

*The Perception of Power In The Context of National Security And
Foreign Policy Thrust*

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Introduction

For a concept that is so widely used, 'power' is surprisingly elusive and difficult to measure. Power is a contested concept. No one definition is accepted by all, who use the word and people's choice of definition, reflects their interests and values. Some define power as the ability to make or resist change. Others say it is the ability to get what we want.¹ But central to the considerations in this paper are the issues of definitions or faces of power and power in foreign policy to ensure national security. In international relations, foreign policy is expected to guarantee state sovereignty and security.

There are many factors that affect our ability to get what we want as a state, group or individual. We live in a web of inherited social forces, some of which are visible and others of which are indirect and sometimes called 'structural.' We tend to identify and focus on some of these constraints and forces rather than others depending on our interests. For example, in his work on civilizations, Katzenstein argues that the power of civilizations is different from power in civilizations. Actors in civilizations command hard and soft power, while social power operates beneath the behavioural level by shaping underlying social structures, knowledge systems, and general

¹ K.E. Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* (London: Sage, 1989).

environment.² While such structural social forces are important, for policy purposes we also want to understand what actors or agents can do within given situations. As Harsanyi put it, 'one of the main purposes for which social scientists use the concept of A's power over B is for the description of the policy possibilities open to A'.³ Civilizations and societies are not immutable, and effective leaders can try to shape larger social forces with varying degrees of success. As Weber said, we want to know the probability that an actor in a social relationship can carry out his own will.⁴

Marx Weber view Power as capacity of ego to impose her or his will on alters.⁵ He conceived power as social and psychological resources for social control within a reciprocal social exchange. This form of power has the ability to compel its subjects to compliance against their will although some complaints do comply willingly because of a hitherto approval giving power wielder unreserved legitimacy.⁶ Access to power resources or lack of it has led to social inequality and social stratification in all society. It is the quest for this power by state, group and individual either within the state or in the international arena and the criminalization or victimization by the powerful of this quest that breeds conflict that threatens states sovereignty and national security. It is the efforts to avoid been vulnerable to this threats arising from quest for power by states, group or individual that shapes policy and choice of policy thrust and international political alignments.⁷

² P.J. Katzenstein, ed., *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives* (New York: Rutledge, 2009).

³ J. Harsanyi, "The Dimension and Measurement of Social Power." Reprinted in *Power in Economics*, K.W. Rothschild (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971).

⁴ M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

⁵ G. Ritzer, *Sociological Theory* (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, INC., 1996), p.127.

⁶ A.O. Omobowale, *Political Clientelism and Rural Development in Selected Communities in Ibadan, Nigeria*; Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan. (2006).

⁷ D.O. Igwe, "Globalization and the problems of Entrepreneurial Development in Nigeria", *World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable. Development* 7, no. 3 (2011): p.358.

Conceptualisation of Power

Even when we focus primarily on particular agents or actors, we cannot say that an actor 'has power' without specifying power 'to do what'.⁸ One must specify *who* is involved in the power relationship (the scope of power) as well as *what* topics are involved (the domain of power). For example, the Pope has power over some Christians, but not others (such as Protestants). And even among Catholics he may wish to have power over all their moral decisions, but some adherents may reject his power on some issues (such as birth control or marriage outside the church). Thus to say that the Pope has power requires us to specify the context (scope and domain) of the relationship.

A psychopath may have the power to kill and destroy random strangers, but not the power to persuade them. Some actions that affect others and obtain preferred outcomes can be purely destructive and not depend on what the victim thinks. For example, Pol Pot killed millions of Cambodian citizens. Some say such use of force is not power because there was no two-way relationship involved, but that depends on context and motive. If the actor's motive is pure sadism or terror, the use of force fits within the definition of power as affecting others to get what one wants. Most power relationships, however, depend very much on what the victim thinks. A dictator who wishes to punish a dissident may be misled in thinking he exercised power if the dissident really sought martyrdom to advance her cause. On the other hand, if the dictator simply wanted to destroy the dissident, her intentions did not matter to his power.

Actions often have powerful unintended consequences, but from a policy point of view we are interested in the ability to produce preferred outcomes. If a NATO soldier in Afghanistan kills a child by a stray bullet, he had the power to destroy, but not to achieve his preferred outcome. An air strike that kills one insurgent and many civilians demonstrates a general power to destroy, but it may prove counterproductive for a counter-insurgency policy. A country with a large economy may have unintended effects that cause accidental harm (or wealth) in a small country.⁹ Again if the effects are

⁸ J. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975).

⁹ S. Strange, *States and Markets* (New York: Blackwell, 1988).

unintended, there is power to harm (or benefit) but it is not power to achieve preferred outcomes. Canadians often complain that living next to the United States is like sleeping with an elephant. From the Canadian point of view, intentions do not matter; it hurts if the beast rolls over. But from a policy-oriented perspective, intentions matter in terms of getting preferred outcomes.¹⁰ A policy-oriented concept of power depends upon a specified context to tell us *who gets what, how, where and when*.¹¹

Practical politicians and ordinary people often find these questions of behaviour and motivation too complicated and unpredictable. Behavioural definitions judge power by outcomes which are determined after the action (*ex post*) rather than before the action (*ex ante*). But policy-makers want *ex ante* predictions to help guide their actions. By this second definition of power as resources, a country is powerful if it has a relatively large population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power appear to be concrete, measurable, and predictable – a guide to action. Power in this sense is like holding the high cards in a card game. But this definition has major problems. When people define power as synonymous with the resources that (may) produce outcomes, they often encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want.

This is not to deny the importance of power resources. Power is conveyed through resources, whether tangible or intangible. People notice resources. If you show the highest cards in a poker game, others may fold their hands rather than challenge you. But power resources that win in one game may not help at all in another. Holding a strong poker hand does not win if the game is bridge. Even if the game is poker, if you play your high hand poorly, or fall victim to bluff and deception, you can still lose. Power conversion – getting from resources to behavioural outcomes – is a crucial intervening variable. Having the resources of power does not guarantee that you will always get the outcome you want. For example, in terms of resources, the United States was far more powerful than Vietnam, yet lost the war. Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed

¹⁰ P. Morriss, *Power: A Philosophical Analysis*. 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).

¹¹ H. Lasswell, and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society: a Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950).

strategies and skilful leadership – what I call smart power. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge.

Nonetheless, defining power in terms of resources is a shortcut that policy-makers find useful. In general, a country that is well endowed with power resources is more likely to affect a weaker country and be less dependent upon an optimal strategy than vice versa. Smaller countries may sometimes obtain preferred outcomes because they pick smaller fights or focus selectively on a few issues. On average, and in direct conflicts, one would not expect Finland to prevail over Russia. As a first step in any game, it helps to start by figuring out who is holding the high cards and how many chips they have. Equally important, however, is that policy-makers have the contextual intelligence to understand what game they are playing. Which resources provide the best basis for power behaviour in a particular context? Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age. In traditional realist views of international affairs, war was the ultimate game in which the cards of international politics were played. When all the cards were on the table, estimates of relative power were proven and disproven. But over the centuries, as technologies evolved, the sources of strength for war often changed. Moreover, on an increasing number of issues in the twenty-first century, war is not the ultimate arbiter.

Because of this, many analysts reject the ‘elements of national power’ approach as misleading and inferior to the behavioural or relational approach that became dominant among social science analysis in the latter half of the twentieth century. Strictly speaking, the skeptics are correct. Power resources are simply the tangible and intangible raw materials or vehicles that underlie power relationships, and whether a given set of resources produces preferred outcomes or not depends upon behaviour in context. The vehicle is not the power relationship. Knowing the horsepower and mileage of a vehicle does not tell us whether it will get to the preferred destination.

Faces of Power

Gaventa has called these the public, hidden and invisible faces of power. The second and third faces embody aspects of structural power.¹² A structure is simply an arrangement of all the parts of a whole. Humans are embedded in complex structures of culture, social relations, and power which affect and constrain them. A person's field of action is 'delimited by actors with whom he has no interaction or communication, by actions distant in time and space, by actions of which he is, in no explicit sense the target'.¹³ Some of the exercises of power reflect the intentional decisions of particular actors while others are the product of unintended consequences and larger social forces.

For example, why do large automobiles dominate our city streets? In part the answer reflects individual consumer choices, but these consumer preferences are themselves shaped by a social history of advertising, manufacturers' decisions, tax incentives, public transport policy, road-building subsidies, and urban planning.¹⁴ Different choices on these issues by many visible as well as unseen actors in the past confront an urban resident today with a limited set of choices.

In 1993, Bill Clinton's political adviser James Carville is alleged to have joked that he wished he could be reborn as the bond market because then he would have real power.¹⁵ When we speak of the power of markets, we are referring to a form of structural power. A wheat farmer who wants to earn more income to pay for his daughter's college tuition may decide to plant more wheat. But if other farmers plant more as well (and demand does not change), market forces may reduce his income and affect her educational prospects. In a perfect market, the agent has no pricing power. Millions of other unseen agents making independent choices create the supply and demand that determines the price. This is why poor countries that produce commodities are often subject to wide variations in their terms of trade. But if an agent can find a way to change the structure of a market by introducing an element of monopoly (a single seller) or monopsony (a single buyer), she can gain some power

¹² J. Gaventa, Levels, spaces, and forms of power," in *Power In World Politics*, eds. F. Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 204-224.

¹³ C. Hayward, *De-facing Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹⁴ M.J. Smith, *Power and the State* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

¹⁵ B. Woodward, *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

over price. She can do this by differentiating her product by advertising, creating brand loyalty, picking a special location, and so forth. Or in the case of oil producing countries they can try to form a cartel like OPEC.

Different analysts cut into the complex pattern of causation and draw the line between individual choice and larger structures at different places. For example, sociologists tend to focus less on specific actions and outcomes than political scientists or policy analysts do.¹⁶ Analysts who focus only on individual agents as the first face of power tends to do are clearly failing to understand and describe power relationships fully, but those who focus only on broad social forces and long historical perspective pay too little attention to individual choices and intentions that are crucial in policy.

The second and third faces of power incorporate structural causes such as institutions and culture, but also leave room to focus on agents who make choices, albeit constrained by structural forces. Many power relations, like many markets, are imperfect in their structure, and allow some voluntarism and choice for agents within the structures. Some writers have suggested a 'fourth face' of power that would encompass primarily structural forces. For some purposes this can be fruitful, but it is less useful for understanding the policy options that leaders confront. Digeser has used this term to refer to Michel Foucault's view that subjects and social practices are the effects of a power that one cannot escape, and knowledge presupposes power, but he admits that 'Foucault's, use of power departs significantly from ordinary usage'.¹⁷ For policy purposes, the insights that Foucault and other structuralists provide are purchased at too high a price in terms of conceptual complexity and abstraction. This is also true of Barnett and Duvall's, interesting abstract – fourfold typology – that goes beyond the three 'faces of power' categories.¹⁸ Alternatively, structuralists undoubtedly consider my approach too agent-centered, but it does allow some consideration of structural forces even if it does not include all elements of structure.

¹⁶ K. Dowding, "Agency and Structure: Interpreting Power Relationships," *Journal of Power Studies* 1 (2008): pp. 21–36.

¹⁷ P. Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," *Journal of Politics* 5, no. 4 (1992): pp.977–1007.

¹⁸ M. Barnett, and R. Duvall, "Power in International Politics" *International Organization*, "59, no. 39 (2005): p. 75.

Some analysts regard all these distinctions as useless abstractions that can all be collapsed into the first face of power (Baldwin, 2002).¹⁹ If we succumb to this temptation, however, we are likely to limit what we see in terms of behaviour and that tends to limit the strategies that policy-makers design to achieve their goals. Command power (the first face) is very visible and readily grasped. It is the basis for hard power – the ability to get the outcomes one wants through coercion and payment. The co-optive power of faces 2 and 3 is more subtle, and less visible. It contributes to soft power, the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction. All too often policy-makers have focused solely on hard command power to compel others to act against their preferences, and ignored the soft power that comes from preference formation. But when co-opting is possible, one can save on carrots and sticks.

In global politics, some goals that states seek are more susceptible to the second and third than to the first face of power. Wolfers once distinguished between what he called possession goals – specific and often tangible objectives – and milieu goals which are often structural and intangible.²⁰ For example, access to resources or basing rights or a trade agreement are possession goals, while promoting an open trade system, free markets, democracy, or human rights are milieu goals. In the terminology used above, we can think of states having specific goals and general or structural goals. Focusing solely on command power and the first dimension of power may mislead us about how to promote such goals. For example, military means alone are less successful than when combined with soft power approaches in promoting democracy – as the United States discovered in Iraq. And the soft power of attraction and persuasion can have both agentic and structural dimensions. For example, a government can try to attract others through its actions like public diplomacy, but it may also attract others through the structural effects of its example or what can be called the ‘shining city on the hill’ effect.

Another reason not to collapse all three faces of power into the first is that it diminishes attention to networks, which are an important type of structural power in the twenty-first century. Networks are becoming increasingly important in an

¹⁹ D. A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2002): pp. 177–191.

²⁰ A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1962).

information age, and positioning in social network can be an important power resource. For example, in a hub and spokes network, power can derive from being the hub of communications. If you communicate with your other friends through me, that gives me power. If the points on the rim are not directly connected to each other, their dependence on communication through the hub can shape their agenda. For example, even after independence, many communications among former French African colonies ran through Paris, and that increased French power to shape their agenda.

In other more complex network arrangements, theorists point to the importance of structural holes that prevent direct communication between certain parts of the network.²¹ Those who can bridge or exploit structural holes can use their position as a source of power by controlling communication between others. Another aspect of networks that is relevant to power is their extensiveness. Even weak extensive ties can be useful in acquiring and disseminating novel and innovative information. Weak ties provide the ability to link diverse groups together in a cooperative, successful manner.²² This increases a country's ability to gain power with, rather than over, others. The ability to create networks of trust that enable groups to work together toward common goals is what Boulding called 'integrative power'.²³ According to psychologists, 'years of research suggest that empathy and social intelligence are vastly more important to acquiring and exercising power than are force, deception, or terror'.²⁴

Arendt argues that 'power springs up among men when they act together'.²⁵ Similarly, a state can wield global power, by engaging and acting together with other states, not merely acting against them. Ikenberry has argued that American power after World War II rested on a network of institutions that constrained the United States but were open to others and thus increased American power to act with others.²⁶ This is an important point in assessing the power of nations in the current international system,

²¹ R. Burt, *Structural Holes: the Social Structure of Competition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

²² M. Granovetter, "The Myth of Social Network Analysis as a Special Method in the Social Science," *Connections* 13 (1990): pp. 13–16.

²³ K.E. Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* (London: Sage, 1989).

²⁴ D. Keltner, "The Power Paradox," *Greater Good* 4 (2008): pp. 14–17.

²⁵ H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

²⁶ G.J. Ikenberry, *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

and an important dimension for assessing the future of American and Chinese power in the twenty-first century.²⁷ For example, if the United States is involved in more communication networks, it has a greater opportunity to shape preferences in terms of the third face of power.

For policy purposes, it can be useful to think of the three faces of power in a reverse sequence from the order in which they were invented by social scientists. A policy-maker should consider preference formation and agenda framing as means of shaping the environment before turning to the first or command face of power. In short, those who insist on collapsing the second and third dimensions of power into the first will miss an increasingly important aspect of power in this century.

Forms of Relational Power

In addition to the distinction between resource and relational definitions of power, it is useful to distinguish three different aspects of relational power. All too often these are collapsed. For example, a recent book on foreign policy defines power as 'getting people or groups to do something they don't want to do'.²⁸ But such a narrow approach can lead to mistaken analysis.

The ability to compel others to change their behaviour against their initial preferences is one important dimension, but not the only important aspect of relational power. One can also affect others' preferences so that they need not be compelled to change them. Former USA President (and General) Dwight Eisenhower referred to this as getting people to do something 'not only because you tell them to do so, but because they instinctively want to do it for you'.²⁹ This co-optive power contrasts with and complements command power. It is a mistake to think that power consists of just ordering others to change. You can affect others' behaviour by shaping their preferences

²⁷ A.M. Slaughter, "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century," *Foreign Affairs* 8, no. 8 (2009): pp. 94–113.

²⁸ L. Gelb, *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 2009).

²⁹ A. Axelrod, *Eisenhower And Leadership: Ike's Enduring Lessons In Total Victory Management* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2006).

in ways that produce what you want rather than relying on carrots and sticks to change their behaviour 'when push comes to shove.' Sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without pushing or shoving, and ignoring this by using a too narrow definition of power can lead to a poorly shaped foreign policy.

This first aspect or 'face' of power was defined by Dahl in studies of New Haven in the 1950s, and it is widely used today even though it covers only part of power behaviour.³⁰ It focuses on the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies. To measure or judge power, you have to know how strong another person or nation's initial preferences were and how much they were changed by your efforts. Coercion is quite clear, even when there appears to be some degree of choice. If a gunman says, 'your money or your life,' you have some choice but it is small and not consistent with your initial preferences (unless they included suicide or martyrdom). When Czechoslovakia succumbed to German and Soviet troops entering Prague in 1938 and again in 1968, it was not because it wanted to.

Economic measures are somewhat more complex. Negative sanctions (taking away economic benefit) are clearly felt as coercive. Payment or economic inducement to do what you initially did not want to may seem more attractive to the subject, but any payment can easily be turned into a negative sanction by the implicit or explicit threat of its removal. A year-end bonus is a reward, but its removal is felt as a penalty. Moreover, in unequal bargaining relationships, say between a millionaire landowner and a starving peasant, a paltry 'take it or leave it' payment may give the peasant little sense of choice. The important point is that someone has the capacity to make others act against their initial preferences and strategies, and both sides feel that power.

In the 1960s, Bachrach and Baratz pointed out that Dahl's definition missed what they called the 'second face of power' because it ignored the dimension of framing and agenda setting.³¹ If one can use ideas and institutions to frame the agenda for action in a way that makes others' preferences seem irrelevant or out of bounds, then it may never be necessary to push or shove them. In other words, it may be possible to shape others'

³⁰ R.A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy And Power In An American City* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961).

³¹ P. Bachrach, and M. Baratz, "Decisions And Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review* 5, no. 7 (1963): pp. 632–642.

preferences by affecting their expectations of what is legitimate or feasible. Agenda framing focuses on the ability to keep issues off the table, or as Sherlock Holmes might put it, dogs that fail to bark.

Powerful actors can make sure that the less powerful are never invited to the table, or if they get there, the rules of the game have already been set by those who arrived first. International financial policy had this characteristic, at least before the crisis of 2008 opened things up somewhat when the Group of 8 was supplemented by the Group of 20. Those who are subject to this second face of power may or may not be aware of it. If they accept the legitimacy of the institutions or the social discourse that framed the agenda, they may not feel unduly constrained by the second face of power.

On the other hand, if the agenda of action is constrained by threats of coercion or promises of payments, then it is just an instance of the first face of power. The target's acquiescence in the legitimacy of the agenda is what makes it co-optive and a part of soft power – the ability to get what you want by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction.

Still later, in the 1970s, Lukes pointed out that ideas and beliefs also help shape others' *initial* preferences.³² In Dahl's approach, I can exercise power over you by getting you to do what you would otherwise not want to do, in other words by changing your situation I can make you change your preferred strategy.³³ But I can also exercise power over you by determining your very wants. I can shape your basic or initial preferences, not merely change the situation in a way that makes you change your strategy for achieving your preferences. This dimension of power is missed by Dahl's definition. A teenage boy may carefully choose a fashionable shirt to wear to school to attract a girl, but the teenager may not be aware that the reason the shirt is so fashionable is that a national retailer recently launched a major advertising campaign. Both his preference and that of the other teenagers have been formed by an unseen actor who has shaped their set of preferences. If you can get others to want the same outcomes that you want, it will not be necessary to override their initial desires.

³² S. Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005).

³³ Dahl.

There are critical questions of voluntarism in determining how freely people choose their preferences. Not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics. In some extreme cases, it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes voluntary formation of preferences. For instance, in the 'Stockholm syndrome,' victims of kidnapping who suffered traumatic stress began to identify with their abductors. Captors sometimes try to 'brainwash' their captives, and sometimes to win them over with kindnesses. But in some situations it is more difficult to be certain of others' interests. Are Afghan women oppressed when they choose to wear a burqa? What about the choice of wearing a veil in democratic France? Sometimes it is difficult to know the extent of voluntarism from mere outward appearances. Dictators like Hitler and Stalin tried to create an aura of invincibility to attract followers, and some leaders in South-eastern European countries succumbed to this effect. To the extent that force creates a sense of awe that attracts others, it can be an indirect source of co-optive power, but if the force is directly coercive, then it is simply an instance of the first face of power.

Realism and the Full Spectrum of Power

For centuries, the dominant classical approach to international affairs has been called 'Realism,' and its lineage stretches back to such great thinkers as Thucydides and Machiavelli. Realism assumes that in the anarchic conditions of world politics, where there is no higher international government authority above states, they must rely on their own devices to preserve their independence, and that when push comes to shove, the *ultima ratio* is the use of force. Realism portrays the world in terms of sovereign states aiming to preserve their security with military force as their ultimate instrument. Thus war has been a constant aspect of international affairs over the centuries. Realists come in many sizes and shapes, but all tend to argue that global politics is power politics. In this they are right, but some limit their understanding by conceiving of power too narrowly. A pragmatic or common-sense realist takes into account the full spectrum of power resources, including ideas, persuasion, and attraction. Many classical realists of the past understood the role of soft power better than some of their modern progeny.

Realism represents a good first cut at portraying some aspects of international relations. But as we have seen, states are no longer the only important actors in global affairs; security is not the only major outcome that they seek, and force is not the only or always the best instrument available to achieve those outcomes. Indeed, these conditions of complex interdependence are typical of relations among advanced post-industrial countries such as the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, and Japan. Mutual democracy, liberal culture, and a deep network of transnational ties mean that anarchy has very different effects than realism predicts. In such conditions, a smart power strategy has a much higher mixture of the second and third faces of power.

It is not solely in relations among advanced countries, however, that soft power plays an important role. In an information age, communication strategies become more important, and outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins, but also by whose story wins. In combating terrorism, for example, it is essential to have a narrative that appeals to the mainstream and prevents their recruitment by the radicals. In battling insurgencies, kinetic military force must be accompanied by soft power instruments that help to win over the hearts and minds (shape the preferences) of the majority of the population.

Smart strategies must have an information and communication component. States struggle over the power to define norms, and framing of issues grows in importance. For instance, while CNN and the BBC framed the issues of the first Gulf War in 1991, by 2003, *Al Jazeera* played a large role in shaping the narrative in the Iraq War. Such framing is more than mere propaganda. In describing events in March 2003, one could say that American troops 'entered Iraq,' or that American troops 'invaded Iraq.' Both statements are true, but they have very different effects in terms of power to shape preferences. Similarly, if one thinks of international institutions, it makes a difference if agendas are set in a Group of 8 with a few invited guests or a Group of 20 equal invitees. These are just some examples of how the dimensions of the second and third faces of power are becoming more important in the global politics of an information age.

Soft Power Behaviour and Resources

Some critics complain that the definition of soft power has become fuzzy through expansion 'to include both economic statecraft – used as both a carrot and as a stick – and even military power ... Soft power now seems to mean everything'.³⁴ But these critics are mistaken because they confuse the actions of a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the resources used to produce them. Many types of *resources* can contribute to soft power, but that does not mean that soft power is any type of *behaviour*. The use of force, payment (and some agenda setting based on them) I call hard power. Agenda setting that is regarded as legitimate by the target, positive attraction and persuasion are the parts of the spectrum of behaviours I include in soft power. Hard power is push; soft power is pull. Fully defined, soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction. A spectrum of power behaviours is represented below:

Hard

Soft

Command > Coerce Threat Pay Sanction Frame Persuade Attract < Co-opt

In general, the types of resources that are associated with hard power include tangibles like force and money, while the resources that are associated with soft power often include intangible factors like institutions, ideas, values, culture, and perceived legitimacy of policies. But the relationship is not perfect. Intangible resources like patriotism, morale, and legitimacy strongly affect military capacity to fight and win. And threats to use force are intangible, but a dimension of hard power. If one remembers the distinction between power resources and power behaviour, one realizes that resources often associated with hard power behaviour can also produce soft power behaviour depending on the context and how they are used. Command power can create resources that can create soft power at a later phase, for example, institutions that

³⁴ Gelb.

will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behaviour can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid. A tangible hard power resource like a military unit can produce both command behaviour (by winning a battle) and co-optive behaviour (attraction) depending on how it is used. And since attraction depends upon the minds of the perceiver, the subject's perceptions play a significant role in whether given resources produce hard or soft power behaviour.

For example, naval forces can be used to win battles (hard power) or win hearts and minds (soft power) depending on who the target and what the issue is. The American Navy's help in providing relief to Indonesia after the 2004 East Asian tsunami had a strong effect on increasing their attraction toward the United States, and the Navy's 2007 Maritime Strategy refers not only to war-fighting but 'additionally maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations'.³⁵ Similarly, successful economic performance such as that of China can produce both the hard power of sanctions and restricted market access as well as the soft power of attraction and emulation of success.

Some analysts have misinterpreted soft power as a synonym for culture, and then gone on to downgrade its importance. For example, Ferguson described soft power as 'non-traditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods,' and then dismissed it on the grounds that 'it's, well, soft'.³⁶ Of course eating at McDonald's or wearing a Michael Jackson shirt does not automatically indicate soft power. Militias can perpetrate atrocities or fight Americans while wearing Nike's and drinking coke. Eating sushi and trading Pokémon cards does not necessarily convey power to Japan. But this criticism confuses the resources that may produce behaviour with the behaviour itself. Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favourable behaviour depends upon the context and the skills of the agent in converting the resources into behavioural outcomes. But this is not unique to soft power resources.

Having a larger tank army may produce victory if a battle is fought in the desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp. Similarly, a nice smile can be a soft power resource,

³⁵ Chief of Naval Operations, *A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2007).

³⁶ N. Ferguson, "Think Again: Power," *Foreign Policy* 134 (2003): pp. 18–22.

and you may be more inclined to do something for me if I smile whenever we meet, but if I smile at your mother's funeral it may destroy soft power rather than create it.

Soft power and smart power

I developed the term 'smart power' in 2003 to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. I defined it as the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies. Unlike soft power; it is an evaluative concept as well as a descriptive concept. Soft power can be good or bad from a normative perspective, depending on how it is used. Smart power has the evaluation built into the definition. Critics who say 'smart power – which can be dubbed Soft Power 2.0 – has superseded Soft Power 1.0 in the US foreign policy lexicon' are simply mistaken.³⁷ A more accurate criticism is that because the concept (unlike soft power) has a normative dimension, it often lends itself to slogans, though that need not be the case.

Smart power, defined as strategies that successfully combine hard and soft power resources in differing contexts, is available to all states (and non-state actors), not just the United States. Small states have often developed smart power strategies. Norway, with five million people, has enhanced its attractiveness with legitimizing policies in peace-making and development assistance, while also being an active and effective participant in the NATO. And at the other extreme in terms of population size, China – a rising power in economic and military resources – has deliberately decided to invest in soft power resources so as to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbours and thus develop a smart strategy.

Smart power goes to the heart of the problem of power conversion. As we saw earlier, some countries and actors may be endowed with greater power resources than others, yet not be very effective in converting the full range of their power resources into strategies that produce the outcomes they seek. Some argue that with its inefficient eighteenth-century governmental structure, the United States is weak in power conversion. Others respond that much of American strength is generated outside of

³⁷ C. Layne, "The Unbearable Lightness Of Soft Power," in *Soft Power And US Foreign Policy*, I. Parmer and M. Cox, eds. (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 51–82.

government by its open economy and civil society. And it may be that power conversion is easier when a country has a surplus of assets and can afford to absorb the costs of mistakes. But the first step to smart power and effective power conversion strategies is an understanding of the full range of power resources and the problems of combining them effectively in various contexts.

Hard and soft power sometimes reinforces and sometimes undercut each other, and good contextual intelligence is important in distinguishing how they interact in different situations. But it is a mistake to think of information campaigns in terms that misunderstand the essence of soft power. Smart power suggests it is best to have both. 'The military has to understand that soft power is more challenging to wield in terms of the application of military force – particularly if what that force is doing is not seen as attractive'.³⁸

Early in 2006, then secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld said of the Bush administration's global war on terror, 'In this war, some of the most critical battles may not be in the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Iraq but in newsrooms in New York, London, Cairo and elsewhere.' As *The Economist* commented about Rumsfeld's speech, 'until recently he plainly regarded such a focus on "soft power" as, well, soft – part of "Old Europe's" appeasement of terrorism.' Now he realizes the importance of winning hearts and minds, but 'a good part of his speech was focused on how with slicker PR America could win the propaganda war'.³⁹

Unfortunately, Rumsfeld forgot the first rule of advertising: if you have a poor product, not even the best advertising will sell it, and more generally, the administration's poor power conversion strategy wasted both hard and soft power assets. The first step toward developing more effective smart power strategies starts with a fuller understanding of the types and uses of power in foreign policy.

³⁸ A. Taverner, "The Military Use Of Soft Power – Information Campaigns: The Challenge Of Applications, Their Audiences And Effects," in *Soft Power And US Foreign Policy*, I. Parmer and M. Cox, eds. (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 137–151.

³⁹ "Why it will take so long to win," *The Economist*, 23 February. 2006.

Power in Foreign Policy

In practice, discussions of power in foreign policy involve both definitions. Baldwin, (2002) contests my statement, but does not offer compelling evidence that would make me change it.⁴⁰ In my experience in government, policy-makers do tend to focus on resources. Many of the terms that we use daily such as ‘military power’ and ‘economic power’ are hybrids that combine both resources and behaviours. So long as that is the case, it is important to make clear whether we are speaking of behavioural or resource-based definitions of power and to be aware of the imperfect relation between them. For example, when people speak of the rising power of China or India, they tend to point to the large populations and increased economic or military resources of those countries. But whether the capacity that those resources imply can actually be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the country’s skill in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes. This is what people are getting at when they say things like ‘power doesn’t necessarily lead to influence’ (though for reasons explained above that formulation is confusing).

In the end, since it is outcomes, not resources that policy-makers care about, we must pay more attention to contexts and strategies. Power conversion strategies turn out to be a critical variable that does not receive enough attention. Strategies relate means to ends, and those that combine hard and soft power resources successfully in different contexts are the key to smart power.

⁴⁰ Baldwin, pp. 177–191.

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