

Preparing for Peace in Time of War: Canada and the Post-Hostilities Planning Committees, 1943-1945

Monique Dolak

During the Second World War, as the likelihood of Allied success grew, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) looked towards the post-war world. The increasingly international posture of the Canadian government, coupled with concerns over the shape of the post-war international structure, and Canada's role within it, inspired the Department of External Affairs (DEA) to focus its efforts on post-war planning. For the first time in the DEA's short history, it began to vigorously "plan for the future".¹ This took the form of Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Committees. The PHP framework was not only an exercise in post-war planning, but inter-service and interdepartmental relations. While the three Canadian military services were active participants in the work done, it was dominated by the DEA. Considerations of the military often tended toward more immediate wartime concerns. The PHP committees also served as a means of bringing the services into closer contact and communication with one another. However, political and diplomatic considerations dominated and the services were often sidelined during meetings. Thus, while the Canadian Chiefs of Staff

¹ John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Vol. 1: The Early Years* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), p. 300.

and their representatives sat on the Committees, their ability to shape policy proved limited.

On 4 December 1942, the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs telegraphed External Affairs to inform them of the British efforts to study post-war issues. The Dominions Secretary advised that they would soon approach the Dominion governments for their views related to post-war proposals.² These proposals included "principles for ending hostilities, maintenance of law and order in occupied countries, and their interest in participation in the proposed United Nations Commission for Europe and in the European policing system."³ Thoroughly unprepared to comment or offer advice, Canadian officials recognized the need to begin pondering these questions for themselves or risk their interests to those of other states. However, it took several months for the government to establish a mechanism through which to respond to the British plans and draft coordinated policies of its own.

The British proposals were not the sole impetus for the creation of Canada's own post-hostilities planning machinery. By 1943, as Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King noted in his diary, "the fear of defeat had passed"⁴ and he increasingly began to think towards the future. While the Prime Minister's focus remained chiefly on domestic considerations, the Canadian political environment ripened for greater post-war discourse. The Casablanca Conference of January 1943 helped advance this growing domestic interest in active post-war efforts on the part of the Canadian government. Thus, the British proposals arrived at an important juncture in Canadian foreign affairs thinking. The Canadian government was initially reluctant to engage. It sought to avoid making international commitments which it perceived as serving other states' interests, not Canada's. However, as public and parliamentary support for an increased Canadian role in post-war policies grew more evident, officials within the DEA took advantage of this opportunity. This was led by Norman Robertson,

² Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 December 1942, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AC(s), Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC).

³ Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 June 1943, in Donald Page, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER)*, Volume 9, 1942-1943 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1980), pp. 555-556.

⁴ William Lyon Mackenzie King, *Diary*, Diary (hereafter King diary), 7 January 1943, *William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds*, LAC.

Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, and Hume Wrong, Assistant Undersecretary of State for External Affairs.⁵

Canadian officials were not oblivious to the lack of future planning within the government. Key individuals of the DEA, namely Hume Wrong and Escott Reid, Second Secretary, examined this issue previously. In early 1942, both men advocated for the DEA to be modified into "a planning, thinking, creative body", which should no longer "be content merely to solve-day-to-day problems as they arise."⁶ As detailed by Political Scientist Don Munton and Historian Don Page, "foreign policy planning efforts are rare in foreign affairs bureaucracies", and Canada was no exception.⁷ In this capacity, Canadian foreign policy was handled "in a workaday manner".⁸ The constantly changing international framework impeded the ability of the government to plan in advance. Thus, while officials attempted to prepare for the future, they still had to fulfill their everyday roles. A concerted effort was made, but post-war planning was never the central focus and remained secondary to the regular work and responsibilities of its members. These basic limitations resulted in ad hoc policy decisions and seriously impeded any movements for detailed post-war planning in advance. Nevertheless determined, vague planning for Canada's international future began in early 1942. However, the focus was placed on efforts to obtain greater international wartime representation, specifically on Allied boards and committees which they believed would shape the post-war world.

The United States' entry into the war served as a catalyst. No longer "the senior North American ally", American entry into the war decreased Canadian significance drastically. The lack of Canadian influence during the war frustrated many senior

⁵ It is important to note that domestically post-war planning had begun much earlier. The Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Re-Establishment was created in December 1939. Its succeeding General Advisory Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation which was established in August 1940.

⁶ Escott Reid, "The United States and Canada: Dominion, Co-operation, Absorption," 12 January 1942, MG31 E46, Volume 30, File United States and Canada 1942-1945, LAC.

⁷ Don Munton and Don Page, "Planning in the East Block: The Post-Hostilities Problems Committee in Canada, 1943-1945," *International Journal* 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1977): pp. 688-689. Munton and Page provided a number of explanations for this reality, such as personnel shortages, namely a "high problems-to-personnel ratio", and the "incompatibility between the roles of diplomat and planner".

⁸ James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 153.

officials in the Department of External Affairs and they worked to assert their position on the world stage. As a result, Canadians championed increased representation and a greater presence on the war councils being established in Washington. Recognizing that Canada could not viably or successfully obtain equal representation in the Anglo-American war structure, Canadian self-promotion internationally took the form of 'functionalism'. In the context of the war, the functional principle was articulated by Hume Wrong, then Minister Counsellor at the Canadian Legation in Washington, in early 1942. Writing to Norman Robertson, Wrong stated that "each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of war proportionate to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle [was] that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they [were] directly concerned." Recognizing the importance of Canadian conformity to the Allied war effort, Wrong was not challenging the right of great powers to dominate international affairs. He was simply trying to obtain a greater voice for Canada in spheres of direct interest. As it was, there were two types of powers on the internal stage, the great powers and the rest. Canada, somewhere in between the two, thus merited greater international standing. In the form of the Combined Anglo-American organizations established out of the Arcadia Conference of December 1941 to January 1942, functionalism took the form of representation whereby Canadian efforts were concentrated on their efforts to gain membership on these newly created boards.⁹ In this capacity, Canada never really sought to punch above its weight. Instead, it sought a voice and influence commensurate with its actual standing and contributions. However, its status, both as a dominion and its position as "somewhere between the big powers and the rest", was both contentious and curious. Ultimately, functionalism proved an unappealing concept and left Canadian officials frustrated over their treatment by the larger powers. Nevertheless, during the war it was the policy with dominated External Affairs thinking and was the policy framework through which much of their foreign policy interests were championed.

As previously mentioned, Canadian efforts to achieve functional representation in the combined war structure was not simply a concern due to immediate wartime

⁹ A.J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," *International Journal* 35 (1980): pp. 314-6; and Wrong to Robertson, 20 January 1942, RG25, vol. 2964, File 3265-A-40c Part 1, LAC.

issues, or questions of status and prestige. They looked forward as they attempted to carve out a more favourable position for Canada in the post-war structure which officials foresaw being defined by international organizations. In this context, they aimed to secure a 'special' position for Canada between the major powers and the 'smaller' nations as a middle power, as it would be termed in post-war Canadian diplomatic discourse. Other major issues, such as the overarching likelihood of a four power world order and the looming question of Commonwealth unity, also motivated Canada to reassess its place in the world as well as its needs at home.

While it took several months, the British proposals and post-war planning structure provided the DEA with the means and impetus to create a Canadian planning framework. The Department of National Defence (DND) did not receive the British reports directly and its representatives in London on the British Military Sub-Committee had not considered them important enough to send to Ottawa. Nevertheless, in July 1943 DND, in conjunction with other governmental departments were tasked with the consideration, discussion and assessment of the British proposals.¹⁰ The same month the Canadian High Commissioner in London suggested that Canada name a political official to represent Canada informally on the British Military Sub-Committee in London. In order to provide this official with some guidance, he advocated for the creation of a similar body in Ottawa.¹¹

On 22 July, representatives from the three Canadian Services, the DEA, and the Privy Council Office (PCO) met to discuss the British proposals.¹² Wrong served as Chairman and John Wendell Holmes, temporary wartime assistant of the DEA, served as Secretary. During the meeting, Air Marshal Lloyd Breadner, Chief of the Air Staff, and Admiral Percy Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff, stressed the importance on Canadian participation in the post-war policing of Europe especially if Canada "wished

¹⁰ Munton and Page, "The Operations of the Post-War Hostilities Planning Group in Canada, 1943-1945," Paper presented to the 55th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association (Laval University, 2 June 1976), 76/188, Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), pp. 12-13.

¹¹ "Proposals of the High Commissioner", 22 July 1943, RG25, Volume 5710, File 7-AB(s), LAC.

¹² In attendance was Admiral P.W. Nelles, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner, Brigadier P. Earnshaw, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel J.H. Jenkins, Director of Military Operations and Planning (Army), Air Commodore K.M. Gurthie, Deputy Air Member of Air Staff (Plans), Paymaster Lieutenant Commander G.F. Todd, Secretary, Plans Division (Navy), A.D.P. Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council, N.A. Robertson, H.H. Wrong, G.deT. Glazebrook, DEA, J.W. Holmes, DEA.

to obtain any national status." Wrong advised against such commitments, concerned that Canadian forces may need to be relocated elsewhere at the cessation of European hostilities and highlighted participation in the area of economic relief. To this, Robertson applied the functional principle to suggest that Canada "demand a place" on the UN Commission for Europe Steering Committee. When approaching the CWC, Robertson suggested, the issue of post-war European policing commitments should be framed as a "first installment" for which "refusal by Canada to take part would mean a reversion to isolationism."¹³ On this issue, both military and DEA interests converged in opposition to a resurgence of pre-war isolationism in favour of growing internationalism.

The first unofficial meeting of what later would become the PHP Advisory Committee was an important building block towards interdepartmental coordination. Towards the end of the meeting, Wrong, in agreement with the High Commissioner, proposed the creation of a body in Ottawa which could review the plans of the British Sub-Committee and provide advice to DEA and Service representatives in London. A.D.P. Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council Office (PCO), suggested that officers from the three Services be named to meet representatives of the DEA and other interested departments. The Working Committee's function was "to consider the documents received from London and advise the Chiefs of Staff and the Government. If important decisions were to be taken, those attending the present meeting could reassemble to consider them. Holmes was to act as secretary and look after the circulation of papers received."¹⁴ The first meeting of the preliminary Working Committee took place in Wrong's office soon after, on 3 August 1943.¹⁵

Wrong based the Canadian post-war planning structure off the British PHP Sub-Committee, a Joint Foreign Office-Chiefs of Staff body. The British body was tasked with providing a "Joint Service viewpoint in regard to post-hostilities strategic

¹³ John Wendell Holmes, Secretary, "Minutes of a meeting to consider post-hostilities problems," 22 July 1943, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Present at the meeting was: H. Wrong, DEA, Chairman, Major H.C. Grant, Army, Gp. Capt. W.F. Hanna, Air Force, Lt. Cmdr. G. F. Todd, Naval Services, Lt. Cmdr. D.K. MacTavism, Privy Council, C. Det. Glazebrook, DEA, R.G. Robertson, DEA, and J.W. Holmes, DEA, Secretary. Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 1st Meeting, 3 August 1943, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC.

questions" and serving "as a channel through which Service Departments can exchange views with the Foreign Office and other interested Departments of State." Though a Cabinet committee, the Sub-Committee reported, and was directly subordinate, to the British Chiefs of Staff. Each service appointed two representatives and the Foreign Office named a representative to serve as chairman. The British Sub-Committee contained a full-time staff which studied post-war issues referred by the War Office, the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, and other governmental department. However, the War Office alone could sanction the studies it undertook. The Foreign Office Chairman, Gladwyn Jebb, was the only civilian on the sub-committee and did not help draft the studies. For the Foreign Office, the body provided a means of contact with the Services and the chairman served only as a liaison to keep the Foreign Office informed. Overtime, the Chiefs of Staff resented his position which they perceived as "diplomatic infiltration".¹⁶

The Canadian post-hostilities planning machinery took the form of two primary committees: an Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Planning, officially approved in November 1943, and a Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Planning. Interdepartmental bodies, they contained officials from the DEA, the three Canadian services and the PCO. The Working Committee's purpose was to provide a framework for consultation between the civilian and military departments in the area of planning. At the first meeting, the members also decided that the Working Committee's purpose was "to originate proposals and to give advice."¹⁷

The Canadian bodies differed significantly from the British. Whereas the British PHP Sub-Committee was predominately a military body,¹⁸ the Canadian PHP machinery was under civilian management. This dissimilarity was deliberate.

¹⁶ Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS(43)199(Final), "Military Problems Arising on the Cessation of Hostilities, 25 July 1943, CAB 80/40/99, quoted in Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-1947* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 52-54; Munton and Page, "The Operations of the Post-War Hostilities Planning Group in Canada, 1943-1945", pp. 19-20; and John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949* (Hong King: Kent University Press, 1993), p. 19.

¹⁷ Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 1st Meeting, 3 August 1943, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC.

¹⁸ In the British context, Civil issues were handled by the Armistice and Civil Administration Committee (ACA), reclassified the Armistice and Post-War Committee (APW) in April 1944. Lewis, *Changing Direction*, p. 89.

Robertson and Wrong doubted the political planning capabilities of military officials and thus worked to reassert the DEA's authority over post-war planning. Furthermore, it had a direct interest in a number of post-war civil and defence issues with larger international implications for Canada's role in the post-war world. More broadly, civilians within the Canadian government similarly sought to assert their control over post-hostilities planning, from social issues, such as unemployment, to military and strategic considerations, such as demobilization, participation in the war against Japan, and post-war overseas military commitments.¹⁹

The role of the planning committees, which began by merely commenting on British proposals, evolved gradually. It was only after the Cabinet War Committee (CWC) approved the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Planning in November 1943, when members had already been meeting for over three months, did real planning begin. While this was a little late, as a secondary power they did not have to start from the ground up. In fact, Wrong advised against doing so as "it would be a wasted effort" since Canada does "not have enough influence to make our views prevail." As the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference approached, Wrong, with the approval of the Advisory Committee, expanded the scope of the Working Committee to consider larger economic and political issues.²⁰ The range of discussion consisted of broad considerations of Canada's role in the world, post-war defence relations with the United States and the Commonwealth, issues regarding the surrender of Italy and Germany, overseas commitments, postwar defence establishment, civil administration, and the reparation of Canadian prisoners of war.

Upon his return from Washington in the latter half of 1944 where he served as Army Member and Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Major General Maurice Arthur Pope was invited by Wrong to join the Working Committee. Previously struck by the lack of pre-war defence preparation and resulting inefficiency at the outset of the Second World War, Pope jumped on this opportunity. He immediately got to work on a

¹⁹ J.L. Granatstein, *Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarin, 1935-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 162.

²⁰ Wrong, "Canadian Planning for the International Settlement," 23 February 1944, RG25, Volume 5712, File 7-AQ(s), LAC; Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 28 March 1944, RG25, Volume 5712, File 7-AQ(s), LAC.

paper on "Post-War Politico-Military Organization". In it, he stressed the need for a greater level of preparedness. While cognisant of the national psyche on security and Canada's favourable geographical location, he still stressed the importance of defence obligations both for itself and to appease American apprehensions. Pope also recommended the retention of the CWC, to be transformed into a defence committee to study all matters related to defence. Finally, he recommended that reports be prepared which detailed the work of the departments during the war for future use and study. A little radically, Pope also recommended that the Minister of Defence should have authority over the coordination of all three services, essentially recommending integration to limit the power of individual forces and grant greater power to the Minister of Defence.²¹

With regard to defence, planners rejected the possibility of an attack on North America for at least ten years. As such, they believed national defence would be restricted to an issue of maintenance. However, the issue of regional or universal security became a major consideration of the PHP Committees. Planners were concerned about Canada's role, and that of fellow secondary powers, in the post-war security organization. In January 1944, Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, gave a speech in Toronto in which he encouraged Commonwealth unity. This angered King, who promptly informed the Governor General that "if it were not for the war, I would this evening be asking ... for the dissolution of Parliament to appeal to the people."²² Canadian official objected to any "British Commonwealth strategy" on the post-war security organization. Genuinely committed to collective security, officials preferred a universal approach, which included the development of an international force. This fit into the broader Canadian conception of a multilateral security framework whereby Canada would not be defensively reliant on the United States. It would also serve to limit future conflict between other states, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Planners feared that an Anglo-American security structure would be used against the Soviet Union. Thus, a universal structure which included the

²¹ Major General Maurice Arthur Pope, "Post-War Politico-Military Organization," 13 January 1945, Reports from Major General Pope, 314.009 (D372), DHH.

²² James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, Volume 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 202.

Soviet Union was critical. This was consistent with King's view that the post-war world ought not to rely on force for security, but rather collective coercion.²³

External Affairs and the Services struggled in their efforts to reach a consensus, with differing interests as well as perceptions of the PHP Committees' purpose. This was particularly evident in two key areas of interest to the military: the post-war size of the Canadian forces and the creation of a school for civil administration. As early as the first meeting of the Working Committee, the army, represented by Major H.C. Grant, raised the topic of the training of Canadians for the administration of occupied territories. It was, in fact, the very first issue he raised. He thought it was a more pertinent issue than Canadian participation in the formulation of allied policy. The army preferred that Canadians be trained at home, and if not in Canada than in British schools at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre in Wimbledon. The issue continued to be raised in subsequent meetings. The Working Committee determined that the school would be for all services, but should be under army control, as was the case in Britain, and attached to a university. The issue was placed within the hands of DND, and soon after the CWC accepted these proposals and approved the school on 6 October 1943. The school was attached to the Royal Military College in Kingston and titled the Canadian Civil Affairs Staff Course. Authorities in the United Kingdom quickly recommended that the school's creation be "halted" due to the Moscow Conference. The War Office additionally recommended that "the objects of the School could better and more economically be achieved ... by accepting added vacancies at Wimbledon where specialist instructors and complete facilities were readily available". General Stuart, however, rejected this suggestion and the Canadian school continued as planned, but was limited to 24 students.²⁴ Vincent Massey, High Commissioner to the United

²³ Ibid., pp. 147-149, 201-203; Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 15th Meeting, 2 March 1944; Minutes of 17th Meeting, 30 March 1944; Minutes of 25th Meeting, 3 July 1944, Minutes of 29th Meeting, 26 August 1944; Minutes of 33rd Meeting, 19 October 1944, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC; Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 28 March 1944; Minutes of 8th Meeting, 16 March 1945, RG25, Volume 5712, File 7-AQ(s), LAC; and C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: The Mackenzie King Era, 1921-1948*, volume 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 377-378.

²⁴ Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 1st Meeting, 3 August 1943; Minutes of 2nd Meeting, 17 August 1943; Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 31 August 1943; Minutes of 7th meeting, 9

Kingdom, agreed with Stuart's decision. The army, however, had dissenters. For example, Brigadier W.B. Wedd, Senior Civil Affairs Officer, later commented that "the setting up of a course at Kingdom was done on the initiative of NDHQ supported by External Affairs, or vice versa. I have always felt that it was basically unnecessary and that all Canadian graduates could be trained at Wimbledon."²⁵ Despite the start of the first course in December 1943, the issue of civil affairs administration and training continued to be raised during meetings of the Working Committee, though Wrong noted that it "was not a subject which came strictly within the terms of reference of the Committee."²⁶

With the cuts and struggles of the interwar years an all too recent memory, a major post-war planning preoccupation of the three services was the size of post-war military. Viewing a lack of preparedness as a major cause of the war, they sought greater post-war forces. While they recognized that planning for this could only occur in detail once the Canadian government had decided on policy, they pushed for its discussion and stressed what their post-war requirements would be. The Army in particular pushed for a large peacetime military, despite a lack of perceived threat. An early army proposal recommended that the "approximate size of the permanent Canadian Army of the future" be considered "even at this early stage".²⁷ Similarly, the RCAF stated the importance of offensive, in addition to defensive, capabilities, as well as the ability to transition quickly and rapid transition planning. The RCN stressed their need for large ships for coastal and continental defence, the advancement of national policies and interests, as well as contribute to imperial sea communications, as least as it related to trade.²⁸ This issue persisted for the remainder of the PHP machinery's life.

In July 1945, King finally raised issue of size and nature of post-war forces in a Cabinet meeting as the government needed to be able inform parliament. This became the subject of what would be the final meeting of the Advisory Committee on 31 July.

November 1943, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC; Historical Officer, Directorate of History, CHMQ Report No. 140, "Canadian Participation in Civil Affairs/Military Government," pp. 5-12.

²⁵ Senior Civil Affairs Officer to Chief of Staff, 19 May 1944, quoted in CMHQ Report No. 140, p. 9.

²⁶ Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 22nd Meeting, 2 June 1944, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC.

²⁷ Lt.-Colonel J.C. Collinson, "Memorandum on Post-War Problems: Some Army Aspects," 14 September 1943, RG25, Volume 5710, File AB(s), LAC. (P8301705)

²⁸ Eayrs, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*, pp. 78-82.

King specifically requested information both on forces required until the end of the war with Japan as well as the "size and character" future peacetime defence forces, including financial cost and personnel numbers. Heeney wanted to provide the Cabinet with recommendations for its meeting, to be held the following day. The dilemma was that these were separate issues and the Advisory Committee was only concerned with the latter, which in itself depended on varying conditions. General Murchie, Chief of the General Staff, stressed the importance of devising plans, stating that further delay would result in the loss of good officers and thus damage the quality of the permanent force. Wrong appreciated this predicament, but he maintained that "there were too many unknown factors ... to enable plans." Heeney finally suggested that the issue be referred to the defence body under consideration to replace the CWC, as proposed by Pope. Until then, the Cabinet could use the reports previously prepared by the services as a basis for discussion. Thus, the final meeting ended without reaching a decision.²⁹

The PHP framework contended with serious constraints. External Affairs viewed the Working Committee as a means to influence military thinking and help direct policy. Through it, they also attempted to impose a level of inter-service coordination. However, the creation of a single unified military voice was never achieved. Papers were prepared separately by the three services and their representatives did not meet independently amongst themselves to discuss PHP issues prior to Working Committee meetings. The Working Committee did prove valuable in influencing service thinking and vice versa as it related to the DEA. Yet, this was often limited by the services' resentment of the DEA's intrusion into post-war defence planning, which they perceived as their sphere.

Divergent views on planning between civilian and military officials frequently undermined the Working Committee's ability to create a coordinated policy. The services, whose primary objective remained the war effort, did not devote as much time to planning. As shown by Munton and Page, "the service representatives spent, by one estimate, about five percent" of their time on PHP issues, whereas DEA officials on the Working Committee devoted approximately half of theirs. Furthermore, the military's view of planning tended towards more operational issues, such as training, supply, and

²⁹ Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 9th Meeting, 31 July 1945, RG25, Volume 5712, File 7-AQ(s), LAC.

personnel, as evidenced by preoccupation with Canadian participation in the post-war occupation of Germany and the creation of a school for civil administration. This perspective differed sharply from the DEA and Wrong attempted to impose a broader planning approach, often rejecting specific service interests. Initially, the services appeared engaged by the potential benefit of a planning machinery. For example, in response to the fact that the Working Committee "had not yet produced anything constructive on its own", Lieutenant Commander G.F. Todd proactively produced a paper on "Post-War Strategic Security of Canada". He hoped the other members would follow suit. While Wrong likewise thought the Working Committee should produce studies of its own, this initial effort was quickly overshadowed by more immediate planning needs. With service interests often sidelined, the PHP machinery proved to be of far more interest to officials of the DEA, who dominated the meetings. This was evident, for example, in their ballooning attendance which Wrong was forced to cap due to growing unruliness. The Services, for their part, viewed the Working Committee as an "East Block Committee", where they were merely "visitors", rather than equal participants.³⁰ Thus, the Services often looked outside the PHP Committees when pursuing their independent interests.

A key aspect of Canadian post-war planning was the bureaucracy's lack of decision making power. The PHP Committees were advisory bodies, subject to political approval. Limited to no policy direction from the Canadian government constricted their work. The creation of the Advisory Committee barely mitigated this. On the hand, the lack of governmental instruction allowed the PHP Committees to determine the topics for study and discussion. As the dominant members, External Affairs officials often had free range to shape planning as they saw fit. On the other, it undermined the planners' ability to make recommendations. For example, the lack of governmental commitments regarding occupation forces and relief aid, including Canada's role on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administrations (UNRRA), restricted the ability of planning officials to produce policy recommendations. This was directly reflected in the reports prepared by the Working Committee which were often

³⁰ Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, Minutes of 11th Meeting, 6 January 1944, RG25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC; Lt-Commander G.F. Todd, "Post-War Strategic Security of Canada", 27 April RG2 B2, Volume 20, File W-22-8; Wrong to Keenleyside, 12 June 1944, RG 25, Volume 5711, File 7-AD(s), LAC; Munton and Page, "The Operations of the Post-War Hostilities Planning Group in Canada, 1943-1945", pp. 38, 45-46.

considerations and discussions of issues rather than reflections of any actual concrete decision-making. The CWC frequently did not know what to make of them. While valuable, the nature of the planners' work often undermined external perceptions of the PHP machinery's value. The critical failure of the planners to convince others of the PHP Committees' value ultimately contributed to its undoing.

The end of the European war and the pending federal election brought about a resurgence of domestically-dominated policies by King's government. "Keep Building a New Social Order for Canada" became the slogan of the Liberal campaign, aimed at Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) voters. This domestic shift was consistent with King's goal to socially reform post-war Canada with a complete social security programme, which included an old age pension and unemployment insurance. The growing focus on social programs undermined post-war international efforts of the DEA and undercut any hopes for large peacetime forces. King had always preferred limiting commitments anyways, believing that Canada would get little credit regardless. The CWC also concluded that "the Canadian people would not be prepared to maintain large military establishments after the war", despite polling indications to the contrary.³¹ Even during the war, the CWC did not fully understand or appreciate the work of the PHP or the nature of their reports. In the Spring of 1945, the PHP Committees had completed all their assigned work and did not receive any further guidance. As a result, they disbanded, despite initial diplomatic appeals for continuation in peacetime. The political landscape had changed. An environment which has previously provided the opportunity for post-war planning and an activist foreign policy faded away as domestic political considerations took hold.

³¹ William Lyon Mackenzie King, *A Real Companion and Friend: The Diary of William Lyon Mackenzie King* (hereafter King diary), 7 January 1943, LAC; Allan Levine, *King: William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Life Guided by the Hand of Destiny* (Madeira Park: Douglas and McIntyre, 2005), 366; Cabinet War Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 24 November 1943, RG2 7c, Volume 14, LAC; Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), p. 68.