Strategy, Strategic Leadership and Strategic Control in Ancient Greece

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The purpose of the following paper is to describe the rôle of strategies and strategist in classical and hellenistic Greece: how political and military strategies were decided upon, how far such strategies, once they were conceived of, influenced or governed what actually happened on the battle field, if, how and to what extent strategic control was exercised in battles. In a paper like this describing the rôle of strategy can be achieved only partially, however: We will be looking at a selection of significant examples which show us how institutions for operative and strategic decisions and how strategic thinking developed in Greece.

Consider the first example, which comes from Herodotus' description of the battle of Marathon in 490 BC:

> The opinions of the Athenians generals (στρατηγοί) were divided: While some preferred not to risk a battle, because they were too few to engage the Medians, others advised to risk a battle immediately. Among the latter was Miltiades. Opinions having become that divided and the less worthy opinion prevailing, Miltiades approached the polemarch; for the latter one was the eleventh to cast his vote, since from the olden days the Athenians make the polemarch have the same vote as the generals. At that time,

Callimachus of Aphidnae was polemarch, whom Miltiades told: ... (Herodotus VI 109).[1]

In this situation, there was no central command at Athens. Instead, the main purpose of the city's institutions for making defense decisions was to preserve solidarity and the coherence of the city's semi-tribal structure against of foreign threats. Around 510, Cleisthenes had transformed an even more tribal structure into a more coherent state, with the new artificial "tribe" (phyle) replacing the old local tribal structures and serving as the recruiting base for the army. A few years later, the new office of "army-commanders" was created in addition to the old aristocratic office of the "polemarchos", the "war-leader". Those ten new *strategoi* were to command the ten *phyle* units (from around 500 BC onwards). For a couple of years however, the *polemarchos* still took part in deciding about matters of war. That is: In 490, Athens was in the middle of a transition process that would eventually make the *polemarchos* a functionary responsible for the adminstration of law, while the *strategoi* lost any connection with the *tribes* as the army's recruiting bases and assumed specialized responsibilities instead: Eventually, there was one *strategos* for the hoplite army, one for territorial defence, two to command the harbour forces at the Piraeus, one directly commanding the single ship commanders and the others for special operations. Aristotle attests this distribution of responsibilities for the second half of the 4th century, 150 years after Marathon[2].

From a rotating system whose main feature was to secure the coherence of a comparatively large, heterogeneous system to a highly differenciated, specialized, semi-professional command structure: This describes the development of Greece in general and Athens in particular in the classical and hellenistic era. Connected with this development were: increasing levels of hierarchy, political debates about strategies and control, the development of military training and strategic theory, including the terminological difference between tactics and strategy, and the rapid development of expansive military and political institutions in large parts of Greece, with the Peloponnesian and the Delian Leagues, Athenian expansion into the Aegaean and in

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[1] B.Neißner, *Strategies in Herodotus*, in: V.Karageorghis, I.Taifacos (ed.), *The World of Herodotus*, Nicosia (2004) pp. 223-237.
[2] Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 61,1-2; 22,2-3.

Asia Minor in the 5th century, the creation of larger territorial units and the conquest of Greece, Asia Minor and large parts of the oriental world by Macedonia in the 4th.

All this was accompanied by changes in the political and intellectual culture which directly affected the way war was administered. In most Greek communities, war and peace were decided upon by those fighting and dying in wars, i.e. by a popular assembly of male citizens. At Sparta the élite of heavy infantry fighters were members of the *apella*; at Athens and in other *democratic* states, recruiting of a wider range of social strata for different forms of military service made virtually all male citizens members of the *ekklesia*: There, in the 5th century, matters of war and peace, political and military strategies, became objects of general political awareness.

Strategy and Strategical Control in the 5th Century

Until and during the Xerxes war of 480-479 B.C. there was much change to the Athenian and Greek systems of strategic control. Compared to the rotating command at Athens in 490, much changed: the rotating command system was largely abolished; a couple of Greek cities formed an alliance to which they contributed finances, personnell and weapons (ships); they established a council of representatives to debate and decide about their strategy, and they set up a high command under a Spartan commander. The commanders of the single cities' contingents acted as the latters subordinates and members of his council. With this command structure, the Greek alliance mimicked as much as it possibly could the centralized command structure of its Persian opponent, retaining, however, the flexibility and the cantonal character of their political culture[3]. In retrospect, Herodotus describes the Greeks' process of deciding about their strategy as if this decison had been taken by a democratic body politic:

> When the Greeks returned to the Isthmus (of Corinth), they debated in the light of the letter which king Alexander of Macedon wrote to them where they would bring the war to an end and at which places. The prevailing opinion was that they should guard the pass at Thermopylae, because this way was narrower than the passage into Thessaly, and much nearer to their home bases. They did not know the pathway, by which the Greeks

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[3] Neißner, *Strategies in Herodotus*, pp. 223-237.

who fell at the Thermopylae were intercepted, until the Trachinians disclosed it to them after they had arrived at Thermopylae. It was resolved that they would guard this pass in order to prevent the barbarian from entering into Greece, while the fleet was to proceed to Artemisium in the Hestiaeotis, because, since these two places are near to each other, it would be easy for the fleet and the army to know what happens at the other theatre.[4]

These places, therefore, appeared to the Greeks to be fit for their purpose. Considering everything and calculating that there the barbarians could neither make use of their greater number nor of their horses, the Greeks decided to wait for the invaders of Greece at theese places. And when the Greeks were given information that the Pierians and reached the region of Pieria, they broke up from the Isthmus and proceeded, some on foot to Thermopylae, others at sea to the Artemisium.[5]

At Thermopylae, there were στρατηγοί for the single cities involved, with Leonidas acting as ἡγεμών, the commnnder-in-chief, and as the one, whom the other commanders most intensely *admired* (θαυμάζειν)[6]. This term describes metaphorically as an emotion the relationship between the new supreme commander and the single contingents' commanders, because this relationship was legally and notionally not very precisely defined.

Leonidas who according to Herodotus personally preferred the Peloponnesian strategy of guarding the Isthmus of Corinth over the Athenian strategy of blocking the

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[4]Herodotus VII, p. 175: Οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ἐπείτε ἀπίκατο ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμόν, ἐβουλεύοντο πρὸς τὰ λεχθέντα ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου τῇ τε στήσονται τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν οἵοισι χώροισι. Ἡ νικῶσα δὲ γνώμη ἐγίνετο τὴν ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι ἐσβολὴν φυλάξαι· στεινοτέρη γὰρ ἐφαίνετο ἐοῦσα τῆς ἐς Θεσσαλίην καὶ ἅμα μία ἀγχοτέρη τε τῆς ἑωυτῶν· τὴν δὲ ἀτραπόν, δι' ἣν ἥλωσαν οἱ ἁλόντες Ἑλλήνων ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι, οὐδὲ ἤδεσαν ἐοῦσαν πρότερον ἤ περ ἀπικόμενοι ἐς Θερμοπύλας ἐπύθοντο Τρηχινίων. Ταύτην ὢν ἐβουλεύσαντο φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἐσβολὴν μὴ παριέναι ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὸν βάρβαρον, τὸν δὲ ναυτικὸν στρατὸν πλέειν γῆς τῆς Ἱστιαιώτιδος ἐπὶ Ἀρτεμίσιον· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀγχοῦ τε ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ ὥστε πυνθάνεσθαι τὰ κατὰ ἑκατέρους ἐόντα.

[5]Herodotus VII 177: Οἱ μέν νυν χῶροι οὗτοι τοῖσι Ἕλλησι εἶναι ἐφαίνοντο ἐπιτήδεοι· ἅπαντα γὰρ προσκεψάμενοι καὶ ἐπιλογισθέντες ὅτι οὔτε πλήθεϊ ἕξουσι χρᾶσθαι οἱ βάρβαροι οὔτε ἵππῳ, ταύτῃ σφι ἔδοξε δέκεσθαι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Ὡς δὲ ἐπύθοντο τὸν Πέρσην ἐόντα ἐν Πιερίῃ, διαλυθέντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἐστρατεύοντο αὐτῶν οἱ μὲν ἐς Θερμοπύλας πεζῇ, ἄλλοι δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ' Ἀρτεμίσιον.

[6] Herodotus VII, p. 204.

enemy from entering Central Greece and fighting a war of attrition at the same time, nevertheless held to the strategic compromise of the Greeks, lest some of the allies leave the Greek cause and go over to the Persians[7]. According to Herodotus, the Spartans at Thermopylae were creative in their tactical dealing with the enemy: Staging mock retreats, they tried to draw the enemy into the narrow straights. They *turned their backs* as if for flight, provoking them to pursue with much noise, upon which the Greeks would flexibly turn around (ὑποστρέφω) and return to their previous positions (μεταστρέφω), killing many of the Persians.[8] This was a serious deviation of usual Greek hoplite tactics, to which belonged, at the least, what Herodotus makes the Spartan king in exile, Demaratus, tell the Persian king Xerxes in order to explain why the Greeks would fight: The Greeks, he declares, are peronally free, but much more bound by their habits and laws (νόμος) than any of the Great King's subjects to never leave the lines and either win or die.[9] In Herodotus, this allegedly failed expectation helps explain why the Greeks won: They modified their customary tactics, whithout the Persians expecting such variation to happen.

On the Thermopylae theatre of operations the decision was taken that most of the Greek forces should retreat, once the Persians had found the pathway to outflank, or rather: circumvent the Greek position.

Regardless of whether this marked a partial break-up of the Greek alliance or, on the contrary, Leonidas' conscious calculation in order to prevent such a break-up by his own and his men's symbolic sacrifice: It is characteristic of 5th and 4th century Greek commanders like Leonidas to personally lead the army, sometimes even from the front (Alexander, Pyrrhus) and to die fighting as Leonidas did.[10] There was but little distance and friction between armies and the commanders of their operations. Control was exerted personally, by acoustic and optical symbols and by messengers.

In addition to tactical innovation, experiment and learning, Herodotus narrates the organizational improvements on part of the Greeks. What Paul Pédech with regard

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[7] Herodotus VII, pp. 206-207.
[8] Herodotus VII, p. 211.
[9] Herodotus VII , p. 104.
[10] Herodotus VII , p. 224.

to the hellenistic Historian Polybius has called *intellectualisme historique*[11] is already present in Herodotus' war narrative, because one of Herodotus' topics consists of the development of new communication and command structures among the Greeks. Connected with this change is the establishment of a new hierarchical organisation, the competition between and the and justification of strategic aims and ideas, the deciding about general principles and the derivation of operations and single missions from them. Herodotus describes warfare and the exertion of military commands as communicative and intellectual activities, applying to them a system of rhetorical categories and topoi (sensual and intellectual perception, calculation and anticipation, derivation of maxims and conclusions), in order to describe how the Greek representatives and commanders dealt with the Persian attack in 480 and 479 BC.[12] As is illustrated by the Greek reaction to the Thermopylae situation, there emerged a pattern of strategic decision making: anticipation of situations, evaluation of possible actions, decision between alternatives, derivation of tactical missions[13]: These are the stages in the making of strategic decisions which Herodotus' narrative repeatedly describes.

The Greeks set up a supreme command under a Spartan commander (Eurybiades) and a war council to decide about fundamental issues: This organization was much more advanced and adapted to the exigencies of fighting against a large territorial state than was the small scale Athenian way of dealing with the Persian invasion ten years earlier. The strategic decisions in 480 and 479 were to a large extent compromises between differing interests, in particular between the Lacedaemonian interest to guard the Peloponnese only and the Athenian interest in a defence of central Greece; these decisions were also compromises between differing expectations, for example as to the fighting value of the fleet, and they were the results of incomplete and differring knowledge about the geography and the situation (e.d: Thermopylae).

Strategy and Strategic Control in Classical Athens

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[11]P.Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe*, Paris (1964), p. 75ff.
[12]B.Meißner, *Strategies in Herodotus*, pp. 223-237.
[13]B.Meißner, *Strategies in Herodotus,* p. 231. Cf. Herodotus VIII, p. 15.

Athens can be used as an example for strategies in the later part of the century, because we know quite something about how the Athenian democracy kept military power under control, while using it for exansive purposes at the same time. The main institutions of political control over military operations were: The principle of personal responsibility and post-office accounting (*eutyne*); the decision about war and peace by popular assemblies; public control over expenses, including military (Strategic and political control have much to do with public money and resources). Instead of repeating the well known facts here, let us look at three examples from the 5th century which show those principles of control at work.

In 440, the island of Samos and the city of Miletus were having trouble with each other; Athens intervened, and Pericles was leading one of the first technically and financially expensive all-out siege wars in Greece, for which Artemon of Clazomenae built rams and tortoises[14]. The Samians finally surrendered and had to change their political constitution to a democratic one. An inscription with the accounts of the money has survived which was handed over from the sanctuary of the goddess Athena to the *strategoi* for the operations against Samos and for an expedition to Byzantium to secure control over the Bosporus for Athens. The figures are not without smaller errors, but relatively clear: The war against Byzantium cost 128 talents of silver, the two-year siege of Samos, however, 368 and 908 talents, this is: 1276 talents (à ca. 25 kg: ca. 32000 kg) of silver[15]: ten times as much. Equally meticulous were the accounts kept for two smaller expeditions to Corcyra shortly before the Peloponnesian War (433-432 BC): In the first of these two years three *strategoi* were sent out against the island, getting 26 talents from the sanctuary for their expenses; the three *strategoi* for the second year received 50 talents[16] which were recorded in an inscription on the Acropolis at Athens.

Control was exerted upon the *strategoi* not only because of their accountability after they had held office or completed their mission, but also by meticulously prescribing them their tasks and legislating about which resources to allocate for them and how to use or spend these resources. For example, when the Athenians sent out an

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[14]Diod. XII, pp. 27-28; Thuc. I 115-117; Plut., *Pericl.*, pp. 25-28.

[15]IGI³ 363 and 48. Today, this amount of silver would be worth some 16 million Euros. At Athens, this sum was equal to 765600 drachmae or 4593600 obeloi or ca. 1531200 day wages (4253 persons for two years).

[16]IGI³, p. 364.

expedition to Sicily in 415, the assembly ruled about the funamental details of this operation. The decree of the popular assembly requested the city's functionaries to work out a plan and to have it put to the assebly's vote in due course. The number of ships (60) and soldiers was enumerated as was their daily wage (in one case: 4 obols). Near the end of the preserved lines of the inscription there is a stipulation that all these resources are to be used neither for any other mission (ἔργον) nor operation (στρατιά)[17]. This means: The Athenians neatly distinguished between operation/στρατιά (in this case: on the theatre of Sicily) and the specific *work* or *mission* or *task* assigned to any of the units, persons or resources involved (ἔργον). The freedom of choice on part of the commanders was limited: by the geographical boundaries of the theatre of operations, the time limits (one campaign season, normally within one year), the tasks or missions assigned, the wages or stipends and the overall sum of the resources.

That this form of political and strategic control over military activities, including private military activities, was far from being perfect is borne out by the fact that when in 401 the second son of Dareius II., Cyrus, staged a war against his brother Artaxerxes II., he used quite a few rootless Greek adventurers (of whom there were many after the end of the Peloponnesian War) as his military advisers and functionaries without regard for the policy of their poleis.

One of those who wanted to make a fortune at a new Great King's court was Xenophon of Athens, who took part in the operation as a private individual, and who was eventually chosen commander of the rear guard once the élite of the troops had been killed after the battle of Cunaxa. Many of the soldiers who thus managed to spontaneously reorganize themselves and to fight their way back through Asia Minor into the Greek world in the Black Sea region, later entered the service of local dynasts like the Thracian king Seuthes and of the Spartans when in 396 to 394 BC the Spartan king Agesilaos directed a war to undermine Persian control over the West of Asia Minor[18]. Xenophon's description of these events is so full of details of military and civil

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[17]IGI[3] 93, esp. frs. d,g line 47.
[18]Xenophon, *Anabas.*, *Hellenica*, pass.

self-organization that one has compared the soldiers of Cyrus to a *marching democracy*[19]. By the course of events Xenophon and other were more and more drawn into a Spartan life of continuous fighting: After 394, he accompanied Agesilaos in the battle of Coroneia on the Spartan side - and until the 360s, he lived in exile. War had always been a promising profession in the Greek world, if not a way of life; but at the turn from from the 5th to the 4th centuries single operations in wars became longer than ever, the duration of service was longer, a higher degree of professionalization was achieved, siege wars became more frequent, while strategic control to a certain extent remained with the communities from which the fighters themselves came. At Athens, the office of *strategos* had become the primary focus of political initiative and ambition. However, in the latter part of the century, during the Peloponnesian War and after, this specialization lead to the emergence of strategic teaching, learning, thinking and literature.

War, Theory, Learning, Teaching, and the Notion of Strategy

A process of literarization and intellectualization of war and the preparation to war began when at the end of the fifth century at Athens rhetoric teaching became fashionable as a preparation to political carreers and as a prerequisite to public success: *Sophists* like Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus taught classes in warfare for a public of young people who wanted to qualify for posts like *strategos*. The criticism which this teaching met with on part of the followers of Socrates created, for the first time in European literature, the notional distinction between *tactics* and *strategy*.

Twice in his writings, the Socratic Xenophon mocks at the Sophists' teaching in matters military: In the third book of his *Memorabilia of Socrates* he lets Socrates examine a young boy whom Socrates himself had allegedly sent off to Dionysodorus to take a course in generalship.[20] The same point is made in the *Cyropaedia*: Cyrus' father had given his son money to go to a sophist who taught him the art of the commander (*strategein*), and the is now described examining his son diligently[21] about what he has

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[19] Cf. T.Rood, *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis*, The Journal of Military History LXXIII (2009), 625f.

[20] Xenoph., *Mem.* III, 1, p. 1

[21] Xenoph., *Cyrop.* I pp. 6,12-44

learnt[22]. In both passages Xenophon lets Socrates/Cyrus question the theoretical and practical value of the Sophists' military teaching. The dialogue shows that what is lacking with the sophists' military teaching is judgement; the sophists imbue the future commander with *tactics* (*taktika*): *where to put the strongest and the best forces, in order to protect the weaker ones and to drive them into battle*. Allegedly the sophists neglect to teach their pupils logistics and the task of quality assessment of their troops,[23] although both are necessary prerequisites for their tactics. They teach *tattein*, the disposition of an army, not its usages, movements and changes (the *agein*). *Taktika* are, as Xenophon makes Socrates observe, *only a small part of strategy*[24].

From this context of the Socratic criticism of Sophistic teaching stems the Clausewitzian notion of a functional hierarchy between strategy and tactics. Characteristic of the sophists' teaching of *tactics* was the explaining of geometrical

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[22]In the *Memorabilia* Xenophon scrutinizes the achievements of the sophists in tactics and strategy: Dionysodorus, the famous sophist, has come to Athens to teach the art of the commander (*strategein*) (Xenoph., *Mem*. III 1,1). Xenophon's Dionysodorus is the very Dionysodorus of Chios (later: Thurioi), who together with his brother Euthydemus is questioned - not very favourably, though - in Plato's dialogue *Euthydemus*. Both these sophists, according to Plato, taught everything concerning war (*peri ton polemon panta*), and judicial oratory; and thence went over to the more general teaching of *goodness* (*arete*) (Plat., *Euthyd*. 273a-d). Like Herodotus, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus took part in the colonization of Thurii; they had to go into exile and to live on sophistic teaching. In Plato's *Euthydemus* they are depicted teaching at Athens in the 20s of the 5th century, while Aristotle in his treatment of the characters seems to presuppose the years of the Athenian expedition to Sicily after 415 B.C. Cfr. G.B.Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, Cambridge etc. (1981) 53f.; p. 63. In Aristotle, Dionysodorus' brother Euthydemus is said to have shed doubt on the geographical and temporal generality of knowledge, thus leading his opponents into fallacies: Arist., *Rhetorica* 1401a28f. Cf. Arist., *Sophistici elenchi* 177b12-15. Xenophon refers to the military teaching of the two brothers who wanted to educate future *strategoi*. Sextus Empiricus (3rd cent. A.D.) mentions three theses of Dionysodorus' and/or his brother Euthydemus: Both sophists made logic the core of any practical and theoretical teaching [*Adv. math.* VII 13], and they held a kind of logical and empirical relativism [VII 48; 64]. Xenophon calls the criterion of suitability for a given situations *prosekei*. In Aristotle, this term *prosekei*, which Xenophon uses, denotes the right mean. So what is lacking with our young commander is his inability to use the right criteria and to make appropriate judgement. Xenophon concludes that laking a sense for what suits a given situation, the young student, before becoming a commander, should better go all the way back to his sophist teacher and complain about the latter's insufficient curriculum (Xenoph., *Memorabilia* III, pp. 1, 6,12-44). Cfr. Arist., *Magna moralia* I, 25, pp. 2-3; II, 8, pp. 3-4; 13, p. 2; *Rhetorica* 1355a22-25; 1367b12-17; 1379b29f.
[23] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* III, pp.5-10.
[24]Xenophon, *Memorabilia* III, pp. 1, 5-6: τὰ γὰρ τακτικὰ ἐμέ γε καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἐδίδαξεν. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦτό γε πολλοστὸν μέρος ἐστὶ στρατηγίας. *He taught me tactics ad nothing else. But this is, Socrates replied, only a small part of strategy.*

principles, terminology and elementary actions, as well as a strong element of rhetorical rôle pattern drills[25] suitable for lower levels of the military hierarchy. Against this kind of rule and routine teaching Xenophon stresses an creative concept of *strategy* and commanding on a grand scale as an inventive and innovative art. The strategist has to be, he argues, *an inventor of tricks to surprise the enemies*,[26] a ποιητΥς of μηχανημάτα, and he compares the creativity of the military commander to the innovativeness of musicians whose new compositions are more effective than a mere rendering of old hymns and songs.

In order to be creative, the strategist, aacording to Xenophon, needs sound practical judgment and practical training, and, of course, he will refer to collections of established practices and old tricks. Caricaturizing the developing subliterature about this topic, Xenophon summarizes its typical contents (Xenophon, *Cyropedy* I 6,43) as follows:

-How one should pitch camp

-How to station sentinels by night and day

-How to advance on or retreat from the enemy

-How to pass a hostile city

-How to attack fortifications or retreat from such attacks

-How to cross waters and rivers

-How to protect oneself against cavalry, spearmen and bowmen

-What to do if sudden contact with the enemy is being made

-How to use intelligence to explore the enemy's plans and to conceal one's own

These are to a large extent the headings we find in the later tactical literature and in collections of strategems: Aenaeas Tacticus' 4t[h] century essay on Siege Defence touches

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[25]One of the fields of their teaching was *hoplomachia*, fighting with weapons, although we do not know the exact nature of this kind of drill. Cfr. J.Vela Tejada, *Warfare, History and Literature in the Archaic and Classical Periods: The Development of Greek Military Treatises*, Historia LIII (2004), pp. 129-146, esp. 145.
[26] Xenoph., *Cyrop.* I, pp. 6, 38.

a couple of these topics, as do Onasander's *Strategicus*[27] and Aelian's *Tactics*[28] (1st-2nd centuries A.D).

Military literature developed in Greece in the first half of the 4th century, in the time of Xenophon, and Xenophon contributed to this literature mainly in the field of horsemanship); this literature developed its own thematic and dispositional continuities. Among the questions repeatedly raised in this literature were: What is the nature of military activities, military command, the kind of knowledge which the latter requires and the structure and order in which this knowledge can be presented - as an ordered system of precepts or a collection of *exempla*? This theory and literary reflection developed when in practice strategic leadership was developing rapidly. The reason is that in the classical era leadership manifested itself by personal presence in battle, political control by resposibility and personal accountability, while in the Hellenistic world leadership, though still resting on personal charisma, extended over larger regions, implied a higher level of abstraction and more military professionalism. Generally, however, many aspects of strategic control remained similar in the hellenistic world as they were in the classical era, while the size and extent of armieds and operations changed.

Strategic Leadership in the Hellenistic World

One of the core features of hellenistic warfare and hellenistic organization is the importance of monarchic entities as strategic decision-makers as opposed to the prevalence of more or less open decision-making processes in classical cities, whose citizens more or less decided upon matters of war and peace in order to either conclude the treaties or fight the wars themselves. In these systems, it was of utmost importance

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[27]Onasander's work is more systematically ordered along the chronological lines of a virtual military campaign. Some of his topics resemble the headings in Xenophon's caricature of early military literature: Onasand. 10,7: *About foraging*; 10,9: *About reconnoitring*; 10,10: *About night watches*; 10,14: *About the generals negotiations with their enemies' generals*.

[28]Cfr. Aelian., *Tact.* I C 104: *That one should train one's forces to send and receive messages either by special signs, or by the human voice, or by the trumpet*; C 105: *On marches, including attack, the change from column to line in general, the deploying of column to line on the right as well as on the left*.

to keep outstanding commanders under control[29], lest one of them establish a tyranny or other form of illicit government on the basis of military command. In monarchic systems, monarchic self-control was paramount, even under conditions of battle. This expectation as to the dependence upon the monarch's being able to decide rationally even under conditions of imminent threat was so basic that it guided Xenophon's description of how Cyrus' soldiers lost their battle against the Great King at Cunaxa. In fact, loose they did not: While the Greek phalanx won a victory over thei opponents, the centre of Cyrus' army stood fast with Cyrus expecting a mere victory and controlling himself well at the beginning. However, when he came into contact with the king himself and his guard, according to Xenophon he lost control completely, attacking the king instantly and receiving a fatal blow of which he eventually died. οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, he lost self-control: In Xenophon's description it is neither due to a lack of information or to false data, nor to the intertwining complexity of what was going on that Cyrus finally lost his battle[30]. Here, the commander is a lonesome decision-maker like in many hellenistic battles, but contrary to his role in most later battle descriptions, his error does not consist in false assumptions or informations but lack of emotional control. The size of the Cunaxa battle with its separate sub-theatres and complex development of situations which are hard to oversee is something with resembles some of the large-scale hellenistic battles. Xenophon's theory of leadership mistakes, however, is more moralist and less intellectualist than are the leadership concepts of Herodotus and most of his Hellenistic literary successors. Large parts of the militant aspects of Hellenistic kingship can probably be explained by the institutional difficulties controlling the decision-making of a monarchic individual.

Compared to the classical era, in the Hellenistic world technologies developed (e.d.: torsion catapults), political situations changed (e.d.: the size of political entities), many structures, institutions, mentalities and expectations, however, varied only little or remained stable (e.d.: urbanism), when the centres of military and political activities shifted from the large citizen communities to military apparatuses lead by dynasts and monarchs.

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[29]Cf. D.Hamel, *Athenian Generals. Military Authority in the Classical Period*, Leiden (1998).
[30]Xenoph., *Anab*. I pp. 8,17-9,6, esp. pp. 8,26.

We begin with the political constitution. While decision processes and the accountability of office-holders remained largely the same in citizen communities[31] and in the larger political agglomerations which since the 4th century began to flourish (which Larsen called *federal states*, the leagues, politico-military alliances and security systems), lack of accountability and political responsibility was a key feature of monarchies. Largely because the new political centres, the courts and barracks of the monarchs commanded larger and more efficient armies than ever before in Greece, with semi-professional leadership, highly sophisticated and expensive siege machinery which allowed them to destroy and control any city, resentment against the new leading circles at the courts, against their interests and ways of life was repeatedly articulated, and doubts were shed against the personal independence, integrity and sincerity of their members. What made the courts hardly compatible with the political culture of the Greeks was especially the lack of transparency in their decision-making[32].

While political and military decisions in the cities and federal systems were taken in the same way as in the classical era, in the large monarchies, these were taken behind closed doors by *friends* (φίλοι, ἑταίροι) of the kings, their functionaries and members of

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[31]V.Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, Stuttgart (2008); H.Beck, *Polis und Koinon: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, Stuttgart (1997); J.A.O.Larsen, *Greek federal states: their institutions and history*, Oxford (1968).

[32]Cf.: C.Habicht, *Die herrschende Gesellschaft in den hellenistischen Monarchien*, Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte XLV (1958), pp. 1-16; L.Mooren, *La hiérarchie de cour ptolémaïque*, Leuven (1977); G.Herman, *The Friends of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials*, Talanta XII/XIII (1980-1981), pp. 103-149; S.LeBoheq, *Les Philoi des Rois Antigonides*, REG XCVIII (1985), pp. 93-124; L.Mooren, *The Ptolemaic Court System*, Chron.Eg. LX (1985), pp. 214-222; H.-J.Gehrke, *Der siegreiche König. Überlegungen zur hellenistischen Monarchie*, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte LXIV (1982), pp. 247-277; B.Meißner, *Historiker zwischen Polis und Königshof*, Göttingen (1992); G.Weber, *Herrscher, Hof und Dichter. Aspekte der Legitimierung und Repräsentation hellenistischer Könige am Beispiel der ersten drei Antigoniden*, Historia XLIV (1995), pp. 283-316; G.Weber, *Dichtung und höfische Gesellschaft. Die Rezeption von Zeitgeschichte am Hof der ersten drei Ptolemäer*, Stuttgart (1993); G.Weber, *Interaktion, Repräsentation und Herrschaft*, in: A.Winterling (ed.), *Zwischen "Haus" und "Staat". Antike Höfe im Vergleich*, Historische Zeitschrift, Beihefte, Neue Folge XXIII, Münche (1997), pp. 27-71; B.Meißner, *Hofmann und Herrscher. Was es für die Griechen hieß, Freund eines Königs zu sein*, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte LXXXII (2000), pp. 1-36; A.Mehl, *Gedanken zur "herrschenden Gesellschaft" und zu den Untertanen im Seleukidenreich*, Historia LII (2003), pp. 147-160; K.Vössing, *Mensa regia: das Bankett beim hellenistischen König und beim römischen Kaiser*, München (2004). Most recent review of positions: T.Brüggemann, *Vom Machtanspruch zur Herrschaft. Prolegomena zu einer Studie über die Organisation königlicher Herrschaft im Seleukidenreich*, in: T.Brüggemann, B.Meißner, C.Mileta, A.Pabst, O.Schmitt (edd.), *Studia hellenistica et historiographica, Festschrift für Andreas Mehl*, Gutenberg (2010), pp. 19-57 (forthcoming)

their *synhedrion*. However, monarchies had their own inherent problems of political and strategic control: The king had to keep potential competitors under control and to make sure that during operations and on the battle ground everything went according to his or the synhedrion's will. Under normal circumstances, this was assured by the personal presence and leadership of the king. Already at Chaeroneia in 338 BC, Philipp and Alexander acted as commanders of the Macedonian army, and Alexander often lead his army personally from the front. Thus, he fulfilled apparently anachronistic expectations as to a merely *heroic* representation of leadership. This expectation was so intensely felt that the iconic representation of Alexander as a fighter, the mosaic from the casa del fauno in Pompeii, depicts Alexander as if he had directly attacked Dareius. In fact, such attack never happened, but it was part of what was expected from an exceptional leader.

Some military leaders could exploit this expectation as to personal heroism to gain additional aceptance and legitimacy. This was done by Pyrrhus of Epirus, who in 289-288 BC during a campaign against Demetrius' Poliorcetes general Pantauchus in Aetolia staged a hand-to-hand fight (*monomachia*) against his adversary in which he nearly killed him[33]. In the war of 321 BC between Alexander's officers Craterus and Eumenes of Cardia in the Hellespontine region in Asia Minor an officer of Eumenes', Neoptolemus, went over to Craterus. After the latter had died Eumenes encountered Neoptolemus personally and killed him in a *monomachia* during battle. It was part of the military leader's *charisma* to excel not only by virtue of his planning and organisational competenes, but also by deeds of personal heroism in battles. In the case of Eumenes this heroism compensated for defects in his general acceptance by his troops, because as a Greek he did not belong to the Macedonian ruling aristocracy. Eumenes is a good exaple of how loose stragic control could become in practice. A few years after the aforementioned incident (319-316) he was fighting the 2nd war of the dadochi against Antigonus, in which he hibernated and operated in a mobile way in several consecutive operations in Persia (Paraitakene and Gabiene). According to usual military ritual, Eumenes had the better of his opponents, controlling the battlefield and being able to grant the enemies access to their dead bodies. However, his adversaries had seized the

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[33]B.Meißner, *Die Kultur des Krieges*, in: G.Weber (ed.), *Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus*, Stuttgart (2007), pp. 202-223, esp. pp. 217-219. Cf. esp. J.E.Lendon, *Soldiers & Ghosts, A History of Battle in Antiquity*, New Haven/London (2005) 140f. and pass.

baggage train, upon which his own soldiers delivered him and gave up[34]. Before this, Eumenes had already had to change large parts of his mobile strategy in oder to fulfill the aspirations of his satraps, whom he needed for personell and resources. The satraps wanted to retain full control over their territory, not allowing Eumenes to concentrate his forces enough to widthstand the enemy.

Strategic control is exerted by charismatic leaders, sometimes using heroism to secure coherence. It is exerted by generals like Pantauchus who have to play a similar role, and whose personal charisma may become a threat to the king's own one. As functionaries, they have therefore to be controlled, too. In some cases, control is the result of terror, as happened when Alexander's army had to change its leadership culture within a very narrow time frame and under rough condition, i.e.: in Afghanistan. Fighting against the small groups of segmentary societies in the Hindukoosh required the use of independently operating army groups and thus a partial dissolution of the coherent army body that had been the instrument in Alexander's hand as long as the process of decomposing the Achaemeneid Empire went on. Controllling areas like Bactria and Sogdia (modern Afghanistan, Kasakhstan, Tadjikistan) was a different matter: The war became partially an asymmetric war against insurgents (329-328 BC) with the Macedonians operating in smaller, independent battle groups. Against the insurgents and tribal communities, terror was applied in an exemplary or punitive fashion to secure their obedience, their willingness to hand over resources and the absence of attacks from their part, while strategic leadership by personal presence became harder to achieve, due to reduced personal proximity. At the same time, what had been the exception hitherto, namely violence within the leading group of the army itself (cf. the executions of Philotas and Parmenion), became a rule: Alexander assumed the rôle of a superhuman, exempt from legal rules, who could, if he so whished, kill his high-ranking officials like Kleitos, or execute anybody who objected to the new leadership culture established under these conditions (young Macedonian aristocrats, Callisthenens:).[35]

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[34]B.Meißner, *Historiker* (cf. n. 22) 413ff.

[35] Arrian IV, pp. 8-14.

In practice - on the ground, so to speak - we can observe the change in Macedonian leadership culture during the campaign in Afghanistan by looking at an incident of 329 BC. Then, the the Macedonian garrison at Samarkand/Marakanda was being besieged by insurgents.[36] During these operations the Sogdians learned how to organise siege operations, while the Macedonians resorted to terror. Another Macedonian garrison came under pressure at Zariaspa (modern Balkh) in 328 BC: In the city, there was a royal storage house, which was covered by a couple of injured cavalry, including a military musician for their entertainment. In addition, there were some 100 mercenaries and a few aristocratic young trainees. When Alexanders adversaries Spithamenes and his Sogdians were executing raids into the Kundus area making use of Scythian cavalry to harm the royal household, the Macedonians fell upon them, reclaimed their booty and killed a couple of their enemies. However: These had an ambush prepared, in which 60 mercenaries and 7 high-ranking officers (*hetairoi*) were killed (to whom the aforementioned musician belonged, too). In this incident, the garrison, though being one of the larger ones, was practically annihilated.[37] In the sources, we read about continuous threats by an an enemy who had a 7:1 advantage (at least it was presented as such). It was this asymmetry which led to the development of a new leadership culture and war ethics which were characterized by terror on all levels.

The final stage, according to Arrian's narrative, was the war in the mountains of Sogdia (N-Afghanistan-Bukhara) in winter and spring of 327 BC.[38] In this time, according to the sources, strategic control vanished on several levels and was replaced by terror, and this was so, because mechanisms of indirect control were underdeveloped for an operation which was not executed by compact army bodies, but by smaller battle groups.

To return to the issue of the relationship between organization and strategic leadership: When Ptolemaic Egypt under the inexperienced Ptolemy IVth in 218 was facing an imminent attack by Antiochus III., the two leading courtiers in Alexandria, Sosibius and Agathocles, out of their own accord decided to completely re-organize the Egyptian army, enrolling Egyptians in addition to Macedonian and Greek settlers.

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[36] Arrian IV 5, p. 2.
[37] Arrian IV 16, 6f.
[38] Arrian IV 18, pp. 4-21,10.

Sosibius and Agathocles let Macedonian and above all Greek professionals do the actual planning and training, using expert military advisors to build-up an army new from scratch. Mercenaries like the Thessalian cavalry expert Echecrates and about a dozen others whom Polybius mentions by name, were put in charge of the larger units[39]. In the actual battle at Raphia, Antiochus was sucessful on his right flank, lost on the left, while the mobile Egyptian cavalry managed to drive the opposing horses to flight. As was usual with many hellenistic battles, the *phalanx* units at the centre remained static and inactive until the very last moment of the battle, much like a fortress built of heavy armed men; Antiochus, on the other hand, was already pursuing the enemy with his horses, assuming an all-out victory:

> Both phalanges remained unmoved in the centre of the battlefield, both without their flanking units, but otherwise completely intact, and both with uncerntain expectations as to what might happen. Antiochus, on the one hand, tried to exploit his victory on the right side, while Ptolemy, who had retreated under the protection of his phalanx, suddenly sprang forward into the middle and made himself apparent to both armies, inflicting the enemy with fear and imbuing his own men with eagerness and optimism. Therefore, the men around Andromachus and Sosibius instantly fell their sarissae and began advancing. For a very short moment, the Syrian élite units on the other side could stand it, those around Nicarchus, however, immediately turned and retreated. While Antiochus, falsely assuming he had won, kept pursuing the fleeing forces on the opposing side, Ptolemy won a decisive victory in the centre by re-ordering his troops and surprise atacking with his phalanx. This is fully born out by the fact that Antiochus, after retreating to Gaza, on the day after asked for access to the battlefield to bury his dead[40].

We see both kings leaving much of the actual strategic and operative planning and commanding to professional soldiers from Greece, Asia Minor and other parts of the Greek world[41]. Nevertheless: In the battle, the king assumes a ceremonial rôle of starting and then personally leading crucial movements: Pursuing fleeing enemy on the Syrian side, surprise attacking the enemy centre in the case of Ptolemy. Behaving much

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[39]Polybius V, 62, pp. 7-65,11.
[40]Polybius V, 85, pp. 6-86,6, esp. 85, pp. 6-10.
[41]Cf. Polyb. V, pp. 68-69; 79.

like a *promachos* or *monomachos* was expected even from a man as inexperienced in military affairs as Ptolemy IVth, who was around 20 years old and less than 4 years on the throne, but what is more important: He or his advisors managed to influence the course of the battle effectively, exerting strategic control over what was going on.

Ptolemy's action which turned the outcome of the battle was merely a theatrical performance; Ptolemy was the actor in a play which was ruled by expectations in the form of vigorous ruler ethics; it will have been stage-managed by one of his professional military experts and court advisors rather than by himself. The incident shows, however, that the issue of strategic, operative and tactical control was paramount in Hellenistic battles, and that the personal presence of the commander or ruler played an important, if not decisive role in it and that a strong element of heroic example was still present in this way of fighting, despite all changes and all the professional development which had occurred since the Persian Wars.

To cut the long story of Hellenistic warfare and strategic command and control short: Charismatic leadership and the personal presence of rulers on the battlefield remained an important rule, but they did so more and more as a theatrical aspect of rulership, while the actual planning, the training and the command over the army lay in the hands of professional functionaries. Leadership, command and control became part of complicated processes of communication and action, mutually interrelated with each other and sometimes hard to understand for those not directly involved in them. Therefore, while the ubiquitousness of warfare in most of the *failing* hellenistic states could be experienced continuously by many people, insight into the military command and communications structures, especially of the monarchs, was necessarily limited. However, these structures and the mutual communications underlying the relationship between commanders and their armies seem to have worked quite effectively, if we allow for misperceptions on part of actors like Antiochus III. or later writers like those creatiung the tradition about the battle of Raphia.

The Lonesome Commander as a Literary Commonplace

If we look for a paradigm for an information link between the commander and the different parts of his army as loose as the Keeganian picture would like to have it,

we have to look at a fictitious example, which, though it comes from a Greek love romance of the time around the Christian era, takes as its setting an idealized semi-oriental world of the Hellenistic era. In this romance written by Chariton of Aphrodisias, the male hero Chaereas, though without any military experience and training, becomes the charismatic leader of an Egyptian insurgency against Persian rule; later in the romance, he is made counsillor of the Egyptian king and commander of a special operation against the city of Tyre (the town which Alexander had besieged). This operation had been proposed by Chaereas himself. Its legitimacy and its positive perspectives are assured by the soldiers' acclaiming Chaereas much like Roman Imperial troops acclaimed a Roman Emperor. During the battle, however, Chaereas, the commander, does not know how his operation is going:

> At sea Chaereas was victorious, so that the enemy fleet proved to be no match for him, at all... The king, however, did neither know anything about the defeat of his own naval forces, nor did Chaereas know about the defeat of the Egyptian land troops, and both assumed they had been victorious at both places[42].

Chaereas just does not know that he had already got much beloved Callirhoe in his hands - a fact which contributes to the paradoxical fulfillment of the love story. This lack of information is not only, as in a Keeganian battle, an absence of information, but the presence of a mixture of correct and wrong information: Both commanders' presuppositions are half true, half wrong. On the basis of their information they decide and act so that the continuity of the story is based on the informational disaster.

This informational gap on part of the operative leader occurs sometimes in the historiography of the late classical and hellenistic periods (after the Peloponnesian War). For example, in Polybius' rendering of the battle of Raphia, espcially in his description of Antiochus' III's behaviour, quite a few details of the romance's version of incomplete leadership knowledge occur, too:

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[42]Chariton, *De Chaerea et Callirhoe* VII 6, pp. 1-2: ἐν δὲ τῇ θαλάσσῃ Χαιρέας ἐνίκησεν, ὥστε μηδὲ ἀντίπαλον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ πολέμιον ναυτικόν· ... ἀλλ' οὔτε βασιλεὺς ἐγίνωσκε τὴν ἧτταν τὴν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ τῶν ἰδίων οὔτε Χαιρέας τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ἐνόμιζε δὲ ἑκάτερος κρατεῖν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.

But Antiochus, a young and inexperienced person, assumed from what happened at his particular flank that a similar victory must have been won everywhere, and he continued pursuing the fleeing enemies. Only later, however, when one of the older soldiers directed his attention to the matter and pointed at the cloud of dust that was moving from where his phalanx was to the place of their camp, then he realized what had happened and attempted at riding back onto the battle field together with his horse guard. When, however, he noticed that all his troops were in flight, he retreated to Raphia, convinced that on his part he had won a glorious victory, while by and large, due to the meanness and cowardice of the others, they had lost the battle[43].

What in the case of Raphia is a matter of surprise is complete desinformation in the romance; Antiochus is depicted by Polybius like a tragic hero, who, on the basis of his false assumptions acts and speaks in the wrong manner. Not knowing what happened at the other place appears as a literary topos in fictional and nonfictional literature to describe and explain outstanding individual's behaviour, and, above all: to evaluate it. Actually, Polybius' source will hardly have had any information about why Antiochus decided to go on with his cavalry pursuit, or why his phalanx did not stand against the Egyptian attack. In Egyptian propagada, the victory was largely attributed to Ptolemy's qualities as a *monomachos* and his special relationship with the Egyptian gods. The explanation in Polybius does not reproduce this Egyptian propaganda[44], at least not completely, which made Antiochus even loose his attributes as a king. Instead, Polybius reproduces a stereotype which he applies to other leading commanders, too: Like Antiochus, Eumenes is described as a commander tactically successful in battle whose wrong operative and strategic information in a tragical fashion leads to his loosing the war; Philipp V is merely described as a tragical king and commander. In the

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[43]Polybius V, 85, pp. 11-13: <u>ὁ δ' Ἀντίοχος</u>, ὡς ἂν ἄπειρος καὶ νέος, ὑπολαμβάνων <u>ἐκ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν μέρους</u> καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παραπλησίως αὐτῷ πάντα <u>νικᾶν</u>, ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν. ὀψὲ δέ ποτε τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὸς ἐπιστήσαντος αὐτόν, καὶ δείξαντος φερόμενον τὸν κονιορτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρεμβολήν, τότε συννοήσας τὸ γινόμενον ἀνατρέχειν ἐπειρᾶτο μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς (ἴλης) ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς παρατάξεως τόπον. καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς παρ' αὑτοῦ πάντας πεφευγότας, οὕτως ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν Ῥαφίαν, τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸν μέρος πεπεισμένος νικᾶν, διὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγεννίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἐσφάλθαι νομίζων τοῖς ὅλοις.

[44]Suppl. Hell. 979; H.Gauthier, H.Sottas, *Décret trilingue en l'honneur de Ptolémée IV*, Kairo (1925); H.-J.Thissen, *Studien zum Raphiadekret*, Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie XXIII, Meisenheim a.Glan (1966). Cf. W.Huß, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit*, München (2001), pp. 388-403.

battle at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC Polybius describes him as similarly misinformed as Antiochus at Raphia 20 years earlier:

> As I have said already, from what happened at his particular flank Philipp was convinced that he had won a complete victory. But when he saw his Macedonians throwing away their weapons and the enemies going after them, he retreated a small distance from the battle zone together with a few cavalry and infantry and looked at the battle as a whole. When he realized that the Romans pursuing the left flank of his army were already approaching the line of hills, he collected as many Thracians and Macedonias around himself as he could in this situation and decided to flee[45].

Contrary to what he alleges, Polybius had mentioned Philipp's success on the right flank, but nothing about the conclusions Philipp had drawn from it[46]. In both these Polybian cases, the commander's false view is depicted similarly and partly with the same words[47]: From his particular experience the commander draws false generalizations, and while he thinks he has won he looses battle. There is a slight anti-monarchic element present in the topos of the lonesome king, which was already exploited by the Roman diplomat and commander Titus Quinctius Flamininus in his dealings with Philipp before the battle. When in the presence of Titus and many Greek envoys Philipp had asked for the conditions to be given to him in written form, because he had no counsillors to consult with, the Roman is said to have replied: *Quite naturally you are alone now, Philipp, because your friends and best advisors have all been killed by you*[48].

The Keeganian commander, detached from information as to what goes on the ground is by itself a literary commonplace which had, in the cultural context of a civil

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[45]Polybius XVIII, pp. 26, 6-8: <u>ὁ δὲ</u> Φίλιππος ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καθάπερ εἶπα, τεκμαιρόμενος <u>ἐκ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸν μέρους</u> ἐπέπειστο τελέως <u>νικᾶν</u>· τότε δὲ συνθεασάμενος ἄφνω ἱπτοῦντας τὰ ὅπλα τοὺς Μακεδόνας καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους κατὰ νώτου προσβεβληκότας, βραχὺ γενόμενος ἐκ τοῦ κινδύνου μετ' ὀλίγων ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν συνεθεώρει τὰ ὅλα. κατανοήσας δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους κατὰ τὸ δίωγμα τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως τοῖς ἄκροις ἤδη προσπελάζοντας, ἐγίνετο (πρὸς τὸ φεύγειν, ὅσους ἐδύνατο) πλείστους ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ συναθροίσας τῶν Θρᾳκῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων.

[46]Polyb. XVII, 25, pp. 2.

[47]These are underlined in the corresponding passages.

[48]Polybius XVIII 7,6. Cf. F.W.Walbank, *Philippos tragodoumenos. A Polybian Experiment*, JHS 58 (1938), pp. 55-68. For topoi in Greek and Roman historiography cf. T.P.Wiseman, *Clio's cosmetics: three studies in Greco-Roman literature*, London (1979).

society like the Greek one, polemic implications: The single-handed king and commander is a tragic and finally failing hero, at least if he confronts Rome.

We shall not pursue our topic further into the Roman Empire for two reasons: first, much of what had been said about citicen communities, segementary societies and monarchic rule applies to the Roman world, too, and if not in an identical, than in a similar way; and second, there were considerable changes as to how the military was organized, strategies implemented and control exercised in the High and Late Empires, especially after Diocletian and in the Christian era.

Summary

Heroic ritual and the continuity of a warrior ethics have had at least as much influence on actual battles in antiquity as had planning, training and consciously controlling what was giong on or letting oneself be controlled. There was much inventiveness, experimentation and innovation in ancient, especially Greek warfare, and much continuity, especially in the mental sphere. There was little, however, to recommend the Keeganian or Tolstoyan idea of battles and wars merely emerging autonomously out of what was realised, felt, thought and experienced on the lowest levels of the military hierarchy. This, as far as I see, is also the conclusion of Jon Lendon's marvellous study, which is devoted mainly to the mental continuities of heroic fighting and leadership models[49]. Kimberly Kagan has argued that where we have narratives from the perspective of an actual commander, i.e.: in the cases of Caesar describing his warfare in Gaul 58-51 BC and of Julan Apostata fighting the Alamans near Strasbourg in the 350s (357) AD as described by Ammianus Marcellinus, they do not fit the Keeganian approach neetly: While Caesar's account, according to Kagan, is fully aware of a dialectical relationship between the commander and his army, of command and control being a communication process, so to speak, Ammianus makes his hero Julian unspecifically control and influence his troops by his mere physical presence or appearance - much like what is recorded of some of the charismatic rulers of the Hellenistic era. Caesar, according to Kagan, presupposes a much more sophistic, pragmatic and at the same time more professional and experienced idea of what it means to command an army than Ammianus, who sees in Julian the expression and the

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[49]J.E.Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts: A HIstory of Battle in Antiquity*, New Haven and London (2005).

model of exemplary moral values guiding the soldiers in their fighting rather than the initiator of communicative processes. This, Kagan concludes, resembles the reductionist view of Keegan's more than does Caesar's approach (which Keegan had misunderstood, according to Kagan). While the latter contention is certainly, at least in part, inspired by polemic, it does, however, justice to the facts: Battles and wars, as far as we see, do not simply develop out of an autonomous moral sphere, but of a complicated network of planning, interests, communications, loyalties, moral dispositions, sudden changes and premeditated ideas about movements and sequences of actions in time and space[50].

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[50]K.Kagan, *The Eye of Command*, Ann Arbor (2006).