armed groups), xenophobic violence, localized violence (e.g., conflicts around cattle rustling or access to land), and routinized violence (for instance, during legitimate strikes).

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\(^{19}\) See AUC Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Tabled at the 455th PSC meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 2 September 2014 [PSC/AHG/2(CDLV)]; and AU PSC (African Union Peace and Security Council), “Communiqué of the 571st PSC meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 29 January 2016” [PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (DLXXI)].


But increasingly, the AU cannot shoulder the burden of addressing these conflicts comprehensively on its own.\textsuperscript{24} The AU’s total budget for 2016/2017 was US$782 million, out of which member states only contributed US$205 million and international partners US$576.9 million.\textsuperscript{25} Obviously, this budget cannot cater for on-going peacekeeping operations, mediation efforts, and other forms of engaging with violent conflict – not to mention post-reconstruction and development agendas or the structural prevention of violent conflict.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, there is a high degree of financial dependency.

And, finally, the emerging partnerships between the AU and the UN on the one hand, and the EU on the other, have set in motion certain dynamics of their own.\textsuperscript{27} Since around 2006/2007 both relationships have been intensified, institutionalized, and routinized. By now both partnerships have become the major sources of co-financing the AU’s APSA ambitions. The UN is putting up the bulk of resources for currently nine peacekeeping missions in Africa – in financial year 2015/2016 a record $6.840 billion or 82.65\% of all its expenditure on peacekeeping (in the previous five financial years, the average budget for Africa was $5.541 billion). In addition, the EU is supporting the AU through the African Peace Facility (APF). Between 2004 and 2015 a total amount of €1.703 billion has been contracted and more than €1.594 billion has been released through this instrument.\textsuperscript{28} In both cases, and according to the relevant scales of assessment, Germany has contributed substantially to these efforts.

To summarize, the debate about a possible geo-strategic isolation of Germany within the Western alliance has led German coalition governments to show loyalty to

\textsuperscript{25} AU Executive Council, “Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2017 Financial Year. 29\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary session of the Executive Council held in Kigali, Rwanda, on 13-15 July 2016” [EX.CL/Dec. 919 (XXIX)].
\textsuperscript{28} See: Engel, “The African Union finances”.

the alliance and commitment to shared EU values in some other theatres of conflict – mainly in the Balkans (Kosovo, since 1999) and in Afghanistan (2002-2014), but also by joining some interventions in Africa under the EU Common Defence and Security Policy (e.g., 2006 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC). In this context, the combination of increasing conflict on the continent and lack of finances and logistics on the part of the AU – combined with the fostering of the AU’s strategic partnerships with UN and EU – has slightly changed the situation, and prepared the ground for the current German government to extend its commitment towards the African continent.

**German contribution to peacekeeping and policing in Africa**

German experience with UN peace operations began after reunification in 1989/1990 with the deployment of non-combat troops in Cambodia (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC) and Namibia (UN Transition Assistance Group, UNTAG), as well as a larger contingent (up to 1,700 soldiers in August to October 1993) in Somalia (UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II). Since 1994, Germany has participated actively in combat missions as well, but its contributions have been heavily concentrated outside the purview of the UN, in missions deployed by NATO and the EU. Contributions to UN-led peacekeeping operations in Africa have consisted of a steady but small number of military observers, covering for example the entire mandate periods for the ... AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Other contributions include the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)....

Current missions include the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), UNAMID in Darfur/Sudan, UNMIL in Liberia, UNMISS in

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30 Providing for Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Germany,” last accessed: August 26, 2016, [http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-germany/](http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-germany/). Providing for Peacekeeping is a project of the International Peace Institute, the Elliott School at George Washington University, and the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland.
the Sudan, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in Somalia.\textsuperscript{31}

In July 1998 Germany joined the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). Its contributions are focused on “the areas of land and air transport, medical capacity, engineering, communications, maritime components, military observers, military police and staff personnel”.\textsuperscript{32} The establishment of the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin in 2002 boosted professionalization in the area of “civilian capacities for international peace operations” – and election observer missions.\textsuperscript{33}

Financially Germany currently is the fourth largest contributor to UN peace support operations, after the United States, China and Japan, contributing 6.26\% to the 2016 budget (in 2006, it was third behind the US and Japan at 8.42\%; and in 1996, also third with 8.65\%).\textsuperscript{34} According to Providing for Peacekeeping (2016), Germany’s current contribution in terms of providing boots on the ground breaks down as follows:

\textsuperscript{31} BMVg, “Einsätze,” last accessed: August 26, 2016, \url{https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/}.
\textsuperscript{32} Providing for Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Germany.”
Table 1: German troop contributions to international missions (as of 31 December 2015)

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<th>EU missions (146)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Darfur (UNAMID, 12: 4p, 8t)</td>
<td>Mali (EUTM, 146)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (UNMIL, 7: 2e, 5p)</td>
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<td>South Sudan (UNMISS 24: 9e, 10p, 5t)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali (MINUSMA, 24: 1e, 15p, 8t)</td>
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<td>Western Sahara (MINURSO, 4e)</td>
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<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (UNAMA, 1e)</td>
<td>Afghanistan (ISAF, 1,599)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo (UNMIK, 1p)</td>
<td>Kosovo (KFOR, 674)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon (UNIFIL, 102 t)</td>
<td>Ukraine (OSCE, 21)</td>
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Note: e = 17 experts, p = 35 police, t = 123 troops in UN missions.
Source: Providing for Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Germany,” 2016:
http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-germany/.

End of 2015 figures suggest that 6.69% of all German international deployments (or 207 men and woman) were based in Africa. On 28 January 2016, Germany’s parliament approved the stationing of up to 650 troops to join MINUSMA in Mali. As of 15 August 2016 a total of 2,935 Germans were stationed abroad, including 497 with MINUSMA. Thus, within less than eight months the current number of Germans in international missions in Africa has increased by 17.74% to 24.43%.

The background to these developments is succinctly summarised by Providing for Peacekeeping:

The German Armed Forces are currently undergoing significant reform and restructuring. The reform process was initiated in 2010 and has been in the process of implementation since 2012. Motivated by austerity and the desire to address capability gaps and operations problems, the reform has included significant budget cuts, base closures, personnel reduction, the move to an all-volunteer force, and a restructuring

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35 Bundeswehr, “Aktuelle Einsätze,” last accessed: August 26, 2016,
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/.
emphasizing flexibility and broad-spectrum capabilities. Underlying the reform process was an orientation from the operation. Consequently, one of the reform’s targets is guaranteeing the permanent availability of 10,000 combat-ready troops for overseas deployment [current size of the defence force: 177,000]. This reflects the priority status of conflict resolution operations in the German Armed Forces’ mission, albeit overwhelmingly within the framework of its regional alliance commitments.

In addition to UN missions, Germany is also participating in all three components of EU missions: military, policy, and civilian. In the military component this includes education for the EU Training Mission for Somalia, advice to EUSEC (EU SSR in DRC), provision of airlift capacity for UNAMID (Darfur/Sudan), observer at UNMISS (South Sudan), and training plans (e.g., RPTC Harare). Completed military-police missions include the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) Kinshasa, and EUPOL in the DRC (2003, 2005-2007, 2006 and 2007-2014, respectively) as well as today’s police component concerns with EU police mission in Somalia.

**Fighting Piracy, Terrorism and TOC**

Three issues are perceived to warrant a German security presence in Africa: (1) to prevent the development of save heavens for “terrorists and religious extremists” in Europe’s periphery; (2) to further prevent the development of what is referred to as “corridors of irregular migration”; and (3) to protect international trade routes.

Historically, the latter has been the most recent point of entry for Germany. Its navy is still participating in the EU Operation Naval Force *Atalanta* off the Somali coast in the waters around the Horn of Africa. It joined this operation under the EU Common

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36 Providing for Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Germany.”
38 BMVg, “Einsätze.”
Security and Defence Policy in December 2008. At its peak this was the biggest German naval operation since the Second World War. Parliament has just extended the country’s participation to 31 May 2017. The personnel cap has been reduced from 950 to 600; currently there are some 313 people deployed.  

Already for a number of years counter-terrorism and anti-TOC policies have been supported by the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau (BKA), for instance through training organised with the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), based in Algiers, Algeria. Part of these activities fell under *Euromed Police III*, an EU 2012-2014 programme under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to combat cybercrime. This in turn has been critiqued by some German political parties because it was feared that the transferred surveillance techniques could also be used against the concerned country’s political opposition and civil society. Here the regional focus is on Tunisia. In addition, Germany is supporting a number of more recent international programmes, for instance it is funding the Interpol OASIS (Operational Assistance, Services and Infrastructure Support) programme in Africa. At several German embassies the BKA, the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*) and the military attachés of the Defence Forces have formed small teams to backstop and support some of these activities and, more generally, network German security efforts. However, fighting TOC is not only a manner of the BKA, but also of German International Aid (GIZ, see below) which has a development agenda around the TOC issue.  

Since 2011 there is an annual US$100 million budget from both the Foreign Office and Defence, called the “getting physically fit” initiative to foster “conflict prevention” and assist countries with counter-terrorism hardware (2016 beneficiaries: Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Tunisia). Some of these activities call for more coordination and cohesion with partners, for instance through the recently launched EU “Enable and Enhance

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40 Bundeswehr, “Aktuelle Einsätze.”
41 See, for instance: Deutscher Bundestag, “Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abg. u.a. und der Fraktion Die Linke” (Berlin: DBT; BT-Drucksache 17/12981, 2013).
Initiative” (E2I)\textsuperscript{44} which is trying to support holistic conflict responses from capacity-building for armed and police forces, to conflict prevention – thus reiterating a security-development nexus that had already been discussed ten years ago.\textsuperscript{45} Pilot cases are being pursued in Mali and Somalia. In addition, since 2006 a small number of German troops also regularly participate in Exercise Flintlock, in which US, Canadian, and European Special Forces work with and train their African counterparts.\textsuperscript{46}

All in all, activities in this diffuse field appear to be manifold, not all of them fully transparent, but there seems to be a general trend to increasingly link these activities both among the various German agencies and the main international partners with a view to create greater coherence and synergy.

**German Development Aid: Supporting APSA**

A good example of the security-development nexus can be seen in the activities of German International Aid (Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Entwicklung GmbH, GIZ) in support of the African Union’s and the REC’s APSA. GIZ is a registered company that for the past 50 years or so has been involved in development assistance, starting as the government’s official implementation agency in 1975. Headquartered in Bonn and Berlin, business volume exceeded €2.1 billion in 2015, and staff of 17,319 works in Germany and over 130 countries.\textsuperscript{47} Most of the below mentioned projects or programmes have been commissioned by the German Ministry of Development Assistance (BMZ), yet for the last few years Foreign Affairs commands some substantial financial official development assistance resources in its own right.

Thematically, GIZ has worked on small-arms and light weapons (SALW) control, DDR, SSR, analysis including Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA), and


capacity-building. The current programme components to assist the AU Commission include:

- support for the operationalization of the APSA (2009-2017);
- capacity development for the AU Commission Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security (Conflict Management Division & Peace Support Operations, respectively), which involved the provision of long-term consultants for policy development and planning as well as the Continental Early Warning System and Panel of the Wise (since 2006);
- finances for the Police Programme Africa, to support one particular component of the African Standby Force (ASF, 2013-2015);
- subsidies for the African Peace and Security Programme (APSP) as a joint project with the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University, which in 2010 started developing a master’s course in peace and security for senior officials of the AU and the RECs;
- support to the AU Border Programme (AUBP) that is to re-demarcate African borders, assist in border management, and thereby prevent future conflict on borders (2008-2018);
- aid the launching of the institutionalization of an African Security Conference (2011-2013) which has been established by IPSS as the TANA High-Level Forum on Security in Africa (and run for a fifth time this year).

In addition, the German Foreign Office provided €20 million for the construction of the AU’s new peace and security building (while the AU’s new headquarters was “a gift of the Chinese people”). The building was officially opened by Chancellor Merkel and the Chairperson of the AUC on 11 October 2016.

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GIZ support to African RECs currently involves seven components, including:

- the German Partnership Programme for Excellence in Biological and Health Security with implementation through the governments of Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan (2013-2016);
- a Civil Peace Service programme aiming at conflict transformation and crisis prevention in the area of cross-border transhumance in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger and (2011-2016);
- with the Police Programme Africa (with funds from the Foreign Office), assistance was provided to national ministries for internal security and national police structures as well as RECs (2009-2015);
- regional coordination of peace and security activities in Africa among GIZ offices that offer capacity-building to RECs such as East African Community (EAC), ECOWAS or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (2005-2015);
- support of the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, which provides training for civilian, police, and military personnel in areas of conflict prevention, conflict management, and resolution (2004-2018);
- support of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe (yet at times with some difficulties because of EU sanctions on Zimbabwe);
- assistance to the secretariats of both the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) (2004-2014) and EAC (2009-2014).

Cooperation with the IGAD on the organization’s conflict early warning system CEWARN, which was started already in 1990, ceased in 2011.

Overall, GIZ’s contribution in this field differs from other international donors in two ways: the mode of delivery has become almost unique as GIZ is still offering capacity development with staff on the ground; and GIZ invests in comparatively long-
term periods of assistance – in this case with ten to twelve year periods of support to APSA. For the organization itself, various opportunities arose to network its activities in different RECs and thereby, at least in principle, create synergies. With regard to the sustainability and impact of these interventions, GIZ itself is cautiously optimistic and positive.50 Some of the above mentioned support policies will be phased out in 2017/2018 (or already have come to an end). On the one hand one might argue that Germany is giving away a comparative advantage over other OECD DAC countries, but also an effective policy instrument, too early. But on the other, the AU aims at the full implementation of APSA by 2018.51

However, since around autumn 2015 all German security and development interventions in Africa are facing a new challenge, as the Federal Government and in particular BMZ are very keen to use all existing instruments to reduce the number of refugees entering Germany mainly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but also from Eritrea or Nigeria. Among various other initiatives, this policy has led to the adoption of the Valetta Action Plan of 10-11 November 2015 between the EU and a number of African governments. Since then, even smaller and very case specific German interventions in Africa countries have to demonstrate their contributions to reducing the number of refugees. German policies towards Africa are undergoing a period of securitization.52 One could argue that the security-development nexus many German actors find to be relevant in Africa has now been complemented by a – though debatable – migration-security nexus in Europe.

**Arms Trade**

Apart from the civilian power habitus primarily displayed in the fields of peace support and development assistance, there is another dimension of Germany’s security

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50 See: GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), APSA Impact Report. Results-Based Desk Study on the state of APSA instruments and on Interventions of AU and Regional Economic Communities for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Reporting Period 2007-2013 (Eschborn: GIZ, 2014).


policy towards Africa – that of an industrialized export nation selling arms. These exports are regulated by federal and international laws, most importantly the Weapons of War Control Law (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) and the Foreign Trade Law (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz). In addition there are Political Principles the government adopted in 2000, further principles on the sale of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2015), the 2008 EU Common Position and the 2014 international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Accordingly, each single export is based on a decision taken by the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat). The oversight ministry is that of economics and energy, BMWi. In principle the government is aiming at a Europeanization of standards and politics. Although the government claims to follow a transparent policy of restraint, regular critique is aired because of the volume of arms trade and the repressive nature of some of the recipient countries.

Internationally, Germany remains an important arms dealer, though in the past five years its share of global arms exports has gone down by more than 50% (to 4.7% during 2011-2015 compared to 11.7% during 2006-2010). Quoting SIPRI figures, the latest annual arms exports report of the ministry puts Germany in fifth place – following the United States, Russia, China, and France.\(^\text{53}\) The ministry’s report differentiates between single permits and aggregative permits. In 2015 a total of €7.859 billion in single permits was granted (2010: €4.754 billion; 2005: €4.216 billion – excluding SALW). In addition the ministry also approved €4.960 billion (2010: €0.737 billion; 2005: €2.032 billion) in aggregative permits.\(^\text{54}\) In 2015 the single biggest export permit granted to an African country was on trucks for the Algerian army worth €411 million,\(^\text{55}\) followed by smaller deals with South Africa (€19.5 million), Egypt (€18.7 million) and Botswana (€13.9 million). The biggest arms deal in Africa in recent years was the sale of four MEKO-A200 frigates and three Type 209 /1440 submarines to South


\(^\text{54}\) BMWi, Rüstungsexportbericht 2015, p. 22.

\(^\text{55}\) BMWi, Rüstungsexportbericht 2015, p. 82.
Africa, delivered in 2005-2008 and highly controversial in that country. The volume of these deals was €924 million and €748 million, respectively.\textsuperscript{56}

In 2015 the share of so-called developing countries (following OECD DAC criteria) in total German arms trade was 3.5%.\textsuperscript{57} At the same time, arms embargos were imposed in the following cases: Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, DRC, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{58}

Conclusions: “Networked Security” Beyond Civilian Power Politics

For many German policymakers today, the continent is seen as a not too distant site of multiple security threats – ranging from fragile states, to terrorism and violent extremism to “irregular migration”. In contrast to the first four or five decades after the second wind of change in the 1960s, this time Germany is firmly developing a “networked” security policy towards Africa. Of course, Africa also serves as a laboratory both for intra-German policy harmonization among security actors and the practicalities of German-European intervention strategies. In this thrust Germany certainly has no ambition to assume European or even global leadership (even if Germany is still the world’s fourth largest economy and, compared to many, still a rather healthy one). But with the increase of its MINUSMA contribution, the regional distribution of German peacekeeping has definitely shifted towards Africa, where almost a quarter of all troops globally involved in peace support operations are deployed. Slowly, German peacekeeping is becoming Africanized. This might hold interesting perspectives for the future with regard to doctrines, but also with regard to the division of labour between the various actors addressing the security-development nexus.

Finally, this brief essay certainly is not the place to interrogate in greater detail how exactly coordination and harmonization of security policies between various


\textsuperscript{57} BMWi, Rüstungsexportbericht 2015, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{58} BMWi, Rüstungsexportbericht 2015, p. 80.
German actors has developed over the past five years or so. In-depth case studies on recent interventions are still missing.\textsuperscript{59} Thorough document analysis and interviews need to be carried out to reach firm conclusions about the nature and direction of Germany’s security policy towards Africa and also the prospects of civilian power politics of the non-P3 members in the G7 (Germany, Canada, Japan, and Italy).

\textsuperscript{59} A remarkable exception, on Mali and Libya in particular, is Hanisch, \textit{On German foreign and security policy}. 