Grand strategy has not been a topic that has traditionally received much attention in discussions of Canadian foreign and defence policy; however, in recent years, this situation has begun to change. For example, David Haglund examined this idea in his work, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*. Moreover, in 2003, Hugh Segal, then serving as the president of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, called for the formation of a “grand strategy for a small country” that “integrates military, diplomatic, and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad.” Then in the 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies, David Pratt, a former Minister of National Defence discussed this issue. He argued that Canadian foreign and defence policy in the

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1 Dickey Center International Security and U.S. Foreign Policy Fellow, Dartmouth College.
early years of the Cold War up to the defeat of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s government in June 1957 was "a grand strategy within a grand strategy." He added that it allowed for the pursuit of “objectives which were specific to Canada, but which strongly complemented the overall U.S. and Allied grand strategy of containment.” 4 In 2012, Pratt and Charles Doran also wrote on the need for a Canadian grand strategy in today’s world.5

On the other hand, scholars such as J.L. Granatstein have countered that only great powers can have grand strategies or in his words, nations such as Canada: “Do not have Grand Strategies because they lack the human, industrial, and military resources to sustain them. In other words, the God of Grand Strategy is only found on the side of the big battalions.”6 The first time I thought about this issue, I completely agreed with Granatstein. Canadian grand strategy, at first glance, seems to be a contradiction of terms, but then I thought more about it, and I concluded that yes, Canada has had such a strategy in the past, and it was during the Cold War. Indeed, one can look at Canadian foreign and defence policy in the early 1950s and then during the 1980s and perceive the same basic framework in place that was built around the support of the United States and Canada’s Western European allies in their efforts to contain the Soviet Union.

This article will first define grand strategy and will outline what Canadian grand strategy was during the Cold War. I will focus on its foreign and defence policy aspects, although I will touch upon its economic elements when appropriate. I will then examine the two great strategic challenges to this strategy that emerged during the Cold War: under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker from 1959 to 1963 and during the early years of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s time in office in the late-1960s and early-1970s. I argue that Canadian Cold War grand strategy survived these challenges and

continued on until the end of the 1980s. This article will conclude with a brief discussion of what lessons can be learned from this experience.

**What is Grand Strategy?**

Before I begin to examine this issue, I must define the term grand strategy. For the purposes of this article, I will use Paul Kennedy’s definition:

The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long term (that is in wartime and peacetime) best interests ... it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to advance (or retard) the primary aim.\(^7\)

I will add to Kennedy’s explanation the need for continuity and consistency over a long period of time. In addition, like David McDonough, when I use the term grand strategy, I mean a nation having a national security strategy.\(^8\) I further assume that a grand strategy does not have to be some master plan produced by that country’s leaders, and can include a diverse variety of policies, some of which will have other motivations.

Thus, what was Canadian grand strategy during the Cold War? In my view, it was based on the need to support Canada’s allies, particularly the United States in their efforts to contain the Soviet Union, as a way to guarantee Canadian security and prosperity. It was, as Pratt argued, a grand strategy within in a grand strategy.\(^9\) It was built around three pillars, the first of which was the defence of Western Europe through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the commitment of forces to that alliance in order to help protect Canada’s Western European allies from Soviet domination. This reflected the reality that: “The global balance of power, and North American security, required that the Eurasian landmass – potentially the greatest

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\(^7\) Pratt, *Is there a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?*, p. 15.


single source of power on earth – should not be allowed to fall under the control of a hostile country. Europe was where the power was. It was also where the threat was."\(^\text{10}\)

The second part of this approach was the creation of a strong peacetime defence relationship with the United States, which included the development of the North American air defence system. Canada would also work with the Americans to help support and sustain the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the bulwark for the security of the Western Alliance. The final pillar was Canada’s utilization of international forums such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth to support its allies. These activities would include diplomatic manoeuvrings, foreign aid programs and later contributions to peacekeeping operations. These three pillars would represent the core of Canadian foreign and defence policy during the Cold War.

Therefore, having explained what this grand strategy was, there is still the need to explain how it emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But before I do, I should explain what factors did not lead to its creation and one example was Louis St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture of January 1947. This address was given by St. Laurent when he was Secretary of State for External Affairs, and is one of the most famous speeches ever given on Canadian foreign policy. It certainly did contain some important ideas, including a willingness to adopt a more international approach to foreign affairs, and that Canada’s foreign policies should never impair the unity of the country, which was a reflection of the Second World War experience.\(^\text{11}\) Furthermore, it contained some interesting thoughts on the Canada-U.S. relationship, as St. Laurent compared it to two farmers “whose lands had a common concession line” and that the problems between them were settled “without dignifying the process by the word ‘policy!’” \(^\text{12}\) This comment reflected how Canadian ministers and officials of the late-1940s wanted this relationship to work, although in the end, the defence relationship would become much

\(^\text{10}\) Haglund, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited, 12. It should be noted that this approach would allow Western Europe to serve as a potential counterweight to American influence. David G. Haglund and Stephane Roussel, “Escott Reid, the North Atlantic Treaty, and Canadian Strategic Culture,” In Escott Reid Diplomat and Scholar, ed. Greg Donaghy and Stephane Roussel (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), pp. 44-45.


more integrated in the 1950s. Notwithstanding Pratt’s assertion to the contrary, this speech, however, was not a statement of Canadian grand strategy as it both too general, and comes too early in the Cold War for it to fill that role.

Another possible source was the extensive Canadian debates of 1946 and 1947 over how Canada should respond to the increase in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. These discussions involved many members of the Department of External Affairs, including the Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Dana Wilgress as well as other senior officials such as Escott Reid who both expressed concerns about the erratic nature of American policy.13 But while this debate expressed a number of different strains of Canadian opinion, it did not really contribute to the emergence of a Canadian grand strategy. As the Canadian historians, Don Page, and Don Munton later argued “although the Canadians may well have been less ready than their American counterparts to brand the Soviet Union an enemy, it was nonetheless clear where Canada stood.”14

This reality existed for a number of reasons such as Canada’s strategic inheritance, which included the fact that Canada had just been an important part of a grand alliance with the United States and Great Britain in the Second World War. During the early part of the Cold War, Canada also retained its strong traditional ties to Britain. These were supplemented by the personal connections that many figures in Ottawa, including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and the future chief of the Canadian General Staff, General Guy Simmons, had with their British counterparts. This inheritance further included the foreign policy lessons of the 1930s, as Canadian ministers and officials had seen democratic governments collapse “from fear of rather than actual invasion,” and “countries behaved immorally because they lacked the power to do otherwise.”15 The Canadians like their counterparts in London

and Washington had learned that aggressive authoritarian states should not appeased and instead needed to be confronted directly.16

Another factor was “an electorate conditioned to think in terms of an alliance, to identify its interests with those of the United States and Britain and the leadership of the Western powers in the new United Nations.”17 These political realities were particularly important since the Department of External Affairs fully understood that “public opinion is the most important determinant of foreign policy.”18 Moreover, the strong anti-communist sentiments that were already present in Canada had been further stimulated by the defection of Igor Gouzenko in 1945. He was a cipher clerk from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa who brought with him information about a Soviet spy ring in Canada, Britain and the United States that had operated during the war.19 These views were especially important in Quebec, since they allowed ministers and officials like St. Laurent to use the fate of the Cardinal Mindszenty of Hungary, who had been imprisoned and tortured by the communists in his country to overcome Quebec’s historically isolationist sentiments.20

The development of this grand strategy was also influenced by Canada’s strategic position in the period after 1945, which included the fact that it was part of the North American continent. This reality meant that Canadian airspace was essentially an air highway between the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, Escott Reid asserted that Canada “shall have no freedom of action in any matter which the United

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18 A Survey of Relations Between Canada and the United States, June 20 1951, 73/1223 Raymont Collection, Box 113, File 2511 A Survey of Relations Between Canada and the United States, DHH, pp. 13-14.
20 Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire Canada and the World to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd, 1994), pp. 204-5; For additional information on French Canadian attitudes to Canada’s post-war defence policies see B.S. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs 1951 to 1953 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 148-9.
States considers essential. We shall be all-out belligerents from the day the war starts.” 21
Prime Minister St. Laurent later added that “Canada could not stay out of a third World
War if 11,999,999 of her 12,000,000 citizens wanted to remain neutral.”22 Canada’s
enhanced position in this period as a “leading middle power” was another notable
factor in the emergence of this strategy. Canada came out of the Second World War a
more economically advanced country with an expanded industrial base, and even had
the capability to design and manufacture its own jet aircraft. Canada did have its
struggles in the postwar period, namely with a deficit in its balance of payments in 1947
and 1948 due to a shortage of American dollars, but it was still in a very good position.
In fact, with the defeat of Germany, Japan and Italy and excluding the United States, the
Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. Canada’s “competition” in this period were the
white dominions, including Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the nations of
Western Europe, including Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, which had
devastated by the war and countries such as India, which had just started to emerge out
of the process of decolonization. This state of affairs meant that Canada was in a
position where its relative power in the international environment was high.
Furthermore, there was a willingness in Ottawa to act, since Canadian officials “had a
more self-confident policy and status in world affairs which they wished to express
more by assertion than by exercising the right of withdrawal.”23

But there was still a need for something to actually shock the Canadian
government to commit resources to help contain the Soviet Bloc. In the end, there were
several of these events: the most important was the communist takeover of
Czechoslovakia in February 1948. This coup was particularly significant, as it not only
brought up memories of the betrayal of the Czechs in 1938 and 1939, but many
Canadian ministers and officials knew Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk,
who had been either murdered or committed suicide during the coup. It thus

21 The United States and the Soviet Union Study of the Possibility of War Implications for Canadian
Policy, August 20 1947, MG 31 E46 Arnold Smith Fonds, Vol. 80, File The Russians and the Rest of Us
Memoranda and Lecture 1947, 1977, LAC.
22 P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “Sovereignty and Security: Canadian Diplomacy, the
United States, and the Arctic, 1943-1968 In In The National Interest Canadian Foreign Policy and the
encouraged Canada to take up an important role in the negotiations that led to the formation of the NATO in April 1949.  

**Canadian Grand Strategy**

At this point, Canada had what one could call a proto-Canadian grand strategy, as it was not only a member of NATO and had established a peacetime defence relationship with the Americans but was utilizing its membership in the United Nations and the Commonwealth to protect the interests of the Western Alliance, namely in UN disarmament talks. However, it should be emphasized at this point that this strategy had not fully matured. NATO was still weak, and there were no Canadian forces stationed in Western Europe. Moreover, while there was a formal commitment to defend North America, there was little interest in either Ottawa or indeed Washington in doing anything about this problem. Although, the Soviets had begun to produce a copy of the B-29 Superfortress, the TU-4 Bull in 1947, it did not conduct an atomic bomb test until August 31, 1949. Therefore, the only steps taken by Canada and the United States were to keep the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and to begin to develop some new joint defence plans. Canadian grand strategy was, thus, in a skeletal form, with no real muscle behind it, but this situation was to change dramatically with the start of the Korean War in June 1950.

Although this conflict remained confined to the Korean Peninsula, the invasion of South Korea seemed to many in Western capitals to be the first part of a general

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25 This is not to say that Canada did not have its disagreements with the Americans. One such example, were the differences in opinion between General Andrew McNaughton and Bernard Baruch over the Baruch Plan on international control of atomic weapons in 1946 and 1947. Joseph Levitt, *Canada’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, 1945-1957* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), pp. 104-5.

26 The development of these defence plans was much more complicated than they should have been. These difficulties emerged because of the approval by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff of a new strategic appreciation which called for the construction of a vast air defence system in the Canadian North. While this document did not reflect thinking amongst senior U.S. policy makers, inadequate communication between the two countries resulted in a great deal of alarm in Ottawa that was only resolved after a conference at the Chateau Laurier in December 1946. For more information see Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), pp. 17-29.
communist offensive, and spurred greater defence spending in both Canada and the United States. Consequently, Canada raised and dispatched the 25th Brigade Group to Korea while the 27th Brigade Group was sent to Western Europe to reinforce the defences there. This military programme included a revitalized Royal Canadian Navy as well as the First Canadian Air Division with its twelve squadrons of F-86 Sabre fighters that formed a critical part of NATO's European air defences.\(^{27}\) Canada also contributed military hardware to its allies through mutual aid, including a division worth of British type equipment from Canadian stocks in addition to hundreds of Sabre fighters, which were provided to Great Britain.\(^{28}\)

This expanded military effort further involved increased attention to the defence of North America, as Canada went from having only a limited national air defence system to participating with the Americans in the development an extensive continental air defence network. It included the deployment of hundreds of jet fighters and the construction of several early warning lines: the Pinetree Line, the Mid Canada Line and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. Moreover, in the early 1950s, both nations agreed to a number of initiatives to facilitate air defence co-operation, including measures that allowed for U.S. Air Force fighters to conduct interceptions of unidentified aircraft in Canadian airspace.\(^ {29}\)

Canada also provided support for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Canada may have said “no” to the development of its own nuclear weapon in 1945, but, as Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky have argued, it "said 'yes' to participation in almost every aspect of American nuclear infrastructure."\(^ {30}\) During the Cold War, Canada was "second only to West Germany in hosting nuclear-related facilities with nearly eighty separate installations."\(^{31}\) Canada provided weapon storage facilities and forward bases for the


\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 201. This hardware was replaced by American type equipment.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 280. Both countries also work together to promote civil defence and joint industrial mobilization.


Strategic Air Command (SAC) that enhanced SAC’s ability to conduct retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against the Soviet Union.  

Even Canada’s participation in the North American air defence system provided tactical warning of a Soviet bomber attack and would have helped to protect the American mobilization base from whatever Soviet bombers had survived an U.S. pre-emptive strike. 

Canadian grand strategy further utilized Canada's productive capabilities through the manufacture of fighter aircraft and electronic components for radar installations. For instance, before the construction of the Pinetree Line had been approved by the Cabinet, officials in Ottawa had placed a number of orders for Canadian-made radar systems. This effort was couched in a language of allied solidarity and Canadian officials emphasized to their American counterparts that “this arrangement was not merely in the interest of Canada;” however, in reality there was a strong desire amongst Canadian ministers and officials to build up Canada’s domestic industries. 

The final pillar of this strategy was Canada’s use of international organizations such as the UN to support its allies in the Cold War. This included the dispatching of forces to fight as part of the UN force in the Korean War in addition to Canada’s decision to refuse to recognize the government of the Peoples’ Republic of China until 1970. Another example was Canada’s participation in UN disarmament talks where “the main thrust of Canada’s activities ... was to help the American-led Western alliance succeed in its strategy of compelling the Soviet Union to negotiate on disarmament and arms control on its terms or, failing that, to assist the West in winning the all-important propaganda war.” Canada further worked to ensure that France and India were not successfully wooed by the Soviets during these discussions. In general, Canada used the UN as “a forum which had enough legitimacy to apply direct (and

34 Notes for the Canadian Chairman, February 25 1952, 2002/17 Joint Staff Fonds, Box 101, File 10 Permanent Joint Board on Defence Air Defence System, DHH.  
36 Levitt, Canada’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, pp. 5, 7.
public) international diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union.”

Likewise, the Commonwealth was used to support some of its member states economically and diplomatically through initiatives such as the Colombo Plan to ensure that they did not fall into the Soviet sphere of influence.

Canada’s participation in the International Commission of Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Indochina was motivated by similar considerations. The ICSC had been created as part of the Geneva Accords of 1954 that had emerged out of the French withdrawal from this area. The purpose of this body was to supervise the imposition of this peace agreement and its members included Canada, Poland and India. Notwithstanding the fact that Canada was the representative of the Western powers, it did at first seek to be impartial; however, when faced with the outright Polish partisanship towards the communists and biased Indian “neutrality,” the Canadians took the side of the anti-communist forces in the region, and would come to provide intelligence to the Americans.

The most notable example of these activities was Pearson’s efforts at the UN during the Suez Crisis in 1956. This crisis emerged as the result of a conspiracy initiated by Great Britain, France and Israel to invade Egypt. The British had been angered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal while the French government was worried that Nasser’s Arab Nationalist rhetoric would cause them difficulties in Algeria where a revolt had broken out in 1954. In addition, the Israelis feared that Nasser’s desire for Egypt to become the leader of the Arab World when combined with his new Soviet weapons posed a serious threat to their security. The plan was for Israel to attack the Egyptians in the Sinai while the British and French would occupy the canal-zone in the name of “protecting” the canal from the fighting. The problem was that this invasion not only greatly upset world public opinion and led to serious world crisis, but it angered the Eisenhower administration, since it had been

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38 Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*, p. 18.
launched during the 1956 presidential election campaign. The result was that the Americans strongly opposed the invasion, which posed deep problems for the future of NATO. Pearson then stepped into this situation, and with the support of other nations, including the United States he spearheaded the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to help resolve this crisis. For this act, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Subsequently, UN peacekeeping missions would come to occupy a prominent place in Canadian grand strategy into the 1960s.

Thus, a distinct Canadian Cold War grand strategy had emerged in the 1950s. It offered a series of strong roles for the Canadian military in NATO and North American defence in what became known as a “strategy of commitments.” It provided Canada “a seat at the table” in the Western Alliance that gave Pearson and his officials in the Department of External Affairs the international influence or at least the high level access to American and Western European policy makers they desired. Furthermore, this strategy gave a sense of purpose to many tasks that Canada took on at the UN and other international forums. Finally, it provided extensive industrial benefits to the Canadian economy; however, it would not be too long before this grand strategy faced its first challenges. Some of these were inevitable, namely the concerns about its costs. A defence peacetime budget that represented 45% of government spending and 7.8% of GDP, as was the case in the early-1950s, was ultimately not sustainable, especially with the emergence of new social programs. It also required a great deal of skill and contiguity at the top to maintain its effectiveness. It is important to remember that Pearson was at the centre of the making of Canadian foreign policy as both Undersecretary and then Secretary of State for External Affairs from October 1946 to June 1957. General Charles Foulkes, first as Chief of the General Staff and then as Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, played a key role in the creation of foreign and defence policy from 1945 to his retirement in 1960. Nevertheless, the cause of most of these difficulties was the election of John Diefenbaker as Prime Minister in June 1957.

The Diefenbaker Strategic Challenge

The problem was not Diefenbaker’s perspective on foreign affairs. Except for an overly romantic view of the future of the Commonwealth and the British connection
and some strong anti-American rhetoric on the campaign trail, Diefenbaker did not come to power with a distinct foreign policy vision. Indeed, there was a great deal of continuity in Canadian foreign and defence policy during his time from office. Canada maintained its conventional forces in Europe and in fact increased their numbers.\textsuperscript{40} His government also dispatched military personnel to support the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The Diefenbaker government did cancel the Avro Arrow in 1959, but the Liberals were planning to do that after the June 1957 federal election. The government also negotiated a Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the Americans, a goal of Canadian officials since the late-1940s.\textsuperscript{41}

This is not to say that difficulties did not emerge due to Diefenbaker’s distrust of the bureaucracy. He and his ministers further suffered from the fact that the Liberals had made very little effort to keep the opposition parties informed during their time in office for political reasons. Indeed, the St. Laurent government had rejected the creation of a parliamentary committee on defence for this reason. The Diefenbaker government’s policies were further coloured by the fiasco over the creation of North America Air Defence Command (NORAD), which was approved without a meeting of the Cabinet or the Cabinet Defence Committee, at least partially due to advice from General Foulkes. Foulkes would later admit that he had “stampeded” the government into agreeing to the formation of NORAD.\textsuperscript{42} This act exposed the Diefenbaker and his cabinet to criticism and damaged their relations with the Canadian military. Moreover, Diefenbaker’s very poor relationship with President John F. Kennedy would have eventually created issues; nonetheless, Canadian grand strategy would have continued on, albeit with somewhat reduced effectiveness, except for the emergence of the first strategic challenge to this strategy.

It came from the Department of External Affairs, namely the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, and his Undersecretary, Norman Robertson, and was centred on their opposition to Canada acquiring nuclear weapons. There is much

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[40]{Erika Simpson, \textit{NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics} (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2001), p. 145.}
\footnotetext[42]{Jockel, \textit{No Boundaries Upstairs}, p. 104.}
\end{footnotes}
scholarly debate of why these men adopted this position and there are not any clear answers, but it is clear that this "Green-Robertson" axis was very influential because of Green’s close relationship with Diefenbaker and the credibility that Robertson had in External Affairs. On the surface, this stance was not actually that problematic, since Canada had been an active participant in nuclear disarmament negotiations since the end of the Second World War, ironically due to its participation in the Manhattan Project. Green and Robertson’s position, however, would become disruptive because they believed that Canada should lead the drive for unilateral nuclear disarmament at the UN.

The problem with this stance was that by the late 1950s, nuclear weapons had become part of Canadian Cold War grand strategy. Canada was not only a member of a nuclear armed alliance, NATO, but had agreed to acquire weapons systems that required nuclear warheads, namely the Honest John surface-to-surface missile and the CF-104 Starfighter, which would perform “the strike reconnaissance role” for the alliance. The same was the case with North American air defence, as Canada had acquired the BOMARC B surface-to-air missile and the CF-101 Voodoo that was armed with the MB-1 Genie air-to-air missile. In contrast, Green and Robertson believed that Canada should “take a principled stand against nuclear weapons, even if doing so meant disregarding commitments and distancing this country from its traditional friends and allies.” Therefore, in the words of Jon McLin, Green and Robertson were prepared to “reduce to ineffectiveness a large part of Canada’s military forces rather than suffer what might have been a marginal reduction in the effectiveness of Canada’s disarmament policy, which was only marginally influential at best.”

45 The strike reconnaissance role would have involved launching tactical nuclear strikes behind the Central Front into countries such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia. These attacks would involve the use of thermonuclear weapons up to a yield of 1.45 megatons. John Clearwater, *Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1998), p. 92.
made even worse because Diefenbaker declined to make a decision on whether or not Canada should keep its commitments to acquire nuclear weapons. As the Canadian political scientist, Andrew Richter, has stated:

Canada’s tortuous nuclear weapons debate reflected the prime minister’s personal ambivalence on the issue. Believing that Canada had international defence responsibilities, Diefenbaker tended to side with defence officials who spoke of Canadian obligations. On the other hand, he was deeply concerned about the tone of the Cold War, and believed that disarmament and arms control represented a promising avenue for reducing US-Soviet tensions. Stranded between the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs, Diefenbaker chose the path of least political resistance – delay.48

Thus, there emerged an inherent contradiction in Canadian policy, as on one hand Canada had pledged to acquire nuclear weapons and had purchased the weapon systems that required these warheads, but then decided to debate whether it would uphold its commitment to be a nuclear armed state while leading the drive at the UN for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Canada had pledged to defend Western Europe, but at the same time it was agitating for the banning of the one weapon that allowed the Western Alliance to balance the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. The result was that Canadian grand strategy suffered from incoherence and imbalance and Canada’s allies, namely the Americans, became increasingly annoyed and frustrated by Canada’s indecision.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 would only make this situation even worse, since despite a request from the Kennedy administration to put Canada’s armed forces on alert, Diefenbaker refused to do this despite seeing evidence of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. He did this because of his position that the Americans had not sufficiently consulted Canada before they had decided to confront the Soviet Union on this issue. While Canadian forces were informally put on alert by Douglas Harkness, the Minister of National Defence and Diefenbaker did eventually agree to do this officially, the damage had been done and the Canada-U.S. relationship had reached a new low.

48 Richter, Avoiding Armageddon, p. 102.
After the crisis ended, talks between American and Canadian representatives would continue about finding a way for Canada to meet its nuclear weapon commitments, but this disruption of Canadian grand strategy would not be ended until Diefenbaker’s government fell and was replaced by one led by Lester Pearson. Pearson for a variety of reasons, including political expediency, alliance solidarity and the need to repair Canada’s relations with the United States had decided that Canada needed to fulfill its nuclear weapons commitments. During his announcement, he asserted that “as a Canadian I am ashamed if we accept commitments and then refuse to discharge them.” He added that Canada would soon begin negotiations with its allies to withdraw from this role.49

The Second Strategic Challenge

With Pearson decision as well as the removal of Green and Robertson from the scene, order was restored to Canadian grand strategy.50 The 1964 Defence White Paper argued that because NATO was armed with nuclear weapons, Canada had to “share in that responsibility [as] a necessary commitment of Canada’s membership” in the Western Alliance.51 Peacekeeping also remained an important focus for the Pearson government, as it played a critical role in organizing several missions, most notably the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which helped to prevent the emergence of a crisis between Greece and Turkey that would have threatened NATO’s southern flank.

Moreover, despite some public questioning of the Vietnam War by Pearson in his 1965 speech at Temple University, Canada continued to allow its personnel in the ICSC to support the American effort in Vietnam. Pearson and his ministers even gave permission for a Canadian diplomat, Blair Seaborn, to be used as a go between Washington and Hanoi to deliver messages about America’s willingness to defend

50 Green lost his seat in the 1963 election while Robertson soon left the post of Undersecretary due to health reasons. Granatstein, A Man of Influence, p. 362.
South Vietnam in addition to the consequences for North Vietnam for continuing to support the Viet Cong.\textsuperscript{52} Under its Defence Production Sharing Agreement, Canada was also selling increasing amounts of military supplies to the Americans.

Alas, there were rough waters on the horizon, and one of them was the funding problems that have already been alluded to. These issues grew even more serious in the 1960s with the increasing financial demands of Canada’s social programs. The result was that the Canadian military contribution to NATO was increasingly more about keeping Canada’s seat at the table than having an effective military presence in the alliance. In fact, there would be no significant increase in the Canadian defence budget until the late 1970s. In addition, the Americans were increasingly disinterested in continental air defence due to the decline of the Soviet bomber threat and the rise of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), although Canada would continue to provide support for the American nuclear deterrent. Canadian politicians and officials were also preoccupied with Quebec, including the foreign policy difficulties related to Quebec’s national aspirations, which were exasperated by French President Charles de Gaulle “Vive le Quebec! Vive le Quebec libre!” speech in Montreal in July 1967.

It was at this point that another strategic challenge, which was distinct from the first, emerged and one of its sources was Canada’s intelligentsia. It is fair to say that Canadian intellectuals have always had a complicated relationship with Canadian officialdom, reflecting the tension between the intellectual and the policy maker that in the words of James Eayrs “can be exploited but seldom dissipated.” It is important to remember that Harold Innis, Frank Underhill and Donald Creighton, some of Canada’s most prominent historians, had opposed the creation of NATO in the late-1940s.\textsuperscript{53} This tension faded in the 1950s for a number of reasons, including the general success of Canadian foreign policy, but by the mid-1960s, Canadian intellectuals had become especially critical of Canada’s foreign policy and its participation in NATO.

\textsuperscript{52} Hillmer and Granatstein, \textit{Empire to Umpire}, p. 272.
\textsuperscript{53} Eayrs, \textit{Growing Up Allied}, p. 52.
One first saw this perspective with James Macdonald Minifie’s *Peacemaker or Powdermonkey* and his call for Canada to become a neutral power.\(^5^4\) As the decade went on, this criticism appeared in the works of scholars such as Stephen Clarkson, Kenneth McNaught, Lewis Hertzman, Thomas Hockin, John Warnock and James Eayrs in addition to politicians like Walter Gordon, Andrew Brewin and Dalton Camp.\(^5^5\) There were a number of reasons for these views such as the reality that Canadian foreign and defence policies seemed to be increasingly stale as they had been developed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Another factor was the rise of anti-militarism and anti-Americanism due to the Vietnam War. Indeed, there was a great deal of moral indignation about Canada’s selling of war materials to the Americans and the government’s declination to openly oppose America’s involvement in the Vietnam War.\(^5^6\) Furthermore, the anti-establishmentarism of the 1960s had led to a pervasive questioning of the status quo. In fact, it can be argued that Norman Robertson’s study of Canadian foreign policy that was completed in 1968 was dismissed partially because it did not sufficiently challenge Canadian foreign and defence policies. The fact that Robertson did not do this because he knew better was not acknowledged.

There was also much skepticism of the Cold War in Canada during this period, which ignored the fact that although the Soviet Union had mellowed somewhat under the leadership of men such as Leonid Brezhnev, it still had hundreds of thousands of troops pointed at the heart of NATO, had just crushed the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia and had growing arsenal of nuclear weapons and ICBMs, many of which were targeted at Canada. One other contributing factor was that Canadian foreign and defence policy faced a contradictory situation in the mid-to-late 1960s.


Canada was a richer, more prosperous country than it ever had been, but at the same time, it was losing influence in the world. The answer for this was two-fold, namely Canada had lost most of the advantages that it previously had in the late-1940s and the 1950s, and it was simply not allocating as many resources to its foreign and defence policies as before. But some of these critics believed that Canada’s ties to its alliances were the problem, and called for Canada to declare its neutrality.

These ideas, which Michel Fortmann and Martin Larose have called a “strategic counter culture,” found an attentive audience with Pierre Trudeau, the new Canadian Prime Minister. When Trudeau became PM in 1968, he had very little experience with foreign affairs and later admitted that he only had a limited knowledge on this subject. This was partially due to the fact that he had only been a member of the Cabinet for a couple of years during Pearson’s last years in government. In addition, during this period, Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr., and the Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, had kept a tight lid on foreign and defence policy discussions. Nonetheless, Trudeau had a number of definite ideas such as a deep skepticism of both NATO, and interesting enough, the UN. He also had a distinct world view that was shaped by several different factors, including a traditional Quebecois disinterest in European entanglements and his time as what was essentially a left wing fellow traveller when he had visited the Soviet Union and China, which left him for the most part disinterested in rhetoric of the Cold War. As his future Principal Secretary, Thomas Axworthy, later concluded, Trudeau was “skeptical about the Cold War alliance structure and [was] distressed by the Manichean tendencies of the United States.” He had even called Pearson “a defrocked priest of peace” for accepting nuclear weapons in 1963.

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57 Ibid., p. 11.
On top of all these factors, Trudeau was driven a strong desire to challenge existing policies and had a strong streak of anti-establishmentarianism. He may have been 49 years old, but he thought as a much younger man. In the words of the Canadian political scientist, Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau had won the Liberal leadership in 1968 due to his “swinger” image and “the expectations of change, however vague and undefined, that were associated with his style.”59 He also had the intellectual hubris to think he could do better than his predecessors.

To compensate for his inexperience, Trudeau drew upon the advice of a number of experts, including some of the aforementioned academics and intellectuals and some younger officials in the Department of External Affairs such as Allan Gotlieb. The most important of these advisors was the former Second Secretary to the Canadian High Commission in Malaysia, Ivan Head. Head, who first came to Trudeau’s attention as an expert on constitutional affairs, quickly emerged as Trudeau’s most important foreign policy expert. He was a man who was “vigorous, and [had] abundant confidence,’ and saw himself as an iconoclast on subjects such as NATO.” However, other observers were more critical like the Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert A.D. Ford, who argued that Head was “very pro-Soviet at this time,” and sought to downplay the Soviet threat.60 Trudeau may have talked a lot about “first principles” and the need to take a fresh look at existing policies, but he and his advisors had their own deep biases. The result was when External Affairs and the Canadian military produced policy reviews that did not satisfy the Prime Minister, Trudeau turned to Head for a response. Head’s report, the so-called “Non-Group Paper,” called for a reduction in the Canadian military from 100 000 to 50 000 personnel, the withdrawal of Canada’s forces from Europe and the elimination of its contribution to NATO’s nuclear forces. In particular, Head’s report was critical of the CF-104 because he saw it to be a destabilizing force, since it could only really be used as a first strike weapon due to its vulnerability to attack. The Canadian military would be restricted to domestic duties, accept for a 1 800 men contingent that would used as a mobile force for NATO and peacekeeping. Although this paper was withdrawn due to pressure from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, and the Minister of National Defence, Leo

60 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 20.
Cadieux, it reflected the thinking of Trudeau and many of his ministers, including Donald Macdonald, Jean Marchand and Gerald Pelletier.\textsuperscript{61}

Eventually, this debate would be settled at a Cabinet meeting in March 1969 with Sharp and Cadieux being forced to compromise. While it is not entirely clear what Trudeau really wanted out of this process,\textsuperscript{62} the result was that Canadian Cold War grand strategy was shaken to its core. Canada’s contribution to NATO was to be halved, and this force was formally stripped of its nuclear capability. This decision was harshly criticized by Canada’s Western European allies, although not so much by the United States because the Nixon administration was preoccupied by Vietnam. This later point is especially important because the Americans were the ones that could have applied the necessary pressure to reverse this decision. But since they did not do this, and Trudeau cared little of what the Western Europeans thought, the decision held.\textsuperscript{63}

Under the shift, Canadian defence priorities would be: Defence of Canadian sovereignty, Defence of North America (including support of the American nuclear deterrent), the carrying out of alliance commitments in NATO and finally peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{64} But more was to come. The 1970 Foreign Policy White Paper, \textit{A Foreign Policy for Canadians}, made it clear that Canada’s national interests, namely its economic rather than security ones, were to be emphasized, and that Canada’s attempts to play a “helpful fixer role” in the world through activities such as peacekeeping were to be played down. This document reflected Trudeau opinion that foreign policy was important “to the extent that it contributes to such goals as national unity, economic growth and the creation of a just society in Canada.”\textsuperscript{65} Needless to say, Pearson was not impressed, and he complained privately that peacekeeping was “put alongside indeed after light aircraft manufacture,” as a foreign policy priority; however, Trudeau had little interest in what Pearson thought. In 1971, a defence white paper was also

\textsuperscript{61} Bothwell, \textit{Alliance and Illusion}, 287; Granatstein and Bothwell, \textit{Pirouette}, pp. 20-21. It was called the “Non Group Paper” because of the committee’s informal status.
\textsuperscript{62} For example, Hellyer argued that the Non-Group Paper was really advice for the Cabinet and that Trudeau was “trying desperately to get his way and he may as well succeed in the end.” Granatstein and Bothwell, \textit{Pirouette}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{63} Fortmann, Larose and Murphy, “An Emerging Strategic Counterculture,” pp. 553-5.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 553
\textsuperscript{65} Thordarson, \textit{Trudeau and Foreign Policy}, p. 118.
published, which heavily criticized both Canada’s anti-submarine force and opposed the acquisition of a new main battle tank for Canada’s NATO contingent. Trudeau thus had established his dominance over Canadian foreign and defence policy.  

Over the next few years, under Trudeau, the People’s Republic of China was recognized and Canada continued its dance with the governments of Quebec and France. Canada’s relations with Francophone Africa were given a higher priority while the government made an effort improve the projection of Canada’s bilingual character in the world. Military spending was frozen and development aid was significantly increased. Trudeau also visited Moscow in 1971 where he signed some minor agreements and then blundered badly when he stated his concerns about the “‘overwhelming presence’ of the United States.” Nevertheless, while he had shaken Canadian Cold War grand strategy to its core, he was not able to establish a lasting alternative. Although External Affairs and National Defence had been battered, they had not been defeated and remained in the background.

The Trudeauvian U Turn

Some cracks in Trudeau’s victorious revolution had quickly begun to emerge. For example, despite the de-emphasis on peacekeeping operations, Canada participated in the missions that were established in the Sinai and the Golan Heights after the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, which had a least some Cold War implications due to the fact that Egypt and Syria were Soviet client states while the Israelis were allied with the United States. In addition, Trudeau and his ministers decided to reinforce the Canadian force in Cyprus after the Turkish invasion in 1974. However, it would be until the

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67 Axworthy, “‘To Stand Not So High,’” pp. 19, 21; Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy , p. 105.

68 Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, p. 314.

69 Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping, p. 241. Canada also briefly participated in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) that was established by the 1973 Paris Accords, which ended America’s involvement in the Vietnam War.
mid-1970s that a real opportunity to reassert Canadian grand strategy emerged and it came from an unlikely source, the so-called “Nixon Shock” of 1971.

The Nixon Shock was a series of measures proposed by President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of the Treasury, John Connolly, to deal with some of the economic problems that the United States faced in the early 1970s. It included a ten percent surcharge on durable American imports. These measures would therefore have had a dramatic impact on Canada’s economy. While this initiative was eventually withdrawn, its imposition encouraged the Canadians to consider means of diversifying Canadian exports by increasing trade with the European Economic Community (EEC). The result was the Third Option; however, it had a number of significant flaws, including the fact that Canada with the reduction to its forces in NATO had just turned their back on their Western European allies, and Canada was now it was asking for something from them. Not surprisingly, the negotiations with the EEC would drag on for several years.

The result was that the stage was set for a reversal of Canadian policy on acquiring a new tank for its NATO contingent. Previously, the 1971 Defence White Paper had argued against such a purchase, but the Canadian military had remained determined that their remaining forces in Western Europe would have an armoured component. The three key figures in this episode were the Chief of the Defence Staff, Jacques Dextraze, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Sylvain Cloutier, and the Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt. In particular, Schmidt, who was driven by the need to have as many allied troops defending West Germany as possible as well as his desire to sell German tanks was important because he had the advantage of having some leverage since Trudeau needed West German support to get the Third Option approved by the EEC. Furthermore, Trudeau respected Schmidt’s views on foreign and defence policy. The result of these maneuverings was that Canada acquired the Leopard I main battle tank.

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71 Canada sought to increase its trade with Japan during this period as well.
72 During his time as chief of the Defence Staff, Dextraze had established a very good relationship with Trudeau. Bland, Chiefs of Defence, pp. 136-138.
73 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 253.
This move signalled the beginning of what I term the Trudeauivan U-turn in foreign and defence policy, which resulted in the re-emergence of Canadian Cold War grand strategy. After the mid-1970s, Canada began to allocate significant resources to acquire new military hardware that not only including the Leopard 1, but the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft and frigates to enhance NATO’s anti-submarine capabilities and the CF-18 fighter for service in both Western Europe and North America. In 1978, as part of its NATO commitments, Canada further agreed to a three percent after inflation increase in defence spending, which meant that Canadian defence spending rose from $4.380 billion in 1980 to $6.027 billion in 1984.

So what are the reasons for this change in position by the Trudeau government? Pressures from NATO and the Americans to increase defence spending as well as the resilience of the Canadian bureaucracy that outlasted Trudeau’s attempts to conduct a revolution in foreign affairs were definitely major factors. Another explanation was that Trudeau had learned on the job and improved his policies to adjust to the realities of the world, although it is possible that Trudeau, faced with the economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s and the election of a separatist government in Quebec in 1976, simply did not have the time and energy to take charge as he previously did. It should be emphasized that one of the very few times he did show leadership in foreign and defence policy after the mid-1970s was his peace initiative in 1983 and 1984, which was an extremely poorly planned exercise that achieved little of any consequence. Whatever the reason, the result was that Canadian grand strategy, while shaken and less effective than it had been at its peak in the 1950s, had survived the early Trudeau years and would continue until the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, in the early 1980s, Canada agreed to allow the United States to conduct testing for air launched cruise missiles on Canadian soil. This move was formally meant to support Canada’s NATO commitments, but was really about supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent and American nuclear war fighting capabilities.

Moreover, when fears of new Soviet bombers and cruise missiles prompted renewed

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74 Fortmann, Larose and Murphy, “An Emerging Strategic Counterculture?,” p. 556; Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 378.
75 Ibid., p. 255. All this defence spending came with extensive industrial offsets for Canadian industry.
76 For more information on cruise missiles and American nuclear war fighting capabilities see Jockel and Sokolsky, “Canada’s Cold War Nuclear Experience.”
interest in continental air defence, Canada worked with the Americans to lay the groundwork for future action, which included the construction of the North Warning System in the mid-1980s.

As for Canada’s support of the West in international organizations such as the UN and the Commonwealth, these activities declined because these organizations were much less important in the conduct of the Cold War then they had previously been. Indeed, there were very few new peacekeeping missions in this period. Nevertheless, under the Clark government, Canada did join the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, a decision that Trudeau complained about, but did not reverse.

So finally we come to the Mulroney years, which can be summed up with expression, good intentions, but no money. Thus, this period saw another attempt to restructure Canada’s NATO commitments through a shift of Canadian forces from the central front to Norway, but this effort was abandoned after criticism by Canada’s European allies. There was also continued cooperation with the United States on continental air defence and on nuclear strategy, although the government, after consultation with the Americans, decided not to participate in the Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Then, in 1987, the government decided to revitalize Canada’s armed forces and produced the 1987 Defence White Paper that laid out this vision, but the need to try to deal with Canada’s growing budget deficit as well as the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the resulting easing of Cold War tensions quickly ended this effort. Soon after, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War would come to an end, and with it, the raison d’etre of Canadian grand strategy. Now the challenge would be to adapt to a new post-Cold War world.

Conclusion

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77 Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping, p. 241.
78 Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 96-99.
From 1950s to 1980s, Canada pursued a Cold War grand strategy that was based on support of NATO, a strong defence relationship with the Americans and support for the United States and its allies in international organizations such as the UN and the Commonwealth. Notwithstanding the two strategic challenges to this strategy that emerged under Diefenbaker and Trudeau, this strategy remained in place until the end of the Cold War in 1989 and contributed to the West’s victory in the Cold War.

So what are some lessons that can be drawn from this experience, in particular about Canada developing a grand strategy for today’s world? I believe that the most important one is that yes, Canada can have a grand strategy, but the obstacles to its creation are very great. For these strategies to be really effective they require great financial and human resources as well as large amounts of attention by Canadian ministers and officials to make them work. Ultimately, it is difficult to see any government today devoting the significant resources to foreign and defence policy given other priorities such as health care and education, especially considering that there is not an existential threat to Canada’s existence. Islamic terrorism is a major problem, but it is not the Soviet Union of the late-1940s and 1950s. If the Harper government cannot spend more than 1.46% of GDP on defence, what government will? In fact, since this peak, Canadian defence spending has been reduced and faces even further cuts.80

The lack of an existential threat will also mean that it will be very difficult to maintain continuity in policy over a long period of time. This was a problem even during the Cold War, as many Canadians in the 1960s and 1970s were skeptical that the Soviet Union posed a significant danger to Canadian security despite events such as the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. Furthermore, these problems of continuity will only grow because foreign policy has become increasingly politicized. Any government that will replace the Conservatives, especially if it is dominated by the NDP, will face pressure from its supporters in academia, the media, and the intelligentsia to distance

Canada from Harper “warrior nation” rhetoric and to adopt more “Pearsonian” approach, with an emphasis on the UN, diplomacy and peacekeeping. Thus, while a new Canadian grand strategy would be nice to deal with the challenges of today’s world, it is unlikely to emerge any time soon.

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81 Examples of this viewpoint include Noah Richler, *What We Talk About When We Talk About War* (Toronto: Goose Lane Editions, 2012) and Ian MacKay and Jamie Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012).

82 It should be emphasized that this Pearsonian vision is a romantized view of what Lester Pearson actually believed.