Roman Catholic Royalist Officers in the North Midlands, 1642-1646

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Introduction

Henry Hastings, described by C.V. Wedgwood as maintaining ‘the royalist cause with vigour and ferocity in Leicestershire’ was accused by his enemies of leading an army of papists. Even before open warfare existed, he and ‘his friends (many of them Papists …)’ were portrayed as leading a body of men ‘with arms furnished from Garendon Abbey and other Popish places’ to Leicester. Later in the year, following its appearance in the Edgehill campaign, the royalist army was catalogued and analysed by its enemies. In the resulting pamphlet, A Most True Relation of His Majesties Army, several officers associated with Hastings were identified as Papists. ‘Captain Stanley sergeant major to Captain Henry Hastings now a colonel of a regiment of foot besides 1000 dragoons that he had before’ and ‘Sir John Beaumont baronet, colonel of foot, Captain Dormer, son of Anthony Dormer of Grove Peak in Warwickshire, one of Colonel Beaumonts private captains who hath many more of that religion in his regiment’. Such descriptions and identifications continued throughout the war. In 1644 Mercurius Aulicus reported that parliamentarian newspapers described the royalist (South) Wingfield garrison in Derbyshire as ‘a nest of bloody papists’. That same year the parliamentarian paper Kingdom’s Weekly Intelligencer suggested that the protestant royalist deputy governor of Lichfield, Hervey Bagot had referred to the royalist Dudley garrison as comprising

Abbreviations:
BL British library
HMC Historical Manuscripts Commission
TT Thomason Tracts

1 A Version of this paper was given under the title; ‘Mostly Papists’ Religion and Royalism in a Provincial Army 1642-1646’ at the conference, Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern England in April 2001. I would like to record my thanks all those people who made important suggestions about the paper at that conference.
4 BL, TT, E244(2), A Most True Relation of His Majesties Army, (London, December 1642).
5 BL, TT, E8(20), Mercurius Aulicus, 33 Week, (London, 1644).
'heathenish cavaliers'. It was clear that for both the royalists and their parliamentarian enemies, the employment of Roman Catholics in the royalist armed forces would be a contentious issue. Indeed as David Smith has pointed out anti-Catholicism was a trait common to both the king’s opponents and constitutional royalists. This essay explores the way in which Roman Catholic royalists were incorporated into the midlands based army led by Henry Hastings, scion of the sometime puritan Hastings household. The army held the centre of England and was a sub-command of the Earl, later Marquis of Newcastle, whose army was also reputed to be a stronghold of Catholic royalism. To the south of Hastings’s army were royalist armies with far fewer Roman Catholic soldiers serving in them. This essay will suggest Hastings’s army held the centre ground in more than just a geographical sense.

Perhaps the most pertinent analysis of Roman Catholics in royalist armies comes from work undertaken by Peter Newman between the 1970s and 1990s. Newman identified political loyalties to the monarch as the basic principle of royalism in arms. The royalist soldier was supported by Natural Law, which would expect a servant to defend his master with arms if necessary. His typical royalist officer was ‘a country gentleman approaching or in early middle age’. In this scenario, Roman Catholics were royalists because they were gentlemen with a primary duty of loyalty to the monarch. The same would be true for the few puritan royalists, who were royalists because they were also gentlemen with the same principles. When Roman Catholics were praised for their actions on behalf of the king they were praised for loyalty, their religion was not made an issue. Newman’s 1993 analysis of Roman Catholics in the royalist forces concentrates upon the 603 colonels. Amongst then he found 117 Roman Catholics, having filtered out those labelled Papist but whom were Laudian or moderate Anglicans. Only a further 18 may have been Roman Catholics, but if they were then they were very successful in being quiet about it. Out of the 117, no less than 49 (41.8%) were in the Northern Army or from the six northern counties. Twenty-one of the Earl of Newcastle’s 46 colonels were Roman Catholic. The largely Laodicean protestant officers in the army seem to have

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6 BL, TT, E51(10), Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, 11-18 (London, June 1644).
accepted this, perhaps because Newcastle’s primary concerns were known to be loyalty and determination. Little, other than religion distinguished the royalist Catholics: they were the same class as their counterparts. There is one marked difference however; most active Catholics served in the north. In the southern armies, Newman reckons, Roman Catholic service was discouraged and because there were fewer Catholics living in the south, and some counties south of the Trent supplied no Catholic officers at all to the royalist cause, a point which coalesces with the analysis of Roman Catholic activism provided by Keith Lindley. It must be remembered however, that Lindley did point out that Somerset did have a very royalist Catholic community, but this was not reflected in the levels of military activism within the immediate region. Newman’s critique of the royalist officer corps is of great value, however it cannot do other than mask some of the subtleties of the issues which appear in either concentrated studies or those which take into account a wider group of officers. Therefore examining one provincial army in some detail has value in developing our perceptions of Roman Catholic activism.

The North Midlands Army

Henry Hastings was the second son of the fifth Earl of Huntingdon and was 32 years old when the civil war in England and Wales began. Due to having been a deputy lieutenant to his father and brother, joint Lord Lieutenants of Leicestershire and Rutland, Henry had been a captain during the Bishop’s Wars. Having brought the first commission of array into the north Midlands during June 1642, Hastings went on to command the royalists forces in the region, firstly as colonel-general from the end of February 1643 and as lieutenant from the following October. Hastings may have been promoted again because in June 1645 George Lisle was appointed to the post of lieutenant general under him. Within the counties under his control, Hastings had an army, based in a series of garrisons, that served several purposes. The central task was to hold onto the counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire

10 Ibid., pp. 200, 207, 211, 214015, 216.
Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Staffordshire: this it was able to do with varying success during the whole war. Its effective territorial control increased from February 1643 until the end of the year, but decline followed the Battle of Marston Moor (2 July 1644). A second job was to assemble as a field or flying army to serve within its own boundaries or outside: it did so at the successful relief of Newark (18-22 March 1644) and at the catastrophic defeat at Denton (31 October 1644). The third chief role of this army was to provide reinforcements for other commanders outside the region. The relief of York and Marston Moor campaign (June-July 1644) and its involvement in princes Rupert’s and Maurice’s West Midland and Marcher Country campaign in spring 1645, are examples of this work.\(^\text{13}\)

Counting George Lisle, the army had an officer corps comprising two lieutenant generals and every rank down to cornets and ensigns the lowest commissioned ranks in the horse and foot respectively. This is a total of 357 officers, but as George Lisle served with the army for less than a fortnight because his command imploded immediately after the Battle of Naseby (14 July 1645), it is justifiable to leave him out of the accounting. This leaves Hastings as the only general with 355 other officers serving in the forces under his command between 1642 and 1646.\(^\text{14}\) These men held commissions in 17 regiments of horse, 15 regiments of foot and four troop-sized regiments of dragoons. In common with the situation in other royalist armies, these regiments were, with the possible exception of Hastings’s own regiments of horse and foot, all undersized. Estimations of total numbers can be made at various times during the war and it is possible that in the spring of 1644 Hastings’s army had approximately 5,130 men. There would, therefore, have been enough men for about five full-sized regiments of horse and just two of foot.

The North Midlands Army would become a professional army as the war progressed and its officers tutored by those colleagues who had military

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\(^\text{13}\) I have covered these campaigns in my thesis and alluded to them elsewhere: Martyn Bennett, 'The Royalist War Effort in the North Midlands, 1642-1646', Loughborough University, PhD Thesis, (1987), chapters five and six.

experience. The service record of the army would see to the training process: the major battles of Edgehill, Marston Moor and Naseby all involved North Midlands' men. The relief of two sieges of Newark, the siege of Lichfield, smaller battles at Hopton Heath, Cotes and Denton and countless skirmishes all within four years provided experience. The army could well have been seen as a profession, for many of these men held small estates before the war. Only 43% of the field officers and small minority of regimental officers compounded for their estates, were fined at the end of the war, or sought to avoid sequestration and composition by inclusion within surrender terms, suggesting that many of them held little real estate upon which to base financial penalties. For such men war offered a chance for economic, social and perhaps political advancement; in short, it offered a career. Such a suggestion may not coalesce with Peter Newman's assertion that the defence of the king (royalism) was feudal, by which he means men were fighting with their king to preserve their common interest in property holding and rights, for these men were fighting with little to lose. Perhaps they had much more to gain, because we cannot entirely be sure that men with such a small stake in pre-war society were only fighting to defend what little they had. It is possible that they were fighting with at least half an eye open to the main chance. These young royalists were perhaps fighting to establish themselves and their families in the higher echelons of local, county and even, for a few of them, national government.

With the exception of the (quite exceptional) Thomas Leveson of Wolverhampton, there appears to have been no Roman Catholic involved in the administrative bodies established by the king in the counties under Hastings’s command, before the creation of the Marcher County Commission in 1645. Thus there was no administrative outlet for Roman Catholic royalist activism. Even Leveson, despite having served as a deputy lieutenant in 1640, was denied a role on the commission of array for Staffordshire, the county’s royalist administration. The king appointed him High Sheriff of Staffordshire in 1644 and it was from this position that he raised extra men for his forces through collecting what he termed his posse comitatus gathered in the areas from where the commissioners of array were trying

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to conscript recruits for the other county regiments. 17 This was just one of the conflicts of interest within this section of Hastings’s command. The North Midlands Army provided the legitimate outlet for Roman Catholic royalism for those who wished to remain close to their home region. Naturally it is easier to examine the 356 officers than the 5,130 men, and this is where concentration will lie.

The king, or rather his apologist Dr Gouden, explained in *Eikon Basililike* why Catholic service was not discouraged. He argued that using Roman Catholics in no way implied an attack on the established church. Religion did not matter when the issue was ‘Duty, Allegiance, and Subjection’. If any blame was to be attached to the use of Roman Catholics then it lay with the Protestants who by rebelling against the king forced him ‘to a necessary use of Papists, or any other who did but their duty to help Me to defend My self’. He himself did nothing but that which was lawful for any king ‘in such exigence to use the ayd of any of his Subjects’. He finished his brief discussion with a criticism of those who sought to castigate him.

I am sorry the Papists should have a greater sense of their Allegiance, than many Protestant Professors; who seem to have learned, and to practice the worst principles of the worst Papists … I needed the help of My Subjects as men, no lesse than their prayers as Christians18

The issue was one of legal obedience to the monarch and the right of the monarch to raise forces in his own defence, in other words law and politics, not religion.

Hastings’s army was established in early 1643 and he was placed under the command of the Earl of Newcastle who was responsible for the counties north of the Trent, the North Midlands and in East Anglia. Although Staffordshire was later technically incorporated into other commands it remained under Hastings, but such dual authority gave rise to Thomas Leveson’s attempts to remain independent. Newcastle was naturally criticized for the large proportion of Catholic officers in his army. Margaret, his second wife, raised the issue with him.

He answered … that he did not examine their Opinions in Religion, but look’d more upon their Honesty and Duty; for certainly there were Honest men and loyal subjects amongst Roman Catholicks as well as Protestants …19

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Despite the king’s assertions about his right to summon aid from the Catholic minority, and Newcastle’s attitude, some royalists opposed having Roman Catholics in the armed forces and as Newman pointed out, Catholics were discouraged from appearing in arms in the south. So why did Henry Hastings, son of a puritan household, allow them into his forces? Hastings’s own religious position is unclear. He left no personal testimony of his political or religious beliefs or of his service in the king’s cause. We have always had to judge him by his actions. We do know that his father, the fifth Earl of Huntingdon considered himself one of the godly. He had risked James VI and I’s and Archbishop Abbot’s ire earlier in the century, because he was well known for favouring ministers who ‘had been silenced for not conforming themselves unto the orders of the church’ and who would not ‘be tolerated to preach upon any pretence whatsoever’.\(^{20}\) Huntingdon drafted a guide for life for his eldest son Ferdinando, Lord Hastings, the future sixth earl. The book was a 90 page treatise called ‘Certaine Directions for My Eldest sonne Ferdinando’ and drafted around 1613 when the boy was about five or six years old. It dealt with three areas; religion, health and ‘The Goods of Fortune’ which included duty to the king.\(^{21}\) The religious section identified Huntingdon, then himself only 27 or 28, as a moderate puritan. He took a swipe at critics who labelled people puritans derogatorily: they were either ‘Papists, that do hate all ministers except those of their own sect, or atheists or men so extremely vicious that think every man that will not be drunk, swear or lie whore is a Puritan’.\(^{22}\) On the other hand Huntingdon saw vestments and title in the church as essential to its status and necessary to prevent service to God being meanly performed. Perhaps this is the necessary explanation of a Godly man who just happened to own one of the country’s most sumptuous private chapels. On the subject of Roman Catholics, Huntingdon advised his son not to meddle with God’s work. He thanked God for ensuring that a reformed religion was practiced in the country, but noted that ‘Popery, though not tolerated is secretly in many parts of the kingdom and doth increase’ he noted that: ‘for until the day of judgement the sheep and the goats shall live together’.\(^{23}\) A later section advised Ferdinando not to


\(^{22}\) Ibidem., p. 330.

\(^{23}\) Ibidem, p.330
marry a Catholic, partly because the children would be ‘papists or neuters’. Whilst written for the heir, the text was passed on to his younger son Henry when the earl realized that Henry was enjoying court life too much in 1627. The book ‘wch ch I rough hewen 12 (sic)yeares since wch if it please God I shall polish for you’. The guidance, perhaps polished as the Earl hoped was sent to his son ‘ere it be long’.24

The Context of the Officer Corps

The most accurate statistics obtainable for the North Midland Army soldiers relate to the field officers (majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels). The material consulted included papers of the Committees for Compounding, the Committee for the Advance of Money, the various papers published in the 1660s regarding Catholic contributions to the war, newspapers, letters written during the war and personal papers.25 As with Newman’s work strenuous efforts have been made to weed out those men maliciously and erroneously referred to as papist in either vague or specific terms in news books and so on. Some of those so named were clearly not: Captain Thomas Mason of Gervaise Lucas’s Horse was referred to as ‘papist’ because he was known to adhere to the Book of Common Prayer. Conversely some may have ‘got away with it’. Henry Hunloke of Wingerworth, Lt Colonel of Freschville’s horse may well have been a crypto-Catholic of some form. His son was the first head of the family to ‘go public’, but Hunloke’s mother was a Catholic and was sequestered as such in 1649.26

The basic figures are these: Of the 73 field officers, 41 can be ascribed a confessional position; 11 of these were Roman Catholics, that is 26.8% of those ascribed. We could probably assume that the majority if not all of the remaining 32 field officers, for whom there is no positive evidence of confessional stance, were Protestants of some ilk. Roman Catholics tended to be identified whilst in action by

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25 Mary Everitt-Green, ed., Calendar of the Committee for Compounding, (Lichtenstein, 1967), Mary Everitt-Green, ed., Calendar of the Committee for the Advance of Money, (Lichtenstein, 1967); The Royal Martyrs, (London, 1663); A Catalogue of the Lords, Knights, and Gentlemen (of the Catholic Religion) that were slain in the Late Warre, in Defence of their King and Country; Roger Palmer, Castlemaine The Catholique Apology with a Reply to the Answer, (1674)
the press and after the war by the county committees, sequestration sub-committees or the committee of compounding. This would give us a proportion of nearer to 15% (15.1%), but clearly neither total is close to the proportion of Roman Catholics identified in the officer corps of the Northern Army by Peter Newman as being 36%. With regard to the regimental officers only 59 (20.8%) can be ascribed confessional status. Of them 20 (34%) were Roman Catholics. For the same reason as given above, we are probably looking at an over estimated proportion that could not justifiably be extended to the rest of the regimental cohort. The confessional obscurity of so many is mirrored in other aspects of the group, for instance some 78% cannot be ascribed a precise social status based on property or income.

The 11 Roman Catholic field officers were men drawn from the higher ranks of society in the same way as their Protestant colleagues. Three Roman Catholics cannot be ascribed a certain social rank, but are likely to be at least gentlemen, of the others, one, Sir John Fitzherbert of Norbury, was a knight and heir to a title, four were esquires and three gentlemen. The esquires were Rowland Eyre of Hassop in Derbyshire and his brother William; William Fitzherbert of Tissington in Derbyshire; Thomas Leveson of Wolverhampton; the gentlemen were Simon and Christopher Heveningham of Pipehill in Staffordshire and Walter Giffard of Hyon, Staffordshire. Of the 11 Roman Catholic field officers only seven can be ascribed familial status. Six were heads of family or first sons. This included Rowland Eyre, Thomas Leveson who were heads and John Fitzherbert, William Fitzherbert, Walter Giffard and Edward Stamford of Perry Hill, Staffordshire who were heirs. This mirrors the commitment to the cause revealed by the officer cohort as a whole where over 65%
of the colonels were heads of families with similar commitment shown further down the field officer ranks. Only five Roman Catholic field officers can be ascribed an age at the beginning of the war. The oldest was 42 (Rowland Eyre) the youngest 23 (Edward Stamford). The average age of 32 compares with the all of the colonels in the army whose average age of 30. In the young man’s army under Hastings’s command, the Catholic cohort blended in regarding their age as they did in all other aspects.

In terms of later career paths, the Roman Catholic officers as a cohort returned, like their Protestant counterparts to obscurity. Several leading Catholics died before the Restoration: John Fitzherbert in 1649, Leveson in 1652, William Eyre a year later. Of the survivors, Richard Astley became a baronet in 1662, but many more of the others ended up claiming to the £60,000 set aside by Charles II in 1660 for his and his father’s poor and indigent officers as did a number of their Protestant colleagues. Successful Protestants are similarly hard to find too. Hastings became Lord Lieutenant of Leicestershire, but in many ways he can be seen in the role of a custodian for his under-age nephew the Earl of Huntingdon just as he had been representative of his father and brother during the war years. He gained income from cattle imports and a fine house in Brixton. John Freschville finally gained the barony promised in the war (1664) and returned briefly to parliament, he served as governor of York in 1660 and served in the Royal Regiment of Horse as a captain 1661-1667. Gervaise Lucas served as governor of Bombay after the restoration. The others seem to have made little impact on the Restoration state. Thus the suggestion that the Roman Catholic soldiers were distinguished only by their religion is borne out: the sheep and the goats roamed together.

**Regional Contexts for Roman Catholic Officers**

On the other hand there may well have been limits to royalist ecumenicalism. The best known accounts of the Ashby garrison contains a description of the stone-built

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28 Public Record Office SP28/69, 19 List of Officers claiming to the £60,000 etc, granted by his Sacred Majesty for the Relief of his Truly Loyal and Indigent Party.


triangular fort on the Leicester Road. The garrison as a whole was described as ‘debased and wicked wretches there as if they had been raked out of Hell’. However, even if wicked, they were choosy wretches, for the fort was said to be have been built not simply to defend the southern approaches to the castle complex, but to house Roman Catholic Irish troops. They were kept segregated because the other royalists ‘that profess themselves to be Protestants’ would not serve alongside them. Despite there being little evidence that even soldiers returned from Ireland after the cessation served at Ashby, the name stuck and the fort, long used as the grammar school headmaster’s house is still referred to locally as the Irish Fort.31 Nevertheless, the fort may serve as a metaphor for confessional attitudes in the North Midlands Army, because the notion of segregation may have some basis in reality for the Roman Catholics tended to be concentrated in regiments which themselves reflected the geographical location of Catholics. The single greatest concentration was in the regiments of Thomas Leveson. The vast majority of officers in his regiment of horse were Catholics and most of those in the foot were too. Most of them were from south Staffordshire, part of a county long known because of its concentration of Catholic families as one of the regions ‘dark corners’ with perhaps between 11% and 20% of its 1641-2 population being Catholic.32 Leveson’s regiments of horse and foot were raised sometime in late 1642 and early 1643. His commission for the foot was issued in May 1643, but its issue was probably a recognition of a fait accompli as in other cases in the North Midlands Army. Thomas Leveson had been out of the country, probably in hiding, when war broke out, but returned before the end of the year. He was prominent in the attempt to seize control of his county when the king ordered Hastings and the High Sheriff William Comberford (a man accused of being a church papist) to take control of Staffordshire. Leveson’s role was to seize his home town Wolverhampton.33 He also took charge of Dudley Castle, which was just as well for he had to abandon Wolverhampton around the time of Lord Brooke’s invasion of Staffordshire in February 1643. There he remained until May 1646. His regiments were present at Hopton Heath (20 March 1643), Newark, (21 March 1644), Marston Moor (2 July

1644) and Naseby (14 June 1644). At Marston Moor Leveson’s horse numbered about 200 men, some troops were still stationed at Dudley at the time. By the end of the war he had about 150 soldiers in each of his regiments. Despite being reminded constantly that he was under Hastings’s command, Leveson sought to distance himself from his commander whenever possible. He argued with the county commissioners, poached their money and recruits, claimed immunity from their orders and refused to obey Hastings’s commands. In March 1644 when Hastings was assembling the army to take on Meldrum at Newark, Leveson petulantly joined Prince Rupert’s small army as it marched to join Hastings at Ashby rather than rendezvous with the rest of the North Midlands force.\(^3^4\)

The regiment was largely staffed by Leveson’s co-religionists. All three men registered as having been his lieutenant colonel of horse, Walter Giffard of Hyon, George Parker of Sutton Coney and Francis Beaumont of Barrow upon Trent, Derbyshire were. Both majors, brothers Christopher and Simon Heveningham, were. This means that six of the army’s 11 Roman Catholic field officers were concentrated here in this regiment.\(^3^5\) All of the troop commanders, captains Richard Astley, William Careless, John Potts and Captain Lieutenant John Birch were all Catholics. As if to emphasize the point, Careless, later involved in Charles II’s escape after the Battle of Worcester, was often referred to by his enemies by the Spanish and thus papist sounding name Carlos. In the foot Captain Thomas Giffard was a Catholic. Further down the officer ranks, it is really impossible to make certain identifications. In the foot two men Lieutenant Francis Colles and Ensign John Rumney are possible Roman Catholics.\(^3^6\) The regiment was clearly a base for the expression of Catholic loyalty. All the lieutenant colonels were local, Staffordshire or Staffordshire bordermen, the majors were also local and so were the captains. Many of them were from the Roman Catholic enclave of south Staffordshire. The Roman Catholics

\(^{34}\) BL. TT. E49(21), News From Prince Rupert.
of Dudley remained central to the royalist cause here until the end of the war, three of them acted as commissioners for Dudley’s surrender: Christopher Heveningham and John Giffard and Francis Beaumont. The Weekly Account seems to have thought that the latter was Sir John Beaumont, the Catholic officer associated with Hastings back in 1642. However, Beaumont had served in Worcestershire during the war and had been killed in 1643.  

North Derbyshire provided a number of Roman Catholic officers for the regiments of Sir John Fitzherbert of Tissington and Rowland Eyre of Hassop, despite this being one of Bossy’s eccentric regions, it was geographically close to Catholic enclaves in north Staffordshire. Rowland Eyre has been described as one of the two leading Derbyshire recusants he was 42 when war broke out in England. Nevertheless the family’s involvement with lead mining has been regarded as exceptional in a Catholic family.  

Despite having been forward in lending money as a Roman Catholic to Queen Henrietta Maria’s fund for the war against the Scots, Eyre apparently did little to publicly support the king until late 1643. Two things pushed him into action. The Derbyshire committee decided to treat Catholics as automatic enemies and the Earl of Newcastle with his ecumenical approach to loyalism stationed his army in north Derbyshire and north Nottinghamshire. The earl commissioned Eyre and his Anglican friend John Milward and they both raised forces. Eyre raised both horse and foot, and both regiments were small, about 100 or so men in each. As well as garrisoning Chatsworth and Hassop they both fought at Marston Moor where the foot was badly mauled and may well have ceased to exist in the following days. The horse made it south, and despite being surprised at Boyleston church wound up at Newark. Eyre’s regiments contained several Catholics, including his brother William. The horse had at least one Catholic captain, in England and Wales, 1642-1660, (New York1981), Nos, 40, 246. Public Record Office, SP16/495/1E, Recusants in England.


38 John Bossy, The English Catholic Community 1570-1850, (London, 1975), p. 100: he referred to the East Midlands as an area where the decision to be Catholic was ‘an eccentric choice’.


Howard Brock and the dragoon captain James Tunstead was also Catholic. It must be noted that despite the heavy Catholic presence, this regiment jointly garrisoned Chatsworth in the company of Eyre’s protestant neighbour John Milward’s regiments, which contained only one Catholic, Cornet Thomas Herrod. The only other regiment with a notable Catholic presence was Sir John Fitzherbert of Norbury’s who was himself a Roman Catholic, but this was limited to four officers, including Simon Heveningham who was promoted to the lieutenant colonelcy having previously served as Leveson’s major.

The Derbyshire regiment at the centre of the ‘nest of bloody Papists’ accusation was Roger Molyneux’s, which ironically had no Roman Catholic officers. Hastings’s own regiments proved to be something of a military academy and thus had a high turn-over of staff. Four officers from it moved on to colonelcies of their own. Other field officers had served in Hastings’s regiment or in other North Midland regiments as regimental officers before being promoted. Some may have moved on to field command elsewhere. When in 1661 Charles II decided to offer remuneration to former officers financially ruined by the war a massive number of men subscribed to the list claiming to be captains in Hastings’s regiments. According to the list Hastings’s regiment of horse had three lieutenant colonels, six majors and 29 captains; the foot regiment had 12 captains. Casualties could easily account for the excessive foot regiment captains, Hastings’s Horse was a different matter there should only be three captains and three captain lieutenants, not the 29 captains registered. Out of the 77 officers serving at some time in Hastings’s regiments only two were Catholics: Captain Poole Turville of Castle Gresley, Derbyshire who forfeited his entire estate in 1653 and the mysterious Major Stanley who was listed as having served with Hastings at Edgehill, and then leaves the scene.


43 Public Record Office SP29/69, 19 List of Officers claiming to the £60,000 etc, granted by his Sacred Majesty for the Relief of his Truly Loyal and Indigent Party., columns 87-88.
Conclusion

If the first consideration of royalist activism was allegiance to the lawful king then there were apparently strict limitations to that premise within some sections of militant royalism. The Midlands might be a place where Newman’s permissive north and the prescriptive south met geographically but it was also where attitudes to service also met. Roman Catholics formed an important part of the officer corps of the North Midland Army, but many of them were kept separate and discreet. The Loadicean attitudes found in the Northern Army may not have been found in the Midlands. In religious terms, Hastings proved himself once again so different from his father: in the North Midlands Army for the most part it was Henry Hastings and his fellow commanders, not God who separated the sheep from the goats.