

NEW REGIMENTS, NEW SPECIALIST CORPS, AND A NEW GENERAL STAFF

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Transforming Army Culture

Many analysts assume Western Armies are in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs that primarily concerns doctrine and technology.² There is a compelling argument, however, that military culture determines the pace and success of army transformation.³ This paper proposes a new force structure, personnel strategy, and governance system to initiate Army cultural transformation. These changes should provide the culture necessary for continuous, evolutionary innovation of doctrine and technology. The argument is relevant to other branches of service and other militaries, although the discussion focuses primarily on the Canadian Army.

The proposed reforms draw upon the traditional sources of Anglo-Western⁴ military strength - *cohesion, discipline, organization and professionalism*.⁵ These strengths arise from deep-seated civilizational social habits - *social capital, societal discipline, modern bureaucracy and innovation*. *Social capital* is the quality of human relationships that generate the trust and

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² Hans Binnendijk, ed., *Transforming America's Military* (Washington: National Defence University Press, 2002); Robert L. Bateman, ed., *Digital War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999).

³ A.D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, Contract Report DCIEM No. CR 2001-047 for Defence R&D Canada, Toronto, ON, 2001; Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002); Donald Vandergriff, ed., *Spirit, Blood, and Treasure* (Novato: Presidio, 2001); Nick Jans and David Schmidtchen, *The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers & Climate, and how they affect capability* (ACT, Australia: Australian National University, 2002).

⁴ The paper uses the terms Western and Anglo-Western selectively to contrast historic similarities within Western civilization with the growing gap described in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996). The difference in geopolitical and military opinion and behaviour has markedly increased since asymmetric warfare involving Anglo-Western states became more pronounced with the attacks of September 11, 2001.

⁵ For a more detailed argument, see Harry J. Bondy, "Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West," *Armed Forces & Society* 31(1), November 2004.

generalized reciprocity⁶ necessary for modern, large-scale military forces, corporations, and market-oriented, democratic societies. Individuals develop reputations for reliability within stable communities to stretch short-term, self-interest into longer-term, delayed gratification.⁷ Large-scale social capital correlates closely to the trust and cooperation underlying *social cohesion* and *task cohesion* in military units.⁸ Cohesion strengthens primary group morale and combat effectiveness.⁹ *Social capital* and military *cohesion* depend on stable relationships, informal, communication “loops,” and realistic, repetitive training. This paper proposes the creation of the New Regiment to build on these sources of Anglo-Western military strength.¹⁰

The great expansion of Western military and civil institutions in the modern period was made possible because of an increase in *societal discipline*. The bureaucratization of traditional professions and the new social and human science professions greatly increased the range and effectiveness of acculturation for armies as well as large-scale civilian organizations and even the national population as a whole. The new professions and the state promoted norms and efficiently enforced behaviour that favoured health, education, crime reduction, rehabilitation, employment and even careers.¹¹ In Western armies, traditional military discipline was strongly reinforced by new personnel strategies surrounding promotions, postings, perstempo, and other conditions of service.¹² To increase the effects of modern societal discipline in the military, this

⁶ James Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” *American Journal of Sociology* 1(s), 1998: 95-101; Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Francis Fukuyama, *Trust* (New York: Free Press, 1995); Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*.

⁷ Ian Maitland, “Virtuous Markets: The Market as School of the Virtues,” *Business Ethics Quarterly* 7(1), (1997): 17-31.

⁸ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*; Hagen, U. v., “Social Capital – the Currency of the Armed Forces,” for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Canada, Kingston, ON, 26-27 October 2002; Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic Imperative,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle, PA. 11-12, (for copies of USAWC papers call (717) 245-4133 or email Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil).

⁹ Kelly Farley, “A Model of Unit Climate and Stress for Canadian Soldiers on Operations” PhD diss., Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, 2002, 6-10; David Segal and Meyer Kestnbaum, “Professional Closure in the Military Labor Market: A Critique of Pure Cohesion,” in *Army Profession* ed. Snider and Watkins.

¹⁰ Joseph Collins and T.O. Jacobs, “Trust in the Profession of Arms,” in *Army Profession* ed. Snider and Watkins, 39; Jonathan Shay, “Trust: Touchstone for a Practical Military Ethos,” in *Spirit* ed. Vandergriff; Jones, “Effective Command Climate.”

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. by Alan Sheridan, (Vintage Books: New York, 1995); Mike Gane, ed., *Towards a Critique of Foucault* (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1996); David Hoy, ed., *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

¹² William Bell, “Personnel Policies and Army Culture,” in *Spirit*, ed. Vandergriff.

paper proposes concentrating and amplifying the effect through the creation of a new personnel strategy applied by a series of New Specialist Corps.

At the same time, officers and soldiers are conditioned to accept non-traditional military norms by centralized, functional specialization and selection that emphasize competition, individual replacements, and the generalist, career model. Modern management techniques do not always build good social capital and discipline. Research has shown that individual performance appraisal and selection systems, for example, are inaccurate, unscientific, and prone to sub-group subversion.¹³ More than half of any rating variance is due to “idiosyncratic rater effects”¹⁴ such as how much the rater likes the ratee; whether they have similar personalities; their views on performance; stereotypes on gender, race and ethnicity; self-interest; sub-group factional interests; and variations in work context, which are significant in the military. Most importantly, centralized transfer and promotion queues lead to frequent, expensive postings that reduce social capital, erode trust, and add to careerist credentialism. The annual promotion “tournament”¹⁵ shifts people between units, as if robbing Peter to pay Paul, primarily to reward the winners. This does little to improve team performance because individuals do not have a measurable effect on productivity.¹⁶ Legitimacy and commitment suffer because almost everyone not promoted to senior officer and non-commissioned member rank in Canada is dissatisfied with the current system.¹⁷ Those who are promoted and in control

¹³ Harry Bondy, “Toward a Postmodern Transformation in Military Culture: Selection, Personality Type and Culture,” IUS Biennial Symposium on Armed Forces & Society, 25-26 October 2003, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Ill., U.S.A., at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ius/>; T. Coens and M. Jenkins, *Abolishing Performance Appraisals: Why They Backfire and What To Do Instead* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000); Joel Lefkowitz, “The Role of Interpersonal Affective Regard in Supervisory Performance Ratings: A Literature Review and Proposed Causal Model,” *Journal of Occupational Psychology* 73(1), March 2000: 67-86; K.R. Murphy and J.N. Cleveland, *Understanding Performance Appraisal: Social, Organizational, and Goal-based Perspectives* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995).

¹⁴ S.E. Scullen, M.K. Mount and M. Goff, “Understanding the Latent Structure of Job Performance Ratings,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 2000, 85(6): 956-970.

¹⁵ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*, 82.

¹⁶ Coens and Jenkins, *Abolishing Performance Appraisal*; Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*.

¹⁷ Craig Dowden, *Quality of Life in the Canadian Forces, Results from the National Survey, Sponsor Research Report 01-13*, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, October 2001, accessed September 23, 2004, at http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/gol/pdf/01_13_e.pdf; M. Le Beau, *Land Staff Survey 2002*, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, 2002.

dismiss the dissatisfaction as “sour grapes.” The new personnel strategy and the New Specialist Corps would also control for these unintended, negative effects of modern management practice.

Although a source of great productivity, *modern bureaucracy* as a decision-making methodology tends to repeat the same solutions, react late under pressure, and remain tied to narrow goals of cost reduction and incremental productivity.¹⁸ Military analysts warn that excessive modern bureaucracy inhibits innovation and other changes necessary to evolve with the host society.¹⁹ Modern bureaucracy has difficulty accommodating other philosophies, such as the professional military ethos. In particular, institutional issues surrounding professional expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy fall outside the decision making routine of military bureaucracy.²⁰ Professional *innovation*, accordingly, should make these embedded modernist assumptions accessible for analysis and reform. Colonel (USA) Papparone argues that postmodernism can help military professionals to think outside the orthodox, modernist box.²¹ Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General(USA ret) Sullivan, and Colonel (USA ret) Harper, his chief strategic planning officer, recommend “in-depth, serious thinking by a leader and his or her team – that results in the creation of an intellectual framework for the future.”²² Their advice “*not to be surprised to be surprised... when the unexpected occurs...*”²³ may resemble a Yogi-ism,²⁴ but aptly describes postmodern innovation crucial for military professionalism and cultural

¹⁸ Foucault, *Discipline*; Gane, ed., *Critique of Foucault*; Hoy, ed., *Critical Reader*; Gibson Burrell and Robert Cooper in *Organization Studies* 9(1) 1988, 9(2) 1998, and 10(4) 1989; Kenneth Gergen and Tojo Thatchenkery, “Organization Science as Social Construction: Postmodern Potentials,” *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 1996, 32(4): 356-377.

¹⁹ Gregg F. Martin and Jeffrey D. McCausland, “The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession,” and Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, “Project conclusions,” both in *Army Profession* ed. Snider and Watkins; Donald E. Vandergriff, *The Path to Victory: America’s Army and Revolution in Human Affairs* (Novato: Presidio, 2002).

²⁰ Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory of Professions,” in *Army Profession*, ed. Snider and Watkins, 530-531; Richard A. Laquement, “Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdictions,” USAWC, October 2003.

²¹ Christopher R. Papparone, “Deconstructing Army Leadership,” *Military Review* 84(1) (Jan-Feb) 2004:2-10.

²² Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper, *Hope is not a Method* (New York: Random House, 1996), 237.

²³ *Ibid*, 238, (emphasis theirs).

²⁴ A homespun, guileless but pithy aphorism characteristic of U.S. professional baseball player and manager Lawrence “Yogi” Berra, born 1925, <http://www.yogi-berra.com/yogiisms.html>.

transformation. This paper proposes the creation of a New General Staff to balance productive bureaucracy with professional adaptability and shape Army culture to suit the environment.

To understand who can belong to the profession and who can build the profession, this paper uses the four categories of professional and psychological maturity developed by Forsythe, Snook, Lewis and Bartone.²⁵ These categories can help place officers and soldiers into one of four roles necessary for an Army to balance operational effectiveness and professional institution building. Stage One officers and soldiers follow rules, accept standard military roles and adhere to rudimentary social virtues, such as the ability to delay gratification. Their identity and self-interest depend on the opportunity to continuously act-out a military role, such as the warrior persona, and to practice traditional military skills, such as parachuting or crewing their weapon system. Because they usually resist change and are prone to exclusion and factionalism, those in stage one are *not yet members of the profession*. Stage Two individuals become genuine team players, motivated by cultural assumptions beyond rudimentary social virtues, such as traditional military ‘values’ of reliability, honesty, and duty. Their professional identity is more internalized and somewhat less dependent on acting-out their preferred military roles. Soldiers and officers in Stage Two still resist innovation affecting traditional values, however, and *are limited members of the military profession*. Stage Three officers and soldiers achieve greater psychological autonomy and flexibility toward military cultural assumptions. They adhere to traditional norms, but with a self-awareness and personal responsibility to conform or innovate depending on the environment. Stage Three personnel are sufficiently mature, psychologically and emotionally, to participate in the transformation of military culture, doctrine and technology. Thus, they *are true professionals*.²⁶ Stage Four individuals go further by recognizing that cultural norms and narratives are social constructs that might be adaptive or non-adaptive. They understand that professional self-identity is fluid and

are free to shape Army culture, doctrine and technology to suit its military and social environment.²⁷ Instead of just being military professionals, they can *lead the military profession*. The force structure and personnel strategy proposed here aims to stream personnel into four main defence roles according to their level of professional maturity.

Dark side social capital, finally, leads to counter-productive trust and cooperation among self-interested sub-groups.²⁸ Any large organization, but especially Armies where trust is essential, must control for self-interest and shirking within the principal/agent/subordinate relationship.²⁹ Unfortunately, there is much room for improvement on this issue in Anglo-Western defence systems. Examples include unsustainable personnel tempo, politicized equipment acquisition, service and branch factionalism, careerism, and reduced retention and commitment.³⁰ A new governance system is required to control for dark side social capital.

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Army have taken contrasting approaches to the issue of cultural transformation. The mandate for most of the policy decisions that affect culture rests with the centralized, departmental military human resources bureaucracy. Influenced by its strong, modernist management science culture, the department aims for incremental process changes to its human resource processes and policies. For example, the department has recently adjusted the entry gates and performance specifications for the training periods in its tri-service professional development system. It has also replaced the Military Occupation Coding (MOC) system with a re-tailored Military Occupation Structure

²⁵ George B. Forsythe, Scott Snook, Philip Lewis and Paul T. Bartone, "Making Sense of Officership: Developing a Professional Identity for 21st Century Army Officers," in *Army Profession* ed. Snider and Watkins.

²⁶ Ibid, 366-369

²⁷ Ibid, 366-369.

²⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, "le capital social: notes provisoires," *Actes de la Recherche en sciences sociales* January 1980.

²⁹ Peter D. Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 1998, 24(3): 407-434; Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*.

³⁰ Collins and Jacobs, "Trust"; Jones, "Improving Accountability"; Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*; English, *A Canadian Perspective*.

Identification System (MOSID).³¹ The Canadian Defence Academy, similarly, takes a limited approach to military culture as exemplified by their capstone publication *Duty With Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*.³² The manual takes a traditionally Anglo-Western approach to military ethos by focusing on espoused moral code³³ and asserting juridic legitimacy³⁴ from the Canadian constitution.³⁵ There are no references to practical means of acculturation, especially to the most important normalization tool in our culture, the promotion and selection system. Rather than substantive reform, senior departmental officials turn instead to “proof is in the pudding,”³⁶ performativity.³⁷ They point to deployment rotations that leave and return and an

³¹ Internal DND memo file number 5555-130-0 (MOSART 2) 25 August 2004. MOSART stands for Military Occupation Analysis, Review and Tailoring, a project whose very mandate allows only minor “tailoring.”

³² *Duty with Honour, The Profession of Arms in Canada*, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Kingston Ontario, Canada, 2003, accessed July 7, 2004, at <http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca>.

³³ writing on the Anglo-Western ethos usually goes no further than espoused moral codes, as discussed in David Ingram, “Introduction,” in *The Political*, ed. David Ingram, (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 2-3. The moral code in *Duty with Honour* is similar to Anglo-Western army codes of recent history based on that of the Victorian gentlemen, as described in Steven Harris, “Leadership in the Canadian Army: An Impressionistic Survey” presented at the Canadian Army Leadership in the 21st Century Seminar, Kingston, Ontario, February 6-7, 2002, accessed September 24, 2004, at http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/CLS/143000440000841/ARMY_FUTURES_SEMINAR.PDF.

³⁴ For a critique of juridic legitimacy, see Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*” *Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-76*, tr. D. Macey, English series ed. Arnold Davidson, (New York: Picador, 2003). The Canadian Defence Academy does not attempt to establish legitimacy according to alternatives, such as efficiency, self-interest, logic, morality, spirituality, and so forth.

³⁵ For a critique of the logical contradictions arising from national constitutional documents in the West, see Jean-François Lyotard, “Memorandum on Legitimation,” in *The Political*. In addition, the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, negotiated by political insiders in secret, finally conferred full independence from the UK quite late in Canada’s history. Nevertheless, the Canadian constitution is a series of documents that bear little resemblance to the real government operating principles, which are primarily unspoken conventions. It has not been signed by successive elected governments of the Province of Quebec, (whose legislature declares the Constitution Act of 1982 to be illegitimate), by representatives of Aboriginal Nations, and has not been ratified by popular referendum or by other forms of democratic voice. The Constitutional Amendment Proclamation of 1983 requires that representatives of Canada’s Aboriginal Nations be invited as observers but not participants to future constitutional conferences. Attempts to include those parties or hold referendums have failed, (five constitutional conferences in public and private 1968-1980, Constitution Act in 1982, Meech Lake Accords in 1987-1990, and the Charlottetown Accords in 1992). See and the documents themselves and James Ross Hurley, “The Canadian Constitutional Debate,” Canadian Privy Council Office, Intergovernmental Affairs website, accessed September 23, 2004, at <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp?Language=E&Page=consfile&Sub=Theconstitutionaldebate>.

³⁶ For example, Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Ray Hénault was quoted as follows, “We are trying to make it better. The proof of the pudding is what you can do today, and we are always able to respond to calls from government for international operations and domestic requirements” in “Airman At The Top,” by Ray Dick, in *Legion Magazine* (March/April 2002). The folk saying and value judgement “the proof is in the pudding” has also been used frequently by former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Defence Ministers A. Eggleton and J. McCallum, regarding defence policy, and, notoriously, by Mr. Charles Guité, a senior government official, to justify breaking public fund spending rules to wage a political “war” against separatism, (*Standing Committee on Public Accounts*, Committee Evidence No. 64, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada, July 9, 2004, accessed September 10, 2004, at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/PubDocument.asp?Language=E&DocumentID=1287271>).

³⁷ For a critique of performativity, see Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, tr. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1984): 41-47.

absence of scandals in the headlines³⁸ in the immediate past.³⁹ Army officials, with little control over the transactions and personnel policies that form the core of its culture, are concerned over the results of cultural climate surveys⁴⁰ of its personnel. They point to significant, long-term cultural problems, as mentioned above, that affect cohesion, discipline, organization and professionalism.

The argument for army transformation, of course, goes beyond culture to include issues of strategic force employment and tactical flexibility. As mentioned above, cultural assumptions also affect attitudes toward and willingness to change strategy and tactics. Culture in this sense includes political preferences, branch and service loyalties, and a belief in modernism that biases interpretations of history and even recent operations. Selective or simplistic conclusions drawn from strategic and tactical “lessons-learned” is itself a worthy subject of study.⁴¹ This paper attempts to recommend reforms consistent with the post-WWII deployment history of Canada,⁴² recent UK Army reforms intended to provide brigades with “integral enablers and logistics,”⁴³ and a wealth of analysis in the U.S. including a recent comprehensive review of U.S. Army brigades that incorporates lessons learned from the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁴ All point toward an all-arms battle group with integral logistics and administration of about brigade size. The force structure reforms proposed here follows on this research and development.

³⁸ The scandals in the headlines heuristic is commonly referred to as the Globe and Mail test.

³⁹ a Canadian military culture “expert” recently stated this opinion to the author in a written review of a draft of this article.

⁴⁰ Dowden, *Sponsor Research Report 01-13*; Le Beau, *Land Staff Survey 2002*; “Focus on Ethics” internal focus group survey completed in the Army during 2003 as part of the Department Ethics Program (DEP), Chief of Review Services, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. DEP is expected to release a report to the public in the fall of 2004; J. Peter Bradley, Danielle Charbonneau, John Johnston, Sarah K. Campbell, and B. Bhattacharjee, “Army Culture Survey 2004 Results,” Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, June 24, 2004, abstract accessed September 23, 2004, at www.rmc.ca/academic/conference/iuscanada/papers/bradley_army_culture.doc.

⁴¹ It was the subject of the 25th Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Military History Symposium held at RMC, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, March 20-21, 2003.

⁴² For a more detailed argument, see the introduction to Harry J. Bondy, “The New Regimental System,” *Canadian Army Journal* 7(1), Spring 2004: 76-85.

⁴³ “Delivering Security in a Changing World,” Defence Command Paper CM 6269, Chapter 2, UK Ministry of Defence, accessed September 21, 2004, at <http://www.mod.uk/issues/security/cm6269/chapter2.htm>.

⁴⁴ Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx* (New York: Praeger, 1997); Richard D. Hooker Jr., ed. *Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology* (Novato: Presidio, 1993); John J. McGrath, *The Brigade: A History- Its Organization and Employment in the US Army* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004): 103-130.

Canada's Department of National Defence, however, has followed a modernist bias that attempts to derive future force generation and employment plans from eleven task oriented scenarios.⁴⁵ The Canadian Army Force Employment Concept, in contrast, more uses military capabilities,⁴⁶ which should lead to greater force employment flexibility than scenarios. The Army concept, unfortunately, places too much emphasis on high technology network centric fire and movement, as did the U.S. prior to Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁷ Whatever the emphasis, the capability approach to employment and structure both permits and requires Army cultural transformation consonant with the source of Anglo-Western military strength as argued above.

Organizational change experts advise that the reform of ingrained problems in mature institutions require an abrupt change to organizational design, management processes and personnel.⁴⁸ Meese argues that armies change more quickly and thoroughly if reform is based on known and proven military concepts.⁴⁹ Thus, this paper will refer to elements of the pre-WW II, Prussian-German military, a rich source of army transformation ideas.⁵⁰ While the French military made many rational changes to "make yesterday perfect," Germany had to go beyond the "epitome" of mid-twentieth century "modern" warfare.⁵¹ They countered the industrial advantage of their opponents by combining the tactics of the *Jäger* light infantry, the theatre operations approach of the *Kriegsakademie*, and newly evolving offensive technologies.⁵² The comparison of lessons-learned from the same war fought by France and Germany adds additional complexity to that subject and points to another caution for the Anglo-West.

⁴⁵ Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, website, accessed September 21, 2004, at http://vcds.mil.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen/intro_e.asp.

⁴⁶ such as command, sense, act, shield and sustain as explained in *The Force Employment Concept for the Army*, issued March 31, 2004, accessed September 21, 2004, at http://fdts.army.mil.ca/ael/pubs/reference/fe_concepts_eng.pdf.

⁴⁷ McGrath, *The Brigade*, 103-139.

⁴⁸ Michael Gould, "Strategic Leadership and Organizational Change: Challenges in Army Transformation," U.S. Army War College paper, USAWC, Carlisle, PA, 10 April 2002; John Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 145; Schein, *Culture*.

⁴⁹ Michael Meese, "Institutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Institutional Change," in *Maneuver Warfare*, 201-202.

⁵⁰ Douglas A. Macgregor, "Transformation and the Illusion of Change," in *Spirit*, ed. Vandergriff, 284.

⁵¹ Sullivan and Harper, *Hope is not a Method*, 33.

⁵² Hooker, ed., *Maneuver*; Macgregor, *Phalanx*.

Transformation has normally been quicker and more complete for defeated armies “unfettered by the legacy of recent victory.”⁵³ Ultimately, the goal should not be to duplicate a specific doctrine or historical period, whether of a victorious or defeated army. Military history is a complex cultural analysis on building a professional, innovative institution that suits an evolving geopolitical environment.⁵⁴

The following introduces a new army force structure formed on a New Regiment, a series of New Specialist Corps, a New General Staff, and a civilian bureaucracy. More importantly, it proposes a new personnel strategy and system of governance to shape our military culture for the post-Cold War era.

The New Regiment

The New Regiment is a single, combined arms, brigade-sized battle group, including logistics and administration. Sub-units vary in size from battalions to sections customized for specific tasks, training, and detachments. If there is a multi-year requirement to provide an all-arms, self-supporting battalion-sized peacekeeping contingent, for example, a group this size remains intact for as long as possible. Concurrently, company-sized battle groups or section-sized building blocks remain for minor deployments, contingencies, and small unit exchanges. Battle groups can also specialize as standing capabilities such as parachuting, UAV teams, and aid to the civil power. New Regiments provide personnel for national joint force formations and operational headquarters. They also provide the candidates for command up to the rank of Lieutenant General. A team of officers and soldiers, whatever the size or the task, is kept together as long as possible before re-grouping.

⁵³ Macgregor, *Phalanx*, 234. This comment applies to Anglo-Western triumphalism from the Cold War.

⁵⁴ For an example of military history analyzed as a contingent cultural phenomena see John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder: Westview, 2003).

Officers and soldiers “belong” exclusively to the New Regiment. Each Regiment is known by a single name, one set of insignia and regalia, and a unified history. New Regiment sub-groupings bear temporary names for a standing task or have generic indicators with no symbolic significance. There are no permanent units, branches, corps, occupations or other affiliations sub-dividing the regiment. There are no local or centralized entities based on tactical, functional or technological specializations, such as infantry, armour, artillery, engineering, signals, logistics, and so forth. The absence of competing affiliations reduces resistance to doctrinal and technological change arising from permanent, lionized units tied to an historic role or weapons system. The history of current and past units is preserved as factually as possible, but the names and insignia of the New Regiments avoid references to ethnicity, colonialism, and participation in unjust wars in favour of traditions that are uniquely Canadian.

Officers and soldiers spend their entire service life with the same New Regiment. They are recruited from the surrounding region to take advantage of existing social cohesion and reduce moves for personal reasons. Officers and soldiers do not follow the generalist’s route of rotating at regular intervals to accumulate credentials without fully mastering any role. The complexity and requirement for innovation is too great to continue with the industrial age, general manager approach. Personnel remain in key positions, especially command, far longer than is currently the case to allow enough time to learn, to perform at their optimum productivity, and still more to train successors and complete improvement projects.⁵⁵ New Regiment officers and soldiers do not take tours within the civilian bureaucracy or at higher, non-operational headquarters. Everyone in the New Regiment is deployable and civilians provide all non-deployable bureaucratic and technical support. Vacant positions and promotions are filled through internal competitions open only to members of the same New Regiment.

⁵⁵ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*, 81-104.

This stability enables everyone to master skills, tactics and theatre operations. It builds social and task cohesion and reduces sub-group exclusivity and factionalism. Trust among peers and the relationship between follower and leader solidify. Individuals make, lose and regain personal reputations within long-standing, intimate markets of reputation. Pay, benefits and terms of service are enhanced to compensate for the rigours of full deployability and include richer deployment allowances, limits on perstempo, guarantees for quality of life, and additional pension credits toward earlier retirement. There are no distinctions in conditions of service between executive category officers and others except for rank based, pay ranges. Thus, everyone in the New Regiment shares the same soldier's life.

In some ways, the New Regiment follows the tradition of the former German, hunter/woodsmen, light infantry *Jäger* units. Their expertise in tactics and the operational theatre evolved over time and included medium weight attacks, quick manoeuvre, patrolling, outpost policing, long-term occupations, and other basics of soldiering that resemble post-Cold War tasks. The New Regiment also adopts the rigorous thought process for tactics and theatre operations developed at von Moltke's *Kriegsakademie*.⁵⁶ This includes a culture of "independence of thought and freedom of decision" within a broad outline of a commander's objectives that the Germans called *Auftragstaktik*.⁵⁷ Now known as Mission Command,⁵⁸ it is a disciplined methodology for multi-purpose deployment and continuous innovation.

Most recruits in the New Regiment begin with the self-interested motivations and cultural assumptions of the host society, which is Stage One of psychological and professional maturity according to Forsythe, *et al.* Eventually, they are socialized into Stage Two to accept army "values" and better accept non-warrior roles. Their limited professional identity can be best managed within the New Regiment, where they can satisfy a basic need for uninterrupted service in the soldier's life of field training and operational deployment.

⁵⁶ Bruce Gudmundsson, "Maneuver Warfare: The German Tradition," in *Maneuver* ed. Hooker, 274-289.

U.S. Army analysts such as Vandergriff, Hooker, Macgregor, Kagan, and Laquement, along with former Chief of Staff General Shinseki have proposed forming units similar to the New Regiment. They want “unbreakable units” that implement lessons learned from U.S. cohesion experiments such as COHORT, General Gray’s efforts in the USMC; General Meyer’s and Lieutenant General Ulmer’s reforms at III Corps, Fort Hood; and other Inspector General and TRADOC projects.⁵⁹ Indeed, TRADOC’s White Paper on cultural innovation recommends brigade re-structuring as a way of “pulling” the U.S. Army toward a set of new behaviours.⁶⁰ The Australian Officer Professional Effectiveness Strategy, meanwhile, advocates similar specialization by military role and improvements to personnel stability.⁶¹

Macgregor describes how combined arms combat teams became smaller over the years as doctrine and technology improved. He argues that the battle group and combat team best exploits the flexibility and balance available from all-arms cooperation, improved information, and precision targeting.⁶² Long-standing, functionally specialized units, Macgregor maintains, became an anachronism as early as the end of WWII.⁶³ The mobilization of mass armies must finally give way to post-industrial flexibility suited for Post-Cold War security tasks.

New Specialist Corps

A series of New Specialist Corps are formed around traditional professions and the social and human sciences to acculturate, support and monitor the New Regiments. A separate New Specialist Corps exists for military law, chaplainry, complaints and inspection, personnel

⁵⁷ Franz Uhle-Wettler, “*Auftragstaktik*: Mission Orders and the German Experience,” in *Maneuver* ed. Hooker, 238-242, 244.

⁵⁸ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*, 114.

⁵⁹ Vandergriff, *Victory*; Don Vandergriff, “Culture Wars,” in *Digital War* ed. Bateman, 220-224; Richard D. Hooker Jr., “Implementing Maneuver Warfare,” in *Maneuver* ed. Hooker, 230-233.

⁶⁰ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “‘Adapt or Die’: The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army,” U.S. TRADOC Draft White Paper as of 1/9/2004 2:51 PM, 7.

⁶¹ “The Australian Officer Corps of the Future: The Officer Professional Effectiveness Strategy,” Project OPERA (Officer Professional Effectiveness Review for the Army), September 2000, accessed February 19, 2004, at www.army.gov.au/opera.html.

⁶² Macgregor, *Phalanx*, 86.

selection, social work, social science, counselling, family services, medical and dental care, bioengineering, and so forth. Although New Regiment commanders continue to discipline their troops in the traditional military sense, these Specialist Corps socialize troops via the techniques of modern bureaucracy that brought societal discipline to the West. In other words, New Specialist Corps observe, categorize, record, assess, reward, diagnose, treat, counsel, educate, indoctrinate, investigate, prosecute and punish. To improve social cohesion, for example, several Specialist Corps survey unit climate, indoctrinate officers and soldiers to accept gender and ethnic integration, and punish anti-social behaviour. Although these relatively new Western professions remain quasi-autonomous, they nevertheless follow a common modern philosophy. These New Specialist Corps, therefore, “discipline” the New Regiment from several angles with continuity, breadth and depth that are well ingrained in the West. The New Specialist Corps together shape the New Regiment’s culture into the soldier’s life of the *Jäger*.

New Specialist Corps use a separate rank structure and wear a uniform distinct from the New Regiment and New General Staff. Each adopts a unique hierarchy with or without insignia to mark professional standing and other gradations, such as medical assistant, nurse, surgeon, barrister, magistrate, monsignor, bishop, and imam. They avoid military terms for appointments, like commanding officer, in favour of existing, specialized titles such as commandant, superintendent, judge advocate general, chaplain general, and surgeon general. They develop customized compensation systems and terms of service to compete with their civilian counterparts and reinforce their unique professional identification. With the divergent ethos of these professions removed one-step from the New Regiment, the latter can embody the soldier’s life with greater force and continuity.

Specialist Corps do not include specialists related to combat, combat support, communications, logistics or similar types of administrative and technological expertise integral

⁶³ Macgregor, *Phalanx*, 53.

to field operations. Specialist Corps are restricted to the human and social sciences that shape the cultural assumptions and behaviour of the soldier. Specialists that apply technology and administration directly to tactics and theatre operations remain full members of the deployable New Regiment. By the same token, experts in military technology and administration who are not deployed become part of the civilian bureaucracy. New Specialist Corps that deploy with New Regiments, such as the medical corps, remain under the control of the New Regiment.

Personnel stream at mid-service life from New Regiments into New Specialist Corps to take advantage of accumulated military experience and reduce the size of the regular army officer corps at senior ranks. Specialist Corps members remain as long as possible supporting the same New Regiment to aim for stability and expertise. Ideally, Specialist Corps members are at Stage Two of professional maturity for their specialty within the Army and their civilian analogues.

Vandergriff proposes a different approach to specialization that places all non-combat arms specialties in one category. His specialists serve with both manoeuvre units and headquarters' staff, and remain at the military rank of captain.⁶⁴ Vandergriff's specialists combine non-deployable and deployable troops and divides combat arms from combat support. Thus, it does not focus the potential of the social and human sciences as acculturating professions and dilutes the identity of the New Regiment as the profession of arms. Likewise, the Australian model for specialists divides tactical/operational theatre units into combat and support occupational categories. Contrary to the advice offered by Jans and Schmidtchen, it also expects individuals to combine the very different intellects and personalities required to serve in manoeuvre units and in national headquarters.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Vandergriff, *Victory*, 244-251.

⁶⁵ Project OPERA, op cit.

The New General Staff

The New General Staff is a small cadre of officers responsible for strategy, civil-military relations, institution building and professionalism for the Army. It develops and implements policies to adapt technology, doctrine and culture to evolving security needs and societal change. It is the point of contact with the civilian bureaucracy, government, and the host society. It advises elected defence executives, negotiates with the government's central agencies, and directs the remainder of the army and the supporting civilian bureaucracy.⁶⁶ The New General Staff performs headquarters duties that allow New Regiment members to remain in manoeuvre units. Jans and Schmidtchen describe how officers well suited for operations are bewildered by the culture of national headquarters. Conversely, those with competencies ideal for institution building are held back by the operations-centric career track.⁶⁷

New General Staff officers strive for a thorough, inter-disciplinary comprehension of the military profession, related bureaucratic organizations, civil-military relations, and the host society. They attempt to improve cohesion, discipline and professionalism and to mitigate careerism, factionalism, and resistance to change. They do not compile simple lists of espoused virtues or even pursue a "Jominian search for universal guiding principles."⁶⁸ Instead, New General Staff officers respect the "complexity of the circumstances under which military actions could take place."⁶⁹ They apply expert organizational knowledge to practical military structure and personnel policies, the essence of professionalism as defined by Abbott.⁷⁰ Essentially, this is the postmodern approach to cultural transformation.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Douglas L. Bland, *Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces* (Kingston, ON: Queen's and Laval Universities, 1999).

⁶⁷ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*, 126-136.

⁶⁸ Rob McLaughlin, "Helmuth von Moltke and the Rise of the War Planning System," *Australian Defence Force Journal* No. 135, March/April 1999: 45-51.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 47.

⁷⁰ Laquement, "Army Professional."

⁷¹ Arnold Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, and Ethics" in *Foucault: A Critical Reader* ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 224.

Officers and candidates for commissioning from the ranks are selected for the New General Staff from New Regiments at the mid-point of their service life. They are selected according to their intellectual, emotional, and philosophic characteristics. After ten to fifteen years service, they are well acculturated, operationally skilled and experienced to represent New Regiments at national headquarters. They serve the remainder of their service life with the New General Staff and its detachments. After the initial streaming, vacant positions and promotions are filled by competitions open only to members of the New General Staff. There is time for reputations to form for scholarship, strategic vision, self-awareness, and commitment.

The New General Staff has one set of identifying insignia distinct from the New Regiments to reduce factionalism and misdirected loyalty. Officers serve on the New General Staff from the rank of Major to General. They do not serve in operational theatre control centres or headquarters and do not perform routine bureaucratic functions in national headquarters. Instead, the New General Staff exercises a form of Mission Command over the New Regiment officers for military operations and over the civilian bureaucracy responsible for infrastructure, procurement, comptrollership, and so forth.

As the Prussian/German *Generalstab* dealt with the complexity of a “nineteenth century ‘revolution in military affairs,’” so the New General Staff deals with post-Cold War challenges in doctrine, technology and societal change.⁷² It emulates the intellectual professionalism of the *Generalstab* and von Moltke’s inclination for “the life of the mind.”⁷³ It consists of “innovative, original, uncommon personalities and intellects”⁷⁴ and serves as the Army’s intellectual vanguard to critique orthodoxy and the embedded “values” of the military bureaucracy.⁷⁵ Accordingly, General Staff officers are in Stage Three of professional maturity and enjoy the psychological independence normally accessible to people forty years of age or older, if it exists

⁷² McLaughlin, “Helmuth von Moltke,” 46.

⁷³ Gudmundsson, “Tradition,” 274-281.

⁷⁴ Hooker, “Implementing,” 224-230.

⁷⁵ Smart, “Truth and the Problem of Hegemony,” in *Critical Reader* ed. Hoy, 164-166, 169-171.

at all. Top leaders and theorists should reach Stage Four so they can freely critique and shape Army culture. Thus, the New General Staff provides innovative and over the horizon leadership for personnel in the New Regiments who remain, for the most part, in Stages One and Two.

Although Hooker argues for a General Staff with rare “intuition, intelligence, and insight,” he is mainly concerned with tactics and the operational theatre.⁷⁶ Many authors call for institution building and professional adaptability without discussing required changes to force structure or personnel strategy.⁷⁷ The U.S. TRADOC draft White Paper on innovation, however, recognizes that no officer can become an effective innovator at all three levels of military practice, i.e., the tactical, the operational and the strategic. It advocates developing a staff uniquely devoted to building the institution and shaping culture.⁷⁸

The New Personnel Strategy

Jans and Schmidtchen suggest that the familiar slogan “our people are our greatest asset” become “our personnel systems are our greatest asset.”⁷⁹ Personnel policies shape Army culture more effectively than lists of espoused “virtues.”⁸⁰ Accordingly, the New Personnel Strategy centres on service-life streaming; training and education; selection, promotions, and streaming methodology; other conditions of service; individual competencies and military capabilities; and the management of the whole.

⁷⁶ Hooker, “Implementing,” 228-233.

⁷⁷ E.M. Coffman, “The Long Shadow of the Soldier and the State,” *The Journal of Military History* 1991, 55(1): 69-82; E. Dorn, H. Graves, W.F. Ulmer, J.J. Collins and T.O. Jacobs *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 2000, p. 70; A.D. English, A.D. 2001. *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, DCIEM No. CR 2001-047 for Defence R&D Canada, Toronto, ON, 2001; J.A. Gentry, “Doomed to Fail: America’s Blind Faith in Military Technology,” *Parameters*, 2002, 32(4): 88-103; M. Janowitz, “The Emergent Military,” in *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*, ed. C.C. Moskos (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971).

⁷⁸ TRADOC, “Adapt or Die,” 10-11.

⁷⁹ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*, 13.

⁸⁰ Bell, “Personnel Policies and Army Culture.”

Service-Life Streaming

Every officer and soldier begins service with the New Regiment and most stay with their regiment for the remainder of their service life. The first ten or fifteen years of service-life in the regiment are the “muddy boots” phase of Army training and acculturation. At the mid-point in their service, however, selected individuals have the opportunity to stream into three other roles. They may join one of the New Specialists Corps, the New General Staff or the civilian bureaucracy. Alternately, they may choose to leave the defence community entirely. There are no “streams” or military occupational categories below these four broad roles. The management of individual specialized competencies and military capabilities are discussed below.

The New Specialist Corps for personnel selection manage the streaming process. Streaming becomes one of the prime, normalization and personnel development tools that shape Army culture. It channels people according to personality type, ambition, physical and psychological endurance, command talent, intellectual acuity and agility, strategic vision, and other characteristics. The individual’s stage of psychological, professional maturity is one of the more important factors. This is critical to the formation of the appropriate culture for each of the New Regiment, New Specialist Corps, New General Staff, and the civilian bureaucracy.

There are many similarities between this proposal and the Australian Officer Professional Effectiveness Strategy (AOPS), such as a universal “muddy boots” initiation, followed by mid-service life streaming into either command or staff roles. The AOPS seeks to alleviate common problems with Anglo-Western selection system, such as credentialist careerism, lack of advancement and recognition for those not on the command track, personnel instability and amateurism. AOPS also glosses over the selection system methodology, which is critical to the success of streaming and to ending sub-group subversion of the selection

system.⁸¹ Vandergriff recommends a different streaming strategy for the U.S. Army.⁸² Although it focuses the individual better than the traditional generalist approach, it still creates functional sub-groups under centralized control that undermine unit cohesion. Laquement introduces a model for career streaming based on a good interpretation of Abbott's theories on professionalism. Unfortunately, he does not address problems associated with generalist commanders, the difference between operations and institution building, and the disciplining potential of personnel strategy.⁸³

Training and Education

Training and education gives the depth, experience, specialization, and state of the art currency required for the Post-Cold War environment in lieu of generalist sampling. Officers remaining in the New Regiment receive further tactical and operational theatre training at staff colleges similar to the *Kriegsakademie*. They focus on the thought process necessary for successful *Mission Command*. Senior non-commissioned members receive similar training at leadership and battle schools. Officers and soldiers selected to join a Specialist Corps or the civilian headquarters' bureaucracy pursue the qualifications of their professions and fields whether inside or outside the defence establishment. Those who leave the defence community entirely receive benefits for re-training or education. Officers selected for the New General Staff apply for graduate, inter-disciplinary programs at civilian universities for the theory and practice of organizations and professions; discipline, power and self-identity; military-civilian relations; geopolitical grand strategy; and cultural studies for the host society.

⁸¹ Project OPERA, op cit.

⁸² Donald Vandergriff, "Tools for Transforming the Officer Corps," *DefenceWatch* 21 November 2003, at <http://www.sftt.org/dwarchive.html>.

⁸³ Lacquement, "Army Professional."

Selection, Promotions, and Streaming Methodology

As already mentioned, selection and promotion are prime acculturation tools shaping Army culture. The current, counterproductive selection system⁸⁴ must be replaced with one aimed at building social capital, discipline and professionalism. The new selection and promotion system fills vacancies, with or without a promotion, by holding competitions open only to persons currently serving in that unit. Transfers and promotions do not occur in sequence from a central selection list or queue, do not involve transfers from one New Regiment to another, and do not stream personnel between the four broad roles of the defence system. Rank structures for the three military roles, or streams, are engineered to obtain equitable ratios for promotion. Like streaming, intense scrutiny within stable markets of reputation surrounding competitions, produces a powerful and reasonably precise acculturation.

The New Specialist Corps for personnel, social science and personnel management professionals have sole authority to select the candidate for the vacancy. Internal and external observers, inspectors, and independent advocates representing the Army and the candidate closely monitor streaming decisions and competitions for vacancies. The observers might have veto power over any decision but cannot force a selection. The chain of command has no vote, veto or otherwise. It is only one source of information among many. This reduces the likelihood that insiders could subvert the selection system according to sub-group dynamics, self-interest, personality type, and other prejudices.⁸⁵

The Specialist Corps for selection collects information throughout the members' service life within a stable market of reputation and a 360-degree view.⁸⁶ This panoramic source of information can include the chain of command; peers and subordinates at the candidate's sub-

⁸⁴ See endnote 13 and 14.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ David Bracken, Maxine Dalton, Robert Jako, Cynthia McCauley, and Victoria Pollman, *Should 360-degree Feedback Be Used Only for Developmental Purposes?* (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1997); Timothy Reese, *Transforming the Officer Evaluation System: Using a 360-degree Feedback Model*, USAWC, April 9, 2002; Owen West, "You Can't Fool the

unit; and stakeholders at other units, other New Specialist Corps, the civilian bureaucracy, the military community and elsewhere. The information is not limited to surveys or performance appraisals and can include several types of indicators applicable to the individual, their sub-unit, Regiment, Corps or Staff. This data does not directly determine a selection or a streaming decision according to pro forma scoring schemes. The Specialist Corps for selection have the freedom to select, weigh and interpret complex and detailed data according to professional standards, the vacancy, and circumstances at the unit. Notwithstanding these conditions, local competitions may be less costly than current, counterproductive, centralized, selection and posting systems.⁸⁷ Written examinations should not become an important determinant so learning and experience are not replaced with an artificial event that masks true goal of education.

Other Conditions of Service

Other conditions of service are realigned to support the new force structure and personnel strategy. Compensation and benefits, terms of service, perstempo, liability to deploy, pension and severance arrangements, and other policies have accumulated *ad hoc* without regard for the sources of Western military strength.⁸⁸ They are redesigned to generate good social capital and to facilitate acculturation and military professionalism. The Canadian Forces pay range structure, for example, has been based on the journeyman job rate and Public Service comparability. It has a limited number of annual increments with no overlap between ranks. Neither has been fairly applied and is only partially relevant to military service. Even attempts at reform, such as studies to align pay with degrees of specialization, would have

Troops," *Naval Institute Proceedings* September 1988 Walter F. Ulmer, "Military leadership into the 21st century: Another 'Bridge Too Far?'" *Parameters* 1998, 28(1), 10, 13.

⁸⁷ See endnote 13 and 14.

⁸⁸ Report by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) for Canada, for the Fiscal Year ended 31 March 1990, articles 21.6 to 21.7, Ottawa, 1990; *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*,

further weakened cohesion and professionalism. In the new personnel strategy, pay ranges remain stratified by rank but overlap to provide annual increases that reward accumulated military experience and commitment, regardless of the degree of specialization analogous to civilian equivalents. Compensation literature suggests that this policy is feasible, effective and perceived as equitable.⁸⁹

Individual Competencies and Military Capabilities

Personnel specialists manage a local system in support of each regiment, corps or the general staff that is designed to match the supply individual competencies to the demand of military capabilities. The supply side consists of the individual's tangible competencies developed as much as possible according to individual interests, aptitude and personality. The demand side is driven by unit requirements for capabilities, such as sense, act, shield, sustain and command⁹⁰ for the New Regiments; social and human science skills for New Specialist Corps; and third and fourth stage professionalism for the New General Staff. Individuals can acquire a wider range of competencies without concern for a "one-size-fits-all" military occupational classification. Regiments can be re-grouped and re-tasked without resistance from factions loyal to "official" occupations, legacy weapon platforms, and lionized branch-pure units. Selection for vacancies make the final link between supply and demand where the competencies of a candidate provide the capability expected from a vacancy.

Here is how competency/capability supply and demand relates to streaming. Recruits in the New Regiment begin with infantry tactics and gradually acquire more specialized individual competencies that match the capabilities of their unit. Officers and soldiers with talent and

Final Report – 1999, "The Minister's Reform Program: Canada's Military at a Crossroads," Part One, released 9 February 2000, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/monitor_com_final/eng/cover_e.htm.

⁸⁹ Kanungo and Mendoca, *Compensation: Effective Reward Management* (Canada: Butterworths, 1992), 314-316; Belcher and Atkinson, *Compensation Management* (USA: Prentice Hall, 1987), 241-244.

⁹⁰ "Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities," Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, Kingston, Ontario, 2003, 91-152.

interest for *command*, for example, acquire competencies related to personal leadership, tactics, and theatre operations. At the mid-point of their service-life, if they have demonstrated superior ability and ambition, and if their unit has forecasted vacancies, they likely remain with their Regiment. Those interested in *sensing* tactics and technology, meanwhile, acquire competencies related to sensing systems, such as surveillance drones, their tactical and theatre applications, *sustaining* logistics and so forth. They might remain with the New Regiment, stream to the civilian bureaucracy, or even take their release to work for a private sector supplier. Those interested in tactical manoeuvre, (the *act* capability), concentrate on crewing a major weapon platform, such as armoured fighting vehicles. They may continue to serve with the New Regiment until retirement or stream to the civilian bureaucracy to manage their weapon platform's life cycle. Meanwhile, officers and soldiers with the required intellectual or professional competencies stream into the Specialist Corps or the New General Staff. The permutations to match individual interests and service requirements are almost endless. With this flexibility, the Specialist Corps for personnel can combine true personnel and professional development over an individual's service life with the continuously evolving military capabilities of the post-Cold War era. To appreciate its potential, imagine how such a competency/capability system would have facilitated the introduction of computers, renewed emphasis on joint operations, the range of special operations, or even force adjustments between tracked, heavy armoured to wheeled, light armoured fighting vehicles.

The idea of personnel management by competencies has appeared in military reform literature. Ulmer recommends a form of competency management for the U.S. Army.⁹¹ Academics also discuss essentialist definitions and methodologies to measure and rate intangible competencies such as character, personality type and emotional intelligence.⁹² The New Personnel Strategy only inventories tangible skills directly based on qualifications and

⁹¹ Ulmer, "Bridge" 17.

experience. Intangible competencies are not inventoried and are only assessed for specific competitions for vacancies, streaming or personal development.

Managing the New Force Structure and New Personnel Strategy

The New Regiment, New Specialty Corps and the New General Staff become more responsible for their own success and failure under the new force structure and personnel strategy. Chronic problems with morale, strength, or competency/capability matching become helpful symptoms for analysis and reason for intervention. The effectiveness of a New Regiment is primarily measured as a single unit in terms of recruiting, retention, readiness and effectiveness while at manoeuvre training centres and on deployments. Regiments with chronic problems receive remedial attention and easier deployments. Well-managed Regiments are chosen to absorb increases in strength, trial new doctrines, receive new equipment systems, and embark on difficult deployments. Specialist Corps are accountable for their ability to acculturate and manage the supply and demand of personnel. The New General Staff is held accountable by the Specialist Corps and external stakeholders within the New Governance System proposed below.

While the emphasis in performance measurement is on the regiment as a team, the New Regiment also has advantages regarding individual accountability and development. Commanders cannot “escape” difficult problems or contribute to perstempo “burn out” that they leave behind with short tours. Problem soldiers cannot out-wait a tough commander or be passed on to infect other units. Likewise, neither the commander nor the soldier would be “fired” via quick postings for mistakes made while learning and developing. Providing they remain within an acceptable range, the New Regiment is forced to develop the human

⁹² Victor Catano, “Empirically Supported Interventions and HR Practice,” *HRM Research Quarterly* 5(1), Spring 2001.

resources at hand. Since leaders and followers hold a position for many years and remain with the same regiment over their entire service life, they have the opportunity to learn and try again. Hopefully, the current emphasis on zero-risk, short-term, impression management will be replaced by a more realistic and forgiving 360-degree assessment and a life-long reputation. Hopefully, zero risk, impression

The New General Staff manages the individual and collective training, doctrine and materiel to achieve adequate commonality and interoperability among New Regiments, (with the details managed by civilian bureaucrats, most likely persons streamed from New Regiments). A fair degree of divergence would be desirable, however, to customize Regiments according to regional differences and for specific operational roles. This increases the variety of capability, recruiting appeal and *esprit de corps*. It is important that the New General Staff and the New Regiments not interchange personnel to accommodate promotions, fill urgent vacancies or to keep headquarters "in touch" with the field. Both are better left to master and remain current in their very different roles. They also must build cohesion, trust and reputation within their units. Most importantly, the New General Staff must remain sufficiently objective and detached to avoid factionalism and achieve the psychological independence of Stage Three and Four of professional maturity. They must not be subject to any emotional or peer pressure from the New Regiments that might interfere with their ability to intervene or otherwise shape Army culture.

A New Governance System

The risk of a principal/agency/subordinate problem exists in all Western armies.⁹³ Checks and balances are necessary to control for sub-group subversion and human resource exploitation against the interests of subordinates, the defence system and the nation state.

⁹³ Feaver, "Agency Theory in Civil-Military Relations."

Checks and balances also solve problems related to legitimacy, ethics and equity inherent in the exercise of authority. Offsetting powers must be both internal and external. Significant internal monitoring and intervention is already implied in the separate roles of the New Regiment, New Specialist Corps, the New General Staff, and the civilian bureaucracy. More is required.

Firstly, an internal Inspector General Specialist Corps fills an audit and ombudsman role and inspects all parts of the Army. The Inspector General submits reports to New Regiment and formation commanders, the Chief of the New General Staff, the commandants of New Specialist Corps and the Minister of National Defence. The Inspector Corps bridges the gap between internal and external stakeholders by submitting reports to the government, the Auditor General, the Privacy Commissioner, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and so forth. This Corps focuses on wrongdoing, waste, military justice, and grievances related to streaming, selection, abuse of authority and similar, unavoidable complaints.

The mandates of stakeholders external to the Army and defence department are also strengthened. They include pay and compensation committees, Parliamentary investigative committees with substantial research and audit staff, and the many agencies and commissions responsible to defend rights and obligations in Canada, including human rights, privacy, access to information, and so forth. The most important additions to Army governance, however, are a professional association for executive category officers and a trade union for the rank and file. Milner argues that the executive officer cadre, the Canadian government and the public are unlikely to make equity and military reform a priority.⁹⁴ The right of association is common and well established for militaries in continental Europe.⁹⁵ In this matter, Canadian politicians have another opportunity to enhance human rights and act as a liberal force among Anglo-Western nations. Unionization, moreover, may be the only way to initiate the force structure and

⁹⁴ Marc Milner, "A Proposal for a New Social Contract for the Canadian Armed Forces," presented at Combat Training Centre Tactics Seminar, CFB Gagetown, N.B., 1-2 October 1998, milner@unb.ca.

personnel strategy reforms described above. It also allows for a more equitable distribution of risk and benefits, democratic legitimacy, and knowledgeable analysis about the quality of life of non-executive officers and soldiers.⁹⁶ Officers and soldiers in a liberal democracy ought to stake their liberty and their life only after negotiating reasonable limits on their liability to serve.⁹⁷

Conclusion

General (USA ret) Sullivan warns that “The leader must change the critical processes within the organization if he wishes to effect true change. Working upon the margins, in increments, will not effect substantive and enduring transformation.”⁹⁸ The U.S. Army’s proposed Officer Progression Management System for the 21st Century, (OPMS XXI), still uses centralized selection lists for promotion. Vandergriff warns that individual competition will still corrupt.⁹⁹ Despite the Australian Officer Professional Effectiveness Strategy, (AOPS), Jans and Schmidtchen worry about a “notable lack of urgency in most programs that are not concerned with other than short-term.”¹⁰⁰ In Canada, the personnel project known as the Military Occupation Structure Analysis, Redesign and Tailoring, (MOSART), will have even less impact.

⁹⁵ Military associations exist in Australia and Europe and military trade unions are well established in continental Europe. European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL), 33 av. Général de Gaulle, B-1050 Bruxelles, tel: 0032.2.626.06.83, Fax: 0032.2.626.06.99, euromil@euromil.org.

⁹⁶ Harry Bondy, “Ethical Contradictions and Organizational Constraints: Is Ethical Leadership Really an Oxymoron?” in “The Tautology of Ethical Leadership: Who Speaks for the Soldier in a Distressed Military Culture?” R. Walker, K. Farley and H. Bondy, paper presented at the Fifth Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership, 6-7 November 2003, Royal Military College, Kingston, ON, accessed September 27, 2004, at http://www.rmc.ca/academic/conference/leadership/index_e.html.

⁹⁷ Judith Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” in *The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy* ed. David Ingram (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002), 218, 221.

⁹⁸ Sullivan and Harper, *Hope is Not a Method*, 105.

⁹⁹ Vandergriff, “Culture Wars,” 224-228, 226.

¹⁰⁰ Jans and Schmidtchen, *C-Cubed*, 8, 150.

The “T” is for “Tailoring,” implying that the status quo is sound.¹⁰¹ The “T” could also stand for “Tinkering” or even “Tayloring” to preserve the industrial age model.¹⁰²

Military strength in the West largely depends on social capital, discipline, organization and professionalism. Only an abrupt change to Army force structure, personnel policies, and governance can achieve meaningful cultural transformation. This paper recommends the formation of stable, unified New Regiments to master tactics and theatre operations. A few officers and soldiers stream at mid-service life into a series of Specialist Corps that focus on acculturation and discipline. A few others transfer to a New General Staff to shape Army culture, balance the productive bureaucracy, build the institution and lead the profession. New personnel strategies build human relationships, trust, reputation, acculturation, and unique personal competencies. A New Governance System provides checks and balances against self-interested agency and exploitation. A New Governance System, including an Inspector General Corps and an independent union, legitimizes military coercion and liability in the democratic West.

¹⁰¹ Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Military), (MOSART), National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, http://hr3.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/mosart/engraph/home_e.asp. Accessed 10 January 2002.

¹⁰² “Tayloring” refers to Frederick W. Taylor, an early and influential proponent of management science and bureaucratic control, see Frederick W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1911); Minson, “Strategies for Socialists?” in *Critique of Foucault* ed. Gane, 122.