ORGANIZING FOR PEACE: COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

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Introduction

In the context of crises ranging from Rwanda to East Timor, the possibility of humanitarian intervention, especially with armed force, has increasingly consumed the post Cold War world’s attention. The literature thus far, however, has focused principally on the ethical and normative dimensions of humanitarian intervention. This discussion examines the problem in a different light and concludes that humanitarian intervention can also be characterized as one of a class of “collective action problems.” As a result, interdisciplinary literature on the subject of collective action problems offers important implications on how to organize international efforts among sovereign state actors to best keep the peace.

The conclusions advanced in this discussion derive from a research project conducted at the University of Michigan involving multiple case studies, reviews of literature and interviews with American government officials, security experts, NGO advocates and defense industry representatives. Since it is not possible to present the entire study in this forum, this discussion will only briefly discuss the academic literature of collective action problems before focusing upon the policy implications it presents for future humanitarian interventions.

Collective Action: A Brief Overview

The phrase collective action “refers to activities that require the coordination of
efforts by two or more individuals.” As such, collective action involves group actions intended to further the “interests or well-being of the members”\(^1\). Collective action is often seen in situations when groups pursue collective or public goods. The defining characteristic of such goods is such that if one member of a group “consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group”\(^2\). In other words, collective or public goods are non-excludable, indivisible goods. National defense, lighthouses, public roads and other utilities are all examples of such goods. Indeed, many basic mandates of governments involve the use of public funds to provide such public goods; in this sense, governmental action can often be properly characterized as collective action in pursuit of collective goods.

Collective action problems, by consequence, denote the barriers faced by groups of self-interested actors working toward a common, collective interest. One of the earliest conclusions, advanced by Mancur Olson, within the literature of collective action problems was that: “even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest”\(^3\). Discovering the underlying causes for this paradoxical condition has occupied the attention of collective action scholars over the course of the past quarter century. Their conclusions are briefly outlined below.

In the first place, collective action is inhibited by a lack of information or communication regarding the importance of a public good. Such definitional problems

\(^3\) Ibid.
and the resulting uncertainty about the nature of a public good, including anticipated costs and benefits, must be clarified by members of a group before it can be pursued. For instance, Sandler notes that widespread acceptance of a link between CFCs and ozone destruction was a prerequisite to the negotiation by several nations to limit such emissions through the Montreal Protocol\(^4\). Additionally, a related problem exists in that groups pursuing public goods must have leaders or entrepreneurs at their founding who bear disproportionate costs through the burdens of organization, motivation and direction\(^5\).

Even after it has been agreed that collective action is necessary to pursue a public good, powerful incentives remain for self-interested actors not to pursue mutual or collective interests. Prime among these is a “free-rider problem” wherein each self-interested actor in a collective enterprise has an incentive not to contribute to the group effort and simply “free-ride” off the benefits provided by the others. The more individual actors that do this, the more likely the collective effort is to be damaged or unsuccessful\(^6\).

Finally, the literature realizes that technological differences can exacerbate collective action problems. Technological differences between actors, such as military caliber or scientific prowess, therefore need to be considered carefully as collective action might be inhibited by difference in capabilities.

Such collective action problems have long had relevance to problems of


international security. In studies of early burden-sharing among NATO allies, for instance, scholars noted an exploitation of the “great by the small” in the provision of alliance forces, effectively documenting a free-rider problem. More recently, a study examining worldwide peacekeeping burdens suggested that an exploitation of the large by small was once again occurring in the post Cold War era of 1994-2000.

Indeed, the literature’s recognition of military alliances and international peacekeeping operations as collective actions offers the logical foundation for a similar treatment of military humanitarian intervention efforts in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity or other mass atrocities. A variety of costs, including refugee flows, economic losses, regional security concerns, reconstruction expenses and damage to global prestige have changed the calculus of rationality among democratic nations. It can now be said that such nations have a rational interest in promoting early, rapid intervention during humanitarian crises, including genocide and related mass atrocities, rather than resorting to inaction or delayed action. This is not to imply that all democratic nations have an interest in unilaterally prosecuting humanitarian intervention—only that they have an interest in promoting or contributing to a collective effort to do so. However, these nations have not taken steps to resolve the problem of humanitarian intervention in favor of this common interest. Such are the markings of a collective action problem.

If humanitarian intervention is, in fact, viewed as a collective action to provide the collective good of a world free of major atrocities, then many of its failings can also be

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8 It should be noted that peacekeeping in this study was not confined to United Nations-led missions but included others, such as those led by NATO. Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, “Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000” Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 39, No. 6, 2002). pp. 651-668.
readily categorized as classic collective action problems. Definitional problems, for instance, plagued efforts to organize humanitarian intervention during the 1994 Rwandan genocide with the United States infamously acknowledging “acts of genocide” but denying the occurrence of genocide itself. Similarly, in denying the possibility of genocide at the outset of the Bosnian civil war, the U.K. government of John Major erroneously concluded that since all sides had committed atrocities, all parties were equally responsible for the massive death tally. In contrast, key actors—the United States and Australia—quickly recognized that conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor, both occurring in 1999, had the potential to mandate third-party humanitarian intervention.

Problems of free-riding and the role of technological differences also inform analyses of humanitarian intervention. The former phenomenon can be observed after the passage of Resolution 918 by the Security Council during the Rwandan genocide. Although the resolution belatedly authorized an intervention force, its plea to member states to contribute troops still went woefully unanswered—either by Western democracies or regional nations. Writing after Rwanda, General Andrew Goodpaster expressed this reality as follows:

“Few [political] leaders are willing to invest their political capital in risky, controversial international interventions with uncertain outcomes. And the effects of this unwillingness and consequent inaction are painfully clear: armed conflicts devastate communities and the lives of individuals, create refugees, disrupt international commerce, and undermine international norms. Unless the major security interests of the leading nations are directly threatened, however, substantial military involvement by the international community will be rare

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10 The Clinton administration assumed a similar tack by arguing that the conflict in Bosnia was the result of intractable ancient ethnic hatreds. As one observer of that crisis poignantly noted, however, “No other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was better monitored and understood by the U.S. government. U.S. analysts fed their higher-ups detailed and devastating reports on Serbian war aims and tactics” Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. (New York: Basic Books. 2002), p. 264.
beyond peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations”\textsuperscript{11}.

In sum, a free-rider problem occurred during the Rwandan genocide: rational actors, in this case principally Western democracies and African nations, all acknowledged an interest in mitigating the genocide but failed to do so as a group in the hope that the problem would be resolved without their individual contribution. As a result, the international community failed at securing the public good of stopping genocide in Rwanda.

Intervention efforts during the Rwandan genocide (1994) and mass atrocities in East Timor (1999) demonstrate the importance of technological differences during collective action efforts. During the crisis in Rwanda, agreement to intervene in the genocide by the Organization of African Unity was contingent upon American military equipment support. Delays in delivering this technology by the U.S. bureaucracy contributed heavily to the total failure of the venture\textsuperscript{12}. In the INTERFET mission in East Timor, Australia similarly determined that U.S. transportation and logistics support was absolutely vital to ensuring the rapid execution of the mission\textsuperscript{13}. Despite Australia’s significant military planning and intelligence activities preceding the intervention, the technological capabilities of the United States were simply indispensable to the intervention.

As a result, it can be said that humanitarian intervention constitutes a collective action effort facing the classic problems of definition, free-riders and technological differences. In examining collective action problems, however, the literature also


\textsuperscript{12} Ronayne, 2001.

\textsuperscript{13} Nicholas Wheeler, & Tim Dunne, “East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism” International Affairs (77, 4, 2001), pp. 805-827.
describes many methods to facilitate collective action. Three—joint products, small groups, entrepreneurs—are particularly salient to the present discussion.

First, combining private benefits for specific actors with the production of public goods, to produce joint products, increases the likelihood of collective action. In a study of NATO infrastructure costs, Olson and Zeckhauser noted that, in contrast to force structure, many smaller allies had overcome the free-rider problem to the point that there was a “significant negative correlation between national income and the percentage of national income devoted to NATO infrastructure”\(^\text{14}\). Smaller nations had not only overcome the free-rider problem with respect to infrastructure costs, but were contributing more than their proportionate share.

This discrepancy between alliance force costs, which exhibited a tremendous free-rider problem, and infrastructure costs, in which burdens were shared, was explained by two factors: negotiated agreements and the presence of selective incentives. Agreements existed wherein smaller NATO allies benefited, privately, by the construction of infrastructure in their nations, and agreed to a marginal cost sharing in which each nation paid a percentage of additional alliance costs. Clearly, private incentives can aid the provision of public goods; to do so, however, the incentives and realistic motivations of various actors must be frankly catalogued. Such a catalogue, in the context of humanitarian intervention, is provided in Appendix 1 for the three nonexclusive categories of actors (regional nations, small democracies, large democracies) with an interest in humanitarian intervention.

Secondly, group size, is an important consideration. Collective action scholars generally agree that smaller groups are simply much more conducive to collective

\(^{14}\) Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966, p. 277.
action\textsuperscript{15}. Additionally, empirical findings support the inclusion of a large “privileged actor” in small group alliances to aid the provision of collective goods since a single large member will disproportionately bear the costs of providing the collective good to the entire group. This claim, however, assumes that each state within such a group values the good equally\textsuperscript{16}. Thirdly, policy entrepreneurs, or actors who bear organizational costs leading to collective action, are simply judged vital to its success\textsuperscript{17}. With respect to humanitarian intervention, entrepreneurs must often invest significant diplomatic capital to spearhead the collective action effort. During run-up to intervention in East Timor in 1999, for example, Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres, participated in “a six-mile human chain to protest in Lisbon to protest the violence in East Timor, effectively put Portugal’s entire relationship with the USA on the line over the issue of Washington’s support for a peacekeeping force [for intervention]”\textsuperscript{18}. Guterres even threatened to pull Portugal’s military contribution to NATO out of Kosovo, at a time when alliance unity was crucial to justify bypassing the UN Security Council, if President Clinton did not aid the effort to bring peace to East Timor.

The impetus for such policy entrepreneurs often defy simple strategic calculations. In the example of Portugal’s support for intervention in East Timor, such a strong line by the poorest nation in the European Union was motivated by a sense of historical guilt: Portugal’s uncoordinated exit from its former colony had left East Timor ripe for Indonesian invasion rather than finally allowing that nation the right of self-

\textsuperscript{15} Olson, 1965.
\textsuperscript{17} Nownes and Neely, 1996; Sandler, 1998.
determination.

Implications for Humanitarian Intervention Policy Options

Having briefly outlined the collective action literature, this discussion now applies the logic of collective action to three contemporary policy options to intervene in humanitarian crises—the United Nations (UN) system, regional security organizations and military service providers. From the analysis of this section, concrete policy recommendations emerge with regard to the three options. The international community at large has an interest in maximizing two key elements, political will and military capacity, if it hopes to respond quickly and effectively to future episodes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or other mass atrocities. Principles for maximizing these two elements are provided below.

A prerequisite to the mobilization of political will is the early agreement, among relevant actors, upon the definition of a situation as a crisis. This problem of crisis definition impeded intervention efforts in Rwanda and Bosnia and has not readily been addressed through policy. The creation of an independent intelligence and strategic analysis capability (EISAS) within the United Nations Secretariat would go far to address this. The unique role of the UN, as the legitimate voice of the international community, would make early-warnings of atrocities more credible and more effective at galvanizing political will.

An EISAS, however, would not rectify the fundamental deficiency of the UN to undertake robust operations. It is a sad commentary that years after Srebrenica and Rwanda, a lack of private incentives still makes humanitarian intervention primarily a public good to powerful UN member states. This view of intervention operations as
charitable missions makes the UN an inappropriate default institution for the use of robust military force, either by deputizing member nations to intervene in humanitarian crisis or by authorizing blue helmet forces.

In the first case, of deputizing UN member states to intervene in a humanitarian crisis, the organization’s large size still creates a free rider problem which paralyzes collective action. Every nation, judging that it has no vital interest in stopping genocides or other crimes against humanity simply waits for other nations to take concrete military action. A recently leaked internal French military analysis of the operation in Congo, summarized this prevailing attitude: “The operation in Bunia is politically and military high risk; very sensitive and complex. France has no specific interest in the area except solidarity with the international community.” Unsurprisingly, French forces firmly withdrew from the Congo after only a short-term commitment despite negligible progress.

The notable exception to this trend is the Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor in 1999. In this case, however, Australia’s long relationship with the beleaguered islanders created a significant private incentive, in the form of a domestic constituency, for intervention. In the words of Australia’s Foreign Minister Alexander Downer:

“The Australian public were screaming out, everybody was—I mean it wasn’t a party thing, a Left-Right thing—screaming out to do something to stop it. People were ringing up, crying over the phone, we had more calls on that issue than I’ve ever had in my life on anything”.

Such circumstances, however, are the exception that proves the rule: political will to intervene in humanitarian crises among UN member states is generally not forthcoming.

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19 James Astill, “French say their mission will have little impact on Congo fighting” The Guardian (June 10, 2003).
20 Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p. 245.
The second form of UN intervention, by blue-helmet forces, faces the dual obstacle of technological barriers and political will. In a personal interview with General Gregory Mitchell, commander of the Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade For UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), he noted that even the most advanced UN blue helmet force was not equipped to deal with Chapter VII operations; if violence during a Chapter VI operation escalated, as was the case in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, SHIRBRIG had to return to the Security Council for a new mandate and resources, where it inevitably faced problems of lackadaisical political will.\(^{21}\)

Indeed, the comparative advantages of the UN lie in its role as the voice of the international community and longstanding expertise on Chapter VI peacekeeping operations and conflict prevention.

Regional organizations, such as the EU and AU, offer a great deal more promise on the aspect of political will. Their structures are both more equitable than the UN and they have a range of private benefits, including protecting their credibility, preventing refugee flows, maintaining regional stability, and, in the case of the EU, defending advanced economic interdependence, which all make intervention more likely. This changes the nature of humanitarian intervention from a charitable public good to a joint product, with significant private incentives. The issue of regional credibility, especially, creates unique incentives for regional leaders to intervene in internal conflicts. As James Goldgeier, a Council of Foreign Relations expert on European security noted to me in a personal interview,

"If you had something similar like that [Bosnia or Kosovo] break out and they [the

\(^{21}\) Brigadier-General Gregory Mitchell, Commander, Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade For UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). Personal Correspondence, March 1, 2004.
EU still couldn’t do it then I think it would be such an indictment of the European Union, it would just be unbelievable to me. I mean, you know, things have gone so far…the EU would have to be able act, it would totally be a credibility issue for them…they have got to be able to act to deal with a problem in Europe.”

Current regional organizations, however, are far from ideal. In both the case of the EU and AU, technological inferiorities are significant barriers to intervention. Despite its economic prowess, the EU is dominated by two military actors, Great Britain and France. The Union will not have significant air and sealift capacity until at least 2008. Moreover, its “headline goal” of establishing a 60,000 person rapid reaction force has gone strikingly unfulfilled. In a recent assessment of European crisis response capability, the International Crisis Group noted the negative consequences of the situation: “The EU is the only serious partner in sight that can significantly help the U.S. deal with a wide range of security problems -- and with the potential strength to cause Washington to take notice from time to time of constructive criticism and alternative policies. That will not happen until the Union builds some further military muscle and above all learns how to punch at a higher political weight.”

The AU suffers from an even worse technological inferiority. In training, supplies, logistics, expertise, intelligence and experience, the African Standby Force lags far behind its UN and EU counterparts. Even worse, the continent is home to a majority of the world’s humanitarian crises and currently consumes 60% of the UN peacekeeping budget. It is unrealistic to suppose the AU will be self-sufficient anytime in the near future. In a personal interview, Sarah Sewall, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of

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22 James Goldgeier, Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliot School of International Affairs. Personal Interview, February 21, 2004.
Defense for peacekeeping operations, noted her skepticism for using regional organizations as a model for intervention. To paraphrase her comments, consistent successful intervention on the African continent by regional and subregional actors would take an enormous infusion of money, training and military support from donors outside the region, and the effort might still fail.  

In sum, the EU, AU and other regional organizations offer better prospects for the political will to intervene in regional humanitarian crises than the United Nations. Still, technological inferiorities, especially in the case of the African Union, preclude an effective intervention capacity without a radical change in policy. Past efforts to improve peacekeeping capabilities, such as the U.S. ACOTA program, have fallen woefully short. The proposed Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), as outlined at the June, 2004 G8 summit, would be a more appropriate response but funding from both the United States Congress and other G8 nations is not assured.

A third option for intervention comes in the form of private military service providers (MSPs). MSPs currently perform a wide variety of functions. As a result, proponents have circulated proposals urging a wide variety of roles for them ranging from outright intervention by MSPs, who would ostensibly be contracted by the UN or a regional authority, to logistical and other support roles. In a personal interview, Doug Brooks, head of International Peace Operations Association, a consortium of MSPs, presented me with a detailed plan from Executive Outcomes, an MSP, to stop the

Rwandan genocide. Although not approved, he argued that the plan illustrated the feasibility of contracting MSPs to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises.  

Despite such arguments, however, the firm stance of African heads of state against so-called mercenaries pragmatically rules them out as an independent intervention force. This is not to say that MSPs do not have a role in interventions. Indeed, General Mitchell noted that the UN SHIRBRIG often contracts air and sea lift—a vital capacity for rapid deployment—and that UN contracting of MSPs for such tasks is routine. An IPOA Operational Concept Paper provided to me outlined the logistics, airlift, police, surveillance, humanitarian protection, disarmament, and local gendarme capacity building that various MSPs could provide on contract to aid the current UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). In short, MSPs can act as “force multipliers” which strengthen the military capacity of blue helmet or other forces and allow them to overcome technological inferiorities.

Conclusions

Alarmingly few studies currently exist regarding the technological needs of a worldwide intervention capacity. O’Hanlon and Singer have recently authored one of the first major pieces examining this issue. In defining the response to humanitarian crises, they found a shocking lack of intervention capability. Accounting for political forces, they estimate that the international community will need to spend $20 billion over ten years to reform intervention capacities. They note further that glaring deficiencies exist in the estimates of personnel and budget commitment necessary for an adequate

intervention capacity in the EU, AU and elsewhere. Moreover, commitments that are made, especially in the developed world, are spent ineffectively—upon personnel or unnecessary hardware rather than force projection capabilities critical to intervention.

A preliminary discussion paper on the responsibility to protect civilians, undertaken by the Henry L. Stimson Center, similarly notes the deficiency in military capacity for humanitarian intervention:

"In refining the use of military force for humanitarian and peace operations, there has been more emphasis on the military’s role and expansion into support for assisting governance, development, peacebuilding and traditional humanitarian roles, rather than towards refining the discrete uses of force in non-permissive environments for humanitarian... As UN-led and UN-authorized operations shift toward more robust, Chapter VII mandates, however, UN peacekeepers may be more clearly required to put muscle into their actions on behalf of threatened civilian populations."29

Over ten years after the Rwandan genocide, increased scholarly attention to the redefinition of the world’s intervention capacities is vital to providing solutions and assisting such threatened civilian populations.

Based upon the factors outlined above, the most feasible long-term model for intervention would involve a combination of actors. The United Nations would take responsibility for longer term Chapter VI operations and crisis definition. Regional organizations with greater political will than the UN, however, should provide rapid and robust operations. For this model to succeed, however, the United States, European nations, Japan and other wealthy nations will have to commit, in a much larger and more substantive manner than presently employed, to developing the military and intelligence capacities of underfunded regional organizations, such as the EU and AU.

Such a policy, however, does not come without costs. The United States, for example, will have to refrain from actions that will divide European nations from the EU project of collective defense. It will have to refrain from excessively and unnecessarily dividing European nations over defense policy—the way it did in the build up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With respect to the AU, military service providers can be a vital link in serving as “force multipliers” for the organization but it requires larger commitments from donor nations. In addition, serious political will must be dedicated to the organization. Currently the U.S. liaison to the African Union, at time when the organization is tasked with sending peacekeeping forces to mitigate genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, is the most junior officer at the American embassy in Addis Ababa.30

Ultimately, implementing this multi-tiered model and sustaining political will behind it in the long term requires that all actors, ranging from the United States to the nations of the African Union, fully understand, agree and commit to such a system of collective action. Only then will a future based upon common dreams and shared responsibilities be possible.

References

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Other


## Appendix I: Preferences of three actors with regard to humanitarian intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences of Actor</th>
<th>Benefits of Intervention</th>
<th>Costs of Intervention</th>
<th>Benefits of Nonintervention</th>
<th>Costs of Nonintervention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vi(R)</td>
<td>Regional and national stability, Potential for increased regional influence</td>
<td>Use of possibly scant, ineffective or outdated military resources, High potential for casualties</td>
<td>Potential to free-ride off other’s efforts at stabilization</td>
<td>Refugee influxes, Cross-border violence, Disruption of tourism, Disruption of regional trade, Regional credibility crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Nations of all regime types who are affected by a local humanitarian crisis</td>
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<tr>
<th>Vi(S) Middle Sized democracies with modern armed forces but lacking significant force projection capabilities (e.g. Canada, Germany, Australia)</th>
<th>Increased international and domestic prestige, Possibility of creating unity with other Vi(S) or Vi(L) nations</th>
<th>Potential for casualties, Potential to free-ride</th>
<th>Domestic political costs, Loss of moral prestige, Increased foreign assistance costs, Potential spread of destabilizing diseases, Weapons Proliferation, Threat of failed states—increased international narcotics, organized crime and terrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vi(L) Large democracies with significant global force projection capabilities (e.g. U.S./UK/France)</td>
<td>Claim to moral leadership, Domestic political benefits from leadership abroad, Mitigation of possible terrorist havens</td>
<td>Potential for (serious) political backlash, Potential for distraction from other political priorities</td>
<td>Increased costs in foreign assistance, Reconstructio n aid, Potential spread of destabilizing diseases and requisite increased funding, Potential spread of weapons proliferation, Loss of moral leadership, Potential loss of credibility, Potential for wider regional threat, Threat</td>
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of failed states—increased international narcotics, organized crime and terrorism