A Role for Effects-Based Planning in a National Security Framework

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Modern operations, both domestic and expeditionary, share much with those of the past in that they require the application of both civil and military power to shape the operating environment towards the desired end state. Recently, two related concepts have been developed to codify the best practices related to resolving crises and conflicts through the coordinated use of a variety of levers of power. Of course, the extent to which this process should be considered conceptual is open to question, given that it reflects only what competent civilian and military leaders have always sought to accomplish. Nonetheless, there is broad intuitive acceptance that the Comprehensive Approach (CA) or Whole of Government (WoG) approach is a strategic level framework for the coordination of all elements of national or coalition power, with an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) being the military contribution to the larger effort.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the sources of concern that have arisen concerning the concept’s intellectual underpinnings, and from there to suggest a means by which to apply a pragmatic application of the planning tool. By dispelling some of the fanciful notions surrounding the concept and questioning the appropriateness of calling it so in the first place, this paper places the “Effects Based Approach” in a larger comprehensive or whole of government approach to operations. From there, it will suggest an essential framework in which this planning tool can be
applied usefully to the domestic and continental operating environment. In doing so, it places CF operations and their desired effects in the broader context of national security and the strategic or “Whole of Government” framework required therein.

Before turning to an analysis of the potential difficulties with this concept and recommending a domestic application of the approach, it is essential to develop an understanding of the concept’s fundamental principles and nature. This will by no means be an exhaustive study of an evolving concept that means different things to different people. Rather, the main pillars of the EBAO concept will be outlined to determine what, if anything, it adds to the current planning and conduct of domestic operations. While concept developers within NATO argue EBAO is applicable across the spectrum of operations, including domestic, the bulk of the experimentation has been focused on deployed operations. Therefore, the literature is skewed towards a discussion of deployed operations, and one will see this bias reflected in the description of the main tenets of the concept. But domestic operations are different in character from deployed operations, and thus there is a need to engage the Commands responsible for implementing this concept in their areas of responsibility in the writing of joint doctrine, not to mention joint concept and joint force development.

The intent of EBAO is to shape the physical and behavioural state of the operating environment towards the attainment of a desired end-state. The potential of EBAO comes from the focus on the dynamics of stimulus response – on actions and their links to the state of a system – rather than purely on targets identified and damage inflicted, making the approach applicable not only to traditional warfare, but to military operations across the spectrum. But the coordinated use of all elements of national or

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1 This paper will focus on the concept’s implications for domestic operations. Both the recent Defence Policy Statement and the Canada First Defence Strategy argue for a “Canada-first” approach to defence and security operations, but the application of this and other concepts in the domestic environment bring unique requirements not addressed adequately in the literature. By focusing on the top priority for CF operations, this paper hopefully will assist in the development of a pragmatic approach to the planning and conduct of such operations.

2 There have been a number of Multi-National Experiments conducted to explore EBAO for deployed, multi-national operations. There has yet to be any significant exploration of the concept for domestic operations.

coalition power to produce a desired end state is not as revolutionary a development as many supporters of EBAO contend.\(^4\) As will be demonstrated, the best commanders and the most capable statesmen always have focused on attaining the desired end state, and did not discount the human dimension of conflict. Although they did not call it either EBAO or CA, but rather grand strategy, the desire to set and attain a desired end-state is the same.\(^5\) In order to come to a rational understanding of how this concept differs from traditional approaches and how it should be adopted for current and foreseeable operations, claims about its revolutionary nature must be dispensed with and the concept placed in a proper historical and strategic context.

The concept does differ from past operational planning experience in two important ways. First, it attempts to alter the somewhat \textit{ad hoc} approach to coordinating elements of national power practiced by capable statesmen and military commanders, to make it a standard operational method. In doing so it provides some specific guidelines and processes that, if followed, could result in new ways of thinking and acting. Second, it differs in its attempt to seek a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment through a system of systems analysis (SoSA), using this understanding as the basis to determine a desired end-state and a coordinated set of actions to attain it. During an operation, the proponents argue, it will be possible to measure accurately the effectiveness of the actions taken, while avoiding unintended effects and adjusting actions in response. Herein lies something often promised but as yet undelivered and, as will be discussed, should serve as a cautionary note. The assumption that a mechanistic solution to the uncertainty of operations can be provided and maintained through all stages of an operation sets an unrealistic context around the concept. Moreover, it downplays the importance of command ability, judgement and intuition in being able to take appropriate action without perfect understanding. Thus,


the setting of a realistic context around the concept will assist in determining its proper role in the planning and conduct of CF operations as part of a WoG approach.

In adopting an effects-based approach, it must be recognised that military operations invariably are chaotic and subject to chance. They are a non-linear activity influenced by the interplay of, among other things, politics, culture, international conventions, violent impulses, and fear. Small changes in any of these areas can produce significant alterations in the overall character of the conflict. This makes the prediction of second and third order effects extremely challenging. While complete certainty and total knowledge can never be attained in a military operation, an effects-based approach, if placed in its proper concept, may assist Commander Canada Command to educate other government departments (OGD) about the kind of effects the command can deliver, and therefore help to develop a more collaborative, WoG approach to operations.

The promises offered by an effects-based approach to operations have swayed many to its cause, but much of the promise seems to contrast with the realities of operations. Again, the main focus of EBAO is defining and then attaining desired effects, implying an ability to link cause and effect and thus translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. Doing so is contingent upon the establishment and maintenance of information dominance over the enemy or the situation, with the goal of creating a virtually transparent battlespace. Armed with a near-perfect understanding of one’s own forces, the adversary – either human or natural – as well as neutral parties, critical vulnerabilities or nodes can then be identified and leveraged using military or other elements of national power to attain the predefined desired effects. These assumptions, which underpin the concept of EBAO, reduce conflict and operations into logical and neat activities, rather than the chaotic, dynamic, and often uncertain reality that has always shaped warfare. EBAO thus offers the potential for a synthetic “controlled system” approach to conflict, while those who report on recent operational experience indicate no sign of a break from the past.

Confusion and surprise, both the

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Clausewitzian “fog of war” and that derived from having too much information, still exist in both domestic and deployed operations, and unexpected and minor influences/impacts can at times produce a disproportionate effect. In order to come to terms with this reality requires a pragmatic and flexible approach to the application of EBAO, emphasising the continuing need for the operational art.

The Domestic Operating Environment

Much of the discussion about complexity in modern operations tends to focus on deployed operations rather than domestic. Indeed, most of the analysis and experimentation of the EBAO concept uses deployed operations as the backdrop.\(^8\) Again, while there can be no denying that deployed operations are complex, it is far from certain that they are increasingly complex, more so than in the past. Indeed, although factors such as globalisation and advances in technology have affected the character of this complexity, they also offer means to mitigate the challenges posed. But the underlying nature of this complexity remains as it ever was, and includes such things as “the adequacy of intelligence, the lack of cultural sensitivity, the risk of studying inputs rather than outputs, and the need for models to account for cognitive, cultural, political, and social factors.”\(^9\) In all military operations, whether expeditionary or domestic, complexity is an enduring condition that likely must be borne, more than a problem that can be solved.

But domestic operations are complex for different reasons. The legislated reality for most CF domestic operations is by nature an unavoidably complex one, which is always the case for militaries within liberal democracies. However, some recent developments promise to ease the inherent complexity of the multi-agency nature of domestic operations. The establishment of Canada Command in 2006 was, at least in part, an attempt to formalise the relationships between the CF and its security partners through a command with the authority and accountability for conducting routine and

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\(^8\) The Multinational Experiment series conducted by USJFCOM and involving key Canadian allies such as the US, UK, and Australia, is an example of this situation.

contingency operations within Canada. The ongoing work to establish appropriate
linkages with security partners at all levels, to understand their cultures and educate
them about the kind of effect the CF can provide, and simply knowing whom to call in
time of crisis are all positive developments critical to the formulation of a coordinated,
whole of government approach. In many ways, treating Canada as a theatre of
operations is simply a formalisation of a long established practice made necessary by a
changed threat environment. The form is starting to catch up with the function. What
remains uncertain is whether the transformation efforts have gone far enough, and are
they soon to be erased? Does form now follow function, or are there still significant
cultural and structural obstacles in the way of satisfying the Chief of the Defence Staff’s
(CDS) vision for the CF and the Government of Canada (GoC) policy direction?

When considering an EBAO for the domestic and continental environment, it is
important to look pragmatically at the concept and avoid making it into more than it is
or should be. Moreover, the shop-worn clichés about its revolutionary nature must be
avoided, as should be the mechanistic and unrealistic underpinnings of near certainty
and the ability to maintain it throughout an operation. Only then will it be possible to
address coherently the role of EBAO in a domestic context, assess its value to
contingency and crisis operations, and recommend an appropriate process in which it
should function.

The prevention or resolution of crises, either natural or man-made, is only
achievable by dealing with the immediate symptoms of the crisis, while also addressing
the associated causes of each individual situation. Having said this, the response to each
crisis will be different, as will the means used. It is generally accepted that the military
instrument is only one of a number of influences that can usefully be brought to bear on
a rapidly changing situation. This is especially true in the domestic operating
environment where usually the CF is a force of last resort, and acts in support of the
lead civilian agency.\(^{10}\) Thus, a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach almost
always is required to ensure the adoption of an appropriate overarching strategy for the
conduct of domestic operations, as well as practical measures to coordinate and focus

\(^{10}\) While “usually” a tool of last resort, in some cases, especially in the Arctic, the CF is often the only tool
at the Government’s disposal with the capabilities required for particular tasks. The CF will also be the
tool of “first resort” in the case of air Search-and-Rescue.
activity towards the successful resolution of the situation. In the majority of domestic operations, the resolution would not be possible without external influences, resources, or assistance provided by a range of groups and agencies, including provincial and municipal governments, and private and commercial interests. Yet, as discussed previously, this multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach is extraordinarily difficult to achieve for numerous reasons. Until these difficulties are overcome, they must at least be acknowledged and mitigated to the degree possible.

Thus we are confronted with the nature of “complexity” in domestic operations, and the need to sort out responsibilities and relationships at the so-called “strategic” level of government seems intuitively obvious. Yet, “strategy” remains elusive for most governments. As historian Hew Strachan has pointed out, the word strategy has been used with such imprecision that its meaning has been significantly weakened if not lost altogether. Indeed, he argues it “has acquired a universality which has robbed it of its meaning, and left it only with banalities.”11 While this may overstate the case, it is certainly true that “strategy” has been conflated with policy in recent decades, and has lost some of its distinction. For example, it is common to see governments developing strategies for the formulation of policy, rather than the traditionally accepted relationship where a clear and relevant policy allows for the development of a strategy to attain policy goals. A case in point is the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s development of a strategy “for policy, public service delivery and organisational priorities.”12 In this case, policy no longer sets the strategy, but rather strategy has resulted in policy. Furthermore, far too frequently strategy has been used to describe a desired end-state, further confusing ways, means, and ends.

In a recent speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, President Bush argued that tyranny should be opposed by democratic states. To this end, the US would pursue “a different course, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.”13 While one can develop a strategy to attain freedom, it is a condition or desired end-state

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12 Ibid., p. 33.
towards which the strategy is aimed, not a strategy itself.

In addition to the conflation of strategy with policy, there seems to be a corresponding confusion over the process behind the formulation of a coherent strategy. Although extant government policy, in the form of the National Security, Defence, and Foreign Policy, all wrestle with the threat environment facing Canada and the CF, this is only the first step in developing a strategy to meet the challenges posed – a step that must be continually analysed and updated to ensure its relevance, but that is not a strategy in itself. Clear political decision-making leading to relevant policy upon which a coherent strategy can be based has been the crucial element in the success or failure of military operations.

In the past the creation of such a vision has eluded political leadership. Yet without some coherent and intelligent strategic vision towards which both civilian and military action can be directed, the results are often disastrous. In 1914, for example, none of the major powers understood clearly the desired strategic outcome, or what that outcome would demand of them. The continual references to the conflict being completed and the troops returning home by Christmas illustrates the misunderstanding of the strategic and military realities faced. The conflict quickly became so costly and dreadful that continuing the struggle, and risking much more, was viewed as the only option. The political price of admitting that the sacrifices made and casualties suffered so far had been a mistake, would have been so dire that any alternative was preferable. As often happens, this belief contrasted with the opinion of senior military leaders. For example, General Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and German War Minister, argued in late 1914 that Germany could not win the war and it would be better to make peace sooner, under more favourable terms. German Chancellor Theobold von Bethmann Hollweg, however, either could not or would not accept this interpretation and “informed Falkenhayn that he was prepared to fight to the bitter end, no matter how long it might take.”

Thus, as has always been the case, the development of a sound strategy with clearly defined and attainable end-states is essential to the formulation of an effects-

based approach to operations. Even effective performance at the tactical level will be hard pressed to overcome the negative impact of a flawed national strategy. A coherent and adaptable strategy providing a realistic framework and balancing ends and means for all participants in a domestic operation is critical to success.

However, various government departments have only begun to explore the “Comprehensive” or “Whole of Government” approach, which might follow from a clear national strategy. Developing an EBAO before the WoG concept has been advanced is somewhat backwards, and reflects the confusion surrounding policy, strategy and its execution – a confusion of ways, means, and ends. Moreover, it likely reflects a lack of a clear understanding of the national interest, and the threats facing Canada.

Despite such obstacles, the development of a realistic strategy requires an honest interplay between the operational level commander and his subordinates, and the operational level commander and those responsible for determining the strategic course. The operational commander must begin with a clear understanding of the strategic end state sought by the political leadership, as this understanding will be translated into its operational context. In doing so, the operational commander must inform strategic decision makers about the potential costs of and possible limitations of the employment of military capabilities. The frank ebb and flow of communication between the operational commander and the strategic decision makers is essential to balancing means and ends.15 Often, it must be said, the outcomes of this process will generate ambiguities and uncertainties driven by misunderstandings of the nature of the crisis. However, the operational commander must always estimate and effectively communicate what has been achieved and what remains, determine what the intentions and capabilities of partner organisations are and be ready to take swift and decisive actions to achieve the strategic ends. One caveat to this seemingly simple process must be offered. Past attempts to translate strategic end-states into actual military operations have proven to be extraordinarily difficult, and there is no reason to expect this to

change in the future.16

There is thus a need to begin an analysis of EBAO for the domestic and continental operating environment from a clear understanding of the current and anticipated threat environment, and from existing Government of Canada national security and foreign policy. From there it would be possible to identify any gaps or areas requiring attention to formulate the kind of policy that will serve the nation’s interests. It ultimately should be the role of the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor to make these recommendations to the Government of Canada, and to direct the formulation of relevant policy with appropriate input from those best positioned to provide comment.17 Armed with a relevant policy backdrop, it would be far easier to develop a national or WoG strategy for the attainment of policy objectives. In this context, it would be far easier for the CF Strategic Joint Staff to develop a Force Employment Strategy for CDS approval that would give the operational commands the specific guidance needed to formulate an EBAO appropriate for their areas of responsibility, and also to recommend capabilities and other concepts needed to position the commands for success in future operations.18

Samples of Past Operational Experience – the Historical Context

It is important to keep in mind that, while the military may have only a supporting – and infrequent – role in internal security operations today, that has not always been the case. In the early days of Canadian history, the military was routinely used to support the civil power in its duty to uphold the “peace, order and good government of Canada,” as stated in Section 91 of the British North America Act. Certain significant incidents, such as the use of military force to quell both Riel Rebellions, to

17 The Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 has recently recommended a more proactive role within the federal national security structure, particularly in the area of terrorism cases. See the Commission’s documentation at www.majorcomm.ca.
18 For a detailed analysis of the means by which these force development recommendations should be developed see Brad Gladman, The Requirements for a Canada Command Integrated Operating Concept, (Ottawa: DRDC CORA Technical Report 2006-39, 2007).
enforce martial law in Quebec City in 1918 in response to the anti-conscription riots and to support the police during the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike are relatively well known affairs. However, in the absence of effective police forces, troops were regularly called upon to keep the peace. As Desmond Morton points out, the militia “was often a magistrate’s only resource for even such routine duties as guarding a hanging or breaking up a boxing match.”

In the aftermath of the First World War, subversion was foremost in most military assessments of internal security threats. As countering subversive elements meant upholding “peace, order and good government,” as the strategic end-state, some in the General Staff considered the best approach would be to expand the non-permanent militia as a means to buttress the principles of citizenship and social order through the Dominion. As there was little political appetite for the notion of universal training to achieve such a vast expansion, however, the proposal faded away.

However, the General Staff seized on the threat of Bolshevik agitation in Canada, using it to justify an increase in the permanent militia from 5,000 to 10,000 men. The Winnipeg General Strike fresh in his mind, the Minister of Militia and Defence, Major-General SC Mewburn, agreed and overcame opposition to the whole idea of increasing the size of the military, and Parliament approved the increase in 1920. Although the size of the Permanent Force remained just over 4,000 for several years, it was called out several times to perform what was euphemistically known as “strike duty.” One such instance in Cape Breton, when over a thousand Permanent Force troops were called out in response to a miner’s strike, led William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Liberal government to amend the Militia Act in 1924 to strip County Court judges of the authority to call out

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20 The social function of the Reserves remains a principle of national policy. The October 2000 Government of Canada Policy Statement Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) stated the following: “Located in communities throughout Canada, the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the raison d’être of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a “footprint” in communities across the country. Its significant social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.” See Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee, *Progress Report 1: Land Force Reserve Restructure* (Ottawa: 2002), p. 25.

the militia. That power was henceforth given to provincial attorneys-general.\textsuperscript{22}

While there exist numerous examples of domestic operations from which lessons about how military capability has been perceived and used by the civil authority, two recent episodes suffice to show how an effects-based approach requires clear and continuous top-down direction.

The rarity of requests for aid of the civil power since 1960 reflects a long-standing desire by provincial authorities to control their own internal affairs, combined in most cases with the ability to do so. Even in the run-up to the FLQ crisis, the Quebec provincial authorities were confident in their ability to deal with the situation, and only called on Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal assistance.\textsuperscript{22,23} There remain, however, periodic instances where municipal and provincial authorities have been overwhelmed by events and have been forced to seek CF assistance. The trigger which ultimately led to a request for Aid of the Civil Power by the Premier of Quebec was a spike of some 137 FLQ attacks throughout 1969.\textsuperscript{24} Even before this request, analysis and planning had been started by the army region, who assessed that the FLQ had adopted the Maoist five step revolutionary war doctrine, and had progressed to step three – armed resistance. Steps four and five, preparation for mobile warfare and national liberation, would follow.\textsuperscript{25} At the 5 January 1970 Cabinet meeting preparing a response to this, Prime Minister Trudeau made it clear “no modern state would allow a threat of this magnitude to its unity and integrity without mounting a consistent and coordinated defence against it.” However, when the Aid of the Civil Power statutes were later briefed to prepare Cabinet for the anticipated need, the political leadership was “astonished” at the procedures as “they had not given it much thought” until then.\textsuperscript{26}

Two operations were undertaken during this crisis. The first, Operation “Ginger”, began with the kidnapping of the British Trade Commissioner on 5 October 1970, followed by that of the Quebec Minister of Labour. Operation “Ginger” assigned

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
regular troops to the protection of federal politicians in both Ottawa and Quebec. While the Bourassa government did make a request for Aid of the Civil Power on 15 October 1970 under the National Defence Act, the federal government responded more vigorously. The following day Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act and approved the second operation, codenamed operation “Essay”, to enforce it. This operation provided a display of military force to the residents of Montreal, and also provided guards and troops to cordon and search to assist the Quebec provincial police in tracking down the FLQ.27

Ultimately over 12,500 troops were deployed in operation “Essay” and they played the dominant role in what has been criticized as an overreaction, but which was also a brilliant success. As historian Desmond Morton has pointed out,

Trudeau’s target was not two frightened little bands of terrorists, one of which soon strangled its helpless victim: it was the affluent dilettantes of revolutionary violence, cheering on the anonymous heroes of the FLQ. The proclamation of the War Measures Act and the thousands of grim troops pouring into Montreal froze the cheers, dispersed the coffee-table revolutionaries, and left them frightened and isolated while the police rounded up suspects whose offence, if any, was dreaming of blood in the streets.28

There was, in fact, very little associated violence. Only ten warning shots were fired, and no casualties suffered aside from a soldier being killed after stumbling with his loaded weapon.29

Political guidance and direction was also crystal clear, illustrated by Trudeau’s comment of “Well, just watch me,” when asked how far he would go to defend Canada. In a meeting with General Dare, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), he directed putting “tanks on all the bridges in Montreal and men all over the city to show these

pipsqueaks who had the power.” In this case, General Dare was able to convince the Prime Minister to allow the CF to deliver the desired effect in a more orderly way, to which Trudeau replied “do as you think best, but we win.”

This illustrates the two facets of typical government responses to crises – at times to view the CF as a warehouse from which can be drawn specific pieces of kit or manpower to meet a specific need, and in contrast the willingness to allow the military to attain the desired effect in response to a clearly stated need. It is the latter that the establishment of Canada Command, and the application of an effects based approach to operations within the context of a whole of government approach, should seek to make routine.

A more recent example of an Aid of the Civil Power operation was the 1990 Oka crisis, which involved an armed conflict between members of the Mohawk nation, the provincial police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and finally the CF. The source of the conflict is rooted in a land dispute dating back to 1717. In March 1990 this dispute resulted in a number of blockades being erected by members of the Kanesatake Mohawk band and members of a militant native organization known as the Warrior Society. The situation worsened in June when the municipality of Oka obtained a court injunction ordering the removal of the barricades. One hundred Sûreté du Québec (SQ) provincial police officers attempted to enforce the injunction and remove the barricades. During the confrontation gunfire was exchanged between the two opposing forces and a police officer was killed. The Mohawk band and militants responded by erecting additional barricades on the Mercier Bridge, and on all highways crossing the reserve. When it became clear that the SQ had lost control of the situation, RCMP support was sought, but they too were overwhelmed by the Mohawks and difficulties associated with the blocked traffic. An additional ten constables had been hospitalized, and the situation reached a point where, on 14 August Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa requested CF support under the Aid of the Civil Power section of the NDA. The military response, operation “Salon”, involved close to 3,700 members of the

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CF and lasted some 78 days.\textsuperscript{32}

In this operation, the relationship between the CF and the authorities was plagued by the long-standing problems concerning roles and responsibilities during an operation. In this operation, some commentators have suggested the lines of authority and responsibility were clearly defined and respected, with the provincial authorities clearly outlining the goals, while the CDS “determined the necessary level of forces, planned the execution, and decided on the timing.”\textsuperscript{33} Others, however, have suggested a less functional relationship, where the Prime Minister at times overstepped his bounds. For example, it was the Prime Minister who seemed interested in directing the operation, when the NDA clearly states that the CDS should have been the only one responding directly back to the provincial Attorney General.\textsuperscript{34}

Others have suggested an even more obscure relationship, where the Commander of Mobile Command, General Foster, “sat in on the provincial crisis cabinet meetings,” signifying the operational link was not directly to the CDS himself.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, defence analyst Douglas Bland also indicates the federal government was more directly involved. Indeed, he argues that “CF operations were controlled from NDHQ and sometimes in considerable detail...the CDS and the deputy minister began to insist on NDHQ clearance for the most trivial actions in the field.”\textsuperscript{36} This level of confusion over exact responsibilities in operations and who can and should deliver specific effects will hopefully be reduced, at least in the long term, through the establishment of Canada Command.

Some of these problems are unavoidable in politically sensitive operations, but others come from the seemingly common view that the CF is little more than a warehouse from which to draw specific pieces of kit and manpower. The most obvious

\textsuperscript{34} Charters, “From October to Oka: Peacekeeping in Canada, 1970-1990”, p. 382.
example of this in recent history is the 1999 call by the Mayor of Toronto for CF assistance in snow removal. While this kind of provision of service is at times required, it reflects the tendency of some politicians to look to the military as a source of material or manpower rather than effects.\textsuperscript{37} This is a problem that can be solved by educating politicians and bureaucrats, and it is for this reason that EBAO must be considered the military contribution to a Whole of Government approach to avoid “civilianizing” the unique contribution provided by the CF. But such education can only be imparted by the CF if it has sound EBAO-derived doctrine for domestic operations, and understands and applies it. Politicians and politics aside, however, it is also the case that other agencies see military kit as a valuable resource that can sometimes be used to deliver a desired effect only if plainly not associated with the CF. At the Ipperwash standoff in 1995, Ontario Provincial Police Chief Superintendent Christopher Coles made this argument in response to an Inspector’s proposal for the OPP to deploy an armoured personnel carrier as part of its inventory:

I was adamant that if an armoured personnel carrier was going to be used in any way, shape or form by the Ontario Provincial Police, it would have an Ontario Provincial Police sign on it. I didn’t care if it came from the military. I would paint it and I would repaint it whatever they wished. But it was Ontario Provincial Police resource vehicle. It was not a tank.... I can assure you that I was adamant... I did not want to be seen to be assisted by the military. I was keeping that separation, and that was a separation that was very clear in my mind.\textsuperscript{38}

While the nature of CF domestic operations, from their legal authority to the difficulty of true collaboration, has remained fairly constant, the challenge of the current security environment has forced a need to transform both the CF and how it deals with its security partners. CF advice to the civil authority and to other elements of the national security system must remain militarily sound, of course, and based on a firm grasp of CF capabilities. For instance, Minister of National Defence George Pearkes in the 1950s attempted to shift civil defence “national survival” duties from the Department of  

Health and Welfare, but betrayed a lack of understanding of the Militia’s culture. Nonetheless, it is up to the CF to explore the implications of transformation, whereby Canada is no longer a secure base from which to generate forces for deployed operations, but now one where Canada is viewed as a single theatre of operations where responsive and effective force employment for both routine and contingency operations is the priority. The creation of Canada Command embodies this paradigm shift, and its work to establish permanent working relationships at not only the local level, but from a truly national perspective, will do much to further a WoG approach to operations. Given the significant challenge to Western interests and way of life posed by the current existential terrorist threat, this is an important aspect of the development of a national security policy and strategy.

The application of military force domestically by democratic governments will remain a controversial and politically sensitive topic. However, the nature of the threats being confronted has evolved. The threats now include the traditional natural disasters and minor urban unrest, but also transnational terrorists and cult groups potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction, organized and armed urban unrest, and the violent potential of private paramilitary groups. It is also reasonable to assume that “threats to North American domestic security will increase in nature, scope, and number” in this century and that this will “presumably prompt more debate on and calls for an increase in the military’s role in containing and neutralizing those threats.” Indeed, this assertion was the main driver behind the establishment of Canada Command, with the authority to plan for and conduct routine and contingency operations within its area of responsibility (AOR).

A consequence of the increasingly globalized and interwoven world has been the blurring of the boundaries between the three broad geo-strategic imperatives of the CF – the defence of Canada, cooperation with the US to ensure the defence of North America, and selected contributions to operations aimed at maintaining international peace and stability. Events in other regions can, and frequently do, have immediate and

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41 Ibid.
significant ramifications in North America. Thus, the traditional approach of looking at the CF’s principal defence roles of domestic, continental, and international operations in isolation is no longer appropriate, if it ever really was. In many ways, these traditional roles have merged and are now interdependent layers in the nation’s defence. Domestic security is increasingly related to continental security, which is, to a degree, contingent on international security. The point of this discussion is to illustrate that the threats faced target not only specific countries but also the strategic entity of the North American continent. An appropriate response to these threats would require a national security policy and follow-on strategy that clearly articulates the national interests and how domestic and international security relate, and charts a clear course towards a layered defence of the homeland. The policy and strategy should also articulate where Canadian and US interests are parallel or identical, which is of particular importance if a truly WoG approach is to be adopted to combat the rise of the terrorist threat, which compounds the traditional threat environment.

Canada currently has multiple points of vulnerability that adversaries may seek to exploit. The commercial ties with the US see close to $2 billion per day in trade flowing between the two countries. This is reliant on the flow of goods and people across the nation’s borders, through our seaports and airports, and on its highways. Moreover, the “Canadian free market economy requires trust in the uninterrupted electronic movement of financial data and funds through cyberspace.”42 A terrorist attack would impact the flow of this vital trade and commerce, with a commensurate damage to Canadian lives, property, and prosperity. As stated earlier, the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack employing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive weapons has forced Western societies to view their national security in a new light, including developing and maintaining situational awareness, and enhancing the links between the military and law enforcement and other domestic security partners.

Although the main challenges will likely be the asymmetric attacks discussed, the CF must retain and continually update its capability to defend against conventional attacks against Canadian territory, territorial waters, or deployed forces. Indeed, some analysts have noted that a “much more traditional world is emerging, replete with

42 Ibid., p. 5-1.
nation-states, spheres of influence, strategic weapons and so on.” Potential conventional threats must be identified as far from their targets as possible in order to implement an appropriate response. The Canada COM concept of operations argues that Canada COM intends to employ an active layered defence relying on early warnings and actions to emerging threats to quickly deploy appropriate and decisive responses. Networked information sharing with CF agencies, allies and OGDs will provide a comprehensive common operating picture (COP) from which timely defence decisions to act can be made.

Furthermore, given the nature of the strategic entity of continental North America, it makes sense to establish closer linkages with Mexico, and to continue the intimate defence and security relationships with the US, including the development of updated defence and operations plans designed to ensure maximum interoperability and effectiveness for continental defence.

When considering how the Command should fit into an EBAO, it is important to realise what has already been accomplished since the Command was established, and what is currently ongoing, including the recent support provided to the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games in Operation “Podium”. For example, a focus of effort has been directed at attempting to educate OGDs and other security agencies about the nature of effects the CF can deliver through the Command, and to work to establish a permanent working relationship that is well tested and will meet the demands of an actual contingency.

A fairly recent example of such a contingency took place in the spring and early summer of 2007, when Canada Command planned for “a scalable CF response to support the civil authorities in BC in their flood mitigation and response effort”. In broad terms, this operation appears to have been a textbook example of an “effects-

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44 Department of National Defence, Canada Command Concept of Operations, p. 5-1.


based operation”. While undoubtedly there were some cultural issues and long-standing views of the CF and its role that have yet to be overcome, in broad terms the operation was planned in an environment where Canada Command can employ CF capabilities to attain a desired series of effects.

In preparing for the operation, the strategic intent of both the provincial (BC) authorities and the senior leadership of DND/CF, and the expected nature of the CF participation, was clearly spelled-out and nested within the operational orders. Thus, the operational level planning was synchronised with the desired strategic end-state, as was the tactical planning. This would have been an essential element in a successful operation, as Joint Task Force Pacific (JTFP) at the tactical level conducted the detailed planning for the operation to attain the operational level effects sought, while Canada Command focused on operational level issues such as the coordination of force generation activities in support of the operation, as well as providing for needed augmentation should the situation require. All this activity focused around the provision of unique CF capabilities not available from the civilian authorities, and the attainment of the desired end-state.

While this level of planning and coordination is not unique in the history of domestic operations, the level of coordination of all elements of national power apparent in the preparation is distinct, and may reflect a growing understanding that, when called upon to do so, the CF provides capabilities towards the attainment of desired effects. At the start of the planning for this operation, the BC government requested that “the CF focus their planning in the South West Region (lower Fraser River Valley), which is the area with the largest population concentration and greatest amount of infrastructure.” Instead of simply asking for personnel and equipment, the BC authorities would request support in a specific area when the situation reached a point where they were overwhelmed. The effects the CF would achieve were arrived at through a WoG approach. Numerous government departments and agencies at all levels, from the local municipal authorities through to Public Safety Canada, and from the Canadian Coast Guard through to the CF, contributed to a clear understanding of the potential problem and what each could add to the combined effort. While it will

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 7.
never be known how this particular operation would have run, as none of the triggers requiring the deployment of CF assets were reached, it appears as though the goal of educating other security partners of the capabilities the CF can bring to a domestic operation, and what effects it can attain, is not as far off as it might at times seem. There will certainly be issues that need to be addressed, both within the CF and between the organisations involved, and lessons learned from this effort. But even in the most successful operations there are always issues identified and hopefully resolved, which does not invalidate the achievement.

The development of a national approach to domestic security and defence is obviously not in the exclusive domain either of Canada Command or even the Department of National Defence. Through Canada Command, the CF can, however, provide the definition of an appropriate framework that allows for a thoughtful and strategic look at how the operational environments, both foreign and domestic, need to be shaped to Canada’s interests and the effects required to do so.

Returning to Hew Strachan’s argument that the terms “policy” and “strategy” have been conflated to the point where their meaning largely has been lost, the first step in developing a sustainable and well understood whole of government or an effects-based approach to operations is a clear and relevant policy framework. To define an appropriate policy requires a clear articulation of Canada’s national interests, rather than a focus on its values or other nebulous factors; indeed, a nation’s core values likely would be adequately captured in any clear articulation of its national interests.49

A clear statement of the national interest would enable the development of an equally clear national security strategy designed to protect and advance those interests. It is important to note the difference between a national security policy and a strategy –

49 Three prominent Canadians have argued convincingly for the centrality of interests in driving national policies. “Focus, vigilance and relevance should be the watchwords guiding future foreign and economic policy decisions. Trying to be all things to all, or asserting values over interests, risks being of little value to anyone, and most notably to Canada’s own interests. Of course, values are important. Human rights, democratic principles and tolerance are the hallmarks of Canada’s evolution. They inform the choices we make, the alliances we forge, and the actions we take in global affairs. But they are not ends in themselves nor principles that override determination of what our interests are and how they can be best served.” See D.H. Burney, W.A. Dymond and J.L. Granatstein, “Linkage: Foreign Policy, Interests and Prosperity” (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008), p. 4.
the former being the “ends,” the latter is the “ways,” while CA and EBAO are the “means”. Without a lucid and relevant statement of the ends and ways, it becomes difficult to define appropriate means of attaining them. Hence, various government departments are forced to guess at the forms and functions of inter-departmental relations and coordination efforts needed to meet the challenges of the current security environment, needlessly complicating the matter. A concise, realistic and relevant national security policy and strategy would require input from various government departments and agencies with subject matter expertise. Responsibility for writing it should, however, rest elsewhere.

In a sense, the problem concerns governance, which begs the question of who should undertake the writing of both the national security policy and the national security strategy? It is argued here that it should be “directed” by the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and “undertaken” by the Privy Council Office/National Security Advisor. Given that these issues are beyond the mandate of any specific government department, dealing with domestic and foreign policy as well as defence policy, the most logical solution to this question would be for the National Security Advisor to adopt this role. Coordinated, top-down direction is necessary today perhaps more so than in the past because of the necessity of joining up national security and international security policies. In the late 1970s, legal scholar Martin Freidland might have been able to confess, “I do not know what national security means. But, then, neither does the Government.” Freidland’s conception of national security was almost purely domestic. And it was also based on a legal, not strategic, point of view.

Could Freidland’s observation about the inscrutable nature of national security hold today? Indeed, making a government department such as Public Safety Canada (PSC) responsible for “matters of national security” perhaps reflects an immature and

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50 “Top down” refers to the mechanics of Cabinet government. Of course, policy and strategy, based on national interests, might be crafted and “marketed” by elected officials, but voters, in a “bottom-up” fashion, decide their fate.

inappropriate understanding of the nature of national security.\textsuperscript{52} On the one hand, the *National Security Policy* is now owned by PSC and it focuses on domestic issues, but at the same time contains within it a chapter on international security.\textsuperscript{53} On the other hand, the government’s development, foreign, and defence policies, the last of which contains elements of domestic concern, fall out of its international policy statements.\textsuperscript{54} The confusion surrounding responsibility for specific areas points to the lack of top-down direction, and makes a stronger case for the development of a National Security Advisor whose position is not to coordinate, but rather to direct the resolution of national security issues. In that case, the *National Security Policy*, as the direction for subordinate policies, would not be “owned” by a single department. So, while the existence of this policy might seem to make Freidland’s views anachronistic, national security still retains a degree of inscrutability.

Furthermore, many of the associated difficulties with developing a truly WoG approach to planning and conducting operations would be mitigated by having a National Security Advisor (NSA) with the authority and accountability of overseeing the development of a coherent, relevant, and constantly updated national security policy and strategy. In such a context, it would be far easier for the range of government departments and agencies to forge a common understanding of the threats that the country faces and how to counter them. That is, in fact, one of the stated goals of the *National Security Policy* through the creation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) and the Government Operations Centre. The CF provides a unique perspective in such strategic assessments, especially in terms of how the domestic and international security environments join up. In fact, recognizing the permanent nature of complexity both in the “home” and “away” games should drive both the institutional alignment of Canada’s national security apparatus and planning for specific operations, both of which require a collaborative approach. But collaboration can only achieve fruitful results if guided by central, engaged and staff-supported top-down direction, and

\textsuperscript{52} Taken from the Public Safety Canada website on 25 February 2008 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/index-eng.aspx.


enabled by legislation that enables the sharing of information among departments that constitute the national security system.\textsuperscript{55}

Conclusions

The concept of an EBAO has been the subject of much experimentation and study over a period of years. It is time now to decide either that the concept is developed to the point where relevant doctrine can be written, or that it is so intuitive to planners that doctrine is unnecessary. Even if it is not so novel as to warrant new doctrine, the reality is that the concept is currently being employed by many armed forces (including the CF, by CEFCOM, as well as other key allies). In the absence of firm and clearly written doctrine, one tends to find little coherence in the processes, tools, and even the fundamental principles of the concept. Herein lays the danger. If the concept is at the stage where it is being employed in current operations, it should be governed by a pragmatically developed and clearly expressed doctrine that sees through the shop-worn clichés and tired promises that surround the concept. If the concept is put in its proper context, there is nothing revolutionary or indeed entirely new about it. The proponents of both a WoG and an effects-based approach to operations argue that it promises a break with past experience, but this paper has shown that leveraging all elements of national power to achieve strategic ends is not at all a new idea. In Canada’s experience of using military forces in the domestic operating environment, this has always been the way operations have been conducted. These concepts do offer the possibility of altering the somewhat ad hoc approach to coordinating elements of national power practiced by capable statesmen and military commanders, to make it a standard operational method. In doing so the WoG approach, and the military contribution in the form of an EBAO, provide some specific guidelines and processes to assist in developing a more collaborative way of thinking and acting.

This is an eminently reasonable objective, and indeed the establishment of Canada Command is an important first step in achieving what is not only a laudable end, but also addresses the stated requirement for a “fully integrated way to address the security interests of Canadians” called for in the *National Security Policy*.\(^{56}\)

That said, Canada Command represents only an internal CF reorganization, and not a new legislative and regulatory regime for the use of military force within Canada. The impact of Canada Command on the national security structure and culture has been, and will continue to be, indirect and based on the ability of CF planners to influence their civilian counterparts.\(^{57}\) That is why an effect based approach is really most important as a planning tool rather than as doctrine to be applied to multi-agency operations. In essence, EBAO allows the military to work within a Whole of Government framework, while providing a language that reflects its necessarily unique raison d’être and capabilities. And that uniqueness must be protected as a matter of course. It is necessary for the CF not to civilianize its planning processes. Furthermore, the military should not drive, or be perceived to be driving, the Whole of Government approach within the domestic context. EBAO doctrine, therefore, should not be developed, experimented and made more complicated than need be. And all it “needs to be” is codified as a pragmatic iteration of best practices identified by operators based on simple guiding principles. The guiding principles make but a short list: The ability to know whom to call to get or give needed information, having exercised and smoothed the workings of multi-agency and multi-national efforts, having access to a common set of collaboration tools, and having demonstrated repeatedly to the other security partners that the CF delivers effects and is more than just a warehouse of kit that can be called upon to meet a crisis.

All planners must bear in mind that EBAO is only a means to implement the military contribution of a Comprehensive Approach that, in the end, is really just another term for national strategy. In itself, the *National Security Policy*, more permissive than prescriptive, may need to be enhanced to provide more clear direction.

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\(^{57}\) In forthcoming transformation discussions by the newly established office of the Chief of Transformation, the reality of the unique nature of military operations in the domestic environment should not be compromised by organisational changes.
of national strategy, in order for those in the national security system to operate in a way that distinguishes between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of activity. As for the CF specifically, the development of EBAO doctrine for domestic operations should recognize that the establishment of Canada Command, and the subsequent execution of its interagency mandate, in itself is establishing de facto doctrine on an ongoing basis. Any doctrine development should, as its first priority, concentrate on how best the operational commander can implement strategic direction. To do so, we need to think about what process would best allow operational commanders to identify and receive required capabilities. As a result, Canada Command should examine how best to provide a real-world view of how domestic and continental joint doctrine on EBAO should proceed. It is therefore recommended that the Commander of Canada Command seek to develop an appropriate input into joint doctrine development, one that ensures a pragmatic approach to the exploitation of concepts that avoids the fanciful notions discussed and results in doctrine suitable to meeting the challenges posed by the security environment. Moreover, it is recommended that the command develop an approach to EBAO that would serve to educate its other security partners about the unique military contribution to collaborative operations.

58 One such means is the development of an integrated operating concept, which would provide the considered perspective of the force employers as an input into the capability based planning process. Indeed, this idea was endorsed by the Commander of Canada Command, LGen Dumais, as a means to give an operational focus to capability based planning in the CF. See Brad W. Gladman, The Requirements for a Canada Command Integrated Operating Concept, (Ottawa: DRDC CORA TR 2006-39, 2007).