The Limits of Human Security: Canada in East Timor

By Steve Grunau

Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s claimed as its mandate the protection of the individual, and Canada has been at the forefront of the emergence of the construct of human security. While there has been much talk of moving toward a more humane approach to security, Canada’s commitment to human security must be measured in terms of its willingness and ability to put it into practice. After first examining the concept of human security, as imagined by Canadian decision-makers, the historical context of the question of East Timor, leading up to the 1999 crisis, will be explored. Canada’s response to the crisis will then be investigated, and compared with its identification and advocacy of human security. Canada’s involvement in East Timor is indicative of both the importance placed on human security and its limited impact on Canadian foreign policy. These limitations must be addressed if Canada desires to effectively promote human security around the world.

Human Security

Human security emphasizes the safety and well-being of the individual. This emphasis acts as a counterpoint to traditional approaches to security, which make the security of individuals secondary to that of the state. There is, however, a lack of consensus on what threats to the individual are most urgent (Kim and Hyun 39, Ball). The UNDP has taken a broad approach by identifying everything from poverty and famine to pollution and human rights violations as possible sources of human insecurity (Tow and Trood 13, Ball). While still recognizing the relevance of broadly conceived threats to human security, to facilitate policy development Canada has chosen to focus on protection from threats of violence (DFAIT
“Freedom” 3). Canada has argued that freedom from fear of violence can be achieved through the establishment of universal humanitarian standards and the rule of law, where violators are held accountable by multilateral institutions equipped to enforce the standards, thus allowing for the use of force to resolve human security concerns (Ibid. 1, Ball).

Canada’s leadership in the formulation of human security has been strong. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy made reference to it in many of his statements and speeches, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade published several reports on the subject during his tenure. Human security was the driving force behind Canada’s sponsorship of the treaty to ban landmines, and a focal point of its two-year term on the United Nations Security Council (1999 - 2000). In 1999 Canada co-founded the Human Security Network with Norway, and other states have since joined in the purpose of formulating and coordinating human security policy. Axworthy also took the initiative in proposing the formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which attempted to forge a consensus on the issue of interventions in defence of human security by bringing together a panel of experts from a variety of backgrounds (Evans and Sahnoun).

East Timor: Roots of Conflict

The situation in East Timor has presented Canada with a clear-cut case of human insecurity, with individuals under the threat of violence from the Indonesian government and military. Before turning to contemporary developments in East Timor, it is necessary to examine the evolution of the conflict in the territory to understand the roles played by the relevant actors. The island of Timor was divided between the colonial administrations of the Dutch in the west, and the Portuguese in the east in the 18th century. West Timor joined the rest of Holland’s
colonial possessions in declaring independence as Indonesia following World War II. East Timor, however, continued under Portuguese rule until 1974, when the Portuguese withdrew their officials as the decolonization process broke down into civil war, fomented by Indonesian military strategists (Taylor 50-3). After securing the consent of its Western benefactors (Taylor 64, Santoso), Indonesia invaded the territory that same year and formally annexed it after a bloody struggle with Timorese guerrillas, and in spite of Portugal’s protests that it still retained sovereignty. While the Indonesian military occupation was harsh, resulting in the deaths of some 100,000 East Timorese in the late 1970s alone, most Western nations, including Canada, issued only mild protests, and eventually extended *de facto* recognition of Indonesian sovereignty (Santoso, Scharfe 106).

Indonesia was an important Cold War ally in a region threatened by Communist expansionism, and it was also a potentially lucrative trading partner. By 1994, Canadian exports to Indonesia had increased to C$972M, making it Canada’s largest export market in Southeast Asia (Scharfe 193). As a result, relations with Indonesia were accorded a higher priority than the fate of the East Timorese. The end of the Cold War and the increasing Canadian emphasis on human security following Axworthy’s 1997 appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs did bring greater Canadian attention to the situation in East Timor, with Axworthy calling for “a lasting political solution with respect to East Timor” after a 1998 meeting with Timorese activist Jose Ramos-Horta (DFAIT “Axworthy”). The Canadian policy of engaging Indonesia served the dual purpose of protecting Canada’s economic relationship with Indonesia while affording it some forum to address human rights problems in East Timor.

Significant changes in Indonesia, beginning with the Asian economic crisis in 1997, had
important implications for the future of East Timor. Indonesian President Suharto lost power in 1998, partly as a result of the economic crisis, and was replaced by B.J. Habibie, a Suharto loyalist widely viewed as a transitional president entrusted with establishing a functioning democracy in the nation. Habibie supported enhanced autonomy for East Timor, but it soon became clear that neither the East Timorese nor the international community would consider this solution viable unless accompanied by a consultation of the East Timorese themselves (DFAT 27). Ongoing tripartite negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN finally resulted in a May 5, 1999 agreement on a referendum in East Timor between autonomy and independence, with the ballot administered by the UN and security provided by the Indonesians (Indonesian and Portugal). This last point was seen as a necessary concession to the politically powerful Indonesian military, which did not support the territory’s independence and would not tolerate foreign troops on Indonesian soil (DFAT 87).

Security was predictably precarious throughout the voter registration period, with pro-Indonesian militias (armed, organized and funded by the Indonesian military) conducting a campaign of violence designed to intimidate the populace into rejecting independence (DFAT 60-7, Kingsbury 71). While voting day had to be delayed several weeks as a result, on August 30 an overwhelming turnout of 98.6% of registered East Timorese voters favoured independence by a margin of 78.5% (21% for autonomy) (Martin 90, UN). After the results were announced September 4, an organized and intensified campaign of violence conducted by militia (and in some cases Indonesian military personnel) ensued, with devastating results for the territory’s infrastructure. Over half the population were displaced from their homes, and half of these were removed to Indonesian West Timor, many against their will (Annan, Sebastian and Smith). With
no impartial security force to restore order, UN personnel were evacuated to Australia. The international response consisted of a crescendo of condemnation of Indonesian actions in the territory, combined with an unwillingness to intervene with force unless invited by Indonesia to assist in restoring order. While some states undertook limited sanctions against the country (such as the suspension of arms sales by the EU and US), it was the interruption of payments under a US$43B bail-out package being administered by an international consortium of the IMF, World Bank, ADB and Japan that likely made the decision an easy one for Jakarta (Clinton 1521, Human Rights Watch 199-201). Indonesia invited international assistance on September 12, and INTERFET (International Force for East Timor), a multinational force led by Australia, landed in East Timor on September 20 (INTERFET).

Canada’s Response

The Canadian response to the violence in East Timor was high on the rhetoric that proved so ineffective in influencing Indonesian and TNI policy in East Timor throughout the pre-referendum violence, and low on the substantive action that was necessary to effect Indonesia’s eventual policy shift. Canada was quick to call for the sending of a Security Council mission to Indonesia and East Timor, which left on September 8 to observe the situation and remonstrate with Indonesian officials (DFAIT “Canada’s Objectives”). Canada’s “overriding objective,” according to Axworthy, “was to see the rapid deployment of an international peace-keeping force to East Timor to stop the violence” (Ibid.). However, this objective did not override the need for a Security Council mandate for the force; this in turn required Indonesian consent in order to be considered by the Security Council members, who were themselves opposed to an uninvited intervention (CBC “No international”). Despite being a member of the Security
Council, at no time did Canada advocate for either Security Council authorization of a multinational force under Chapter VII without Indonesian consent, or an intervention without a Security Council mandate (as took place in Kosovo). Instead, Canada’s UN Ambassador emphasized the need for multilateral action in a September 8 statement (CBC “Annan gives”).

The Canadian government also assiduously avoided punitive measures such as the arms embargoes taken against Indonesia by other governments. In spite of a policy stating that military exports to states involved in hostilities or extensive human rights violations should be “closely control[ed],” Canada went ahead with substantial military exports totaling C$21.8 million in 1999, making Indonesia the fourth largest market for such exports that year (DFAIT “Axworthy Announces”, “Export”). While these exports consisted largely of a training simulator for transport aircraft, along with some aircraft parts (Ibid.), to export any military-related product to Indonesia at a time when other states were instituting arms embargoes could be interpreted as disinterest in the military’s conduct in East Timor. Unwilling to undertake any substantive measures, the Canadian government, in a special session of the Security Council on September 11 to debate the issue, could only threaten “the opprobrium of the international community” should Indonesia fail to provide for the security of East Timorese (Canada).

Although it would only promote an intervention in East Timor in the context of a multilateral effort authorized by the UN, Canada did exert effort to mobilize the international front necessary to extract an invitation from Indonesia. Axworthy instigated a meeting of foreign affairs officials on the margins of the APEC summit in Auckland, New Zealand on September 9 (DFAIT, “Canada’s objectives”). Canada was one of seven countries to make a firm commitment to participate in the multinational force prior to the APEC conference (CBC
Apec leaders”). Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia Ken Sunquist traveled to West Timor along with the Norwegian Ambassador to examine humanitarian conditions in the refugee camps there on September 14, and Canada subsequently provided C$420,000 for refugee assistance (DFAIT “Canada’s objectives”). Certainly, Canada did not hide its concern with the events unfolding in East Timor. At the same time, it failed to support its talk with consistent action, stopping well short of the suspension of aid and military sales to Indonesia instituted by the United States.

The Canadian government had joined in the call for the insertion of an international force in East Timor to stop the violence and restore order in the territory, and had committed to send forces to participate in the operation in advance of the Indonesian invitation. However, when the invitation finally came on September 12, the Canadian military was left scrambling to try to fulfill the commitments made on its behalf by the government. Existing Canadian commitments overseas meant that few personnel were available (Caragata “Help”). The problem was compounded by the need to have troops available to Operation Abacus, the Canadian contingency plan to deal with possible complications of Y2K at the end of the year (Girouard “Overview”). On September 17, Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced that the government was considering sending one or all of three force components to East Timor: an air component, consisting of two Hercules C-130 transport aircraft, with 100 personnel; a naval component, consisting of the HMCS Protecteur and 250 personnel; and a ground component, consisting of 250 troops and some light vehicles (Eggleton “Speaking”). Coordination of the Canadian contribution with Australian requirements was facilitated by the Canadian Forces attaché in Canberra (Girouard “Overview”), and a fifteen-member strategic reconnaissance team arrived in
Australia September 19 to gather further information necessary to carry out the deployment (Eggleton “Speaking”).

Over the next several days, the Canadian government confirmed its contribution of the air and naval components to what the Canadian Forces began calling ‘Operation Toucan,’ and on September 19 most of the 103 personnel attached to the Hercules aircraft left for Australia on a C-150 Polaris, arriving two days later (after a long flight and a 14 hour time change) on September 21 (DND “Canadian airlift”). The Hercules aircraft did not make the trip as easily. One of the planes was held up in Fiji due to engine problems until September 24, when it finally completed the journey to Townsville, Australia (CBC “Canadian troops”, DND “Canadian airlift”). The second plane was forced to turn back to CFB Trenton three times due to compass problems, and finally departed late on September 23, arriving in Townsville on September 25 (CBC “Canada still”, CBC “Canadian troops”, DND “Canadian airlift”). Once in the theatre, the mechanical problems continued. One of the aircraft was grounded for eleven days, waiting for a replacement bolt which had to be couriered from the United States (CBC “Hercules troubles”). Mechanical difficulties also restricted one plane from flying at high altitudes (Ibid.). According to defence analyst Alain Pellerin, the problems experienced by the Hercules were caused by a combination of aging equipment (the planes were 34 years old) and defence budget cuts, the second making it difficult to find a solution to the first (CBC “Canadian troops”). The naval component also took some time to deploy. The HMCS Protecteur did not leave for East Timor until September 23 (Ibid.), and arrived in the theatre on October 24 (Girouard “Military Effort”).

The land component of the Canadian contribution was the most difficult to arrange. Other commitments meant that a full battalion was not available, and sustaining any ground
troops for an extended time period (by rotating a second group in) was problematic (Girouard “Overview”). The high operational tempo which army personnel had been subjected to in the 1990s also placed limits on how many troops were available for deployment (Eggleton “Canadian”). However, ground troops formed the central thrust of the INTERFET mandate of restoring security on the island, and Canada decided to send a company of Van Doos, augmented by personnel from other outfits to form a 216-member ground contingent (Girouard “Overview”, Girouard “Military Effort”). The land component faced a 40-day delay in deployment, waiting for inoculations against tropical disease recommended by the Surgeon-General to take effect (Eggleton “Speaking”). The shots were administered on September 16, as the Canadian government was organizing its contribution, and the troops used the delay to train in Canada, with the last week prior to deployment spent in Australia standardizing communications and training in jungle warfare (Ibid., DND “Operation”). When the Canadians finally were ready to leave for East Timor on October 25, they were unexpectedly delayed four days due to the limited shipping capacity of the Australian transport vessels; they eventually made their landing on October 29 (DND “194”).

Lack of preparation seemed the hallmark of the initial stages of Canadian participation in INTERFET. Despite having agreed to participate in the multinational force whose creation Canada consistently advocated, it appears that few preparations were undertaken until after the formal Security Council vote authorizing INTERFET a week later, compromising the “overriding” Canadian objective of a “rapid deployment” (DFAIT “Canada’s objectives”). Canada’s contribution was eagerly awaited in the early stages of INTERFET’s operations by force Commander Peter Cosgrove, who noted on September 24 the strength of Canadian
experience in peacekeeping operations (CBC TV “Struggling”). Efforts to coordinate a
contribution with Australia could have begun much earlier, and the delays caused by
inoculations and sailing time could have been mitigated by a similarly early initiative. Canadian
equipment difficulties point to the problems created by the chronic under-funding of the defence
budget. While military operations themselves can be funded on an ad hoc basis using
“incremental funds” (Eggleton “Speaking”), the equipment necessary for the operation must be
technologically adequate and in good working condition if Canada’s contribution is to be both
timely and effective.

In the Theatre: Operation Toucan

Though there were significant delays to the deployment of Canadian forces to the theatre,
one there the troops made significant contributions to the Australian-led operation. The
efficient handling of air cargo by Canadian personnel allowed each aircraft to complete two of
the three-hour round-trip flights daily (DND “Canadian airlift”). Noting that Canadian planes
were generally available on a daily basis, INTERFET personnel dubbed the Canadian contingent
‘Camp Two Can Do’ (Ibid.). By the time the Hercules and air personnel returned to Canada on
November 27, they had transported a prodigious two million pounds of freight, 2500 personnel
and 3000 refugees, totaling 40% of the airlift despite having only 10% of the planes involved
(DND “Briefing Note”, Girouard “Overview”).

The arrival of Canada’s HMCS Protecteur was also eagerly awaited by the Australians,
who were hoping to send their own logistics ship for a maintenance respite (Girouard
“Overview”). The Protecteur was the only ship available to INTERFET capable of taking over
this logistics role, and she served as the primary source of vehicle and aircraft fuel during her
term off East Timor (Ibid., DND “Briefing Note”). Protecteur’s engineers also contributed to the rebuilding effort in East Timor (DND “Canadians help”). The ship returned to Canada on January 25, after 3 months of service with INTERFET (Girouard “Military Effort”).

Canadian ground troops were also put to good use in East Timor. Common British army roots facilitated interoperability between the Canadian military and the other Commonwealth INTERFET participants such as Australia and New Zealand (Ibid.). There was a particular need for troops with robust national Rules of Engagement, since despite the substantial powers granted INTERFET under Chapter VII, some national contingents were limited by their governments as to the role they could play in the intervention. One such outfit was forbidden to use deadly force, clearly a relic of ASEAN reluctance to confront the Indonesian military, given the country’s regional dominance (Ibid.). The Canadian troops were assigned to work under the operational command of a New Zealand contingent in the 1000 km2 western border area around Suai (DND “194”, “Briefing Note”). Canada’s ground troops patrolled rural and urban areas and provided armed security to convoys and humanitarian aid organizations (DND “Ground Troops”). Although by the time of their arrival, the security situation in East Timor had vastly improved, the western border areas the Canadians were stationed in still constituted an area of significant risk from militia attack, especially given that Suai itself had only been occupied by INTERFET troops the previous week (Caragata “Moving”, Girouard “Overview”).

Humanitarian concerns formed an important part of the contribution of Canadian troops, who assisted in the rebuilding of East Timor. Canadian efforts were concentrated in and around Zumalai (in the vicinity of the Canadian encampment), where they installed pipes for water, worked at restoring power to the area, rebuilt a school, hospital and playground, and cut down
trees for use as dugout canoes (Caragata “Moving”, “Out”). Engineers from Protecteur essentially reconstructed a police academy in Dili, and Canadian RCMP lent further assistance by helping to set up a training college for the East Timorese police force (DND “Canadians help,” Caragata “Out”). Canada’s humanitarian efforts were a significant contribution to East Timor’s reconstruction, and were ably performed by the Canadian military on top of its security maintenance duties.

Canada’s ground troops ‘rehatted’ on February 21 as UN peacekeepers after the transfer of authority from INTERFET to the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), but ceased operations several weeks later on March 12, 2000 (DND “Briefing Note”, Girouard “Military Effort”). Canada’s decline of an invitation to maintain a force contribution to UNTAET by its leader Sergio Vieira de Mello was sharply criticized by East Timorese independence activist Jose Ramos-Horta, who exclaimed that “Canada is almost wholly absent,” while de Mello was also disappointed (Caragata “Out”). The withdrawal of the last few hundred Canadians stood in sharp contrast to Canada’s continued contribution of 2700 troops to peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia (Ibid.). However, with the security situation in East Timor by then relatively tranquil, there was perhaps room for a greater regional involvement in the peacekeeping phase, under the UNTAET force appropriately led by Philippine General De Los Santos. The difficulty of sustaining a troop commitment had been noted from the outset of Operation Toucan, and it was a lack of resources to support a longer-term deployment that likely led to the Canadian withdrawal (CBC “Budget”).

Canada in East Timor: The Limits of Human Security

The situation in East Timor clearly represented a substantial human security threat.
Militia violence, forced displacement, lack of services (and the infrastructure necessary to provide them) and the threat of starvation, all on a massive scale, meant that individual security was severely threatened in East Timor in 1999, particularly during the post-ballot violence. Clearly, the militias were intent on using the fear of violence to keep independence supporters from participating in the ballot and, failing that, they resorted to a campaign of unrestrained violence to punish their opponents and try to retain Indonesian control over western sectors of East Timor. As such, the Canadian approach to human security, emphasizing threats of violence and freedom from fear as the fundamental component of human security, was clearly engaged by the circumstances confronting East Timor in 1999 (DFAIT “Freedom” 1, 3).

That threats to human security require a policy response had become a clarion call for Western leaders in the wake of the NATO intervention in Kosovo. While in general Canada advocated the creation of universal humanitarian standards enforced by multilateral institutions (ie. the UN) (DFAIT “Freedom” 3), a clear exception was made in the case of Kosovo, where intervention was not sanctioned by the UN. It is instructive to read the March 1999 statement by then Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN Robert Fowler, describing Canada’s reasons for participating in NATO air strikes in the absence of UN authorization:

Humanitarian considerations underpin our action. We cannot simply stand by while innocents are murdered, an entire population is displaced, villages are burned and looted, and a population is denied its basic rights’ (Fowler 1999 “Notes”).

Fowler could as easily have been describing the carnage in East Timor. In fact, the 500,000 displaced persons in East Timor slightly outnumbered the 450,000 displaced by the Kosovo conflict (Ibid., Sebastian and Smith). The point of making a comparison between Kosovo and East Timor is not to argue that the policy responses of the international community
could or should have been identical, but only to show that the universal terms in which humanitarian intervention was being proclaimed by Western leaders was inconsistent with the reluctance to intervene in East Timor. While in Kosovo Canada insisted that it could not “simply stand by;” in East Timor, while it recognized that “[t]he current situation is obscene in its dimensions [and that t]he numbers of dead and displaced is growing steadily as is the wanton destruction of property,” Canada was only willing to threaten Indonesia with “the opprobrium of the international community.” (Ibid., Canada). Why was this so?

One obstacle to intervention was the uncertainty about the prospects for a successful intervention that would not jeopardize the democratic transition underway in Indonesia or fuel separatist conflicts throughout the archipelago, leading to the Balkanization of Indonesia. Related to this are the substantial human security risks that would have been posed by such an eventuality. The process of democratization in Indonesia held out hope for an end to authoritarian rule and the corruption, human rights violations and lack of political freedom that had characterized Suharto’s regime and had put a limit on the extent of human security achievable in the nation. Had the international community pushed Habibie farther than he was able to go, the result may have been to provide fuel to the fires of nationalism leading to a retrenchment of the ancien regime, possibly via a military coup, given the military’s substantial political power and its interest in the fate of the territory it was responsible for acquiring in 1975.

The stability of the electoral process in Indonesia was the overriding priority for the United States (US Senate 4, 10), and Canadian decision-makers likely had similar concerns.

The possibility that other separatist movements in areas like Aceh and Irian Jaya would take advantage of international involvement in East Timor to advance their own causes would
also have had negative consequences for human security. The validity of any separatist claims notwithstanding, the disorderly process of violent struggle for independence would have raised tensions between TNI and local communities, and resulted in increasingly abusive behaviour by the Indonesian military and deaths on both sides. This process would also have put an added strain on democratization, increased ethnic tensions, and resulted in instability ill conducive to the environment necessary to put economic growth back on track.

If there were justified concerns preventing the international community from conducting an intervention in East Timor without Indonesian consent, these concerns provide little explanation for the reluctance of Canadian decision-makers to take any substantive action to indicate its displeasure with Indonesian policy in East Timor or to press the country to invite international forces to the territory. While it is doubtful that Canada could have single-handedly succeeded in pressuring Indonesia to agree to a multinational force, the Canadian government could have signaled its seriousness about the issue by suspending its substantial military exports to Indonesia in 1999, freezing non-essential aid programs, and imposing targeted trade sanctions. Furthermore, Canada could have had its troops ready to send to the theatre as soon as the multinational force was approved, or even sent personnel to Australia as the violence began to increase, which would have signaled Canadian commitment to the Indonesians. This would have been in keeping with Defence Minister Art Eggleton’s proposed ‘early in, early out’ approach to peacekeeping in which forces are deployed rapidly for up to six months, until a more formal peacekeeping mission can be organized and sent (Gillet). Instead, Canadian troops adhered quite readily to the ‘early out’ concept, as most forces were withdrawn within six months, but found it more difficult to effect the speedy deployment required by ‘early in.’
One reason behind Canada’s lack of enthusiasm in facilitating human security in East Timor appears to be national interest. On the one hand, East Timor, with its small territory and population, is not important to Canadian interests. On the other hand, Indonesia, with its strategic geographical aspects, its vast population and its relatively important trading relationship with Canada, is an important component of Canadian involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Assisting East Timor in gaining independence and security was not worth risking relations with Indonesia.

While national interest constituted one limit of human security, another was the cost of maintaining a combat-capable force with the equipment necessary to field and deploy a significant force in East Timor. Canadian equipment problems in East Timor, particularly with the Hercules aircraft, along with the limited availability of troops to participate in INTERFET, point to the need to increase defence spending to provide well-equipped Canadian troops at levels appropriate to Canada’s traditional leading role in peacekeeping efforts. Despite Axworthy’s public emphasis on peacekeeping and human security, the Chretien government with which he served oversaw the fall of Canada from one of the premier peacekeeping contributors to 24th in the world, the slashing of the defence budget and a drop in foreign aid levels to little more than .3% of GDP (Nossal 94, 102). The result is what Kim Richard Nossal calls “pinchpenny diplomacy,” and has made it virtually impossible for Canadian policy-makers to consistently follow up their words with action (Ibid. 104-5). While governments clearly face difficult trade-offs involving areas of high priority (such as health and education) when apportioning public funds, they must make it clear to the Canadian electorate that under-funding foreign policy and defence initiatives limits the ability of Canada to promote human security to the extent that both its citizens and external actors have come to expect.
While there were clear limits to the willingness and ability of Canada to defend human security in East Timor, Canada’s readiness to participate in any capacity in a territory in which it had little or no national interests must be attributed to some level of concern for advancing human security. The key for the Canadian government is to determine the level of priority to be placed on human security, and then to ensure that Canada has the resources to respond to human security threats in a manner commensurate with that priority level. If, in order to focus its efforts on clear policy goals, Canada has narrowed its human security focus to freedom from fear of violence, it seems evident that defending individuals from violent threats will frequently require the use of force and the ability to deploy it quickly to targeted regions. The inability to make either an immediate or sustained military commitment to East Timor points to the need to improve Canadian capacity, and particularly to increase defence budgets, if Canada is to make a significant contribution to promoting this aspect of human security.

While clearly important, human security was not the key consideration examined by Canadian foreign policy-makers when deciding on Canada’s involvement in East Timor. Instead, one finds the underpinnings of traditional security still at play, with decisions designed in accordance with their impact on ‘the national interest.’ Further limits are placed on the exercise of human security by poor planning and an unwillingness to commit the necessary financial resources. While Canada made a meaningful contribution to the intervention in East Timor under INTERFET, its involvement cannot be said to be in keeping with its emphasis of the importance of human security and the need for humanitarian intervention to maintain it.
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