ABCA RESERVE ARMIES: HISTORY AND FUTURE ROLES

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When first considering the task of speaking about the history of reserve forces in the US, Canada, Britain and Australia I thought the whole problem simple. First of all, the countries share a predominantly ‘British’ heritage in terms of the development of military forces, at least. The case of Canada, of course, is qualified by the fact that military origins can be traced to New France before British victory here. Furthermore, it is not difficult to trace the origins of ‘militias’ in each country formed to defend against some form of threat, and thereby taking up a certain place among the social institutions of the day.

Thinking about the issue of future roles for these reserve armies however (and I speak today primarily about armies) sounded more dreadful the more I thought about it. Having had the privilege of being associated with (dare I say) reserve politics (or, really, army politics) for a particularly fascinating period in the development of Canada’s army reserves, I know there are minefields in the debate over roles, no doubt more than I know. Alas, however, here I am.

Actually, it’s perfectly logical to address the matters of ‘history’ and ‘future’ together. After all, it’s difficult to find a discussion about the present or future of ‘reserves’ or ‘reservists’ or the ‘militia’ without being drawn into the past of what the ‘reserves’, ‘reservists’ or the ‘militia’ have been asked to do, tasked to do or, naturally, whether it was a proper or improper role for the ‘volunteer’ citizen soldier to have

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undertaken in the first place. History is central to the spirit of the citizen soldier (as it is with professionals), looking to fit his/her service to his/her country into the same seamless web of traditions and myths shared by others of the ‘regiment’ or local community who served previously, and will serve in the future. It is very important that we do not discount the importance of such links with the past that provide continuity when we look at a future that can sometimes seem so much a break with that past.

It is worthwhile, then, to examine how the histories of reserve forces, and the interpretations of those histories, shape how governments and militaries regard them today in the post 9/11 security environment. History, however, has its limits as a crutch for today’s decisions, particularly because the new security environment does not provide for an easy definition of homeland defence. One trend is sure, though: reserve forces have gradually become more integrated into the armed forces of the four subject countries. As a result, career professionals tend to see the value of reserve forces to be a product of their ‘usability’ abroad, rather than a sense of inherent social or political value they may wield at home.

**UNITED STATES**

Of the four ABCA countries, the United States obviously has the most complex reserve components. After all, the National Guard and Army Reserves have different histories and distinct missions. The Army National Guard is usually regarded as the oldest component of the US armed forces, the first permanent militia regiments organized in 1636 by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The English settlers remained very ‘English’ in military matters, suspicious of a full-time, professional army, so it was
natural for the original thirteen colonies to come to rely on a militia of citizen soldiers for their own defence.

The colonists feared Britain’s enemies, of course, such as the Spanish, Dutch and French, but they faced their most immediate threat from native Indians. Indians had already hit Virginia settlers heavily in 1622; in 1637, the New England settlers went to war against the Pequot Indians of Connecticut. Indian wars would continue on the frontier for two-and-a-half centuries. And so would 'colonial' wars mark much of the development of North America, seemingly over dominance of the new territories among the European powers but really part and parcel of the larger context of intra-European rivalries. Until 1744, the struggle was focused on the Spanish possessions in the South; after that, it shifted to those of France in the North. Incidentally, the one time Britain asked the colonies for volunteers for an 'expeditionary' campaign, against Spain at Cartagena in 1940, the failure of the British regulars and their treatment of the 'American Regiment' fed further the growing resentment against the regulars. When the French and Indian War began in 1754 (textbooks might say 1756, but French success against two Virginia forces, one commanded by George Washington, had already challenged Britain’s tenuous grip on the Ohio Valley), the British naturally went about augmenting their forces in North America with regiments of ‘Provincials’, more attuned to the requirements of frontier warfare.¹

Britain may have bested France in the war for the colonies, but soon after the British had their hands full with the American colonists. Most regiments that comprised the Continental Army were from the militia. The local militia was often called out

¹ For the best narrative of the Seven Years War, and discussion of what it meant for North America, see Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).
throughout the Revolutionary War, and joining the militia was a symbol of loyalty to the cause. The idea of the ‘citizen-soldier’ thus was intertwined with the creation of the United States itself. Throughout the latter decades of the 18th century, republican essayists appealed to political obligation of citizenry to serve in their community’s militia to protect their property and political rights. In other words, standing armies were distrusted, and security was based on the assumption that free citizens would answer the call when needed. That is, certainly, embodied in the obligations implicit in Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence notion of governments earning their ‘just powers from the consent of the governed.”

True Whigs, then, defended the state citizen soldier militia system as part and parcel of the natural right of freedom – with it comes responsibility to defend it. One Secretary of War of the fledgling nation advocated a standing army (or ‘regular military force’) for economic and political reasons. Keeping the state militia system adequately prepared would cost too much in terms of lost labour among the citizens, he argued. To expect the militiaman to be “master of the several branches of the art of war” was the equivalent of holding building bees to construct houses while “expelling ‘as useless, architects, masons, and carpenters.” Defenders of the citizen-soldier system decried the potential of a full-time army to be “an asylum for all those who do not choose to labour.”

Not surprisingly, federalists and anti-federalists differed over how to deal with the militia in the Constitution. Federalists favoured a strong central government, standing army and militia under federal control. Anti-federalists defended states’ powers, state-controlled militias and a small regular army or, better yet, none at all. The compromise

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3 Ibid, p. 62.
was brilliant: the President controls military forces as Commander-in-Chief; Congress pays for the military forces (and given the sole power to raise taxes to that end) and has the right to declare war. The militia was given a dual state/federal persona; the former could appoint officers and train soldiers, but the latter could set standards. The Militia Act of 1792 subsequently expanded federal policy and clarified the role of the militia. It required all able bodied men aged 18 to 45 years of age to serve, to be armed, to be equipped at their own expense and to participate in annual musters. The 1792 act established the idea of organizing these militia forces into standard divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, as directed by the State legislatures.4

The War of 1812 ushered in a renewed wave of ‘volunteer’ militiaman (as opposed to the ‘enrolled’ militia proscribed by the 1792 act). By the time of America’s first ‘away’ war, the Mexican War of the late 1840s, militia units made up most of the fighting force. In the 1860s, Militia units carried a substantial part of the load for both sides in the Civil War. In the late 19th century, the moniker ‘National Guard’ came to be used increasingly by states in reference to their militias. Guardsman made up the bulk of the soldiers dispatched to hold the Philippines, taken from Spain in the Spanish-American War. Notably, Guardsman had to volunteer for that duty; the President not being able to employ the Guard abroad.

A series of Guard reforms culminated in 1916 with the passing of the National Defence Act which, along with the Naval Act of the same year, provided for increased military capabilities and machinery for mobilization.5 It further expanded the Guard's role

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4 Legislation as it relates to the Army National Guard is well laid out on the Guard’s web-site, www.army.mil, and the summaries are used here.
and guaranteed the State militias’ status as the Army’s primary reserve force. Furthermore, the law mandated use of the term "National Guard" for that force. Moreover, the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the National Guard for the duration of the emergency. The number of yearly drills increased from 24 to 48 and annual training from five to 15 days, and drill pay was authorized for the first time. Almost 160,000 Guardsman were soon dispatched to the Mexican border in reaction to the raids of Poncho Villa, but the threat dissipated. State Guard divisions did, however, comprise almost half of the American Expeditionary Force.

All National Guard divisions fought in the Second World War. National Guard units as well as newly created Air National Guard units saw action in Korea. 45,000 soldiers of the Army National Guard were mobilized for a year when the Soviet Union began to build the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s. The Guard was used frequently in its state role during the 1960s for riot control duties in the wake of race riots and protests against the Vietnam War.

Before turning to Vietnam, I want briefly to cover the history of the US Army Reserve. It usually traces its origins to the creation of the Medical Reserve Corps in 1908. The 1916 National Defence Act, that solidified the status of the National Guard, also created the Officers’ Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps and Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The Organized Reserve Corps contributed over 200,000 personnel to the Army in WW2, and almost 250,000 during the Korean War. During Korea, the ORC became the US Army Reserve, divided into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve, authorized for drill days and annual training, and the

6 Army National Guard web-site (www.armg.mil)
President was given authority to bring up to one million reservists to active duty.7 The call-up of Reservists in response to the Berlin Crisis (one year from September 1961 to September 1962) brought out a number of weaknesses in the component, related to equipment, under strength units and a less than ‘fail-safe’ system in place to find soldiers being called up. A re-organization in the mid- to late 1960s brought the concentration of combat support/combat service support in the Army Reserve, and combat arms units in the National Guard that has endured, for the most part, until today.

That brings me back to Vietnam. The Vietnam War had a profound impact on both the Guard and Reserve. In July 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson announced his intention to send additional combat units to South Vietnam, bringing the strength up to 175,000 by year’s end, the Army prepared to send the new 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and all three brigades of the 1st Infantry Division (not to mention scads of support and logistical units).8 Johnson, however, did not mobilize Reserve or Guard units. This has been described as a ‘fateful’ decision, largely because it meant that the Army had to rely on draft calls and voluntary enlistments.9 The President’s decision meant that the Army had to increase its active strength by a million and a half men over the next three years, in order to find the manpower to sustain training, rotation and replacement requirements.10 To be sure, there were other personnel-related problems that plagued the Army in Vietnam (one-year rotations, shortage of specialist trades), but the real effect of the administration’s

7 U.S. Army Reserve Timeline (www4.army.mil/USAR/mission/history.php)
9 See, for example, the section on Guard history provided on the Army National Guard web-site (www.arng.army.mil)
10 Ibid.
decision was political: was the US committed fully to prosecuting the war with all available means?

The over-commitment of the United States was evident after 1965, and only looked worse with General Westmoreland’s demands for more combat units and requests for troops (200,000 in 1967). He was pressed to execute operations in Vietnam without drawing on forces earmarked for South Korea or NATO. The decision not to mobilize thus was having spin-off effects on all of US foreign policy. In late 1967 and 1968, North Korea captured an American naval vessel, USS Pueblo and the Viet Cong struck the Tet offensive and (later in the year, the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Czechoslovakia). In that context, Johnson did then call to active duty a small number of reservists and guard units for duty in Southeast Asia and South Korea, but never amounted to more than 40,000 troops.11

In 1973, the Nixon administration announced the end of the draft, and the Pentagon brought out its new concept of Total Force, in the works for at least three years by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and driven at least in part by the potential financial benefits to be made available by mixing Active, Reserve and Guard capabilities. The Total Force policy, which coincided with the Nixon Doctrine’s objective of staying out of land wars in Asia, meant, essentially, that the US would maintain sufficient active duty forces to keep the peace and deter aggression. The Reserve Component would reinforce the Active force when necessary. The National Guard and Reserves were given separate (and larger) accounts in order to fulfill their functions. In order to avoid another Vietnam-like failure to mobilize reserves, the Pentagon placed half of the Army’s combat units in the reserves, and specialist skills deemed ‘civilian’,

11 American Military History, p. 674.
were also almost exclusively assigned to the Reserves. (i.e. military police, engineers, civil affairs). The Army was surely the hardest hit by the inception of the all-volunteer force (it had the biggest challenge in attracting recruits) and overall force reductions of active-duty personnel to between 2 and 2.2 million (about a quarter of pre-Vietnam strength of 2.7 million). For Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams, this meant integrating the reserves into the Army’s structure in such a way that Presidents could no longer send the Army to war without mobilization.12

As a result, for the 1991 Gulf War, more than 84,000 Army Reservists were mobilized to provide combat support and combat service support, and over 60,000 Army National Guard soldiers (the number are obviously higher when the other components are added). Those numbers, and the political support for the war gained by mobilizing reservists, is seen as a vindication of the Total Force policy.13 Others, however, criticize the National Guard’s evolution into a federal force at the expense of its state militia heritage; in other words, the preservation of state militias is a Constitutional guarantee, and the demands of homeland defence are necessarily displaced by the more exciting, and more expensive, expeditionary function.

AUSTRALIA

Australia’s peacetime Army was militia-based until after the Second World War. The origins of local volunteer forces can be traced to 1800, when the Sydney and Parramatta Loyal Associations were raised in response to fears of convict and Irish

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13 See, for example, Stephen Duncan, Citizen Warriors: America’s National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security (New York: Ballantyne Books, 1996)
uprisings. Through the second half of the nineteenth century, the fate of volunteer forces fluctuated along with perception of external threats. During the Crimean War, Victoria and New South Wales managed to muster over 5,000 volunteers and construct fortifications (the troops received no pay, but could receive a grant for 50 acres of land from the government after 5 years ‘efficient’ service), and 2,500 men from the eastern Australian colonies volunteered for service in the Waikato War against the Maoris in New Zealand.14 When British troops departed from Australia in 1870, colonial administrators gradually came to look for more capable (and paid) local defence, especially during the economic boom that lasted until around 1890. By that time, several colonies possessed permanent, militia, volunteer and school cadet reserves. Australia sent some 16,000 men off to the Boer War, helping to foster a popular belief that Australian men, fully possessed of natural bush skills were, of course, born soldiers.

By the time of the federation of the Australian colonies in 1901, defence responsibility passed to the new federal government (along with almost 30,000 soldiers, 1,500 of which were full-time). By the First World War, Australia’s military boasted over 200,000 either on full-time or part-time service (largely because of the introduction of compulsory service, a recommendation made by Field Marshal Lord Kitchener in his review of Australian defences). In the two world wars, however, Australia raised separate expeditionary forces (Australian Imperial Force) to serve in Europe and the Middle East, because the Commonwealth Act stipulated that only volunteers could be committed to overseas service. Of course, a large number of volunteers and trained militia nonetheless signed on, and amendments to the legislation in 1943 allowed the militia to be deployed throughout most of the Southwest Pacific.

After the Second World War ushered in the nuclear age, vast changes were in line for Australia’s traditional volunteer/militia based army. Volunteers for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan were taken from the demobilizing divisions of the AIF; militia and other volunteers were not signed up, or even sought. The Australian Regular Army was set-up in 1947. The three battalions in Japan would constitute a permanent infantry brigade, and remained the core of the Regular army throughout the 1950s. It fought, of course, in Korea but, later in the early 1960s, Australia’s coincidental and, really, open-ended commitments to counter Indonesian operations against east Malaysia and Vietnam stretched the Army to its limit.

However, a volunteer Citizen Military Force (CMF) was established in 1948, with the usual training activities for militias. In 1951, the Government tried a national service scheme to build-up the CMF but, for various reasons, especially that the Regular Army, at first, was too busy to train the influx of recruits, it died by the end of the decade. Army reorganization in 1959-1960 resulted in the number of CMF battalions, changes in unit names and a loss of morale. Another national service scheme fed the regular Army for Vietnam in 1964 (until 1972), and the reserves were not mobilized. The CMF became attractive for those who could use the system to avoid national service and Vietnam, but the CMF wallowed still. A report by Dr. TB Millar in 1973 made recommendations along the lines of a total force (i.e. One Army); the renaming of the CMF to Army Reserves, and roles including defence of Australia and serving as a mobilization base. As Allan Ryan pointed out at the first of these conferences two years ago, however, the recommendations were never fully embraced in the sense of equal liability for call out.

15 I have used the material supplied in “A History of Australia’s Army Reserves” (www.defence.gov.au/reserves/History/history.html downloaded 1 March 2004) for the above).
short of war; job protection legislation; and the move toward territorial defence rather than ‘forward defence’ after Vietnam. (with the regulars at home, incentive for building an expansion base waned).  

UNITED KINGDOM

Britain’s Territorial Army of today has complex roots. Militia, Volunteers, Home Guard and just plain Reservists have all existed in one form or another. The militia can be traced to the mid 16th century, and a series of Militia Acts (1761 to 1802), transformed the militia from local police/national defence force to a reserve for the Regular Army). As Richard Holmes has pointed out:

Service in the militia was normally voluntary but the ballot could be used when necessary for those who were not wealthy enough to hire a substitute. In the early 19th century, service became compulsory for, I think, 18-30 year olds. But specific threats – like the continued threat of a Jacobite invasion of England in 1745 - had induced men to volunteer for home defence, and in 1794 the risk of invasion by Revolutionary France persuaded the government to authorise the formation of volunteer units which would be subject to military discipline and eligible for pay when called out. They included infantry and cavalry, the latter known as yeomanry and recruited, at least in theory, from amongst yeoman farmers who owned their own horses.  

After the Napoleonic Wars, the reduced yeomanry helped to keep law and order until the establishment of local police forces. In the mid-19th century, again in the face of a possible threat from France, middle class Rifle Volunteer Corps (RVC) were formed in most towns, and the government reluctantly organized these into administrative  

battalions. (Later, the RVCs became volunteer battalions of regular infantry regiments).\textsuperscript{18}

Reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the Boer War, most notable by R.B. Haldane, Secretary of State for War in the Liberal Government elected in 1905, resulted in the creation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and the abolition of the Militia (units were transferred to the Special Reserve, but didn’t really function, formally disbanded in late 1950s), and consolidation of non-Regular forces (yeomanry and volunteers) into the Territorial Force (later, Territorial Army).\textsuperscript{19} The Territorial Force mobilized for the First World War, but the units were reconstituted in 1920 as the Territorial Army. Soon after, offshoots of the TA were devised, such as the Civil Constabulary Reserve (CCR), to deal with aid to the civil power duties during large-scale strikes. They were short-lived, but the debate within the UK over the propriety of such a role was telling\textsuperscript{20}. The TA went through a process for the Second World War similar to that of the First, mobilizing and losing independent distinction for the duration, and reconstituted in 1947 as a part-time reservist force. Notably, units were re-rolled, ‘duplicated’, disbanded or merged with zeal since the TF/TA had been created.

Similar to other reserve forces, the TA was under-manned and ill equipped through most of the 1950s and 1960s. In an effort to reinvigorate the reserves, the government created the TAVR in 1967 (Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve) in 1967, by merging regular reservists with the TA, preserving only a handful of TA units. Regimental titles and traditions were allocated to the company and squadron level, and

\textsuperscript{19} For a good look at the origins of the TA and its early years, see Peter Dennis, The Territorial Army 1906-1940 (Exeter: Boydell Press, 1987)
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, pp.65-85.
a class of ‘volunteer’ was re-introduced. A hue and cry arose over the loss of the historic TA. (but the TA was in perpetual change, so that was a tough one to understand). Further reorganization began in 1971, and expansion in 1975 and 1986 (the TA reverted back to that name in 1982), and the regimental system re-emerged in the early 1990s.21

We should consider one additional comment on the UK before moving on to Canada. While the ‘volunteer’ concept might have been lost in 1908, it was re-created by the appearance of a home defence force in WW1 among older men. It re-emerged in WW2 as the Home Guard (Local Defence Volunteer). In 1982, it was reincarnated as the Home Service Force. Again, it was composed of older men with experience to guard Key Points (and attached eventually to every TA infantry battalion). It was disbanded in 1992 at the end of the Cold War.

CANADA

While a ‘Regular Army’ or Permanent Force was not created until a few years after Confederation (1867), the first French militia units were formed two centuries earlier in 1673 to defend against the British and the Iroquois. The French militia (milice), working with regular French regiments, was useful in operations in North America, characterized as la petite guerre, essentially woodland guerilla fighting. In the end, of course, British power proved too much for France, and New France succumbed to British North America in 1759. The British maintained the old militia system in the

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21 This summary is taken from “British Territorials and Volunteers,” a section from the excellent web-site (www.regiments.org).
colonies. The purpose of the militia was, for the most part, to help out professional forces when necessary.

I will talk briefly about the war of 1812 later. For now, suffice it to say that the militia had its ups and downs throughout the first half of the 19th century. In the face of British withdraw from the colonies, local leaders had to act to bolster defences. The 1855 Militia Act of the Province of Canada established the concept of a volunteer militia force of 5000, as well as a small voluntary regular force. After Confederation, in 1868, a new Militia Act authorized 40,000 volunteers, in part a response to the 1866 Fenian Raids. The 1885 Northwest Rebellion, the second of such since Confederation, was put down by a force of almost 5,000, thus providing an opportunity for the Militia’s reputation to be enhanced, glossing over shortcomings. The Militia thereafter deteriorated until around the turn of the century, when it was reformed and expanded. The regular army was still supposed to train the militia. Both militiamen and regulars served in the Boer War.

When World War I began, Minister of Militia Sam Hughes (no fan of the regular force) ignored established mobilization plans, and instead telegrammed Militia unit commanders directly, asking them to recruit suitable volunteers for the establishment of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). The recruits that arrived for training at Valcartier Quebec had no official links with Militia units and were organized into numbered battalions. Some Militia units were called to guard vulnerable sites like grain elevators, bridges, and dry docks against sabotage. Their best recruits were assigned to service with the CEF.
Sir W.D. Otter was appointed to head a committee responsible for examining Canada’s post-war Militia requirements. Generals A. MacDonnell, A.G.L. McNaughton, and E.A. Cruikshank joined him on that committee. It was hoped that the CEF units that served at the front during the war could be incorporated into the Militia and a perpetuation system was established whereby CEF units were linked with Militia units. This system appealed to public sentiment and was valuable as a recruiting tool. The 1922 National Defence Act united the Department of Militia and Defence, the Department of Naval Service, and the Air Board under a single Minister of National Defence. Lack of funding and public interest led to a decline in the Militia. The severe depression of the 1930s erased any minor gains in military spending that had occurred in 1928 and 1929. Drastic cuts were made to the navy and air force while the permanent force and the Militia remained relatively unscathed. They were maintained largely as a protection against riots and disorder. The Militia did undergo some reorganization, however, as some regiments were amalgamated and others were converted to alternative arms as required. A mobilization scheme was also developed to provide for a two division expeditionary force.

Canada entered World War II on 10 September 1939. On 1 September, a General Order by the Department of National Defence had authorized the organization of a “Canadian Active Service Force”. Unlike the First World War, the force was rooted in the Militia organization and the units retained the names, badges and battle honours of the existing Militia regiments. The Militia regiments formed the backbone of the Canadian Army during the war.
At the end of the Second World War, Canada's overall strategic concept was based on mobilization.\textsuperscript{22} The three services maintained cadre forces to allow for the rapid expansion of the Militia, Naval Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force in the event of war. Ships and aircraft were mothballed, while the resources for several divisions were stored at various sites throughout the country. The mobilization plan called for the activation of an army roughly the same size and shape as the 1\textsuperscript{st} Canadian Army deployed in northwest Europe in 1944-45. Several factors prevented the Militia from maintaining the numbers necessary for such mobilization in peacetime, largely driven by the high employment rates in the post-war boom years.

The Cold War developed to the point where Canadian forces were required to respond to alliance activities. However, the single regular brigade group in Canada, which by this time had the dual role of handling continental and homeland defence, could not be deployed since it was already over committed. For the Korean War, a two brigade-group force was raised off the streets using the legal term 'Special Force' since this was supposed to be a limited engagement for this particular operation. One brigade group acted as a manpower pool while the other, 25 Brigade, deployed to Korea. 25 Brigade was a mixture of regular Army personnel, demobilized Second World War veterans, Militia personnel, and men who had been too young to fight in that war. Militia personnel had to take leave from their units and sign up as part of the Special Force. No formed Militia units or sub units were deployed as part of 25 Brigade.

During the early stages of the Korean conflict, which lasted from 1950-1953, the Government also deployed forces to Western Europe to meet its NATO commitment.

\textsuperscript{22} I have used much of the text from the Fraser Report for the Canadian background (Hon. John A. Fraser, \textit{In Service of the Nation: Canada's Army Reserves for the 21st Century} a report presented to the Minister of National Defence, the Hon. Art Eggleton, May 2000).
This new type of war that was dissimilar to the Second World War. The Cold War called for maintaining forces in being to deter enemy action and then hold ground until forces could be mobilized. Since the Canada-based brigade group was dual-rolled as a training and continental defence force and 25 Brigade was in Korea, forces would have to come from some other source. The problems with raising, training and deploying 25 Brigade were manifest, so Army HQ decided to create a total force brigade group for the NATO commitment. The line units of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group consisted of composite Militia units with regular force augmentation.

The Army was completely re-organized in 1954: all four brigade groups reverted to regular force formations and the Militia and Special Force personnel were allowed to sign up. Reserve restructure was not far from the minds of Army leadership. The so-called Kennedy and Anderson reports resulted, but were overshadowed and dismissed by John Diefenbaker’s election victory in 1957, when Major-General George Pearkes took on the job of Minister of National Defence.

Pearkes had for some time strongly favoured a civil defence role for the Militia, a role that had been in the hands of the Ministry of Health and Welfare since 1951. It appeared to be an opportune time for new ideas, because the enemy’s deployment of a thermonuclear capability and the means to drop it on North America generated an even greater shift in emphasis toward continental defence. The air defence system absorbed the bulk of the defence budget. Projects like the AVRO Arrow, BOMARC, and the sensor systems in the North took absolute priority. Consequently, more and more money was drained from supporting reserve forces. Mobilization was now considered a dead issue since there would not be enough time to mobilize during a nuclear war. In
that context, in 1959, the Diefenbaker Government assigned the role of civil defence and "national survival" duties to the Militia, mainly among the combat arms units. The Militia was converted to a National Survival rescue force and many units lost their heavy weapons and armoured vehicles. Some Militia units, however, retained their war-fighting capability. Some of the resentment remains within the larger Militia community today.

More studies followed the election of the Liberal Government in 1963, including the defence reorganization that resulted in the unification of the armed services. Following another (Brigadier E.R. Suttie's) report on Militia restructure and internal Army studies in 1964, armouries were closed and Militia command structure was absorbed by the Regular Army. The Militia faced serious attrition as a result, dropping from 46,763 in 1964 to 19,855 in 1970.

When NATO strategy shifted away from immediate nuclear weapons use towards a flexible response strategy in the late 1960s, NATO members were encouraged to improve the readiness and capabilities of their conventional forces. Forces in being were still important but mobilization for a long war increased in importance. The formal adoption of Total Force as part of Canada's defence policy in the 1987 White Paper held for many the dawning of a new age in the status of the Reserves in Canada. As the Cold War ended, however, that document would have a short life.

Throughout the 1990s, several reports on the reserves appeared. In 1992, an Auditor-General’s Report urged improvements in Canada’s reserve force. The 1994 White Paper formed the basis for reserve restructuring. The policy of requiring the CF to deliver “combat capable, multi-purpose” capability was confirmed. It recommended
rejuvenated Reserves with a force structure of 23,000 (and later raised to 30,000) as well as a four-stage mobilization concept. It also contemplated more service support roles for the Reserves. In 1995, the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) stated that, while the mobilization concept introduced in the 1994 White Paper was appropriate, it failed to recognize the fundamental role of the Reserves, namely to provide a mobilization base for war. The peacetime Militia therefore needs to be organized and trained to augment the regulars, and it also needs to be capable of expansion to meet mobilization needs. Thus, the SCRR argued, the formation of a corps should be the base of mobilization. Several internal Army and DND initiatives were still-born, largely because the politics of the day required more alignment between the DND objectives and those of the broader reserves community. As a result, In Service to the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century, (the so-called Fraser Report to the Minister), said that the only way to move ahead would be to differentiate between who decides what. Certain things, like strength and, indeed, the very existence of an army reserve were public policy matters; how the reserves are used and organized should be a chain-of command area. In other words, acknowledge the politics of the situation and work with it. Based on the Fraser Report, late in 2000, the Government released a policy statement on LFRR using that distinction.

That brings me back to what’s known as the Militia Myth. Much is made in Canada about the Militia Myth of the War of 1812, ascribing to it a ‘defence on the cheap’ rationale for Canadian governments ever since. It essentially holds that the militia, and not the professional British soldier, saved Canada from the Americans. Hyperbole aside, the myth was very much a deliberate creation, and, I would argue, had

23 Government of Canada Policy Statement Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR), October 2000
more to do with Upper Canadian propaganda of the heroic defence of the homeland than a slight against professional soldiers. And it was not anti-British, but rather 'locally' (or Upper Canadian) British! I point this out mainly because there is always much discussion in Canada (and this is not unique) that politics and military requirements have to be separated. Surely that is a futile discussion.

**THE FUTURE IS NOW, I’M AFRAID**

So this brings us up to the time when the ABCA countries were thinking seriously about how to deal militarily with the post Cold War period, pre- 9/11. Already, the evolution toward expeditionary forces was evident before that event. So, on the question of reserve forces and how they are to be used, the ‘future’ looks pretty much the same to me as it did five or six years ago. I see no let up in the ‘operational tempo’ all four armies have dealt with over the past few years. The 1990s were not an intermission from Cold War, where armies could retreat to garrison and gear up for the next ‘big one’. Threats constantly, and quickly arise, regional instability has to be contained (i.e. Balkans), and the transformation of military forces continues in step. Combat is now described with new jargon, such as network-centric warfare, the RMA, effects-based operations, etc. are all heady phrases and, contrary to what many might like to believe, they do have meaning, despite the painfully annoying jargon. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are proof of that. US and coalition forces have proven they can quickly defeat enemies, institute regime change and do so in an ever-increasing ‘precise’ way. Post combat challenges are a different story – but that’s another paper.
It seems to me, though, that extended discussions about what proper roles the reserves play or could play in supporting the military objectives of their respective countries is secondary to appreciating fully how 9/11 has laid to waste any notions that first, there are no serious threats to the West and, second, that military force has no legitimate role in a post-modern, post Cold War security environment. That, simply, is why our armies are not going to be able to retreat to garrison any time soon. As British PM Tony Blair said in a speech earlier this month, “9/11 did not create the threat posed by Saddam Hussein but altered critically the balance of risks on whether to deal with it or not. (Blair) is not prepared to run that risk.” As a result, the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 remains the broad basis of British defence policy because it marked the move toward developing expeditionary forces to meet threats before they reach the UK.

TA restructure was intended to support that new doctrine. The numbers were decreased (but not as much as intended – 40000 rather than 25000), but personnel management structures were put in place, and a mobilization center at Chilwell was established to help in the working up of individual reservists for deployment. The Reserve Forces Act of 1996 allows for the greater use of reservists by providing for job protection legislation and top-up money for shortfalls in income upon call –out. The SDR also introduced a category of ‘sponsored’ reserve who, under arrangement between employers and the MOD, would be liable for call out as reservists. The RFA of 1996 has recently been scrutinized in the media because of it stipulation that retired service personnel be kept on the books for callouts for 18 years. That has now happened, and some call it a form of conscription; a term that does not sit well with Britons… conscription was gone in the 1960s while continental Europe is still dealing with it, and
some countries still have it! Nonetheless, the SDR New Chapter in 2002 made specific provision for Reserves involvement in homeland defence. Civil agencies and the police have the lead as ‘first responders’, but reserve capabilities identified as complementary are command and control, communications and reaction forces that could deploy rapidly when needed.

The 2000 White Paper in Australia also called for increased use of reserves. Legislation in Australia has lifted the constraints on calling out reserves for anything but the defence of Australia, and also provides for job protection and financial liability protection. In the summer of 2003, Australia introduced a Reserve Response Force, formed to ‘complement and enhance existing ADF and civilian domestic security capabilities’, to be comprised of about 150 deployable personnel in each of Army’s Reserve Brigades and within 1 Commando Regiment. And Reservists have indeed been used: over 1000 volunteer reservists served in East Timor since peacekeepers deployed there in 1999, more than the total number of reservists used full-time between 1945 and 1999, and included a rifle company, the first time a unit of reserve soldiers deployed since WW2. Roles now include reinforcement (augmentation); round out (for low intensity combat) and rotation/sustainment, in addition to the traditional mobilization base. For the RRF’s counter-terrorist role, tasks will include cordon and search, protection of fixed assets, bomb searches and the like.

I’m going to leave out Canada and defer to those here that will speak on this subject. Except to say, that is, that the much talked about ‘footprint in the community’ of the Army Reserves is a natural fit for a homeland defence role. In the same way that reserve forces were disparaged at the expense of regular ‘forces in being’ during the
Cold War, when it comes to homeland defence, the reserves, by nature of their presence, are a ‘force in being’. Does it require restructure? I don’t know. But we should be careful about what to label ‘anachronistic capabilities’ and force structures: the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq proved that a very difficult judgement to make.

Finally, I’ll offer some thoughts on the United States. There has been so much going on in the US armed forces since the end of the Cold War that it seems inadequate just to touch on it briefly. The reserve and Guard components have certainly been dealing with the issue of OPTEMPO as much as their regular counterparts. I will not go into detail, there are other here involved in this that no doubt will. However, I do want to point out that when Creighton Abrams said bringing the reserves to war brings the nation to war, it is clear now that he got his wish. The US Army has relied heavily on mobilization for the war on terrorism and, again, it is difficult to see it letting up. The USAR supports the Army in a number of important functions, and the Guard has, I think, almost 50% of the Army’s combat power.

The Guard has been restructuring toward being a lighter force since about 1998, and it no doubt takes the matter of transformation as seriously as the active component. Concepts of mobile light brigades and multi-function divisions are part of the ANG Restructuring Initiative. Proposals have been made to ‘dual mission’ units for missions abroad and for homeland defence and in 1999 Congress approved 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams to assist first responders. There are now well over 30 of these Teams. Guardsmen and reservists were deployed at key civilian and military installations after 9/11, and Guardsmen figure prominently in US NORTHCOM, formed in 2002 with the dual mission of conducting operations to deter and prevent
threats against the US and provide military assistance to civil authorities. There has been much discussion of the military’s role in domestic law enforcement, given the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, passed in response to abuses by federal troops in the South after the Civil War. This is usually interpreted as a ban on searching, arresting and spying on US civilians by US troops. Like any law, though, there are interpretations to be made.

Some have argued that the Guard in particular should be reconstituted as a ‘militia’ for homeland defence. The argument is that the guard is too committed to federal missions abroad to be prepared for its state mission at home. I disagree with this as a characterization of homeland defence that is, if not utterly false, at least outdated. After all, President Bush launched Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom as part of the homeland defence mission. In the war on terrorism, operations abroad are part of the forward defence ‘strategy of influence’, if you will, demanded by the National Security Strategy of the US. To be sure, as the Quadrennial Defense Review noted in 2001, the US had to improve the coordination of responses to attacks after they hit… thus the new Homeland Security operation. However, to deter forward is to stop attacks before they happen. The Guard and Reserve are amply involved in that. Incidentally, the UK in the SDR new chapter said pretty much the same thing, and Australian Prime Minister John Howard has defended the notion of preemptive strikes when circumstances merit. This is the new security environment, and it will be with us for the foreseeable future. Thus, there will not be the luxury for reserve forces of picking and choosing their roles. ‘Stay at home’ Homeland Defence should and cannot be the only role for any of the ABCA reserve armies/militias. The current security environment does not allow for mutually exclusive homeland defence and expeditionary armies.