Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Updated edition), (Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), viii, 288.

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Having done a seminar presentation on Hoffmann's *Gulliver's Troubles* (1968), consulted on various occasions on Hoffmann's *The State of War* (1965) and *Living With Nuclear Weapons* (1983) coauthored by Hoffmann, as well as Hoffmann's *Duties Beyond Borders* (1981) and, in a doctoral dissertation, cited Hoffmann's *Janus and Minerva* (1986), this reviewer approached *World Disorders* with considerable anticipation, and was not dissappointed. Stanley Hoffmann represents an example of a serious scholar who can simultaneously distinguish himself in international relations, comparative politics and political theory, drawing on his familiarity with each field to inform his work in the other two . *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post Cold War Era*, is a collection of essays in the field of international politics, most of which have been previously published, written between 1985 and the present.

The essays seek to elucidate and to clarify for students of international politics the implications of the new post-Cold War international order. They reflect, as well, Hoffmann's particular interest in the politics of nationalism and in the issue of intervention --- each subject is of increased relevance in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Conventionally, approaches to the theoretical study of international politics are identified as falling within one or another of three broad perspectives --- realism, Marxism and liberal internationalism. Hoffmann adopts a liberal internationalist perspective. Both realists and Marxists, he suggests, focus too narrowly on the notion of international politics as an arena in which states, in the case of realists, or classes, in the case of Marxists, engage in an unfettered contest for power and interest. Specifically in one of the essays included here, he critiques Michael Mandelbaum's 1996 *Foreign Affairs* article "Foreign Policy as Social Work," arguing that efforts at enhancing international order are justifiable in terms of the pursuit of justice and morality but also in the sense that the United States and other Western liberal democratic states have an interest, if interest is viewed in a broad rather than a narrow sense, in the development of an international order.

In taking the position that situations may arise in international politics in which the conventional prohibitions on intervention by other states in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state may legitimately and appropriately be overridden, he distinguishes himself from both realism with its reluctance to challenge state sovereignty lest peace and order be jeopardized, and Marxism with its presumption that intervention on the part of Western powers tends to reflect neo-imperialism. Liberal internationalism, he observes, is characterized by a tension between a liberalism of national self-determination, on the one hand, and a cosmopolitan liberalism, on the other. While he

seems to be concerned with neither making recourse to intervention too easily justifiable nor rendering it too difficult to justify, he does note that liberal internationalism may plausibly be seen as inconsistent and frequently unclear in its implications. In other words, he might be interpreted as advocating caution about international commitments but not to the point of fear of embarking on another Vietnam War preventing a reasonable response to situations, like Kosovo, in which a domestic conflict threatens regional stability, and/or threatens to result in genocide or in massive human suffering and abuse of human rights, and in which Western states collectively or the international community at large can effectively intervene without producing, as an outcome of the conflict, greater suffering or the impairment of rights. Nevertheless, given the current state of development of liberal theory, he concedes that it will be difficult to avoid the appearance, at times, of inconsistency. It may even be difficult, he implies, to avoid the temptations of hypocrisy and genuine inconsistency.

Hoffmann sees the traditional anarchic state-centered Westphalian system of international politics as coexisting with a nascent post-Westphalian world polity. He reflects that

> How these features of a still very sketchy, badly organized yet unmistakable world polity will coexist with the traditional 'realist' world of inter-state rivalries derived from conflicting fears and ambitions, this is the dominant question for the future. (242.).

While Hoffmann is clearly inclined toward liberal internationalism as a response, he

expresses concerns, as we have noted in the case of the issue of intervention, for example, about the current state of liberal internationalist theory. Hoffmann summarizes his thesis by observing that "Marxism is discredited. Realism promises only the perpetuation of the same old game and is no better equipped to face the politics of chaos than is liberalism." (86). The consequence, Hoffmann asserts, is that "Liberalism remains the only comprehensive and hopeful vision of world affairs, but it needs to be thoroughly reconstructed --- and that task has not proceeded very far, in either its domestic or its international dimensions." (p. 86).

Stanley Hoffmann represents, and for four decades has represented, one of the most thoughtful commentators and scholars in the study of international politics. In this collection, he considers the implications of the end of the Cold War. In this light, he re-examines the longstanding debate between realism and idealism that largely defined post-Second World War international relations theory, and that has persisted in the more recent language of neorealism and liberal internationalism. Two World Wars, and a host of regional and civil wars in the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries testify to the continuing relevance of the sort of security considerations upon which realists have focussed, but realism may have at least two limitations which Hoffmann notes. One is realism's difficulty in accounting for aspects of international politics that are more typically characterized by co-operative than by conflictual behaviour. The other is that realists tend to restrict the scope of study to relations between states, and to view the

content of national interest as necessarily coherent and simply self-evident without serious consideration of phenomena within states like domestic politics or culture, or of phenomena that transcend state boundaries like multinational corporations, religions, international organizations and regimes, or international non-governmental organizations. Certainly Hoffmann's work is useful as a reminder of some of the complexity that is part of international politics. It is fair to note that although his own sympathies are clearly with the liberal internationalist perspective, he is quite willing to subject that perspective as reflected in recent years by both scholars and policy-makers to some critique. The collection's real strength lies in the questions he poses for the field as a challenge to himself and to other students of international politics. *World Disorders* is highly recommended.

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