Appendix

Conference on Arctic Security: Summary and Perspectives

Summary of conference at the University of Southern Denmark, November 5, 2012: Exploring the Foundations for Arctic Order: Collective Security, Collective Defense, or Something New

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Summary

- Depending on which theoretical framework we use to study Arctic security, we would expect to see different levels of cooperation and competition. From an international law perspective, issues of who has the rights over resources, in terms of owning the seabed, are highly significant. From a geopolitical perspective, the issues of a new ice-free nautical passage north of Russia may result in a new geopolitical reality where Russia is no longer the heartland state but becomes part of the rimland of Eurasia. From a global commons perspective, the key focus is the free and global access to the Arctic.
• There are only minor objective reasons for disputes about rights to resources in the Arctic. Almost all of the Arctic oil and gas fields are placed within the 200 nautical mile zone of the five coastal states. Contrary to speculations on the emergence of great power rivalry over resources, the Arctic is therefore unlikely to nourish major disputes between the Arctic powers.

• Human rights concerns for Chinese immigrants working in Arctic mining sites are likely to rise as a political issue within a foreseeable future. Given the Chinese interest in excavating rare earth elements (REEs) in the Arctic, the handling of the large influx of Chinese workers to mining sites in China is likely to remain an unresolved political problem. The free movement of Chinese workers is likely to be the crucial issue.

• The role of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is important in that all five Arctic states have expressed no need for the formulation of a new legal framework in regulating the Arctic. The continued importance of UNCLOS was stressed in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, reached by the five Arctic states. It stressed that ‘We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean’, implying a commitment to adhere to the existing laws of the sea (UNCLOS – which the USA has never signed). Expectedly, one should not see any new regulatory framework regarding the Arctic in the near future.

• The Arctic Council plays only a limited role in the handling of the Arctic. Functioning primarily as a forum for discussions on soft security issues, the Arctic Council plays a subservient role as compared to larger institutions such as the UN, EU, NATO or the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It has no legal framework, no legal use of force and only limited funding is canalised to the institution. But the institution may still serve a role as a discussion forum and consensus-building body on issues that are too small for the larger institutions to be concerned.
NATO’s role in the Arctic is limited even though 4 out of 5 Arctic coastal states are NATO member-states. Russia is the main NATO challenger in the Arctic but NATO has no Arctic strategy and the Arctic member states, besides Norway, have shown little interest for a NATO role. The limited interest in the Arctic is partly a result of NATO’s strongest member, the USA, being more concerned with the Far East and the fact that the main adversary in the Arctic, Russia, has been willing to abide by international law in the Arctic.

The EU has not played any significant role in Arctic security and is not likely to do so in the near future. EU policy on the Arctic is in its very early stages and is characterised by disagreements among EU members. Further, both Canada and Russia are staunch opponents of an active EU in the Arctic.

A rising China may have some future effects on the Arctic order. Beijing has no official Arctic policy, except stating that the region is common heritage of all mankind, its influence and interests are expected to rise in the future (30-50 years), and China might start projecting military assets in the Arctic if the transportation lanes and energy and REE resources are becoming more developed. Timely inclusion may counteract a possible Chinese assertion in the area.

Wider Perspectives

Theoretical underpinnings

The melting ice cap has meant that the Arctic area has moved from the periphery to the center of security thinking. While the geopolitical interest for the Arctic area has increased, however, academics dispute the conception of Arctic security. It is possible to discern at least three main perspectives with widely different understandings of security interactions in the High North: the legal perspective, the geopolitical perspective, and the global commons perspective.

The legal perspective underlines the institutionalised framework that has risen parallel to the liberation of resources in the Arctic following climate changes and increased accessibility to resources in and passages through the area. Cooperation, not
competition, is at the essence of security interactions due to the fact that potential disputes from an early stage have been embedded within legal frameworks ensuring proper arbitration. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) determines the division of resources. As opposed to the Antarctic, which is a piece of land surrounded by ocean, the Arctic is surrounded by land and states wanting to exploit potential resources. UNCLOS distinguishes between ‘territorial sea’ within 12 nautical miles within which the coastal state enjoys full jurisdiction, the ‘contiguous zone’ within 24 nautical miles from the coastal line where the state can enforce customs, taxation, immigration and pollution control, and the ‘exclusive economic zone’ within 200 nautical miles where the coastal state enjoys sole exploitation right over resources. However, and of relevance with regards to the Arctic area, is the fact that the exclusive economic zone may be extended if the continental shelf exceeds the 200-nautical miles limit up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles from the coastline with the right to exploit non-living resources in the subsoil. The division of resources in the High North has thus taken place on the basis of each country having to provide evidence for a possible extended continental shelf. The Ilulissat Declaration in 2008 made it clear that participants would not seek a new comprehensive framework to govern the Arctic. However, some outstanding issues persist with regards to Hans Island between Canada and Denmark, the Lomonosov Ridge, the fact that the US has not signed the UNCLOS agreement as well as with regards to internal waters, territorial seas or international straits in Northern Canada. The outstanding issues make the case that there is a need for further international legislation in the Arctic region.

The global commons perspective, in turn, focuses on our understanding as part of contemporary visions of globality and its historical production or reproduction through ideas and what can be said more fundamentally to be the nature of international relations emerging in the Arctic region. Globality presumes a single, physical and sociopolitical space on planetary space as point of departure. Globality has had different versions through the 20th century but most importantly is that the world should be understood in terms of one entity. When it comes to the Arctic, it means that we need to see the Arctic as part of the world and the global commons. The global commons perspective of the Arctic is partly captured in the UNCLOS, which holds that all waters that lie beyond national boundaries is free to all nations but belonging to none of them.
The geopolitical perspective, finally, would oppose the idea of global commons, since not everything can be said to be ‘in common’ that will drive policy to some considerable extent. It may be possible to regulate behavior between institutions and international law but everything will depend on the willingness of political communities to participate in institutionalised frameworks. Geopolitical thinking presumes political communities to be distinct from one another and that agreement first and foremost will have to focus on the way they each see space around them and how to deal with the big alignments that may arise. Mackinder saw space as a scarce resource and that possessing the Eurasian land mass would allow a state to accumulate the biggest amount of production and power in one’s favor. The Eurasian landmass as the most productive center, the rim land (of Eurasia) and the outer rim land (North America) would also allow the accumulation of a number of other significant resources. According to Spykman, the US faces two challenges: looking south and ensuring the US as the sole/dominant great power in the region and looking west to ensure that no single power possesses full control over the Eurasian landmasses. However, the gradual emergence of the Arctic from the icecap fundamentally alters the northern dimension because Russia is no longer naturally protected from its insularity, i.e. it becomes a rimland state rather itself than remaining the heartland. The High North offers a new power base but also makes Russia more vulnerable than before due to the emergence of new points of contact for external interference. Russia has an interest in keeping China as a rival rim power out of the Arctic.

Concerns were raised that if geopolitical thinking were indeed driving Arctic security, one would have difficulties in explaining the high level of cooperation that exists. Further, the distinction between the ‘global commons’ and ‘geopolitical’ perspective may not be as clear as it is often done. Mahan, for example, includes the global commons perspective in his geopolitical analysis, integrating free access to the seas and prosperity from trade into a broader geopolitical understanding. The point was made that for small states, the interest in solving disputes through UNCLOS and a highly regulated international society is higher than for bigger powers. Had the UNCLOS not existed, Norway would not be able to lay claim to its oil resources.
Interests of the five Arctic states

Five states border the Arctic: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia and the USA. Salient issues in the Arctic were briefly reviewed and discussed. Further, one other state, China, was continuously debated throughout the conference due to issue of the much-debated rising dragon.

- Canada: the Hans Island dispute with Denmark was primarily exploited for domestic political purposes rather than being an issue of serious contestation with Denmark. The issue has existed since 1973 and the two states for the time being have ‘agreed to disagree’.

- Denmark (Greenland): Copenhagen has largely left the issue of resource exploitation to the Greenlandic autonomous authorities but it is still in charge of security and foreign issues. The two issues may at times be intertwined and thus we may see some complications in the future. Further, permission for practicing whaling is also an issue for the Greenlandic authorities.

- Norway: Oslo remains highly involved in Arctic security, which holds high salience for the country. Norway seeks a practical business relationship with Russia in the Norwegian and the Barents Seas due to oil interests. Norway often reminds Russia that it is a member of NATO and that it wants NATO to engage in military training exercises and expand its military infrastructure in the region. However, Norway is ambivalent in its view on NATO’s role in the Arctic because too much NATO involvement may complicate the business relations between Norway and Russia. Norway is the most dominant state in research on Arctic affairs.

- Russia: Moscow’s outlook is an enormous stretch of coastline providing Russia with a natural and very strong interest in the Arctic region. A Russian expedition ship in 2007 planted a flag on the North Pole seabed, which was largely a symbolic signal to domestic audiences that Russia is still an international player to be reckoned with. Being the only non-NATO Arctic bordering state, Russia seeks to exclude NATO from playing any role in the Arctic as base negotiations on bilateral relations.
• The USA: for Washington, the Arctic is not a serious political issue at the moment and it has primarily been discussed as part of homeland security matters – not predominantly in terms of acquiring natural resources. The relatively small northern coastal line of Alaska is the only direct interest of the USA in the Arctic area.

• China: Beijing has shown increasing interest in the Arctic area. China controls the distribution of 97 percent of world REE and is interested in acquiring access to the REEs of the Arctic because it can use this near monopoly on supply of REEs vis-à-vis other states. Further, the Chinese middle class is expanding enormously, providing China with an additional incentive to search for new sources of oil necessary to satisfy the growing economic demands of the new middle class.

Resources of the Arctic

The discussion revolved around three main forms of resources: REEs, oil and whaling. Further the discussion primarily focused on Greenland with the other states playing only a minor role. The discussions on resources fit well within the international law and global commons frameworks because almost all resources are non-disputed due to the fact that they fall within the UNCLOS. Further, the whaling issue is regulated by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which also includes landlocked members not seemingly affected by the whaling issue, increasing the validity of the global commons perspective to understanding whaling.

Greenland is in a unique position in that it encompasses a huge territory containing REEs and oil but in that its population and population density is very low. Denmark has left the decisions of mining and drilling to the Greenlandic autonomous authorities, which has established the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) to administer it. On the other hand, the Danish government still controls the immigration laws of Greenland. Greenland therefore does not enjoy complete control over whether it will invite third countries to import workers for mining. Several participants expressed concerns for the potential problem of human rights in how to handle Chinese guest workers. There may be a need to change Danish immigration laws in the future to cope with how to handle these Chinese workers. Estimates of Greenland’s oil and gas
reserves are 7.3bn barrels of oil and 52bn cubic feet of natural gas. Further, Greenland has significant amounts of uranium, aluminum and other REEs. It is important to note, however, that uranium mining at present is prohibited. Some participants argued that, REEs rather than oil and gas would be the focus in the near future. Establishing oil and gas production would be a longer process and given the shortsightedness of politicians, they would rather excavate REEs. Thus, we should expect to see onshore mining. The Chinese, already controlling 97 percent of REEs, have expressed much interest in this. Further, the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), has expressed interest in aluminum mining. One participant argued that the REEs in Greenland might be a window of opportunity for Denmark and Greenland to enter this market but on the other hand also a source of potential conflict in terms of small-scale frictions.

Whaling is another potential source of Arctic conflict. For the indigenous people of and Greenland and other peoples of the Nordic regions, whaling is a direct source of livelihood. During a meeting in Panama in 2012, IWC rejected the Danish proposal for the indigenous people of Greenland to maintain a whaling quota, de facto ending all whaling by Greenlanders as of January 2013. Denmark is still a member of the IWC but has considered adopting whaling quotas outside the IWC framework.

**Military competition in the Arctic**

During the Cold War, the Arctic area was part of the East-West conflict. The Soviet fleet was, and the Russian fleet still is, stationed at the Kola Peninsula and thus needs to passage through the Arctic north of Norway in order to access the high seas. The discussion on Russia revolved around this issue and fits well with the geopolitical framework. For Russia to assert her status as a major power in world politics it needs its navy and, thus, Arctic security is very important from more than a narrow resource or whaling perspective. This is also confirmed in the fact that Russia has lately increased her naval and aerial activity in the Arctic area: not because the Arctic resources area crucial themselves but because of the larger strategic puzzle of Russian need for access to the seas. The possibility of military conflict initiated by Russia was ruled out because the Arctic is a minor issue and not worth the fight.
Norway is second in viewing the Arctic in military terms because the High North has been a salient issue for many years and because Norway has invested in new naval, aerial and intelligence equipment. However, though there have been some military investments, the view was expressed that much of Norway’s maneuvering in the Arctic is for symbolic reasons.

The Canadians have expressed that the Arctic is of high importance, but thus far not much concrete military spending has been invested (900 more rangers, 6 arctic patrol vessels, some new installations, exercises).

For Denmark, finally, there have been only limited concrete military considerations: an Arctic command, an Arctic force register, and modernisation of coast guard to increase the Danish presence in the High North.

The same applies for the USA: US navy arctic road map, NORTHCOM, Arctic capability advocacy. These limited military buildups by the majority of Arctic states do not point towards a new strategic arms race.

The general picture is that no power (not even the Russians) have initiated any significant militarisation of the presence in the Arctic area. Potential sources of conflict remain but the Arctic is unlikely to rise as a new source of arms race or as a theater for great power competition for resources or international prestige.

Role of the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council (AC) currently encompasses eight member states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. AC is the main regional institution of cooperation and interaction between the five Arctic states as well as three additional states with inhabitants in above the Arctic Circle with stakes in Arctic security issues. Along with a number of states with permanent or ad-hoc observer status, the AC also grants observer status to a number of non-governmental organisations. The primary debate on the AC revolved around the effectiveness of the institution given the somewhat intertwined relationship between governmental and
non-governmental actors and the fact that the AC is not a hard regulatory framework lacking the means of legal use of force and enjoying only limited funding.

Though short of certain mechanisms, the discussion revealed some benefits provided by the AC. Being an institution with limited functional and geographical scope, it is a well-functioning tool for cooperation on soft security issues. As an institution, it does not challenge the legitimacy of broader institutions such as the UN. It further strengthens the ties between states that share the same ‘Arctic’ identity, which, in turn, could serve through continuous interaction to contribute to the creation of a sub-regional identity for the participating states. Its limited scope also enables all the participating states to sit in at the negotiations because they will not feel pressured on issues of high salience. The AC is a good framework of cooperation on issues too small for the larger institutions to deal with. Combining it with the above discussions, the AC may be a good forum for discussing global commons issues but when it comes to geopolitical power considerations, the AC is very unlikely to play any significant role.

However, the AC also suffers from several weaknesses, including lack of the legal use of force, funds, profile and political kudos. In turn, its capabilities for action are very limited. The AC therefore does not discuss hard interstate issues but rather intrastate issues. The AC relies in many ways on other institutions and it therefore finds it hard to admit its co-dependence on other institutions. Other concerned are the limited amount of funding available to the AC and the problem of a mixed role for states and non-state actors, which arguably hampers both decision-making and political delegation.

Both the EU and China enjoy ad-hoc observer status in the AC. Concerns for a ‘bull in the China shop’ scenario where the ‘diplomatic talking shop’ utility of the AC would be compromised if China were to gain more influence in the AC, was expressed. Others expressed that this concern is of limited significance: all the states in the AC still have national interest goals, so China could fit in this sub-regional framework without damaging it because it is not only about building common identities but also about national interests.

The best way to understand the AC is probably as a sub-regional actor preoccupied primarily with soft power issues. It does not attempt to capture hard
power politics or act as a substitute for larger international institutions. It was generally agreed that the AC is not the best possible institution for handling Arctic issues largely due to the hampered decision-making and delegation problems and the fact that the members see it only subsidiary to larger institutions. However, the point was made that fundamentally strengthening the AC is not a feasible option. Rather, it should retain its ‘cozy’ atmosphere and serve as a consensus-building and diplomatic forum where all the concerned states could discuss Arctic issues.

NATO in the Arctic

As a North Atlantic Alliance, and with four out of five Arctic states being members of NATO, the Alliance is bound to play some role in the Arctic game. NATO’s Article 5 has a geographical southern delimitation but it does not have a northern one. The debate revolved around what role NATO should play in the Arctic order. The discussion revealed that so far, the role for NATO has been limited and most Alliance members have not formulated an opinion on the role NATO should play in the High North.

The general view expressed was that NATO would be playing only a limited role in the High North, and the Alliance does not have an Arctic strategy, partly because reaching agreement on such a strategy would be difficult. The Alliance’s strongest state have increasingly realised the threat of a rising China, in turn changing the geopolitical focus away from the challenge of Russia towards the Far East rimland. Further, the NATO engagement in the Middle East (Afghanistan) since 2001 has preoccupied the Alliance, pushing the Arctic issue in the background in most member states.

When discussing NATO in an Arctic perspective, it is clear that Russia will be the main strategic challenge in focus (the challenge of China being discussed in the last section): four of five Arctic states are NATO members and the last Arctic state is Russia. The possible future geopolitical issue of an opening of the Arctic Seas, due to climate change, was discussed because one could, as a consequence, expect more NATO engagement in the Arctic. Participants found this unlikely, arguing that when dealing with Russia, NATO would still focus on traditional challenges from Russia to the
European mainland, leaving the Arctic theatre with a minor independent role at the most. Therefore the nature of the challenges in the Arctic is not driven so much by issues in the Arctic but rather by the traditional security concerns, in turn creating only a minor independent role for the Arctic in NATO strategy.

With Russia having handled most of its affairs in the Arctic through the legal frameworks of, e.g., UNCLOS, it is also unlikely that the country would attempt to challenge NATO on Arctic issues, instead operating through international legal frameworks in the future as well. In order for the Arctic not to become part of a security race, Russia will need some security guarantees from NATO, i.e. that the NATO missile defense will not be stationed in the Arctic. In this potential conflict area NATO will play a confidence-building role in the future, reassuring Russia that no missiles will be stationed in the Arctic.

The energy issue could also be a potential source of conflict between NATO and Russia. Future drilling for energy in the Arctic would provide the NATO allies with a more secure energy source than oil from the highly unstable Middle East. But so far Russia has, as discussed, been willing to comply with UNCLOS as have the Arctic NATO members (except for the USA which has not ratified UNCLOS) and thus potential military conflict as part of a scramble for access to the High North energy reserves is not likely.

Norway has often reminded Russia of its NATO membership status and is well aware that the Article 5 also covers the Arctic. But on the other hand, Norway is ambivalent on its position on the role of NATO in the Arctic. This is not the case for Canada, which is clearer in its desire for non-involvement by NATO in the High North.

In sum, NATO has so far played a limited role in the Arctic and its role is not likely to grow significantly in the future, mainly due to a focus on the Far East and the fact that Russia so far is willing to abide by international law. At the most, the Arctic theatre will play no independent role for NATO and remain a subsidiary theater of action in the larger NATO goal of ensuring European security. But the existence of NATO as an indispensable source of stability should not be understated, given the fact that Russia is very well aware that the remaining four Arctic states are all members of NATO. Further, it is covered by Article 5, and like the Libyan mission in 2011, a sudden
unforeseen event could trigger NATO military involvement but prospects, as mentioned, remain very low.

The EU in the Arctic

The influence of the EU on the Arctic order is very limited. The member states have no common position on the High North and are only in the very early stages of formulating policies towards the region. However, the Arctic issue has gained more salience and Brussels has become a hub for conferences and political meetings on the Arctic. Neither Canada, nor Russia are willing to accept a significant role for EU in the Arctic and in aiming to avoid legitimizing an active role for the EU, Russian officials decline all offers to participate in seminars regarding the Arctic. Notwithstanding these challenges, the EU does have some shared links and interests in the Arctic, among which are shipping (the EU states are responsible for handling 40 percent of the world’s shipping), fisheries, petroleum, research funding on the Arctic, and regional funding to EU citizens living in the Arctic (i.e. the northern parts of Sweden and Finland).

The discussion on the EU's role in the Arctic stressed the fact that there is a severe lack of knowledge among politicians and officials in the EU about the Arctic. The EU, due to its geographic proximity, sees itself as having a natural role in the Arctic and would like to assert some influence on the AC. But so far, this has not materialised to any noteworthy extend.

The Chinese challenge

The big question of China’s rise in international relations begs the question of a Chinese growing interest in the Arctic area. The question concerns, as mentioned, the influx of Chinese labor but also the fact that China strives for influence in the region for different reasons: understanding global climate change, conducting scientific studies, be part of the navigation routes and extracting energy and natural resources. China, on the other hand, and unlike most of the Arctic states, has little environmental concerns in the region. China has no official Arctic policy but is likely over time to become more
clarified about its interests and intentions. It has tried to establish a presence and credibility in the region through partnerships with the small Arctic states, e.g. Denmark. Qua its increasing economic and political weight in international affairs, it seeks to influence Arctic security similar to the exceptionalism and entitlement of the US. The Chinese have so far done little concrete to exert influence in the Arctic region (at most, sending a submarine) and they are unlikely to do before the next 30-50 years. The extent of the Chinese military involvement in Chinese politics and foreign policy has increased since 2010 and Chinese military periodicals reporting about power hungry Japanese and Europeans over the Arctic, which may be indicators of a growing Chinese presence. The UNCLOS continental shelf decision that is expected by 2014-15 is likely to provoke Chinese objections, possibly on the grounds that science is inaccurate. Another and more subtle strategy for the Chinese may be to exploit the fact that countries suffering from a financial crisis. Iceland, with its strategically important geographical position towards the Arctic, has some good reasons to want China in the game, such as Chinese economic investment, aiding Iceland through its recession. In order to develop Arctic resources, hard cash that China possesses is needed, which is interesting from a Danish (Greenlandic) viewpoint. Some of the smaller Northern states may also be interested in China as a balancer of Canada, the USA and Russia in the Arctic. So far, however, cooperation with China has remained rather limited, and prospects for a Chinese military base in Iceland are unrealistic.

Instead of the Arctic states and NATO attempting a strategy of Chinese exclusion from the Arctic, a possible solution would be to involve China more deeply in Arctic affairs. Otherwise, once China rises further, it will through its weight around and may seek to establish hegemony in the Southeast as well as in the High North. To avoid this possible scenario in the Arctic, it should be made clear to China that it will enjoy the same opportunities as everyone else in the Arctic. But it should also be made clear that it would not get more privileges than others either.

From a geopolitical view, China’s interests are all about power and in this view, the Arctic would not play any significant role in future Chinese policy. The new Chinese pivot document ‘Rebalancing’ (from 2012) did not mention the Arctic. It was about the rimland – where the people live and where power can be accumulated. The same is the case for the USA, which also sees the world in geopolitical terms, with
rimland being the key. In this view, the Arctic will continue to be of limited significance, at least for as long as global warming has not yet melted the Arctic sea and left Russia as a rimland state.

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